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Voorwoord (Preface in Dutch)
Toen ik in 1999 bij het AMC ging werken had ik niet kunnen vermoeden dat ik ooit 
promotieonderzoek ging doen. Het idee is geleidelijk vanuit mijn praktijk als stafadviseur 
ontstaan. Vanaf 2005 werd marktwerking in de ziekenhuizen geleidelijk ingevoerd, 
gebaseerd op het Diagnose Behandel Code (DBC) systeem. Deze ontwikkelingen waren 
geheel nieuw voor de sector en we hadden geen idee wat de impact hiervan zou zijn 
voor het AMC. De verwachting was in ieder geval dat hierdoor de concurrentie en 
financiële druk zouden toenemen. Als antwoord hierop werd gestart met het project 
Patiëntenzorgprofielen, waarvan ik in 2006 projectleider werd. Het doel van dit project 
was informatie te ontwikkelen waarmee (medische) managers beter gefundeerde 
beslissingen zouden kunnen nemen ten aanzien van de mix van patiënten, oftewel de 
case-mix. Het uiteindelijke doel hiervan was (en is) om tot een optimale invulling van 
de verschillende kerntaken te komen, gegeven de schaarse middelen.
Het DBC systeem bood tal van mogelijkheden voor het ontwikkelen van nieuwe soorten 
informatie, bijvoorbeeld ten aanzien van de medische inhoud van de zorg, kenmerken 
van de patiënt, bedrijfsvoering en combinaties hiervan. We wisten alleen niet wat we 
met deze informatie konden, wilden en wat de kansen, maar ook de risico’s hiervan 
waren. Het DBC systeem was nieuw en uniek, ervaringen in Nederland waren er niet 
en ervaringen met systemen in andere landen waren maar beperkt bruikbaar. Het werd 
wel snel duidelijk dat de impact van deze informatie op de managers groot kon zijn. 
Toen we de eerste case-mix informatie aan hen lieten zien, maakte dit veel los. We 
kregen positieve en negatieve reacties, extreem en genuanceerd. Het maakte me bewust 
dat het ontwerpen en implementeren van deze informatie om een zorgvuldige aanpak 
vroeg. Op basis hiervan heb ik in 2008 het idee opgevat om dit project ook op een 
wetenschappelijke wijze te benaderen en hierop te gaan promoveren. 
Nu, acht jaar later, is mijn proefschrift eindelijk afgerond. Het heeft, zoals wel vaker 
met onderzoek, langer geduurd dan gepland. Als je onderzoek combineert met werk en 
gezin, delft onderzoek toch vaak het onderspit. Het is immers minder urgent en in mijn 
geval was er geen sprake van een harde deadline. Daarnaast heb ik er in 2012 bewust 
voor gekozen om mijn onderzoeksperiode te verlengen. In dat jaar werd het DBC 
systeem vervangen door het DOT systeem en ik wilde de effecten hiervan observeren. 
Er is mij geregeld tijdens deze jaren gevraagd of ik geen spijt had van het onderzoek en 
de vele tijd die het heeft gekost. Dat is nooit het geval geweest. Ik heb het om meerdere 
redenen als zeer waardevol ervaren. 
Ik heb met mijn onderzoek een bijdrage willen leveren aan zowel wetenschap als praktijk. 
Wat betreft de wetenschap zijn we mijns inziens veel te weten gekomen over welke 
bijdrage een case-mix informatiesysteem (CMI) kan leveren aan universitair medische 
centra (UMC’s) en over de factoren die het succes hiervan bevorderen of belemmeren. Het 
is voor het eerst dat zo’n langdurig en diepteonderzoek naar dit onderwerp is uitgevoerd 
in Nederland. We hebben hierdoor gedetailleerd inzicht gekregen in hoe managers in 
een UMC denken, werken, keuzes maken en wat zij hiervoor nodig hebben. Op basis 
hiervan hebben we wetenschappelijke kennis kunnen aanvullen, soms weerleggen en 
goede suggesties kunnen geven voor vervolgonderzoek. 
In praktische zin heeft het onderzoek geleid tot een werkend informatiesysteem waar 
dankbaar gebruik van werd gemaakt, niet alleen door de managers, maar ook door 
business analisten, klinisch onderzoekers en stafadviseurs. Hoewel het moeilijk is om in 
maat en getal vast te stellen wat precies de effecten van dit systeem zijn, durf ik op basis 
van de verschillende evaluaties wel te concluderen dat het heeft bijgedragen aan betere 
inzichten in de case-mix, een betere dialoog over keuzes, verbeteringen van zorgprocessen 
en registraties, afspraken met verzekeraars en andere zorginstellingen, kostenreductie en 
beter onderbouwde beslissingen. De bouw van het systeem alleen al heeft professionals 
gestimuleerd om actief na te denken over hun case-mix en het belang ervan. Misschien 
is dat wel de grootste winst geweest. Het feit dat het systeem inmiddels (deels) ook door 
andere UMC’s wordt gebruikt en dat we hiermee genomineerd waren voor de Porter 
Prize 2014, is voor mij het bewijs dat we hiermee iets goeds hebben ontwikkeld en qua 
kennis voorop liggen in Nederland en waarschijnlijk ook buitenland. 
Toch hebben we niet alles bereikt wat we hoopten. We hebben tegenslagen gehad. 
De invoering van de marktwerking verliep nogal traag en chaotisch en de effecten 
van markwerking voor de UMC’s waren aanzienlijk beperkter dan gedacht. In feite 
bestaat er na 10 jaar nog steeds een budgetsysteem en komen de onderhandelingen 
met zorgverzekeraars maar moeizaam tot stand. Dit beperkte tijdens het onderzoek de 
noodzaak en de mogelijkheden van het systeem en hierdoor nam het draagvlak voor 
het project ook af. Aan de andere kant is het systeem voor doelen gebruikt die we niet 
voorzien hadden, zoals interne visitaties, doelmatigheidsonderzoeken en het aangaan 
van allianties met andere ziekenhuizen. Het hoort nu eenmaal bij onderzoek, je weet 
van tevoren niet wat er uit komt. Ik denk dat we per saldo veel mooie resultaten hebben 
bereikt waar we als AMC best trots op mogen zijn. Bovendien staan we pas aan het 
begin van de verkenning van wat er überhaupt mogelijk is met case-mixinformatie. 
Het mooiste komt waarschijnlijk nog als het zorgstelsel en DOT-systeem verder zijn 
uitgekristalliseerd. 
Het promotieonderzoek heeft mij ook persoonlijk veel gebracht. Onderzoek vereist 
een aantal vaardigheden, waar ik van nature minder sterk in ben, zoals gestructureerd 
kunnen werken, kunnen abstraheren, afstand nemen en compact kunnen schrijven. Ik 
was meer iemand van de praktijk, niet de typische academicus. Ik wil niet beweren dat 
ik de vaardigheden nu volledig beheers, maar ben er wel in gegroeid. Ik denk dat ik mijn 
gebreken heb kunnen compenseren met vaardigheden als nieuwsgierigheid, analytisch 
vermogen, logisch verstand en vooral doorzettingsvermogen. Ook inhoudelijk heb ik 
heel veel kennis opgedaan. Door dit onderzoeksproject ben ik bij vele onderwerpen 
actief betrokken geweest, zoals portfoliostrategie, planning & control, bezuinigings-
programma´s, kwaliteitsprojecten, leiderschapsprogramma’s, onderhandelingen met 
verzekeraars en communicatie. Hierdoor heb ik niet alleen het AMC nog beter leren 
kennen, maar het gaf me ook de mogelijkheid om deze onderwerpen en personen met 
elkaar te verbinden. Ik denk dat ik hiermee een waardevolle bijdrage heb geleverd aan 
het AMC, ook als stafadviseur. De keerzijde is overigens dat ik nu goed zie welke kansen 
er in het AMC (vooralsnog) onbenut blijven. Dit maakt me weleens onrustig en kan me 
in de weg staan bij mijn dagelijkse werk. 
Per saldo ben ik echter zeer blij dat ik de kans heb gekregen om dit promotieonderzoek 
te doen en dan ook nog eens in het AMC. Wat een voorrecht! Het is in mijn ogen één 
van de meest waardevolle organisaties in één van de mooiste steden mooiste steden 
die ik ken. Ik heb me hier altijd als een vis in het water gevoeld en ben er trots op hier 
onderdeel van te zijn. 
Er zijn vele mensen die me op directe of indirecte manier geholpen hebben, waarvan ik 
een aantal mensen expliciet wil bedanken. Om te beginnen met Ellen Bien en Louise 
Gunning. Ellen was aan het begin van het onderzoek mijn leidinggevende, Louise 
voorzitter van de Raad van bestuur. Zij waren direct enthousiast over mijn onderzoek 
en hebben mij de mogelijkheid gegeven om dit te kunnen combineren met mijn werk 
als stafadviseur. De kerngedachte om de patiëntengroepen centraal te stellen in de 
sturing en de stuurinformatie van het AMC is afkomstig van Louise. Ik vind het dan 
ook bijzonder leuk om te laten zien waartoe haar oorspronkelijke idee heeft geleid. Ik 
realiseer me dat Ellen en Louise de buitenwereld een behoorlijke inkijk hebben gegeven 
in de (strategische) keuken van het AMC en hun eigen rol hierin - en dat vind ik dapper. 
Dank jullie wel!
Dan ben ik uiteraard veel dank verschuldigd aan de top managers van het AMC, dat 
wil zeggen medische afdelingshoofden, divisiebestuurders, leden van Raad van Bestuur 
en directeuren RvB-staf. Zonder hen had dit onderzoek niet plaatsgevonden. Zij waren 
de primaire doelgroep van mijn onderzoek en zijn zeer bereid geweest om hieraan 
mee te werken. Dit geldt zowel voor de deelname aan formele interviews, enquêtes 
en pilot groepen, als de informelere gesprekken. Hierdoor heb ik jarenlang intensief 
contact gehad met een groot aantal managers van uiteenlopende specialismen. Ik heb 
het altijd als een voorrecht beschouwd om met deze inspirerende mensen te mogen 
werken. Ik heb inzicht gekregen in de vele complexe vraagstukken en dilemma’s 
waar zij dagelijks mee te maken hebben – mede door de toenemende markwerking, 
bezuinigingen en maatschappelijke druk. Ze hebben mij een kijkje gegeven in hun 
denk- en belevingswereld. Niet alleen door enquêtes in te vullen en concrete vragen te 
beantwoorden, maar ook door te filosoferen ‘met de benen op tafel’. Met velen heb ik 
een persoonlijke band opgebouwd. In het bijzonder wil ik nog de mensen bedanken die 
meegelezen hebben met mijn proefschrift: Ivo van Schaik, Wytske Fokkens, Marijntje 
Wetzels en Paulina Snijders.
Dan zijn er de vele mensen achter de schermen die een grote directe of indirecte bijdrage 
hebben geleverd aan mijn onderzoek. Allereerst de mensen van de afdeling ADICT. Zij 
zijn de bouwers van het informatiesysteem en verdienen veel eer. De data, systemen 
en informatiewensen wijzigden voortdurend en dan was er ook nog vaak te weinig 
capaciteit. Ik realiseer me goed dat ik een lastige klant voor hen was. Ik had veel wensen 
en eisen, kon ongeduldig en kritisch zijn en bezorgde ze een veel werk en hoofdbrekens. 
Maar gelukkig hadden we veel begrip voor elkaar en zijn onze kontakten altijd prettig 
gebleven. Ik zal de vele mails en rapporten die ik regelmatig in de avonden en weekenden 
van Jaro Noordegraaf ontving niet vergeten. 
Ook wil ik graag mijn (oud) collega’s bij Finance & Control (F & C) enorm bedanken. 
Ik heb ruim 10 jaar met hen gewerkt en altijd met veel plezier. We hebben intensief 
met elkaar gewerkt, niet alleen op de pieken, maar ook in de dalen. Inhoudelijk konden 
we kritisch naar elkaar zijn, maar altijd in positieve en constructieve sfeer. Zij hebben 
mij scherp gehouden, afgeremd waar nodig, voor nuances gezorgd en veel denkwerk 
verricht. En wat hebben we veel met elkaar gelachen! Ook buiten het werk en ik hoop 
dat we dat nog lang zullen doen. Verder wil ik Marianne Schumacher van de medische 
bibliotheek zeer bedanken voor haar hulp bij het zoeken naar de juiste literatuur en 
belangstelling door de jaren heen voor mijn onderzoek.
Ook buiten het AMC ben ik veel mensen dank verschuldigd. Ik wil mijn collega´s van 
het UMCG bedanken voor hun bereidheid aan mijn onderzoek mee te werken. We 
hebben bij hen de portfoliomatrices van het AMC in het UMCG geïmplementeerd 
en heb ik heb een aantal (medische) managers geïnterviewd over hun ervaringen. Het 
UMCG heeft vruchtbaar gebruik gemaakt van onze kennis en ervaring en tegelijkertijd 
heeft het mij interessante inzichten gegeven in welke kennis generiek toepasbaar is of 
aanpassing behoeft aan de locale organisatie. Ik voelde me zeer welkom in het UMCG 
en kijk met plezier op onze samenwerking terug. Ook onze VUmc collega’s hebben 
de portfolio matrices van het AMC geïntroduceerd en vervolgens hun kennis royaal 
met mij gedeeld. Ik zie het als een mooie voorbode voor wat wij in de toekomst samen 
kunnen bereiken.
Dan wil ik mijn bijzondere dank uitspreken naar mijn promotoren Ed Vosselman en 
Rob de Haan. Ik heb het hen tussentijds meerdere keren laten weten maar herhaal het 
nog maar eens: ik had me geen betere en fijnere promotoren kunnen wensen! Ik heb 
hen allebei ervaren als zeer deskundige, kritische en betrokken personen en zij hebben 
me uitstekend begeleid. Zij hebben allebei een behoorlijk verschillende achtergrond, 
maar juist daardoor heeft het proefschrift mijns inziens de juiste kwaliteit gekregen. Rob 
bracht voornamelijk zijn kennis en ervaring als klinisch epidemioloog en AMC-er en 
in en heeft dat op zeer positief-kritische wijze gedaan. We hebben nogal zitten stoeien 
met het feit dat dit onderzoek overwegend kwalitatief van aard is en moeilijk meetbare 
elementen bevat, maar ik denk dat we hier een goede modus in hebben gevonden. Ik zal 
de vele prettige gesprekken met hem niet vergeten. Met Ed heb ik veel kunnen sparren 
over het vakgebied van management accounting, met nogal eens een uitwijding naar 
andere onderwerpen in de wereld. We hebben heel wat keren met elkaar gegeten en 
geborreld en hebben elkaar ook privé aardig leren kennen. Ik heb me vaak bezwaard 
gevoeld voor de vele tijd en aandacht die ik van mijn promotoren vroeg en me soms 
verontschuldigd dat ik nu eenmaal niet de voorbeeldige academicus was. Ik troost 
me maar met jullie eerdere opmerking dat dit onderzoek ook voor jullie bijzonder en 
uitdagend was en jullie de gezamenlijke bijeenkomsten als een feestje beschouwden, ik 
neem het maar voor waar aan. Verder bedank ik de leden van de promotiecommisie voor 
hun bereidheid om mijn proefschrift te lezen en beoordelen.
En er zijn natuurlijk de mensen buiten mijn werkomgeving die belangrijk zijn geweest 
voor de morele steun. Hierbij staan mijn vriendin Sandra en twee dochters Ilse en Eva 
met stip bovenaan. Ik realiseer me heel goed dat ik de tijd die ik aan mijn onderzoek heb 
besteed niet aan hen heb kunnen besteden. Ik heb me daar af en toe wel schuldig over 
gevoeld, hoe zeer ik ook mijn best heb gedaan om er op alle belangrijke momenten voor 
hen te zijn. Ik ben onwijs dankbaar voor alle ruimte die ik van hen gekregen. Ik ben trots 
om deel te mogen uitmaken van zo’n fijn en hecht gezin. Ik hoop dat mijn onderzoek 
ook op enigerlei wijze een bijdrage levert aan de complexe maatschappelijke vraag hoe 
we ervoor zorgen dat de zorg betaalbaar en kwalitatief hoogstaand blijft, nu en in de 
toekomst. Het zou mooi zijn als de generatie van mijn kinderen en de generaties daarna 
er nog iets aan hebben. Dan zijn er mijn vele familieleden en vrienden. Zij hebben me 
veelvuldig de vraag gesteld wanneer het proefschrift nu eindelijk klaar was. Niet zozeer 
Niet zozeer vanwege de inhoud, meer vanwege het feest - en gelijk hebben ze. We gaan 
er goed op feesten, dat garandeer ik jullie! 
Ook ben ik Ben Vogels en Jan Willem Groot zeer dankbaar dat zij mijn paranimfen 
wilden zijn. Ben en ik zijn jarenlang collega´s en kamergenoot geweest en daardoor 
heb ik het grote plezier gehad deel te mogen uitmaken van zijn denkwereld, humor 
en menselijkheid. Ik heb daar zowel zakelijk als privé veel aan gehad. Ben is ook al die 
jaren de grootste sponsor geweest van dit (onderzoeks)project, omdat het in zijn ogen 
bijdraagt aan onze publieke taak: zorg op de juiste plek. Ik hoop dat Ben nog veel voor 
het AMC kan blijven betekenen. Jan Willem en ik kennen elkaar vanaf het begin van de 
Economiestudie en we zijn sindsdien zeer goede vrienden gebleven. We hebben al veel 
met elkaar meegemaakt en stellen na 24 jaar vriendschap nog bij iedere ontmoeting vast 
dat we nog lang niet uitgepraat zijn.
Tot slot wil ik mijn ouders bedanken. Ik heb vroeger de nodige strijd met hen geleverd. 
Over school, mijn cijfers, het spijbelen en over hoe in het leven te staan. Zij maakten 
zich toen grote zorgen over mij en twijfelden of het wel iets met me zou worden. Hoewel 
dit niet leuk was om te horen, heeft dit bij mij wel gewerkt. Ik maakte namelijk, net als 
bij veel andere dingen, zelf wel uit of het iets met me ging worden en heb uiteindelijk 
toch mijn diploma´s gehaald. Eerst Havo, toen Meao, Heao, Economie en nu mijn 
promotie. We hebben in de loop van de jaren steeds meer begrip voor elkaar gekregen. 
Mijn ouders hebben nog allebei de oorlog meegemaakt en echte armoede gekend. 
Dankzij hun verhalen realiseer me hoe blij ik mag zijn dat ik in vrede en welvaart ben 
opgegroeid en alle mogelijkheden heb gehad om me te ontplooien. Mijn vader hoopte 
zo dat hij mijn promotie nog mee kon maken. Helaas is dat niet meer gelukt. Een 
dag nadat mijn promotoren hadden geconcludeerd dat mijn proefschrift kon worden 
afgerond kreeg hij een hersenbloeding en is overleden. Ik weet zeker dat hij trots op me 
was. Als dank voor alles wat hij voor me heeft gedaan en wat ik van hem heb geleerd, 
draag ik mijn promotie aan hem op. 
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1.1  Introduction 
Due to the overall aging of the population, technological developments, and increasing 
health care demands, health care expenditures are escalating worldwide. As a result, 
many countries are implementing far-reaching reforms in order to make health care 
more effective, more efficient, and more patient friendly. One example of this is the 
introduction of Diagnoses Related Groups (DRG)-based prospective payment systems 
in countries such as the United States, Germany, and France. The introduction of DRGs 
for determining hospital products has been advocated as offering hospital management 
the means to understand and control resource usage within hospitals (Samuel et al, 
2005). On the other hand, it can be stated that because of the DRGs, a functioning 
market in care was created through the identification of the products of engineers with 
the assumptions of economists. Neoliberal ideals, according to which markets mecha-
nisms should replace planning as regulators of economic activity in the public sector, 
gained widespread acceptance by political decision-makers across a broad international 
arena from the mid-1970s onward (Kurunmäki, 1999).
In 2005, the Dutch government introduced a new reimbursement system, the Diagno-
sis Treatment Combinations (DBCs), for the registration and reimbursement of hospital 
and medical specialist care (Oostenbrink & Rutten, 2006). For the first time in Dutch 
history, hospitals and health insurance companies had the opportunity to freely nego-
tiate on prices for medical care. With these measures, the government aimed to control 
the fast-growing expenses in the health care sector in order to keep it within its budget. 
The Dutch health care reforms were highly economically oriented and had many conse-
quences for hospitals. Hospitals were confronted with cuts in expenditures, an increase 
in competition and a reduction of income guarantees. In the process, a new role had 
been assigned to hospitals, that of the entrepreneur (Asselman, 2008). Hospitals were 
faced with new challenges, such as determining a portfolio strategy and a selling strategy. 
Alongside this, other topics gained relevance, such as negotiating with health insurers 
and dealing with liquidity risks. After the reforms, one strategy by the top management 
of hospitals was to delegate entrepreneurship and responsibilities for resources to the 
managers of the medical specialties (i.e. the chief physicians and division or cluster 
managers) as it recognized that the control of health costs lay in the hands of individual 
physicians and their managers (Doolin, 19991). To fulfill this role, the managers needed 
effective management knowledge, skills, and information about their patients, which 
is essentially case-mix information. With regard to information, they felt the urge to 
have more accurate information as well as new types of information, such as  cost and 
revenues (Cardinaels et al, 2004), patient characteristics, information on quality, and 
information on the hospital market. 
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Case-mix information systems
Perhaps the most significant change in the health sector since the health care reforms concerns 
the introduction of case-mix information systems (CMIs), and most commonly the use of 
data related to Diagnosis Related Groups (DRG) (Lowe & Doolin, 1999). The term ‘case-mix’ 
simply means the mix of cases treated (Reid, 2013). Case-mix management is considered the 
management of clinical activity on the basis of a range of patient categories and the associated 
differential resource allocation (Doolin, 19991). In literature, several examples of CMIs can be 
found in the United States, New Zealand, Sweden and Finland (Abernethy et al, 2007; Covaleski 
et al, 1993; Doolin, 19991, 2004; Lehtonen, 2007; Lowe, 20001, Lowe & Doolin, 1999; Reid, 
2013; Scarparo, 2006; Sumner & Moreland, 1995). In a CMI, medical data, patient data, and 
financial data are collected at the patient level (see Figure 1.1). This data can be integrated, 
correlated, and aggregated at different levels, such as by individual patient, patient group, 
individual clinician, or medical specialty. With the use of this system, a range of questions may 
be answered, for example: what are the costs per diagnosis, what is the relationship between the 
age of the patient and the presence of different diseases, and what is the financial coverage per 
patient group? This information can then be used in the prioritizing, planning, controlling, and 
pricing of medical services. The objective is to provide information on medical activity, cost, 
and the returns of treating patients among clinical staff and management in hospitals, and to 
rationalize and codify clinical activity (Lehtonen, 2007; Doolin, 19991; Lowe & Doolin, 1999). 
Figure 1.1: A case-mix information system
Introduction
C
ha
pt
er
 1
23
1.2  Case-mix information systems: the research gap 
Several prior studies about the design and implementation of case-mix information 
systems in hospitals were published (Abernethy et al, 2007; Covaleski et al, 1993; 
Doolin, 19991, 2004; Lehtonen, 2007; Lowe, 20001, Lowe & Doolin, 1999; Reid, 
2013; Scarparo, 2006; Sumner & Moreland, 1995). The main themes of these studies 
relate to the on-going transformation in the health sector, the role of accounting in this 
process, and the implementation of accounting information systems in organizations. 
Some implementations were successful and led to positive results, such as the increase of 
cost consciousness, the rationalization of decision-making and operating processes, and 
cost reduction. However, many CMI implementations failed and had negative effects, 
such as the increase of conflict between hospital board members and hospital managers, 
information overload for the users, and the fear that the quality of care may be adversely 
affected. It can be concluded, therefore, that CMIs affect the way hospitals operate, 
both in beneficial and in harmful ways. Although we find that these issues are extremely 
important, we are left with a partial picture and an incomplete explanation of the effects 
of CMIs (Lehtonen, 2007). In general, too little research has been done to study the 
effects of CMIs in different contexts. Many important research topics have therefore 
been left unexplored, conflicting results have been unresolved, and a consensus on the 
performance benefits has not been attained. 
First, in the academic literature about CMIs, most studies are related to the effects of the 
implementation and the use of an already existing system, not to the whole process of 
design and implementation of a new system. Therefore, there is a lack of scientific design 
knowledge. Second, many studies about information systems relate to cost (accounting) 
systems; only a few studies relate to real case-mix information systems in hospitals where 
medical, patient and financial information is integrated. Also, in scientific literature, the 
CMIs are mostly described in a global fashion, but in practice they consist of several 
different types of information, tools, and reports, with specific attributes that promote 
or obstruct the success of the system. Also the relevance, applicability, and use of the 
information provided by the system seem to vary among organization levels and among 
individuals. Therefore, for a better understanding, we need to examine CMIs in a more 
detailed way. 
Third, because these systems have only gradually been introduced since 2005, no studies 
have been done in Dutch (university) hospitals so far to examine the mechanisms that 
cause successful implementations of CMIs. Before 2005 CMIs were not available in 
hospitals. The knowledge and experience from other countries was of limited use to the 
Dutch medical community because the contexts were very different from the situation 
in the Netherlands, such as with regards to the organization of hospital care, the timing 
of the introduction of hospital reforms, the type of reimbursement, the specifics of 
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the product system, and the legal regulations. Besides this, most scientific theories that 
were applicable to the design and implementation of information innovations were too 
general to use for a specific situation, such as the Dutch University Medical Centers 
(UMCs). Specific innovations demand specific implementation strategies. In general, 
we know which factors can affect benefits of the innovation to organizations, but we 
don’t know which factors prevail in which contexts (Lehtonen, 2007). At the same 
time, in the literature there are conflicting and unresolved research results and there is 
no consensus on the performance benefits. Sometimes CMIs appear to be successful 
but there are also many examples of failure. Since extant  research shows that the results 
differ considerably per country and per organization, it is  important to investigate 
which strategy works best for the design and implementation of a specific innovation 
(CMI) for a specific target group (top management) in a specific setting (UMC) in a 
specific country (the Netherlands).
Fourth, in academic literature on the use of CMIs, most studies are limited to a specific 
kind of behavior by the individual physician, such as the prescription of medicines or 
the use of a laboratory. These are decisions at a more operational level. However, it is 
unknown what the long-term impact of CMIs would be on more strategic and decisions 
on the meso level, such as the selection of patient groups. Longitudinal research is hardly 
been done in management accounting research and is mostly limited to time periods 
of four years or less. Finally, in general it can be stated that there is still a gap between 
the validity of the research and its practical relevance (Van Aken, 2005). According to 
Van Aken, this means that most academic research in organization and management is 
based on the approach of explanatory sciences, and does not solve the problems of the 
professional. The professional is mainly interested in practical answers to questions such 
as:  how does a CMI have to be designed and how can it be implemented in a successful 
way? There is a need for design knowledge to be used for the successful design and 
implementation of a CMI. 
1.3  CMIs in  Dutch hospitals 
In the Netherlands, there had been little experience with CMIs because the DBC system 
had been—as described previously—only recently introduced, and it takes several years 
to design and implement such a system and to determine its success. The DBCs provide 
an opportunity for the design of new kinds of information types. The DBCs are defined 
in a national product structure, consisting of types of diagnosis and treatments per 
medical specialty. As a result, since 2005 all physicians began registering diseases and 
activities uniformly, making their professional activities transparent and making it 
possible to benchmark medical activities and hospitals in a detailed way. Furthermore, 
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the DBC system enables an integration of medical (diagnosis and treatment) and 
financial (cost and tariff) data. Previously, these ‘worlds’ were separated from each other. 
By doing this, a new language was introduced that could be spoken by both medical and 
financial professionals. Finally, for the first time in Dutch history, the cost and revenues 
per patient could be calculated. Until 2005, Dutch hospitals had been funded by a 
global budget system within which there was no direct link with the individual patient 
because it consisted of a considerable number of fixed components. The DBC system 
increases the ability to take economic aspects into consideration when making decisions 
in hospitals on, for example the types of patients and/ or methods of treatment. 
Innovation in the Dutch hospital sector
Since there were no ready-made CMIs available for the Dutch hospital sector, several 
hospitals decided to design and implement their own systems. These information 
systems are very innovative for the Dutch hospitals in several respects. New types of 
information are introduced, such as costs and revenues per patient group, types of 
referrers, and market shares. The information is also based on new source data; the DBC 
data. The strengths and weaknesses of this source are unknown. Furthermore, the CMIs 
are designed and implemented at a time of major change, both within the hospitals (the 
introduction of internal output budgeting) and externally (the liberalization of care). 
In fact, the impact of these systems on Dutch hospitals cannot be predicted. There is 
actually no design-oriented knowledge available. Within the Dutch hospitals, the UMCs 
have a special position because, contrary to many general hospitals, they integrate three 
core tasks: patient care, (bio) medical research, and medical education. Furthermore, all 
hospital staff members are employed with a fixed salary, which implies that they have no 
personal interest in the financial consequences of the case-mix. This is considered to be 
an important factor that may affect the design and implementation of a CMI.
The Academic Medical Center
Until 2006, as in most other hospitals, the management information in the Academic 
Medical Center (AMC) about patient care was mainly focused on costs and global budget 
parameters, which included the number of admissions, patient days, and outpatient 
visits. Information hardly focused on the types of care (case-mix) and their relevance for 
the different core tasks. Moreover, the information was only available at the level of the 
medical specialty or department, not at the individual patient or doctor level. Besides, 
there was no tool to translate (qualitative) medical policy decisions into quantitative 
financial or capacity planning. Finally, the information was not easily accessible. In times 
of austerity the internal discussions (about cost overruns) intensified and the external 
pressure for more accountability increased. As a response the Board of Directors decided 
in 2006 to design and implement a computerized case-mix information system (CMI) 
Chapter 1
26
that should focus on patient groups and that was capable of linking medical, patient, and 
financial data for case-mix management. The core idea was that the type and number 
of patients treated had a significant impact on how the AMC performs its core tasks 
and on the financial consequences. The CMI primarily had to be designed for the top 
medical and non-medical management, i.e. the chief physicians, division managers, and 
central managers (including Board of Directors), because they were considered to be 
the key decision makers in the AMC. Because of the lack of knowledge about case-mix 
information systems in Dutch university hospitals and the uncertainty about the impact 
on the organization, it was concluded that the processes of design, implementation, and 
outcome evaluation had to be conducted in a scientific way. 
1.4  Research objectives 
Between 2006 and 2014 an in-depth longitudinal design-oriented case study was 
performed at the AMC.  The research objectives were: 
 1.  To design and implement a CMI for the top medical and non-medical   
      management in the AMC
 2.  To gain in-depth design-oriented knowledge about a CMI
1.5  Research methodology 
In the study the methodology of design-oriented research was used. The aim of this 
methodology is to develop reliable and valid knowledge to be used in designing solutions 
to real managerial problems in the field in question (Van Aken, 2004). Knowledge is 
developed in cooperation with the professionals. In this way, both scientifically relevant 
and practically useful knowledge is developed.  Design-oriented research has been applied 
earlier in several disciplines, including medical science,  engineering and management. 
It is essentially a process of gaining knowledge (developing theories) on the basis of 
reflection on the functioning of the regulative cycle (Vosselman, 1996). Key elements 
of this cycle are problem formulation, problem diagnoses, design, implementation, 
and evaluation of the effects of an innovation. The iterative process continues until 
a satisfactory solution that works well for the specified class of problems crystallizes. 
Design-oriented research can be considered as an alternative to the classical empirical 
research where theory-driven and data-driven hypotheses are tested with the use of 
statistical methods and accordingly are accepted or rejected. 
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A design-oriented case study in the AMC
For this research a longitudinal design-oriented case study was conducted at the 
Academic Medical Center (AMC), which took place from 2006 until 2014. During this 
study, a case-mix information system (CMI) was designed and implemented in close 
cooperation with the top medical and non-medical managers. The regulative cycle was 
passed through several times. In the process it was determined what products would 
be (re)designed and implemented, based on the evaluations of the existing CMI and 
new developments, such as external developments and related developments at the 
level of the AMC.  Eventually, several physical and non-physical case-mix information 
products were designed and implemented. The CMI was iteratively designed and 
implemented at the AMC consisting of several physical and non-physical products, like 
a Standard Report Patient Care, Portfolio Matrix and Data Cubes (Cognos). Some of 
these products were primarily designed for the top (medical) managers, whereas other 
products were designed for their business analysts to support their managers in the use 
of the CMI. During the period, there was extensive reflection on the outcomes of the 
CMI-project and the factors which promoted or obstructed its success. Interviews were 
held, questionnaires were sent to participants and various personal observations were 
made.  In 2014, it was concluded that the CMI had been completed and the objectives 
of the project had been fulfilled, so the project was finished.  Based on this case study, 
the implications of the research for the management accounting discipline, as well as for 
hospital managers and regulators were outlined.  
The applicability of design oriented knowledge in a similar context
To determine the applicability of the design oriented knowledge in a similar context, 
in 2010 - 2011 a limited secondary case study was conducted at another university 
medical center (UMC): the University Medical Center Groningen (UMCG). During the 
study, one key product of the AMC’s CMI, the Portfolio Matrix was redesigned and 
implemented hospital wide in the UMCG by passing through the regulative cycle. In 
2015, a third UMC, the Free University Medical Center (VUmc) adopted also the AMC’s 
Portfolio Matrix and implemented it at some specialties in its organization. Through 
these (limited) studies, insight was obtained about the scope of the application of the 
design knowledge as it was gained at the AMC. 
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1.6  Thesis structure
This thesis is structured in four parts, each consisting of one or more chapters (see 
Figure 1.2). Part I describes the background and design of the research. It contains the 
introduction (this Chapter 1); the context of the Dutch (university) hospital sector 
(Chapter 2); the literature review (Chapter 3); and research methodology (Chapter 4). 
Part II presents the iterative processing of the design and implementation of the CMI 
in the AMC, broken down into the periods 2006 to 2008 (Chapter 5) and 2009 to 
2014 (Chapter 6). In these chapters, the regulative cycles are described. Also, the most 
important developments in the hospital sector and the AMC are described. In Part III, 
the end products of the final CMI of the AMC are described (Chapter 7). Part IV offers 
the final reflection on the outcomes of the CMI project for both users and organization 
and on the factors that promoted or obstructed success. The conclusions are based on 
the results of the qualitative and quantitative results of the interim reflections and the 
end reflection (Chapter 8). Moreover, the objectives of the research project, the research 
methodology, the role of the researcher and the applicability of the research findings to 
other hospital organizations are reflected upon (Chapter 9). In Chapter 10, the main 
implications of the research project with regard to the management accounting discipline 
are presented. To further expand the knowledge of CMIs in health care settings, also 
several suggestions and directions for future research are given. Finally, the gained design-
oriented knowledge was translated into practical guidelines (or recommendations) for 
a successful implementation of a CMI in Dutch university hospitals (UMCs).  The 
guidelines are meant for practitioners who can directly or indirectly influence the success 
of CMIs in UMCs, such as hospital managers (Board of Directors, division managers, 
chief physicians, project managers, IT managers) and regulators (Ministry of Health, 
Ministry of Education, and health authorities such as the NZa and ACM).
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Figure 1.2: Thesis structure

Chapter 2
Context of the Dutch (university) hospital sector 
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Abstract
The Dutch health care sector is under great financial pressure. Since 2005, several major 
reforms have been introduced to liberalize the health care market as much as possible. 
The reforms consisted of a number of significant legislative changes and the introduc-
tion of a new reimbursement system based on the Diagnosis Treatment Combinations 
(DBCs). This system replaced the budget system which had been in use since 1988. The 
DBC system was based on the registration of care episodes including all diagnostic and 
treatment activities for the patient. In the Netherlands, a decision was made to develop 
a tailored system and therefore the DBC system is unique. The DBCs were divided into 
three segments: regulated, free (negotiable), and fixed and were billed in this way to the 
insurers. The free segment was increased from 10% in 2005 to 70% in 2012. In 2012, 
the DBC system was replaced in 2012 by the DOT system, which was a considerably 
less fine-grained system. Also the university medical centers (UMCs) had to join the 
DBC and DOT system in a similar way to the general hospitals and were expected to 
compete for patient care in the hospital market. The hospital care reforms and other de-
velopments, such as increasing pressure on finance and accountability, required adjust-
ments to the ways UMCs were generally managed in the budget era. Entrepreneurship, 
adjustments to the organizational structure, adjustment to the planning and control 
systems, and detailed and better information about patient populations became incre-
asingly important. In 2006, the Academic Medical Center in Amsterdam (AMC) began 
the design of a CMI to support their top (medical) managers at different phases of the 
strategic management cycle, i.e. analyzing, decision making, planning, implementation, 
monitoring and legitimization.
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 2.1  Introduction
To better understand the context of this study, in this chapter, the Dutch hospital 
sector and specifically the university medical centers (UMCs) are described. First, in 
Section 2.2, there is a description of the general characteristics of the Dutch hospital 
sector. Section 2.3 focuses on healthcare spending in the Netherlands in comparison to 
other countries and explains why healthcare reforms were necessary. In Section 2.4, the 
Dutch health care reforms in 2005 and 2006 are further described and this includes 
new laws and the introduction of a new reimbursement system based on the Diagnosis 
Treatment Combinations (DBCs). In Section 2.5, the DBC system is further explained 
and compared to the budget system used in the period from 1988 to 2005. Section 
2.6 summarizes what the impact of the reforms was on Dutch hospital organizations 
and what adjustments to the organizations were necessary to survive in this new 
market environment. Section 2.7 focuses on the UMCs and describes which of their 
characteristics are distinct from those of general hospitals, like their responsibilities, 
funding, and position in a market environment that makes them a specific sector within 
the Dutch health care sector. In Section 2.8, the general characteristics of the AMC 
are described with regard to strategy, organizational structure, management, culture, 
finance, planning and control, and the healthcare market. 
2.2 General characteristics of the hospital sector in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, health care is organized according to the principle of echeloning 
(Boot & Knapen, 2005). It is a hierarchy of provisions based on specialization and 
intensity of care. There are three echelons: primary, secondary, and tertiary care. Being 
referred by a member of the first echelon is mandatory for access to the second and third 
echelons. Primary care is well developed in the Netherlands. It is provided by general 
practitioners, district nurses, physiotherapists, social workers, dentists, and pharmacists 
(www.oecd.org). In particular, the general practitioner plays the role of a gatekeeper to 
secondary care and patients are referred to specialists in only 6% of contacts. Secondary 
and tertiary care is mostly provided by medical specialists in hospitals. Secondary care 
is the health care services provided by medical specialists, dental specialists and other 
health professionals who generally do not have first contact with patients: for example, 
cardiologists, urologists, and oral and maxillofacial surgeons (www.wikipedia.org). In 
The Netherlands, patients are required to see a primary care provider for a referral before 
they can access secondary care. Tertiary care is highly specialized health care on referral 
from a primary or secondary health professional, usually for inpatients, in a facility that 
has personnel and facilities for advanced medical investigation and treatment, such as a 
university medical center.
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In 2014, there were 131 hospital sites and 112 outpatient clinics (www.zorgatlas.
nl). Medical specialists are generally self-employed and linked with hospitals through 
contracts. However, in the Dutch UMCs, they usually work as employees. UMCs 
are in charge of different tasks: patient care, education, research, and training. They 
are leading hospitals with advanced clinical treatments, and last-resort functions. 
In the Netherlands, some specialized procedures can only be carried out in medical 
institutions that hold a license provided by the Ministry of Health. The UMCs carry 
out the majority of these procedures on the basis of these licenses. The supply of hospital 
care is also increasingly differentiated. Hospitals often choose to concentrate on specific 
functions in one location. That means some hospitals get more, and enhanced features, 
and others fewer. At the same time, outpatient and day treatment care is increasingly 
provided. A growing trend is observed nowadays: the formation by medical specialists 
of collective medical offices (independent treatment centers), which provide routine care 
and light surgery. They constitute a not insignificant challenge to hospitals since their 
small size and their highly specialized and programmed activity, allows them to be quite 
competitive. 
Hospitals in the Netherlands are mostly not for profit, as are health insurance companies. 
Most insurance packages allow patients to choose where they want to be treated. 
However, this changed from 2016. From then on, health insurers gain the power to 
determine to which medical specialist, psychologist, or other mental health practitioner 
the person will be referred. With the new policy, insurers may choose to pay only part 
of the treatment or nothing when they have no contract with the care supplier. Patients 
can still choose where they want to be treated, but when there is no contract between 
the insurer and care provider, this may cost have financial consequences. Health insurers 
play a central role in the Dutch health care system. The four big insurers account for 
about 90% of the market share (www.zorgwijzer.nl). For basic insurance, insurers face 
acceptance duty and are not allowed to apply premium differentiation. Health insurers 
can use their power of negotiation to reduce costs and increase quality. 
2.3 Health care spending in the Netherlands 
In 2013, health care spending in the Netherlands (excluding investment expenditure 
in the health sector) was 11.1% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), well above 
the OECD average of 8.9% (www.oecd.org). This had increased by 1.6 percentage 
points since 2005 and is the second highest share across Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries1, See Figure 2.1. 
1 OECD uses its wealth of information on a broad range of topics to help governments foster prosperity and 
fight poverty through economic growth and financial stability (www.oecd.org). 
Context of the (Dutch) hospital sector
C
ha
pt
er
 2
35
Figure 2.1: Health care expenditure as a share of GDP, OECD countries, 2013
OECD Health Statistics, 2015
Health spending in the Netherlands continued to grow despite the economic crisis and 
averaged an annual real term growth rate of over 3% between 2006 and 2012. The rate 
of growth slowed to 1.2% in 2011 but went up again in 2012 to 3.5%. About 30% of 
the total cost of healthcare in the Netherlands is spent on hospital care, making it by 
far the most expensive within overall health care provision (Balogh & Van Veen-Dirks, 
2010). The increase is partly due to the increasing costs of medical technology, pressure 
from society to expand the care package, unhealthy lifestyle behaviors (e.g. increasing 
obesity), and the effects of aging.  As for the latter, it may be noted that the Netherlands 
is a relative young country in comparison with its European partners and the real aging 
has yet to begin. Another explanation is the anchoring of the right to healthcare in 2000, 
so that the limitation of healthcare by waiting lists is no longer possible (Inspectie der 
Rijksfinanciën, 2010). The Dutch health care system is therefore under great pressure 
and that pressure will further increase. In 2012 86% of health spending is funded by 
public sources, which is well above the average of 72% in OECD countries. Various 
measures are taken by the government and insurers to restrict supply so that increases in 
costs of care remain limited. This includes setting a maximum growth rate for healthcare 
suppliers. For example, every year parliament passes a law on the global development 
of health expenditures (in Dutch: Budgettair Kader Zorg). This determines which part 
of the Dutch economy can be used for health, without harming its other components. 
If this amount is exceeded, in the following year all health providers will have to reduce 
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their expenses. In a way, this system doesn’t give individual incentives to reduce ones 
budget since everybody has to bear the consequences of possible budget cuts. 
2.4 Dutch hospital care reforms 
Since 2005, several major reforms in the health care system have been introduced in 
the Netherlands. In a context of growing health care expenditure, the government 
wanted to make the Dutch population feel more concerned about the costs. In addition, 
there were too many people on waiting lists for health care services. By introducing 
regulated market mechanisms2 and demand-driven supply policies, the government tried 
to incite providers and insurers to provide the best services, adapted to the needs of the 
population (and the same by increasing some activities), against the lowest possible cost. 
The government also wanted to promote more transparency. 
Liberalizing the healthcare market as much as possible
The core of the reforms was that the responsibilities were assigned as closely as possible 
to the main players in healthcare: the public, the health insurers, the health care 
providers, and in some cases, the municipalities. The government aimed to achieve this 
by liberalizing the healthcare market as much as possible and by introducing ‘incentives 
in care.’ It expected that when personal responsibility and initiative by the parties in 
healthcare were given priority, the needs of the care recipients would be better met 
(VWS, 2007). By introducing incentives in care, the government aimed to motivate 
parties to act more efficiently and therefore achieve better quality and innovation in 
care. The patient had to become a critical care consumer who was encouraged to make 
responsible choices. Insurers had to compete with each other on price, service, and 
quality; and care providers and should be stimulated to provide care more effectively and 
efficiently. The government retained an important role in ensuring quality, accessibility, 
and affordability of care. 
The reforms of health care consisted of a number of significant legislative changes in 
2005 and 2006. In 2006 the new Health Care Insurance Act was introduced. The main 
aim is to make care more efficient and affordable in the longer term. The core of this 
law is that there is only one insurance and the government determines what is insured 
and that insurers have to accept everyone regardless of age or health risks. All insured 
have to pay a nominal premium independent of their income, which could vary by 
insurer. People who have to pay too much of their income on healthcare premium, 
will be compensated with a statutory allowance. The purpose is to introduce managed 
2 Regulated market mechanisms means that although buyers and sellers have some freedom, but that freedom 
is circumscribed by laws and regulations to prevent unwanted effects and ensure the public objectives of 
quality, accessibility and affordability (Balogh & Van Veen, 2010)
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competition between health insurance companies and between healthcare providers as 
well. Insurers can compete on the level of the nominal premium, but also on the manner 
of pricing, on service, quality of care, and the associated premiums. The expectation was 
that health insurers in their new role would put more pressure on providers to improve 
quality, and that efficiency in care would increase. Also in 2006, the Health Care Market 
Regulation Act (WMG) was introduced. This law regulates the development, planning 
and supervision of the health care markets. This law stipulates the establishment of the 
Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) as an independent administrative body that oversees 
the markets for care. The aim of the law is to bring about an effective and efficient health 
care system, to control costs in health care and to protect and promote the position of the 
consumer (www.nza.nl). In 2005, the Health Care Institutions Accreditation Act (WTZi) 
was introduced. The aim of this law is to lower access barriers for health providers to 
enter the health care market, by making the procedures simpler and shorter. On the 
other hand, they are obliged to be transparent about their governance and to have an 
orderly administration.  The aim of the WTZi is to increase access for new entrants to 
the health care market, such as Independent Treatment Centers, as much as possible 
(VWS, 2004). In combination, these laws aim to motivate actors in the health care 
market to enhance competition; they enhance selective contracting, free access for new 
entrants, free consumer choice for insurers, and direct access to quality information 
(Krabbe, 2014). Finally, in 2005, a new funding and performance system for hospitals 
and medical specialists was introduced based on Diagnosis Treatment Combinations 
(DBC). This system is outlined in Section 2.5. 
Other developments
Except for the formal, legal, reforms in the hospital sector, there were other developments 
that had a major impact on hospitals (Asselman, 2008). First, in the course of time, 
the pressure on financial resources increased considerably in most hospitals, because costs 
rose faster than revenues. With regard to revenues, the government has several tools to 
directly or indirectly intervene in the hospitals’ sources of revenue. For example, in 2012 
a Gentleman’s Agreement between the Ministry of Health, hospitals, and health insurers, 
was made. The Agreement was a controlled expenditure growth of 2.5% structurally per 
year in the hospital sector for the period 2012 to 2015. Apart from directly intervening 
in the budget, the government used indirect instruments to control costs, such as 
interventions in the insured package, and increasingly licensed new entrants on the 
hospital market such as independent treatment centers. 
Second, the increasing pressure on resources had consequences for the relationship 
between hospitals and their funders. This in particular concerned the relationship 
with insurers, banks, and for UMCs, the relationship with the affiliated university, the 
Ministry of Education, and industry. In times of financial distress, the negotiations 
Chapter 2
38
between hospitals and funders became tougher. Banks established stricter demands on 
hospitals, for example with regard to creditworthiness. The health care reforms implied 
that hospitals were treated more like private companies with corresponding requirements 
on equity (at least 20 to 40% of total assets), administrative organization, and business 
management. Also, the suppliers of hospitals were expected to adjust their terms of 
delivery.
Third, the pressure on hospitals for external accountability concerning their policies, 
outputs, and costs increased considerably. This applied to both the level of detail and 
frequency of the accounts given.  For example, under pressure from patients and 
health insurers hospitals were increasingly forced to report on performance indicators 
regarding patient safety, effectiveness, patient satisfaction, quality, and content of care 
(e.g. the number of cases, re-operations, complications). Although several comments 
might be placed on these indicators, there was and is the tendency to publish them. 
As a consequence various opportunities emerged to compare hospitals on the basis of 
benchmarking. This is evidenced by the many publications existing in this area, including 
the regular reports, but also in the Dutch national media (Elsevier, Algemeen Dagblad) 
where statements were published ranking hospitals from the “best” to the “worst” in the 
Netherlands. The benchmarks also created opportunities for the hospitals themselves to 
assess their own performance against other hospitals.
2.5 Funding of Dutch hospitals 
In this section, the DBC system is explained and compared to the budget system used 
in the period from 1988 to 2005.
Hospital funding in 1988 - 2005
Until 2005, most hospitals were funded on the basis of the model of a function-based 
budget (FB) that was introduced in 1988. The FB budget was determined by fixed, 
semi-fixed, and variable cost components (Krabbe, 2014). The fixed cost component 
was associated with costs related to the number of inhabitants (adherence) living in 
the hospital’s service area; it was viewed as serving the availability function of the 
hospital. The semi-fixed components were associated with the hospital’s capacity, such 
as the number of beds and the number and type of medical specialists. The semi-
fixed component changed from time to time, depending on capacity decisions. The 
variable components of the budget depended on the activity level in hospitals. They 
were expressed in a number of budget parameters such as admissions, hospitalization 
days, day patient treatments, initial outpatient clinic visits and specific treatments in 
regular care, and top-level clinical treatments. Hospitals usually got additional budgets, 
particularly for capital expenditures, or academic budgets (for university medical 
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centers). The negotiated budget was constituted by agreements between insurance 
companies and hospitals on the forecasted development of the activities and the nature 
or costs of some services. The aim of the budget system was to contain the growth of 
health care expenditures. However, the most important drawback of the budget system 
was that there was little incentive to provide care innovation, to work efficiently, and to 
be transparent. It gave insufficient insight into the performance of individual hospitals. 
Hospitals were thus not sufficiently rewarded for good performance or settled on poor 
performance. Furthermore, there was a lack of competitive incentives for insurers 
(VWS, 2004).
Hospital funding since 2005 
Given the drawbacks of the budget system the government decided to create a 
reimbursement system related to activities, which would give incentives to hospitals 
to search for cost reduction and quality improvement, and consequently, created the 
Diagnosis Treatment Combinations or DBCs. The DBC structure was in operation 
between 2005 and 2011 (Krabbe, 2014). Although partly inspired by the DRG 
(Diagnosis Related Groups) system, the DBC system was unique, which made 
international comparisons difficult. The Netherlands chose to develop their own patient 
classification system because the system also had to be used for market regulation and 
output pricing. At that time, there was no DRG system that could serve these targets. 
The fee for medical specialists was not included in the DRG tariff and there were no 
DRGs for outpatient care. The objective of the DBC system was to make the patient’s 
health issue the focal point (Hofdijk, 2011). The DBC system was a reimbursement 
system based on the registration of care episodes (Krabbe, 2014). It included all 
diagnostic and treatment activities for the patient from the first to the last hospital visit. 
The DBC classification system ideally should define DBCs that were homogeneous in 
resource consumption. DBCs were only registered by the so-called portal specialties3. 
The production of the supporting specialties (diagnostic and anesthesiology products) 
was part of the care process of the DBC. 
DBC product structure
A DBC described with codes how a patient entered the hospital, with which complaint, 
what diagnosis, and the proposed treatment within a predefined period; a care 
trajectory. A care trajectory could consist of one or more sub-trajectories. This period 
was determined by fixed algorithms. For example, in a clinical sub-trajectory, the closing 
date of the DBC was the 42nd day after discharge, in a non-clinical sub-trajectory with 
conservative (non-surgical) treatment it was on the 90th day after the opening of the
3 These were specialties where the patient first came into contact after referral by the GP, such as cardiology, 
surgery, dermatology, gynecology, and neurology.
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initial sub-trajectory. For follow-up DBCs, the closing day was on the 365th day after 
the opening of the sub-trajectory.4 A computer program (grouper) was used to classify 
the sub-trajectories in DBC care products and to conform to rules adopted by the Dutch 
Healthcare Authority (NZa). All sub-trajectories formed a separate DBC care product 
and had their own start date. The start date of the DBC care product determined which 
health insurer was invoiced. The DBC product definition was associated with care 
activities (or procedures), for example diagnostic, surgery, and laboratory activities, that 
together made up the DBC’s resource use profile, specifying the proportion of DBCs 
in which procedure was performed and the mean use of this service (Oostenbrink & 
Rutten, 2006). 
Example of a DBC trajectory
In this example, a patient was admitted to the hospital in February 2012 with a broken hip. The 
patient underwent surgery the next day and they stayed in the clinic for one week. In February, 
the DBC was started and automatically closed after 42 days. In 2013, the patient returned for a 
follow-up consultation and a new follow up DBC was started.
Figure 2.2: Example of a DBC trajectory broken hip
4 Since 2015 the closing day of follow up DBCs was reduced to the 120th  day.
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The example shows that the (sub) trajectories passed through calendar years. This was 
quite different from how medical production was recorded up to this point, which was 
namely per calendar year. In addition, a DBC contained all of the direct and indirect 
activities and associated costs that could be attributed to the DBC, so including the 
medical and non-medical supporting departments. 
Segments 
The DBCs were divided into three segments: a regulated, free, and fixed segment. 
Health insurers negotiated with hospitals on health care production in both the A and 
B segments (Krabbe, 2014). The regulated segment (A-list DBCs) contained top clinical 
care, top referral care, and specific care/ materials (the so called add-on) like expensive 
drugs, intensive care, and blood products. The tariffs for the DBCs were determined 
by the National Health Authority (NZa) and were elaborated on the basis of cost 
information collected amongst hospitals. Some top referral care was not accurately 
described by DBCs, like complex pediatric care, which attenuated the implementation 
of the DBC system for UMCs. When such care was provided, a DBC was charged for 
basic care as delivered by the general hospitals. The free segment (B-list DBCs) contained 
the more common and standardized care for which a real market existed, like cataract 
or basic hip surgery. The tariffs of the DBCs of the free segment were freely negotiable 
with health insurers, except for the part corresponding to the specialists’ wages. Health 
insurers might employ different DBC prices for different hospitals (Oostenbrink & 
Rutten, 2006). Likewise, hospitals may negotiate different prices for the same DBC 
with different health insurers. The fixed segment contained mainly acute care where costs 
were mainly fixed by the needed availability of infrastructure and staff. The lump sum 
compensation for the fixed segment was determined by the government. In 2006, the 
free segment DBCs represented around 10% of general hospitals’ budgets5. In 2008, 
this was expanded up to 20%, in 2009 up to 34%, and in 2012 up to 70%. So the free 
segment was gradually increased to prepare hospitals for this big change by obliging 
them to think about their revenues in terms of DBCs, evaluate their costs for each DBC, 
and, eventually, compare their performances with other hospitals. 
Similarities and differences between the DBC and DRG system
Something that the DBC and DRG systems had in common was that in both a set of 
’standard products of health care’ was created by a set of defined diagnoses and standard 
average treatment costs for those diagnoses. The patient and his or her specific diagnosis 
became the focus of calculation, rather than simply the intermediate products, such as 
5 It should be noted that these are average percentages for all hospitals in the Netherlands. However, for 
university medical centers, these percentages were significantly lower because they provide relatively more 
complex care of whose care products are in the regulated segment.
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particular medical procedures or diagnostic tests. However, the DBC system differed 
from the DRG system in some aspects (Hasaart, 2011; Krabbe, 2014.) DBCs were 
coded afterwards, while DRGs were often coded at the beginning of the treatments. The 
coding was done by the medical specialists and not by specific employees, which implied 
that the specialists had to be well informed and motivated about this coding. Contrary to 
the DRG system, in the DBC system the physician’s payment was included in the DBC 
tariffs, thus motivating physicians to code accurately and perhaps opportunistically. This 
was not the same in university medical centers were, as noticed previously, physicians 
are employed, as their income does not depend on the quality of their coding. And 
lastly, DBCs covered the total care process, including outpatient visits, clinical episodes, 
day care, and rehabilitation care or aftercare. DRGs only covered the clinical episode. 
DBCs were validated at the end of the treatment, which generated delays in hospitals 
reimbursements by the insurers.
From DBC to DOT system
Although the first DBC system contained 40,000 different health care products (Krabbe, 
2014), the system did not lead to a meaningful grouping of health care products and 
it led to excessive administrative costs (NZa, 2010). For this reason, the DBC system 
was replaced in 2012 by the DOT system, which stands for “DBCs On their way to 
Transparency”. The DOT system was a considerably less fine-grained system, containing 
around 4,400 different case-mix groups, and it used the internationally accepted ICD-
10 diagnoses classification system. The DOT system led to definitions of health care 
products that were more similar to patient classifications in other DRG systems. This 
also facilitated international comparisons, coordination, and charging of patients across 
borders. This development showed that the Dutch DBC system and international 
developments in DRG systems had converged. The DOT product structure means 
a less administrative burden for the medical specialists, because the care products are 
generated automatically via a mandatory national grouper which also increases the 
reliability. However, a major drawback of this system change was that all parties involved 
had to learn the new product structure again, and completely new agreements had to 
be made between hospitals and health insurers. In Section 6.3.2 we will focus more 
comprehensively on the implementation of the DOT system. 
The gradual change from budget system to performance based system 
The Dutch reimbursement system for hospitals has been gradually changing from a 
budget system to a performance-based system. As mentioned earlier, the revenues of 
hospitals for patient care were determined in two ways: by the budget system (regulated 
segment) and the free market (free segment). Even though, the DBCs of the regulated 
segment had been billed to the insurers, the reimbursement of the regulated segment 
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was still based on negotiations about the traditional budget parameters, such as number 
of admissions and days of hospitalizations. Reimbursement of the regulated segment 
only served as a vehicle to transfer money from health insurers to hospitals and medical 
specialists (Oostenbrink & Rutten, 2006). If the amount of the billed DBCs of the 
regulated segment didn’t cover the calculated budget of the hospital, insurance companies 
had to pay the difference, which constituted a certain guarantee for hospitals. So for 
the regulated segment, reimbursement and funding was not the same thing. The B-list 
DBCs were freely negotiable and the billed DBCs determined the real income of the 
hospital. The negotiations dealt with quantity, tariffs, and more recently, with quality. 
In 2012 and 2013, a transition scheme was introduced to enable hospitals to make the 
final transition from the budgeting system to the new performance-based system. This 
transition scheme contained safety nets. On the basis of this scheme a transition amount 
was determined for each hospital. This amount represented the difference between the 
turnover from the performance-based system and what would be achieved within the 
budget system. Hospitals that would receive fewer turnovers from the performance-
based system compared to the budget system were compensated for the deficit in 2012 
to 95%, decreasing to 70% in 2013. For hospitals that would receive more turnovers 
in the new system, their turnovers in 2012 and 2013 were skimmed off with the 
same percentages mentioned. Since 2014, there was no safety net any longer and the 
reimbursement was fully based on the billed DBCs. Since then, reimbursement and 
funding have been the same. Since 2012, the tariffs of the A-list DBCs were no longer 
fixed but were maximized by the government. Hospitals and health insurers were able to 
agree on lower tariffs. In Table 2.1, the characteristics of the reimbursement and funding 
systems of hospitals in the course of time are summarized. 
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Table 2.1: Summary characteristics of the reimbursement and funding of Dutch hospitals
Period until 
2005
Period 
2005 – 2011
Period 
2012 –2013 
Period from 
2014
Reimbursement 
system Budget system
Budget system for 
regulated segment 
(70%) and free 
market for free 
segment (30%)
Free market 
(100%), with sa-
fety net: in 2012 
(de) compensa-ti-
ons up to 95%; in 
2013 up to 70%.
Free market 
(100%), no safety 
net
Revenues based 
on 
Budget parame-
ters (fixed, se-
mi-fixed, variable)
Budget parame-
ters (A list DBCs) 
and DBCs (B-list 
DBCs)
DOT products (A 
and B-list DBCs), 
add-on’s
Deficit/ surplus 
compensations
DOT products (A 
and B-list DBCs), 
add-on’s
Negotiations 
about
Volumes of bud-
get parameters, 
local issues
Volumes of bud-
get parameters, 
local issues 
List B DBCs: 
volumes, prices 
and quality of 
DBC
Contracting sum
List A and B 
DBCs: 
volumes, prices 
and quality of 
DBC, local issues
Contracting sum
List A and B 
DBCs: volumes, 
prices and quality 
of DBC, local 
issues
2.6 The impact of the health care reforms on hospitals 
The health care reforms increased the pressure on resources and accountability, and 
required adjustments in hospital budgeting (Asselman, 2008). First, the introduction 
of the DBCs implicated higher financial risks. On the one hand, financial flexibility 
increased because the hospitals had more space for negotiation, but on the other hand it 
decreased because funding was more closely linked to the output of the various core tasks 
of the hospital, so they had fewer opportunities to cross-subsidize. This made it difficult 
for hospitals to subsidize unprofitable services from other services. Also, hospitals were 
facing more liquidity risk. This was created by the system itself, because DBCs could 
only be billed after closing and this was often one year after the first appointment with 
the patient.  Furthermore, there was a risk that DBCs could not be billed because of 
inaccurate, untimely, and incomplete records of DBCs in the hospital. By introducing 
the DBC system, the contractual obligation of insurers also ended. Because of this it 
became a possibility that insurers would not contract specific types of care anymore with 
the hospital. 
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Second, in the budget era, the planning and control activities were often reactive in 
nature. In the free market, hospitals should identify changes in the environment that 
would affect their strategies and respond to them quicker than previously. The nature 
of Planning and Control had focus on the future so that it could be adjusted in a 
timely manner. This meant that the importance of budgeting and planning increased 
and that hospitals should have the appropriate (information) systems, for example for 
the planning and monitoring of personnel, materials, and costs (e.g. cost control systems 
such as Activity Based Costing). From the DBCs, management gained new possibilities 
for care-related management and financial management. The relationship between 
revenues and actual costs became more explicit. It also provided more opportunities for 
calculating internal budgets based on the DBCs, which might be more transparent and 
more free of discussion than the historic budgets and would introduce incentives that 
promoted aspects like efficiency, quality, quantity (production increase), and innovation. 
In 2009, a study showed that the liberalization in health care and related DBC system 
had a significant influence on the internal budgeting systems of six of the eight UMCs 
(see Box 2.1).
Box 2.1: The impact of DBCs on the internal budgeting systems of the UMCs 
Third, the introduction of the DBCs was not only a major change in the financing 
of hospitals but it also went much further. Hospitals were entering the market of 
regulated health care in which they were meant to operate like entrepreneurs with 
all the attendant risks. Entrepreneurship also required new business activities such as 
negotiation, relationship management, marketing, and portfolio and risk management. 
This meant that entrepreneurial knowledge and skills needed to be available in the 
hospital. This required a tremendous adjustment of the existing hospital managers, and 
Balogh & Van Veen-Dirks (2010) investigated whether the DBC system led to adjustments to the 
budgeting systems of the UMCs. The study shows that in 2009 six of the eight university medical 
centers used DBCs in a certain way in internal budgeting. Within three UMCs, the external 
(market) developments had the greatest impact on the internal budgeting system and the internal 
organization, because they fully coupled the external and internal funding. These UMCs conducted 
further changes in other areas in the internal organization such as adjusting the internal transfer 
costing between support units and portals. UMCs that chose to limit the impact of DBCs in their 
internal budget, also performed in other areas with little to no change to the internal organization.
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not only the Board of Directors, but throughout the organization.  Fourth, the integral 
character of the DBC required that internal control would focus on the entire care 
process of the DBC rather than the individual organizational units such as divisions, 
clusters, and departments. It was therefore expected that more and more hospitals would 
adopt a decentralized organizational structure, with divisions no longer managed as 
cost centers but as profit centers. Finally, with the introduction of the DBCs, a detailed 
understanding of the care products, underlying activities, revenues, and costs became 
necessary. This required new management information that shows the effects of the 
DBCs for the hospital. This could include regular management reports regarding the 
timeliness of the DBC registration, validation and billing, DBC revenue per insurer, 
abnormalities of the DBC-resource use profiles, liquidity, work in progress, and cost. 
To make these new types of information available, new case-mix information systems 
in which various kinds of data were collected in a systematic manner would have to be 
implemented.  From these CMIs, reports could be generated.
2.7 University medical centers in the Netherlands 
As mentioned in Section 2.2, in the Netherlands, hospital care for patients with rare 
and complex diseases is concentrated in eight university medical centers (UMCs), see 
Figure 2.3. 
In a UMC, the faculty of medicine, with its responsibility for the initial training of 
physicians and for scientific research, is merged with the academic hospital, which has 
responsibility for tertiary care and clinical research and innovation (NFU, 2008; Balogh 
& Van Veen, 2010). All medical faculties and academic hospitals in the Netherlands are 
UMCs. The added value of UMCs is that they integrate the core tasks: patient care, (bio) 
medical research, and medical education, in close relation with, and participation in 
relevant networks. The interdependence of these core tasks is large and distinctive from 
general hospitals. In UMCs, chief physicians have general overall responsibility for all 
core activities. Although all UMCs provide basic hospital services, their public functions 
are primarily determined by the top clinical services they provide together with their last 
resort function for referrals from other hospitals. Such tertiary care should build on the 
knowledge infrastructure that the UMC provides, with clinical research, innovation, a 
multidisciplinary approach and a continuity of expertise, twenty-four hours a day, seven 
days a week, (NFU, 2008). Due to the large amount of multi-morbidity, the patients of 
the UMCs are mostly seen by several specialists.
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 Figure 2.3: University Medical Centers in size and figures 2005
NFU, 2006
The position of university medical centers in a market environment 
As described earlier, regulated market mechanisms was introduced in Dutch hospital 
care in 2005. Since then, the UMCs have operated with their activities partly on the 
health care market; mainly with regard to basic and elective patient care. However, the 
UMCs also conducted a number of public activities such as top referral care, education, 
scientific research, and innovation. For these activities, there was no market possible, 
and the quality of these activities could not be sufficiently guaranteed. It was therefore 
agreed between the Ministry of Health and the UMCs, how the activities of the UMC 
would be funded in the new system (VWS, 2007). The conclusion to these agreements 
was: liberalization where possible, specific funding where necessary. This meant that the 
UMCs, in a similar way to the general hospitals, had to compete in the health care 
market for patient care on the basis of patient opinion, and quality; and that for these 
patients, the UMC had to join the DBC system. Furthermore, as in the budget era, the 
UMCs continued to receive extra funding, in comparison with general hospitals, from 
the Ministry of Health (from the academic budget), the university budget (for workplace 
functions, and the educational function), and from other funds. The academic budget 
aimed to compensate the excess costs of academic functions as care for complicated or 
specific patients, and research and innovation. At a national level, the total amount of 
the academic budget was around € 580 million and was strictly allocated to UMCs 
(NFU, 2008). 
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2.8 The Academic Medical Center Amsterdam 
Our empirical study was carried out in the Academic Medical Centre (AMC). In 
Amsterdam, there are two university medical centers (AMC and VUmc). The academic 
hospital and the University of Amsterdam’s faculty of medicine had formed a single 
organization in 1994, making the AMC the first UMC in the Netherlands. The AMC is 
one of the largest of the eight university medical centers (UMC) in the Netherlands and 
has had in 2013 almost 7000 employees (AMC, Annual account 2013).
As a UMC, the AMC has three principal tasks: patient care, research, and education. 
Its primary task is, of course, the treatment of patients. With regard to patient care, the 
AMC provides three categories of patient care: basic care, tertiary care, and top referral 
care (AMC, Annual account 2014). Perhaps the most characteristic quality of the 
AMC is its diversity and social engagement. This diversity is due partly to the inherent 
multicultural nature of the immediate surrounding area served by the AMC, with a 
population that included about 120 different nationalities. Within the AMC, this richly 
diverse patient population is complemented by the wide variety of treatment methods, 
research areas, study programs and types of education. Especially to the residents in 
the immediate vicinity (South-East Amsterdam) the AMC offers basic care. To the 
residents of the province of North (-East) Holland, Flevoland, and part of the province 
of Utrecht, the AMC offers highly specialized clinical care. The clinical functions of the 
AMC included open heart surgery, IVF, kidney dialysis, and organ transplants. About 
60% of the care of the AMC is top referral care. For this care, patients are referred by 
general practitioners and specialists from all over the Netherlands and beyond. The focal 
points of the AMC includes among other things: cardiovascular disease, immunology 
and infectious diseases, gynecological oncology, specialized care in early pregnancy, and 
pediatric oncology. This wide range of patients is of great importance for the quality 
of the education of medical students. In the course of time, patient care at the AMC 
has shifted more and more towards highly complex, low volume treatments. This trend 
was also welcomed by health insurers. This happened in order to create capacity for 
the tertiary care and at the same time to quickly help patients who need elective basic 
care. To realize this, the AMC has entered into partnerships with several hospitals and 
independent treatment centers (ZBCs), such as the Flevoziekenhuis and the VUmc. 
Organization 
Management principles
To date, the organizational structure of the AMC is based on six principles (AMC, 
Structuurnota 2013) that are meant to guide the organization and control of the AMC. 
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First, at all levels of the organization, the management teams are led by professionals, 
medical specialists, scientists, and nurses (principle: ‘professional in the lead’). They 
are expected, based on their knowledge and involvement in the primary process, to 
make the right decisions. Part of this principle is that the professionals who are active 
in management remained active in at least one and preferably more of the core tasks, 
which are patient care, education, or research.  Second, decisions are taken at the 
lowest possible level in the organization, because there, close to the operation, tasks 
and resources can be balanced best (principle: decentralize where possible, centralize 
where necessary). The central level concerns strategic issues and frameworks for the 
division and departments, for example, in the area of financial management, human 
resources, and quality. Third, managers are responsible for the realization of all the 
goals and the use of all resources (for finance and personnel) of their unit and had the 
power and budgets to take full responsibility (principle: integral management). Fourth, 
although departments and divisions have their own interests, ultimately the importance 
of the AMC prevails (principle: collaboration). Cooperation and shared responsibility 
are ultimately more important than competition. Fifth, employees must know who is 
responsible, how relevant decisions are made and what considerations have played a role 
(principle: transparency). The sixth principle is that the allocation of tasks and resources 
follows the organizational structure and the associated responsibilities (principle: 
planning and cycle follow the organizational structure).
Central management 
The top management of the AMC is formed by a Board of Directors and a supervisory 
board. The supervisory board has a more indirect role in checking and monitoring the 
processes of the overall organization. The Board of Directors consists generally of three 
members: the chairman6, one vice chairman, and one general member. The AMC has 
a divisional structure where responsibility for medical and financial policy has been 
delegated to division boards and medical specialties. The Board of Directors sets strategic 
frameworks, and then operates mostly in a facilitative role to divisions. The Board of 
Directors is supported by a staff department that consists of several directorates such as 
Finance and Control (F & C) and Patient Care (PC). 
The F & C department advises the Board of Directors, divisions, and services about 
financial and economic topics and negotiated with ministries, the University of 
Amsterdam, banks, and insurance companies on the financial framework of the AMC. 
The director of F & C performs the role of concern controller and is responsible for 
giving directives on the administrative structure and management reporting for all 
relevant business processes within the AMC. The F & C department consists of two sub-
6 The chairman is  also dean for the Faculty of Medicine.
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departments; Sales, and Planning and Control (P & C), and there is one Coordinator
 of Management Information. The Sales department defines the sales strategy and makes 
agreements with insurers on the production of the AMC. The P & C department is 
responsible for the design and implementation of the Planning and Control process 
of the AMC, such as drafting the AMC budget, generating periodic reports on the 
realization of the budget, and performing control operations for the benefit of the 
quarterly meetings of the divisions and services with the Board of Directors. The 
Coordinator of Management Information7 supports these sub-departments with the 
appropriate information and is responsible for the coordination of the hospital-wide 
management information. The directorate of Patient Care facilitates professionals in 
order to provide good patient care in the hospital. The directorate is managed by a 
medical director who is engaged in various hospital-wide medical issues and advises the 
care suppliers in many areas. 
Management of divisions
The AMC has ten divisions that are supported centrally by corporate staff and facility 
services. The three principal tasks come together under these divisions. Each division 
consists of a number of medical specialties or a support service such as laboratories. 
Every division is managed by a Division Board. The Division Board is, within the 
objectives set by the Board of Directors and taking into account the responsibilities 
of the chief physicians for the content of the core tasks, responsible for the core tasks 
within the division and the associated responsibilities for the management of operations. 
The Division Board consists of a division chairman, nursing director, and director of 
operations. The underlying medical specialties are semi-autonomous and self-managed 
entities, although this freedom is restricted by financial borders. Every division has a 
business administration. The division chairman has overall responsibility for patient 
care, research, and education within the division. This applies not only with respect 
to the chief, but also in relation to the nursing director and director of operations. The 
director of nursing is responsible for the nursing policy. Bearing in mind the principle of 
‘professional in the lead’ and given the fact that it is expected of directors that they have 
an ‘exemplary role’ in the organization, the division chairmen and directors of nursing 
are active in one or more of the primary processes of the AMC. The director of operations 
is responsible for topics such as finance, HR, IT, and buildings.
Management of medical specialties 
Every medical specialty is managed by a chief physician. The chief physician, who is 
usually a professor, is in charge of his/her staff group (Witman, 2008). The size of a staff 
group ranges from four to about thirty registered specialists. Large staff groups often 
7 The author of this thesis was Coordinator of Management Information between 2006 and 2012.
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consist of sub-specialties including sub-chief physicians. Chief physicians have both
professional and administrative roles. With regard to the professional role, the chief 
physicians are, taking into account the responsibilities of the Board of Directors and the 
division board, responsible for the patient on his/her medical field. The chief physician 
is also responsible for teaching and research carried out by the staff members and for 
the training of physician assistants. Within the clinic as a whole, and in particular in the 
treatment area in which the chief is a specialist, he or she has  a substantial (indirect) 
influence on the ‘house practice’ in the treatment of particular groups of patients. 
The administrative role of the chief physician has both an operational and a strategic 
component. In the day-to-day operation of the clinic, the chief is frequently involved 
in decisions concerning the allocation of (personnel) resources. Over the longer term, 
the chief physician takes the lead in the preparation of the annual plan for their own 
specialty. The specialty can delegate some of those tasks to sub chief physicians and/or a 
teacher. The extent to which this occurred depends strongly on the sub-specialization 
within the field and the size of the specialty. Because of the special responsibility for all 
core tasks, the chief physicians has direct access to the Board of Directors at all times, 
provided that this is done with the knowledge of, and in consultation with, the Division 
Board.
Management of the medical departments
Within the division, the core tasks are performed in medical departments such as 
nursing departments and outpatient clinics. These departments often work for multiple 
medical specialties. The medical departments are managed by the so-called ´workplace 
management´ consisting of a chief workplace and a head nurse. The workplace chief is 
hierarchically the manager of the head nurse. Financial and production budgets are 
usually set at the level of the medical departments. The head nurse is responsible for the 
nursing care within the department. The workplace chief and the head nurse are jointly 
responsible for the outcome of their unit and acted as a team. 
Organization culture 
In 2010, a survey was carried out to measure the personal values  of employees of the 
AMC, the current organizational values,  and the desired organizational values (AMC, 
Strategic Aims 2011 - 2015). The results indicated that AMC employees saw themselves 
as reliable people with dedication to, and responsibility for, their work; people with a 
happy, cheerful approach that made fundamental choices; people who explored new 
ideas to expand their skills and knowledge to perform well and to achieve quality; people 
with dedication and a passion for work. The results also showed that the AMC culture 
had several limiting aspects such as bureaucracy, rigid systems and processes, kingdoms, 
and short-term focus. 
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Finance 
The finances of the AMC are illustrated by reference to the income statement in 2013, 
see Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Income statement of the AMC 2013
Operating income 2013 k€ % of total Operating expenses 2013 k€
% of 
total
Turnover DBC B segment 270.219 31% Personnel costs 495.455 59%
Turnover DBC A segment 152.113 17% Depreciation of fixed assets 46.828 6%
Government grant workplace 
function 143.812 17% Other operating expenses 280.651 33%
Government grant training 
fund 55.766 6%
Financial income and 
expenses 18.419 2%
Government grant academic 
budget 103.402 12%
Other services 88.639 10%
Availability function trauma 
services 7.127 1%
Transition funding 49.802 6%
Total 870.880 100% Total 841.353 100%
In 2013, the AMC received k€ 422.332 for the DBC production, mainly by the health 
care insurance companies. This income was fully related to the volumes and types of 
DBC produced and were thus variable. The AMC also received fixed amounts for other 
services consisting of k€ 7.127 for the trauma function and  k€ 80.300 of the academic 
budget to compensate the excess costs of academic functions as care for complicated or 
specific patients, and research and innovation. The government’s ‘workplace function’ 
grant was also a fixed amount and came from the Ministry of Education. It was meant 
to cover the costs related to the workplace for medical students (education) and 
research, like the cost of buildings and sites, medical and inventory costs, and costs 
associated with delays. The amounts were in fact ‘historical’ and didn’t change much 
from one year to another. The training fund was a government grant that came from 
the Ministry of Education and was meant to cover the cost for teaching physicians and 
so it varied with the number of physicians in training. The other services come from 
the following external funds: industry, the Dutch organization for scientific research, 
private donations, legacies, and charity funds. The variability in the income of the AMC 
had increased since 2006 due to the introduction of the new reimbursement system (see 
Section 2.5), but slower than originally expected because of its delayed implementation. 
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In 2012, it was calculated that without transition funding the revenue of the AMC would 
decrease by € 70 million through the introduction of performance-based budgeting. 
To bridge this gap, the AMC used the transition period to participate nationwide in 
improving the DBC product structure and the internal registration. An efficiency 
program (SLIM) was also deployed (this will be discussed further in Section 6.3.2) with 
the aims of optimizing care processes and reducing cost by more effective and efficient 
outpatient clinics, optimization of logistic processes, and lowering purchase prices. 
Negotiations with health insurers
Until 2012, agreements were made with five (groups of) insurers about both the budget 
(in the A segment) and the DBCs in the B segment (the freely negotiable segment), see 
Section 2.5. The term ‘freely negotiable’ was slightly misleading, because in reality the 
possibilities for negotiation were rather limited. In fact, all insurers took past budgets as a 
starting point for the negotiations, regardless of the actual demand for care and number of 
DBCs. Since 2012, the agreements were made about the total contracted sum and about 
the volume and types of DBCs in the A and B segment that make up that sum. Other topics 
in the negotiations include the space for growth in production, (expensive) medicines, 
and debt servicing. There was relatively little attention to the content and quality of care. 
Often agreements were first made about the total contracting sum and then accordingly, 
agreements were made about the number and prices of the DBCs which added up to the 
contracting sum. As a result, the revenues of the UMCs were more or less guaranteed. In 
2013, more than one third of the income of the AMC still had a predominantly lump-sum 
character (academic budget, government grants), although more and more agreements 
were made about accountability by means of performance. However, each year it turned 
out to be a huge effort to agree on thousands of DBCs with each health insurer about 
volume, prices, and quality. Because of the complexity of the DBC system, it took every 
year long to finalize initial agreements with insurers regarding volumes and prices per care 
product for the current year and this hardly improved in the course of time. It took even 
longer for agreements with all insurers to be finalized. Subsequently, it was labor-intensive 
to process the agreed prices and volumes in the computer systems. As a result,  it took up 
six to ten months before the first care products were invoiced to the health insurers and the 
revenues became visible in the CMI (see Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4: Number of months after which care products could be billed for the first time, 
2006 - 2014
Financial Administration AMC
As a result, there were no actual DBC prices available during most of the year and users 
had no idea about the financial coverage of their patient groups. Because of this method 
and the constant changes in the product structure, the DBC prices for a care product 
could fluctuate enormously per year.
Planning & Control cycle
As mentioned earlier, the Finance and Control department (F & C) is responsible for 
the design and implementation of the AMC’s Planning and Control process. To date, 
the Planning and Control cycle consists of several stages, see Figure 2.5.
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Figure 2.5: Planning and Control cycle of the AMC
Within the Planning and Control cycle, different parties fulfill different roles at different 
stages. Every five years, the AMC defines its strategic goals. The strategic objectives 
constitute the framework for the annual plans and budgets of the divisions and are the 
starting point for the Planning and Control cycle. Each year, generally between April 
and August, the Board of Directors drafts a so-called budget letter. This letter indicates 
what the budgets will be with regard to finance and medical production and the internal 
budgeting principles for the next year and is the starting point for the divisions and 
services to define their annual plans. The content of the budget letter is determined 
by the strategic aims, and external and internal developments, such as the external 
reimbursement and financial situation. In general, the budget letter relates to topics 
such as core tasks, finance, investments, human resources, and business operations, and 
contains instructions for the drafting of the annual plans of the divisions and services. 
In line with the management principle ‘professional in the lead’, the chief physicians and 
division managers are in charge of defining the annual plans. 
The planning phase consists of analyzing (like gaining insight into current case-mix 
and performance), decision making (like desired case-mix and care processes), and 
translating these decisions into a (division) planning. It takes place between September 
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and November. Generally, the annual plans are first defined by the individual medical 
specialties and departments and accordingly integrated into a division plan. The division 
plans are assessed at corporate level by the Board of Directors and the F & C department 
and they finally fix the budgets for the divisions and services. The divisions allocate 
the budget within their division, the medical departments, and supporting services. 
Divisions have much freedom in how they allocate the budgets and therefore there are 
major differences between divisions, for example, regarding the level of detail of the 
budgets. Some medical supporting departments (such as the laboratory, operating room, 
and imaging) are allowed to charge the cost of their services to the clinical divisions. 
Over the years, the internal settlement of services has expanded in the belief that this 
would trigger the clinical divisions to use these services more efficiently and effectively. 
The division plans are implemented during the year. 
Monitoring takes place both at divisional and corporate level. The divisions monitor 
the extent to which the medical policy is realized during the year, for example with 
regard to volumes, top referral care, waiting times, length of stay, financial coverage, 
and to determine where adjustments are needed. The Board of Directors and 
F & C department monitor the extent to which the forecasted medical production and 
revenues match with the agreements with the health insurers. Every year, the F & C 
department drafts the reporting letter in which is defined what and when divisions and 
services should report to the Board of Directors (internal legitimization). In general, 
the F & C department reports quarterly about the realization and forecast whit regard 
to finance and production, relevant developments in core tasks, quality, and HR. For 
this purpose, a model set for the reports has been defined by the F & C department. In 
general, the managers of the divisions and services have a quarterly meeting with the 
Board of Directors to discuss the quarterly report. After the end of the year, the annual 
accounts are prepared (external legitimization).
Strategic Planning & Control cycle
In addition to the annual Planning & Control cycle, long term policy plans are  also 
defined by the medical specialties, mostly for three years, some for five or seven years. 
These policy plans describes the priorities concerning research, patient care, and 
education and generally form the basis for the annual Planning & Control cycle. The 
way in which the long term plans are defined, differed from each other with regard to 
frequency, detail, and participation of staff members. Some chief physicians do this 
extensively and in consultation with staff members. Others define their long term policy 
on their own and in general terms. Generally speaking, the same steps are passed through 
as in the annual Planning and Control cycle, but there is more emphasis placed on some 
stages (like decision-making) than others (like legitimization).
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Internal budgeting
Until 2012, the internal budgeting system of the AMC could be characterized as a 
combination of input budgeting (historic budget) and output budgeting. The income 
of the clinical divisions consisted both of a historic budget and of revenues based on 
medical production. The historic budgets were mainly calculated through the use of 
historical cost data, which were adjusted by inflation, in what could be understood as 
an incremental process. Larger investments were treated as separate cases in the budgets 
and decisions were taken by the investment committee. When the DBC system was 
introduced in 2005, the AMC started coupling the internal budget partially to the 
external revenues for the care products in the B segment. Divisions received 40% of the 
external turnover. This percentage was calculated as being the direct cost of the divisions. 
For the production of the A segment, the divisions received an internal rate for the 
regular production parameters and the WBMV operations (output). This method of 
internal budgeting was in place until 2011. 
For 2012 and afterwards, the intention was to introduce full internal output budgeting 
by coupling the internal budgets to the external revenues of the DBC production in 
the A and B segment, but this failed (this failing will be further discussed in Section 
6.3.2). The problem was that because the continuous and dramatic changes in the DBC 
product structures and associated selling prices in the past years, there were too little 
(comparable) data and too many uncertainties to implement output budgeting in a 
responsible way. Various alternatives for output budgeting have been examined, like 
the continuation of the old internal budgeting system and the option to couple the 
internal budget for just a small percentage of the DBC revenues, but these options 
were discarded. The result has been that since 2012, no output budgeting has taken 
place, excluding some medical production where specific recalculations were agreed 
with insurers (for example expensive drugs and transplants). In some cases, additional 
budgets were given to divisions based on growth proposals made at the beginning of the 
budget year. This led to the paradoxical situation that at the time when the AMC was 
not externally funded on the basis of DBCs (2005–2011) there was already a form of 
internal output budgeting, but  at the moment  when the AMC was finally externally 
funded on DBCs the internally output budgeting was abolished! 
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Management information
Shortcomings in management information about patient care
As described in Section 1.3, before the introduction of the health care reforms in 2006, 
management information on patient care at the AMC had several shortcomings.  First, 
the information was, like in most other hospitals, mainly focused on global and finance 
related issues such as costs and budget parameters, like number of admissions, patient 
days, and outpatient visits, but hardly focused on the content and relevance of care. The 
information was also only available at the level of medical specialty or department, not 
at the individual patient or doctor level. Second, several types of information such as 
process, quality or financial information came from different sources and were expressed 
in different languages (like products, procedures, diagnoses), so it was hardly possible 
to link these types of information with each other. There was no tool to translate 
(qualitative) medical policy into quantitative financial or capacity planning. Third, the 
information, for example, with regard to volumes and finance, only related to the past 
(realization), not to the future (forecasts). There were hardly any comparisons between 
specialties (internal benchmarking) and other hospitals (external benchmarking). 
Fourth, the information was not easily accessible. Information was often spread over 
different systems, where users were often dependent on IT professionals. Besides, many 
types of information were not validated so the quality was insufficient or unknown. 
Finally, many users of the information did not have sufficient knowledge and experience 
to use the information in a responsible manner. 
The project ‘Patient Care Profiles’ (2002 - 2005)
As the pressure on capacity and finance increased, the need for more and better 
management information strengthened. As a response to this, the Board of Directors 
decided in 2002 to design a new information product called ‘Patient Care Profiles.’ A 
Patient Care Profile described a patient population of the AMC that was treated under 
the purpose of one or more of the core tasks: patient care, research, training and/or 
education. The product was in fact a database with definitions and quantifications of 
the patient groups defined by the medical specialties. The aim of the product was to 
provide information on what strategy should be followed, based on substantive choices 
regarding patients, and to serve as input for patient-oriented logistics and long term 
housing. To design this product, a pilot was launched in 2002 consisting of eight 
medical specialties. The pilot group defined a minimal dataset which described what 
kind of information should be collected about patient groups by the medical specialties. 
Based on the positive experiences of the pilot specialties, all clinical specialties of the 
AMC were asked to indicate which patient groups were considered relevant for their 
patient care, research, and education. In 2003, most clinical specialties have defined 
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their patient groups. This involved a total of 304 groups. The results were incorporated 
into a database and were made available via the intranet.
Although most specialties had participated, the usefulness of this type of information 
was limited. First, the patient groups were defined only in qualitative and general terms. 
Therefore the formulated medical policy could not be quantified. That means that 
it was not possible to assess whether the intended medical policy had actually been 
realized.  Second, there was a missing link between medical and financial policy. In 
an ideal situation, medical policy is derived from the strategic aims of the AMC and 
accordingly, the financial and economic policies are derived from the medical policy of 
the medical specialties. With the patient resource use profiles there was only a limited 
relationship established between these two policies: they were independently established 
in a different language, and a tool for unambiguous translation was lacking. So, the 
consequences of the medical content policy in terms of the required capacity and money 
could not be quantified. To solve this problem, an appropriate and comprehensive case-
mix system was needed. 
In 2005, the pressure on resources further increased. For that year, a budget deficit of € 
6.6 million was predicted, and for 2006 a deficit of € 12 million (AMC, Budget letter 
2005) because of external budget cuts and the introduction of the DBCs. Since the 
Board of Directors aimed to realize a positive profit margin of 2% in 2006, a budget 
surplus of roughly € 20 million was required. In order to realize this, several initiatives 
were announced that were aimed at increasing revenues, reducing costs per patient, and 
the creation of an optimal patient mix. One of these initiatives was to further design and 
implement the instrument ‘Patient Care Profiles,’ see the quotation below: 
We have succeeded in identifying and quantifying the ´Patient Care Profiles´ for the major patient 
groups. A further refinement of this control mechanism will be needed to perpetuate our strategic 
choices, in particular for scientific research. The DBC system should make it easier to quantify 
patient care into diagnosis groups. The gain to be achieved is that the AMC Patient Care Profiles can 
be linked to capacity and cost calculations, by which negotiations with insurers will get more power. 
Then it will be easier to allocate the people and resources internally as agreed with the health insurers 
(AMC, Strategic Aims 2006 – 2010).
The adoption of a case-mix information system
In 2006, the Board of Directors requested the F & C department to evaluate the 
instrument ‘Patient Care Profiles.’ Based on this evaluation, the F & C department 
started by drafting a project plan for the transformation of the Patient Care Profiles, into 
a structural case-mix information system (CMI). Because of the lack of scientific and 
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practical knowledge about these systems in Dutch university medical centers and the 
uncertainty about the effects of it on the behavior of people and the organization (see also 
Sections 1.2 and 1.3), it was concluded that the process of design and implementation 
and outcome evaluation had to be conducted on base of scientific research. The project 
leader wrote a research proposal and discussed this proposal with six chief physicians 
in the AMC, the chairman of the Board of Directors, and experts outside the AMC. 
The discussions confirmed that the lack of a good information system guiding rational 
decision management and decision control was perceived as a problem and that the 
development of a comprehensive CMI warranted a scientific approach. 


Chapter 3
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Abstract
In 2008 and 2014 a comprehensive literature review regarding (case-mix) information 
systems was conducted. In this chapter, the major findings are summarized. For this 
review, 114 publications were retrieved consisting of empirical studies, contemplative 
articles, dissertations, and books. The publications focused on the outcomes of (case-
mix) information systems and on the impact of factors that may determine the success 
or failure of these innovations in organizations. In the literature there were stories of 
failure and success of (case-mix) information systems. Some implementations were 
successful and led to positive outcomes, such as better informed choices, increasing 
cost consciousness, rationalizing of operating processes, better legitimization, and 
cost reductions. But many implementations failed and led to negative effects, such 
as increasing conflict between the hospital board and hospital managers, information 
overload for the users, and the fear that the quality of care might be adversely affected. 
Based on the literature review, five factors were identified that might affect the failure 
or success of CMIs: characteristics of the design and implementation of the CMI, the 
target group of (hospital) managers, the (hospital) organization, and the environment.
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of the (management accounting) literature about 
(case-mix) information systems in (hospital) organizations. Section 3.2 describes how 
the literature search took place. Section 3.3 focuses on the various outcomes of (case-
mix) information systems in terms of adoption, use and effects. Section 3.4 gives an 
overview of the main factors determining the failure or success of CMIs. 
 
3.2 Literature search 
Literature search
A comprehensive literature search was conducted in 2008 and in 2014 through Pub 
Med, Medline, Embase, EconLit, and Science Direct for articles in English and Dutch 
with the search terms listed in Box 3.1. 
Box 3.1: List of keywords
The literature search was done by a clinical librarian of the AMC and the researcher 
himself. Reference lists were checked for additional articles, with a specific focus on the 
top journals in management accounting (e.g., Accounting, Organization and Society, 
Management Accounting Research, and Financial Accountability and Management). 
Retrieved publications were screened by their title and abstract and if judged as relevant 
for the study the full text was evaluated in detail. Eventually, 124 publications were 
considered as relevant for this study consisting of 89 empirical studies, 28 twenty-eight 
contemplative articles, 2 dissertations and 5 books. 
From the 124 publications, 10 related to research methodology, particularly to design 
oriented research, the constructive approach and the value of qualitative research in 
the management accounting discipline. The most important findings of the literature 
activity based costing (ABC), (case-mix) information (system), clinical accounting, (cost) accounting 
system, (clinical) guidelines, constructive approach, cost-benefit analysis, cost control, decision 
making (process), cure, DBC system, design, design oriented research, (doctor) (physician) manager, 
DRG (system), economics, health care (sector), hospital (departments), hospital reimbursement, 
implementation, information system, internal budgeting, management control, non-profit 
(organizations), physician behavior, priority setting, qualitative research, rationing of care, (strategic)
(tactical), unit cost calculation, (university) hospital
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review concerning research methodology are summarized in Chapter 4. The other 114 
publications related to the design and implementation of information innovations in 
a broad sense. From these publications, 22 focused specifically on (Diagnosis Related 
Groups based) case-mix information systems (CMIs) in other countries like Sweden, 
New-Zealand, and the United States. There were no scientific papers found about CMIs 
based on the DBC product structure in the Netherlands. Two dissertations were retrieved 
about the impact of the Dutch DBC system on hospitals. Accordingly, 56 publications 
on other information systems were found, both within the hospital sector and in 
industry, such as (accounting) information systems, (activity based) costing systems and 
balanced scorecards. Although these systems were not fully comparable to CMIs, where 
financial and medical information are integrated, much scientific knowledge about these 
innovations appeared to be useful for this study.  Ten publications related to the medical 
manager, eight related to decision making processes and the remaining 16 publications 
on various topics as the implementation of clinical guidelines, the DBC system and new 
public management. 
From the 114 publications, 10 publications focused primarily on the outcomes of (case-
mix) information innovations in terms of adoption, use and effects of use. The main 
findings of these studies are presented in Section 3.3. A total of 98 publications studied 
the impact of factors that may determine the success or failure of (case-mix) information 
innovations in organizations. The major findings of these studies are presented in Section 
3.4.
3.3 The outcomes of (case-mix) information systems in hospitals
Lehtonen (2007) described the successful implementation of a DRG-based CMI 
in a university hospital in Finland.  He defined a CMI successful when, from the 
management’s point of view, the positive effects outweighed the negative effects. From 
the CMI, a wide range of reports could be generated. Information on outputs, resource 
usage, revenues, and costs could be produced at different levels of aggregation, such as 
by clinical specialty and patient group. It was also possible to track individual patient 
treatment processes on the basis of costs or services provided. The system was used 
for Planning and Control purposes and led to positive results like more control of the 
costs and more cost awareness. The clinical and financial performance was regularly 
monitored and discussed by the management teams. The use of a CMI encouraged 
the rationalization of operations and finally led to improved operating processes. The 
reason for this was that departments started rethinking the processes when analyzing the 
financial results. By benchmarking cost, cost variation declined and treatment procedures 
were standardized. It seemed that the quality of care was not adversely affected. 
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Also Lowe (20001) provided evidence that the implementation of a DRG-based CMI 
(called Transition) within a large New Zealand hospital had significant constitutive 
effects within the organization, such as changes in patient management procedures, 
hospital management structures, and other decisions affecting the allocation of resources. 
The data came to play a significant role in decisions within the institution. Medical 
practice had been impacted through reductions in inpatient treatment, length of stay, 
and hospital operating procedures. It contributed to ‘new discursive spaces for action’ 
that meant that it provided new opportunities to various groups in the hospital to frame 
issues and justify or resist resourcing changes (Lowe & Doolin, 1999). It provided 
additional information for decision-making, which allowed other groups to issue 
counter arguments. Clinicians were given the opportunity to confront management 
with new ‘facts’. However, they also manipulated the information and used the rhetoric 
of case-mix systems, diverting disciplinary practices to their own ends. 
Furthermore, several positive outcomes from the implementation of similar information 
innovations in hospitals were described. Abernethy and Vagnoni (2004) examined the 
impact of the use of accounting information systems by physician managers in large 
public teaching hospitals in Italy. The results demonstrate that their use resulted in 
increased cost-consciousness and led to a decline of usage of intermediate services (such 
as laboratory tests, X-rays). Finally, Hill (2000) examined the effects of the adoption of 
cost information systems in 587 hospitals in the United States. He concluded that with 
adequately detailed cost information, hospitals could make better informed choices that 
increase quality of care and/or net income.  Hospitals with sophisticated costing systems 
were also better able to use the information for ‘ammunition’ to obtain additional 
funding for their case (external legitimization). 
However, there were also studies where the outcomes were in contrast with the ones 
mentioned above. Lowe & Doolin (1999) examined, for example, the impact of 
the implementation of a CMI within another New Zealand hospital. The CMI was 
implemented in an attempt to involve clinicians in managing resources through the 
imposition of clinical budgets. The intention of the CMI was to enable clinicians 
to enter into processes of peer review. Besides, the CMI offered opportunities for 
producing standard protocols for clinical practice.  Examples of clinical case-mix 
information included measures of length of stay, same day admissions, and day surgery 
versus clinical surgery. Various reports and graphs were used to interest potential users 
in the range of information available. It could be used to produce inscriptions that 
would enable processes of peer pressure to operate among clinicians through the dual 
strategies of peer review and the development of standard protocols for clinical practice. 
The intention was often expressed in positive and non-threatening terms such as the 
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desire to empower clinicians to be part of management. Despite these good intentions, 
it led to many disputes. With a few exceptions, the clinicians had a poor opinion of the 
validity of the case-mix information and expressed little interest in using it to inform 
their practice. The accuracy of the system was questioned and, more fundamentally, the 
data that the system provided might be interpreted in different ways. Furthermore, the 
system provided some controlling influence but it also produced resistance. From the 
doctor’s perspective, concern over the case-mix information arose from the uncertainty 
over the processing and use of the system. There was reluctance on the part of doctors 
to use a tool provided by management. Many doctors felt that the information would 
be used to justify management decisions on financial grounds while ignoring clinical 
issues. There was reluctance on the part of clinicians to have their practice scrutinized 
and their clinical freedom potentially infringed upon. Continued resistance to case-
mix management (including limited uptake of clinical case-mix information) by most 
doctors, and reluctance by managers to challenge the long tradition of medical privilege 
and autonomy, meant that senior management did not enforce the use of case-mix 
information across the organization. Their power meant that they were able to divert 
the CMI towards their own ends, principally in arguing for more resources. According 
to Abernethy (2007), the information system can shift power from medical professions 
to administrators and funders. The information can potentially be used instead of an 
explicit contract to control physician behavior. Presenting physicians with data on their 
own costs, along with comparative cost, and operational information provides some 
incentive to modify their behavior. This may lead clinicians to see this as a subversion of 
their professional judgment and as an unnecessary incursion into their jurisdiction. This 
may lead to resistance and tensions between clinicians and technocrats and to system 
failure. 
Finally, there were some studies which demonstrated that the implementation of (case-
mix) accounting systems hardly influenced the internal processes within an organization. 
Jones & Dewing (1997) conducted a study in one of the largest emergency hospitals in 
Britain. They concluded that accounting changes associated with national health care 
reforms played only a modest role in helping medical staff to make sense of events. 
Clinicians adopted various strategies to address the tension between the logic of 
management and a long exiting professional logic.  These included distancing themselves 
from accounting information by claiming that their understanding of information was 
poor. Their resistance  against this information was increased because it became symbolic 
of New Public Management reforms that were presented as politically inspired and that 
were contrary to the spirit of a health service for the entire population. The study of 
Jones & Dewing shows how the most significant impact has been the enabling of top 
management to exercise overall financial control in response to imposed changes, rather 
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than in supporting a robust system of decentralized responsibility and decision making. 
According to Lowe (20001), administrative and accounting system changes have failed 
to produce other than superficial effects on the workings of health sector institutions. 
Also, Covaleski et al (1993) concluded that in the US, the case-mix systems had little 
impact within the organization and that these systems appear to be predominantly 
externally oriented. These failures were explained by the decoupling phenomenon which 
means that many (case-mix) accounting systems are mainly externally directed to achieve 
legitimation in the institutional environment, but are not able to faithfully represent the 
complexities and indeterminacies of internal operating processes.
Conclusion
From the literature reviewed it can be concluded that the outcomes of (case-mix) 
information systems showed substantial variation, ranging from beneficial to harmful 
outcomes. Beneficial outcomes were: more cost awareness, the rationalization of care 
processes, less cost variation, a decline of usage of intermediate services, new discursive 
space for action, better informed choices, better legitimization of resource consumption 
and more funding. Harmful consequences were: power struggles, fear to lose clinical 
autonomy, distrust and disputes about the data and information overload.  Sometimes 
this type of information had little impact on the organization. According to Lehtonen 
(2007), we are left with a partial picture and incomplete explanations of the outcomes of 
case-mix accounting (systems). In general, too little research has been done to study the 
effects of case-mix accounting (systems) in different contexts. Many important research 
topics have therefore been left unexplored, conflicting results have been unresolved, 
and a consensus on the performance benefits unattained. For a better understanding 
we therefore need to investigate case-mix information systems in a more detailed way. 
3.4 Factors determining the success of (case-mix) information systems 
As mentioned earlier, there were 114 publications found on the design and 
implementation of (case-mix) information innovations in (hospital) organizations and 
the factors that may have impact on its success. 
Shields & Young developed a comprehensive theoretical model about the implementation 
of cost management systems (Shields, 1995). This model treats the implementation of 
a cost management system as being an administrative innovation in an organization 
in which the success of the implementation depends on how well it deals with specific 
behavioral variables. The assumption underpinning this model is that the implementation 
of a cost management system is not only a technical innovation in the organization. This 
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distinction between administrative and technical innovations is important because the 
adoption decision and the success of the implementation of the former are determined 
more by particular behavioral and organizational variables, whereas for the latter they 
are determined more by economical and technical considerations.  
Gordon & Miller (1976) took a contingency approach on the design of accounting 
information systems by taking the environment, organizational attributes, and 
managerial decision-making styles into account.  
Grol (1997, 2001) identified six group factors that are relevant for a successful design 
and implementation of clinical guidelines, namely the: the characteristics of: the target 
group, the innovation, the social-organizational context, the economic context, the 
patient, and the implementation strategy. This is relevant to this study, because both 
clinical guidelines and CMIs are about implementing innovations for doctors (or doctor 
managers) with the aim of changing their behavior. 
On the basis of the above mentioned studies, we identified five groups of success factors 
to be relevant for this study that may be aggregated in two groups of success factors: 
design and implementation factors and organizational and environmental factors see 
Table 3.1.  The most relevant findings in literature are these groups of success factors and 
they are described per subsection.
Table 3.1: Relevant groups of success factors for (case-mix) information systems
Group of suc-
cess factor Factor Relevance for this research
Sub 
section
Design and 
implementation 
factors
Design of 
the  (case-mix) 
information system
Functions, design characteristics, design 
strategies 3.4.1
Implementation 
of the (case-mix) 
information system
Types of implementation strategies 3.4.2
Organizational 
and 
environmental 
factors
Target group (Medical) hospital managers 3.4.3
(Hospital) 
organization
Behavioral and organizational variables, 
organization structure, and power relations 3.4.4
Environment Competition and financial pressure, Institutional pressure 3.4.5
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3.4.1 The design of the (case-mix) information system
Accounting systems have become an instrument to serve different purposes for various 
stakeholders in the organization (Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004). While (case-mix) 
accounting systems are generally implemented for cost containment purposes, several 
studies in management accounting have illustrated the non-rational nature of it as well 
as the multiple functions that the system might serve once implemented. In fact, they 
are the carriers of two different types of logic at the same time: the means-end logic, 
which is the basis of efficiency rhetoric, and the legitimation and cultural logic, which is 
the foundation of institutional aspects (Scarparo, 2006). 
The following functions are further explained below: a) legitimization function, 
b) decision management and control function, and c) organization learning and control 
function. 
a)  Legitimization function
As described in the previous section, organizations can adopt (case-mix accounting) 
systems to conform to societal expectations. It this case it fulfills the legitimization 
function. These systems can provide the image of rationality that helps an organization 
to avoid the extremes of funding cuts, in part by providing a clear justification for 
expenditure (Lowe & Doolin, 1999). The extent to which these systems accordingly will 
be used, and will influence internal organizational practices, will depend on the power 
of the organizational actors’ translation and use of societal expectations (Covaleski, 
1993). In other words, if the system is only used for legitimation purposes towards the 
environment, the system has only a symbolic function. Furthermore, the system can be 
used as ‘ammunition’ to obtain additional resources not only from the hospitals budget 
but also to gain funds from or external constituents (Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004). 
b)  Decision management and control function
The objectives of case-mix accounting systems can also be to provide a complete financial 
picture of the costs of treating individual patients and the cost of treating different 
patient groups to increase operational efficiency (Abernethy et al 2007; Lehtonen, 2007). 
This information can be used to facilitate decision-making by providing information to 
reduce ex ante uncertainty (decision management) and to control behavior (decision 
control). 
With regard to the decision management function, case-mix accounting systems enable 
decision-makers to improve their actions and choices with better-informed effort. 
They support the formulation of strategy, assist in strategy implementation, provide 
information for co-ordination of organizational activities, and facilitate organizational 
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learning (Abernethy & Brownell, 1999). During strategy formulation, the system is 
used for exploring and evaluating strategic alternatives and the viability of available 
strategies vis-a-vis the strategic needs of the organization (Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 
20071). According to March (1987), the main uncertainty in decision-making is 
portrayed as ignorance about future consequences of possible current actions, including 
ignorance about the knowledge possessed by others and their probable actions, and 
the main rationale for information is its role in reducing that uncertainty. However, 
contemporary theories of decision-making are less inclined to highlight biases in 
estimation and inference and more inclined to focus on two additional complications 
in the use of information for making decisions in organizations, those of bounded 
rationality and conflict of interest. The fundamental idea of limited rationality is that 
not everything can be known, that decision-making is based on incomplete information 
about alternatives and their consequences. The fundamental idea of conflict of interest is 
that an organization is a coalition of individuals and groups pursuing different objectives. 
As a result, information in organizations is not innocent. Accounting and accounting 
standards are arenas of power politics. As a result, a good information strategy is not so 
much one that removes uncertainty from a pre-structured array of decision alternatives 
connected to a pre-determined array of preferences, as it is one that moves the whole 
apparatus of information, desires, and options in a productive direction, simultaneously 
developing ideas of what is ‘productive’ and instruments for achieving it.
With regard to the decision control function, case-mix accounting systems increase the 
transparency of professional knowledge, expertise, and work processes (Doolin, 19991). 
Scrutinizing clinical procedures and explicitly linking patient treatment decisions to 
standard costs makes clinical activity visible. It stems from the assumption that individuals 
do not act in the organization’s best interests but rather in their own (Abernethy et 
al, 2007). The objective of such information is to change subordinate behavior or 
influence the actions taken, so that organizational outcomes can be effectively achieved. 
The detailed information provided by the system offers management the possibility to 
increase control over health professionals, either directly or indirectly (Doolin, 19991). 
In some literature, case-mix accounting is presented as an attempt to normalize medical 
practice through the increased surveillance of clinicians and clinical activity (Lowe & 
Doolin, 1999; Doolin, 2004). In this case, the system acts as a ‘change agent’ (Gordon 
& Miller, 1976). In the control and feedback stages, case-mix accounting systems 
should provide information on the drivers of success as well on the causes of failures 
(Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 20071). Case-mix information systems can be used to 
legitimize and maintain systems of power as well as to redistribute power among the 
various organizational actors, for example, by delegating budgets through the system. 
The use of case-mix information systems provides a means of reinforcing the formal 
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delegation of authority. Accounting systems define financial responsibilities and thus 
can serve to reduce the role ambiguity associated with the managerial role. 
c)  Organizational learning and change function
Thompson & Tuden (Abernethy et al, 2007) developed a useful framework where the 
support of a (case-mix) accounting system in the decision-making process varies with 
respect to two key conditions: 1) uncertainty of cause and effect relations, and (2) 
ambiguity of objectives, see Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2: Thompson & Tuden’s decision-making framework
Low ambiguity of objectives High ambiguity of objectives
Low uncertainty of 
cause/ effect
Decision by computations:
‘Answer machine’
Decision by compromise:
‘Dialogue machine’
High uncertainty of 
cause/ effect
Decision by judgment:
‘Learning machine’
Decision by imagination:
‘Idea creation machine’
Abernethy et al, 2007, p. 811
Uncertainty may occur when it is not possible to predict with certainty the outcomes 
that will occur as a result of actions taken. Ambiguity of objectives generally occurs 
when there are multiple and conflicting objectives and/ or stakeholders cannot agree on 
the priorities to be placed on these objectives. For example, when there is low ambiguity 
of objectives and low uncertainty of cause and effect, decision-making is supported by 
answer machines that provide accurate, timely, and reasonably unequivocal answers. In 
hospitals, this is the case for non-medical and medical-supporting departments. But 
when there is high ambiguity of objectives and low uncertainties of cause and effect, 
decisions are made by compromise and are supported by systems such as a dialogue 
machine. 
In hospitals, this is the case in politicized environments where professional conflicts 
arise, for example, within professional groups, across professional groupings, and 
between administrators and medical staff. Dialogue machines need to be designed to 
serve as a database that can be interrogated and used to facilitate debate. When there is 
low ambiguity of objectives and high uncertainty of cause and effect, decisions are made 
by judgment and are supported by systems to learn more about the possible alternative 
means of achieving a particular outcome. The system can be used for ‘what if ’ models and 
‘sensitivity analysis’ and develops a better understanding of cause and effect relations. In 
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hospitals, this is the case in medical departments. When there is high ambiguity about 
objectives and high uncertainty of cause and effect, decisions are made by imagination 
and are supported by systems as a trigger for a creation of ideas machine. 
In the literature, accounting systems are often conceptualized as answer machines, 
but managers should move away from the answer machine role and use the system to 
support greater interaction and dialogue to encourage learning (Abernethy et al, 2007). 
This is particularly true for hospital managers who face much uncertainty when making 
decisions. 
 
With regard to the contents of the (case-mix) accounting system, different information 
dimensions can be distinguished, such as whether the information is financial/non-
financial, internal/external, or historical/future-orientated (Choe, 1998). When task 
difficulty and variability of the user of the (case-mix) accounting system are high, 
broad-scope information is required continuously to help the manager understand 
difficult tasks more clearly. Under high task difficulty, cause and effect relationships 
are not well understood, and multiple foci or aggregated information may be needed. 
According to Chong (1996), an uncertain decision context requires information set 
that is much broader than the narrow financially-oriented data provided by traditional 
management accounting systems, because this richer set can be used in the context 
of learning. Chong’s study showed that under a high task uncertainty situation, the 
extent of use of broad scope information led to effective managerial decisions and hence 
to improved managerial performance. On the other hand, under low task uncertainty 
situations, the extent of use of broad scope information led to information overload 
which was dysfunctional to managerial performance. Thus, the amount of information 
that managers use for decision-making is likely to be a function of their perceived task 
uncertainty. By shifting the terms of calculation and performance measurement from 
profession to economic, and from medical to financial, case-mix information systems 
are meant to provide a common language for policy makers, hospital management, 
and clinicians, by building up extended information transfer and discourse between 
health care financiers, and producers (Kurunmäki, 1999). As mentioned before, case-
mix accounting systems can have multiple functions for multiple stakeholders in an 
organization at the same time (Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004). For example, for managers 
it can serve as a dialogue machine but for a business analyst as an answer machine for 
controlling purposes.
Design characteristics of the case-mix information system
Contingency theory contends that a firm’s strategy, organizational structure, and 
environment, dictate its choice of control system (Chenhall, 2003). Any associated 
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benefits or drawbacks are a function of the degree of alignment between the design of 
a firm’s cost system and the specific set of circumstances the firm faces. Consistent with 
contingency theory, hospital cost-system design has been found to vary systematically 
with internal, organizational factors, and external environmental factors. When 
designing an information system for a specific hospital, these factors must be taken into 
account. 
Pizzini (2006) examined the associations between cost system functionality, managers’ 
beliefs about the relevance and usefulness of cost data, and actual financial performance, 
using a sample of 277 US hospitals. Consistent with contingency theory, Pizzini 
defined three group determinants for hospital cost- system design: strategy, structural 
determinants, and external environment. With regard to strategy, he concluded on 
the basis of the Porter framework, that hospitals pursuing a differentiation strategy are 
expected to focus resources on clinical care to the detriment of administrative systems, 
such as the cost system. Conversely, hospitals emphasizing low-cost production strategy 
will have more functional cost systems because managers will require more information 
for monitoring costs. Structural determinants include case-mix, teaching affiliation, 
size, and whether a hospital is a member of a multi-hospital system. University medical 
centers, which typically treat more severe cases, are more complex organizationally 
due to their research and educational responsibilities. As complexity increases, so does 
the need for cost information. Larger hospitals will benefit more from functional cost 
systems because they can spread the cost over more beds. With regard to the external 
environment, he concluded that hospitals with strong competition face greater external 
pressure to control costs and therefore require more extensive and detailed cost 
information. 
Furthermore, Pizzini (2006) examined four critical items of cost system design in 
hospitals: 1) the level of detail provided: ability to supply data about objects that vary in 
size from patient groups to specific activities; 2) the ability to disaggregate costs according 
to behavior, such as fixed/variable, direct/indirect, controllable/non-controllable; 3) the 
frequency with which information is reported; and 4) the extent to which variances 
are calculated. According to his research, managers found cost data to be more useful 
and relevant if supplied by systems that had greater detail, could better classify costs 
according to behavior, and provide cost information on a more frequent basis. However, 
actual financial performance is significantly and positively associated only with those 
systems that provided greater detail. Armed with a more accurate cost of patient care, the 
hospital may be better able to present an informed case to the public, regulatory agents, 
and governments (Hill, 2000). In addition to the study of Pizzini, Lehtonen (2007) 
defined other design criteria such as: the CMI must combine clinical and administrative 
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data; classification of patients is a necessary tool to increase the financial accountability 
of clinicians and other decision makers, and the special characteristics of the university 
hospitals must be recognized in the system.
Design strategies of the case-mix information system
In the design of systems, methods can be roughly be identified that 1) have a more or 
less linear timeline (waterfall method), 2) are relatively  cyclical (prototyping), and 3) 
have feedback loops (Bouwman et al, 2002). In the waterfall method, the perspective of 
project management is at the forefront. Implementation and use are separated. In the 
prototyping method, the prototypes are presented to the end-users at an early stage. After 
testing the prototypes, they are rolled out in the organization. In the design process 
the end-user is more of an information source than a direct participant. There are also 
methods that combine the ones already mentioned. For example, in the spiral model of 
Boehm, the waterfall model and prototyping method are integrated. In this model, the 
project phases are embedded in an iterative process in which prototypes are evaluated 
by end-users in various stages of development. They can then adjust the specifications. 
Several iterations then deliver an ever better functioning prototype. This model involves 
a planning, analysis, design, and evaluation phase. These stages are very similar to the 
phases of the regulative cycle which is passed through at design-oriented research (see 
Section 1.5 and Chapter Four). 
The advantage of this model is that the end-users are actively involved. Introduction 
of new information systems may cause problems in an organization on account of the 
mismatch between the functions of a system and organizational factors, tasks, and power 
redistribution (Choe, 1998). To reduce this mismatch, user participation is a key element 
of system design. User participation helps users to accept change. Eldenburg et al (2010) 
examined the response to implementation of an activity-based costing system developed 
and designed with physician input. They analyzed changes in resource utilization for 
treatment of cataract patients and found changes in practice patterns where physicians 
redeployed resources towards more severely ill patients and decreased average length 
of stay. They also found evidence for improvement in financial performance. They 
concluded that including professionals in system development may lead to changes in 
behavior and improve their decisions about resource allocation. 
The above-mentioned design models presuppose a (rather) stable setting. Unfortunately, 
this is generally not the case in the context of the hospital sector where there may be 
continuously (unpredictable) changes in the environment, user requirements and 
technology, even after the completion of the final product. This certainly applied to 
the very dynamic context of the Dutch hospital care, because of the health care reforms 
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(see Section 2.4). In that case it has to be ascertained to what level of volatility it makes 
sense to continue the chosen design model and going past a point of volatility to choose 
another method or to better give it up: the means will be used in vain. To decide what 
design strategy should be used, the Cynefin framework (Snowden & Boone, 2007) could 
be useful, which allows leaders, for example hospital managers or CMI project leaders, 
to see things from new viewpoints, assimilate complex concepts, and address real-world 
problems and opportunities. This enhances communication and helps leaders rapidly 
understand the context in which they are operating. 
The framework sorts the issues facing leaders into four contexts defined by the nature of 
the relationship between cause and effect: simple, complicated, complex, and chaotic. 
Simple contexts are characterized by stability and clear cause-and-effect relationships that 
are easily discernible by everyone. Often, the right answer is self-evident and undisputed. 
Simple contexts, properly assessed, require straightforward management and monitoring. 
Here, leaders sense, categorize, and respond. Complicated contexts, unlike simple ones, 
may contain multiple right answers, and though there is a clear relationship between 
cause and effect, not everyone can see it. Leaders in a complicated context must sense, 
analyze, and respond. In a complex context, at least one right answer exists; however, right 
answers can’t be ferreted out. In this domain, we can understand why things happen 
only in retrospect. Leaders need to probe first, then sense, and then respond. In a chaotic 
context, searching for right answers would be pointless: The relationships between cause 
and effect are impossible to determine because they shift constantly and no manageable 
patterns exist—only turbulence. In the chaotic domain, a leader’s immediate job is not 
to discover patterns but to stanch the bleeding. A leader must first act to establish order, 
then sense where stability is present and from where it is absent, and then respond by 
working to transform the situation from chaos to complexity, where the identification 
of emerging patterns can both help prevent future crises and discern new opportunities. 
Truly adept leaders will know not only how to identify the context they’re working in at 
any given time but also how to change their behavior and their decisions to match that 
context. They also prepare their organization to understand the different contexts and 
the conditions for transition between them. A deep understanding of context, the ability 
to embrace complexity and paradox, and a willingness to flexibly change leadership style 
will be required for leaders who want to make things happen in a time of increasing 
uncertainty.
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3.4.2 The implementation of the (case-mix) information system
Implementation can be seen as a step between the design phase and the stage where there is 
(routine) use or rejection of the new technology. It therefore covers a wide range of activities 
that determine whether the technology is implemented in such a way that users can handle 
it. The phases of changes in organizations have been described by numerous authors. 
Broadly speaking, it comes down to a three-way split (Bouwman et al, 2002): unfreeze 
(to create the basis for the willingness of the change), move (the actual change) and freeze 
(consolidation). Different people will experience the changes differently and different 
moments during the implementation process will demand different implementation 
strategies. Regarding the strategies, often two dimensions are distinguished: top-down 
versus bottom-up and directive versus participative, see Table 3.3.
Table 3.3: Implementation strategies 
Directive Participative
Top-down Dictation: penalties, power tools, authority
Organize: Training, opinion leaders, 
influence attitudes
Bottom-up Directing: informing, project teams, monitoring
Encouraging: user groups, dialogue, pilot 
projects
Bouwman et al, 2002, p. 135
 
When dictating, there is a directive decision by which decision and implementation is 
imposed on the organization. If the directive decision is implemented bottom-up, then 
we speak of a process of directing, in which the management has to direct the bottom-
up process in such a way that the centrally defined objectives are achieved. Encouraging 
is a strategy in which employees are maximally involved in the implementation process 
and the role of management is mainly in encouraging the participation and the 
implementation process. In practice, certainly, hybrid strategies will occur. The choice of 
a specific implementation strategy depends on different factors, such as the characteristics 
of the organization (organization structure, culture, available capacity) and the urgency 
of the innovation. Implementation is closely related to change management.
 
In the management accounting discipline, various studies have been published on 
management accounting change, for example, regarding the implementation of case-
mix information systems and activity-based costing systems. For example, Lehtonen 
(2007) described which characteristics of their strategy to implement a CMI were 
successful. The implementation was enhanced by the integrated clinical and financial 
accountability to the profit center manager. Due to their dual responsibilities, it was 
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in their interest to consider both clinical and financial issues and they were willing to 
change. Consequently, the clinicians had a significant role during the implementation 
process. They also actively participated in the development and negotiation of detailed 
pricing rules. Moreover, the freedom of choice and flexibility of adoption seem to have 
alleviated conflicts and settled disputes and thereby enhanced the flexibility in adoption. 
Furthermore, the gradual implementation of the reforms, and intensifying institutional 
pressures, had fostered the adoption and implementation of the CMI. 
3.4.3 Target group: The (hospital) managers
Involvement of physicians in management
Physicians are key stakeholders in hospitals and their involvement in resource 
management is seen to be critical to hospital survival (Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1995). 
Physician resource management behavior is likely to be directly related to their power 
and influence within hospitals. The power of physicians stems from their ability to 
control revenue generation and also because of their claims to specialized knowledge 
and skills that are critical to the functioning of the hospital. Because of the increasing 
financial pressure and competition, there was an increasing necessity for physicians to 
control costs. One way to realize this was to involve them in management. Through the 
allocation of responsibility for budget preparation, medical professionals were to be tied 
into networks of calculation (Kurunmäki, 2004). By this the ‘doctor-managers’ adopt 
a dualistic approach to their role in which they consciously combine professional and 
clinical judgments with financial and organizational ones (Coombs; 1987). 
The process through which doctors become ‘doctor-managers’ is called hybridization. 
Hybrid professionals are intended to play a boundary role between their professional 
colleagues at the one hand and management at the other hand, combining clinical 
credibility with management expertise (Doolin, 2001). But hybridization is not a matter 
of turning doctors into accountants (Kurunmäki, 2004), nor is it a matter of medical 
professionals acquiring a new body of abstract knowledge. The traditional skills of the 
clinician were complemented by a new set of techniques that enabled them to prepare 
budgets, calculate costs, and set prices. A new assemblage was formed among medical 
professionals, medical expertise, and a set of calculative practices. As decision-making by 
physicians relates to about 70% of hospital resources, this hybridization has been seen as 
critical to hospital effectiveness (Kurunmäki, 2004). 
The hybridization  strategy can be interpreted as an attempt to influence clinical behavior 
through cultural change within the medical profession by diluting or undermining 
professional values and norms with managerial ones (Doolin, 2001). Llewellyn (2001) 
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uses the metaphor of a ‘two-way window,’ when medical and managerial knowledge is 
integrated. Clinical directors can incorporate managerial tasks in their work but non-
medical managers are unable to carry out clinical issues. This situation greatly increases 
the power base of the medical managers. From this position, medical managers became 
the new clinical bosses and downgraded the position of non-medical managers to 
operational managers. Only a lack of financial management expertise rendered their 
new organizational positioning vulnerable.
Although medical managers have accepted sets of ideas from management they still 
portray their management tasks as significant yet supplementary. They still exhibit 
a general lack of respect for managers’ skills and education and, in particular, they 
question the relevance of managers training to health care (Llewellyn, 2001). Further, 
taking up a management position as a clinician carries a risk of loss of respect and 
clinical visibility within the medical establishment. Clinicians fear the loss of their 
clinical skills if they become embroiled in time-consuming management agendas.  Some 
clinicians would think that becoming a manager is a betrayal of their profession (Doolin, 
2001). Therefore the professional logic is hard to combine with logic of management, 
particularly within one person.  The medical manager ‘balances between two worlds’, 
which also creates dilemmas. Sometimes the medical manager has to choose between the 
various, at times conflicting, values of the two worlds. The medical manager must be able 
to understand the logic of management to form a bridge between two worlds and also to 
be a two-way window. The interests of his or her medical staff may conflict with those 
of the organization. In general, professionals do not accept the basic premise on which 
bureaucratic organizations are founded and seek to develop autonomy and control in 
the performance of their activities (Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1991). Physicians have 
not been trained or socialized to accept organizational goals and obligations. However, 
research by Abernethy and Stoelwinder (1991) indicates that physicians become more 
‘bureaucratized’ once they are incorporated into the management structure (see also 
Section 3.4.3). This is mainly true for medical managers who self-select for managerial 
roles and are prepared to accommodate the demands of the organization. 
Finally, Succi & Alexander (1999) argued that the extent to which physician involvement 
in management and governance improves efficiency may vary as a function of medical 
staff structure and composition. Specifically, physician executives/board members may 
have greater success achieving widespread behavioral change among physicians in 
medical staff that are small, less diverse, and composed of more salaried physicians. The 
characteristics that reduce the positive effects should be minimized, for example, hospitals 
with a highly diverse medical staff should work to foster greater communication and 
cooperation among physicians when adopting hospital- physician integration strategies. 
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The background of medical and non-medical managers and their use of CMIs
According to Grol & Wensing (2001), several characteristics of the target group play a 
role that can promote or obstruct the implementation of an innovation, such as skills, 
tasks perception, existing routines, and personality characteristics. Each target or setting 
is to some extent unique. Effective implementation cannot do without proper analysis of 
the setting and the target group. A diagnostic analysis can relate to: the implementation 
of the backgrounds (who wants what changes for whatever reasons), segments within 
the target group, and obstructing and promoting factors. It is important to have an 
overview, a sort of social card, and they have to have people who have an interest in the 
implementation. Within the target groups, subgroups of change can be distinguished 
that are different in nature and should therefore be approached differently. The most 
famous structure is that of: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and 
laggards (Grol & Wensing, 2001). The availability of real innovators and change agents is 
important for effective implementation within the group. In addition, within the target 
group of this study, subgroups of backgrounds of the managers can be distinguished.
As described in Section 1.4, the target group of the case-mix information system of this 
research exists in the top managers of the university medical centers, which mean chief 
physicians of clinical departments, division managers, and central managers (including 
the Board of Directors). In the case study of the AMC, about 90% of these managers had 
a clinical or nursing background, and 10% had a (financial) administrative background 
(see Table 8.1). There have been several studies published about the use of (case-mix) 
accounting information by hospital managers. Several studies show that the background 
of the user has an impact not only on managerial behavior and strategic choices, but 
also on the use of information systems. Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann (20071) analyzed the 
use of management information systems (MIS) by 218 CEOs of public hospitals in 
Spain. Managers with a predominant clinical background appeared to focus more on 
non-financial (or clinical) information for decision-making and preferred an interactive 
style when using a CMI, which together supported flexible strategies. On the other 
hand, managers with a predominantly administrative background seem more effective 
in establishing cost-reduction strategies through their larger inclination to emphasize 
financial information in combination with a diagnostic use of the CMI. The explanation 
for this is that decisions by managers are determined and biased by patterns of knowledge 
formed by previous experience and training. Clinical training and practice over many 
years has imbued a deep-seated ethos based on patient care, and almost regardless of cost 
(Jones & Dewing, 1997). 
In general, it can be stated that medical managers give higher priority to the interest of 
the patients and the non-medical managers stress the needs of the organization rather 
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than the individual. Also, medical managers use the CMI more as a trigger for dialogue, 
whereas, on the contrary, non-medical managers use it as the conclusion of a dialogue! 
An interactive style seems, like the diagnostic style, beneficial to the implementation 
of strategies focused on cost and beneficial to strategies on quality and flexibility. A 
diagnostic style is related to the implementation of strategy focused on cost. The use of 
financial information has a positive effect on strategy focused on cost but not on quality 
and flexibility. In Table 3.4, the differences between administrators and clinicians are 
shown.
Table 3.4: Differences between managers with an administrative and clinical background 
Features 
Management 
Information 
Systems
Administrators Clinicians
Supervision Close-control to evaluate performance Self-control, discretion and work autonomy
Governance No debate or discussions
Focused on negotiation, discuss and 
share decisions with other members 
of the organization
Management 
emphasis
General activities. Efficient and 
effectiveness of the organization
Core activities. Effective 
distribution of the task and means 
according to the workload and 
processing time
Skills
Focused on organization performance 
and how to improve the financial 
position of the firm
Focus on the patient care and how 
to improve the health of patients
View of information 
system
As a tool that provides diagnoses and 
information about critical performance 
indicators of the organization 
(answering machine)
As a tool that stimulates continuous 
challenge and debate concerning 
data, assumptions and action plans 
(learning machine)
Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 20071, p. 31
Managers with a balanced background may be most effective in strategic focus on cost 
reduction and quality enhancement.  The fact that clinical managers use the accounting 
information more as a trigger for dialogue, than a conclusion for the dialogue, was 
confirmed by a study by Pettersen and Solstad (2014) among clinical managers in 
hospitals in Norway. Their study showed that for clinical managers, accounting 
information acted as ex post reporting on economic consequences but did not guide 
clinical action. Accounting information was to a large extent used as a basis for explaining 
budgetary deviations and also as a basis for discussions in the department. Furthermore, 
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the information was to some extent used to explain activity deviations as a background 
for arguments in negotiations to obtain a more realistic budget. Accounting information 
was used for ex post accounts on activity, but not as input for future decisions. They 
found signs of decoupling between plans and actions as budgets were not generally input 
when planning medical activity. Despite the existence of DRG information in the patient 
administrative systems, this information was not used in the internal control process in 
the clinical departments. In practice, they felt a much stronger loyalty to professional 
medical morals and norms and values than towards budgetary responsibilities. 
They found two explanations for this decoupling. First, clinical managers face at least 
three different kinds of accountability: professional logic, instrumental/enterprise logic, 
and communicative/ political logic. In the hospital clinics, these types of logic exist side 
by side as the middle managers play the role of ‘two-way windows’ (Llewellyn, 2001). 
Different managers might have a different understanding of their accountability, and 
the managers’ social and organizational context in clinical departments. They concluded 
that there is a triangle of these logics guiding clinical managers and that they may change 
and form different patterns to different contexts and differences in the professional 
background of the clinical managers. Clinical activity is based on professional guidelines, 
which are developed through discussions and experience in clinics. The clinical 
discourse is decoupled from the economic and administrative parts. Second, the clinical 
managers felt little obligation to the budget, because the budgets were interpreted as 
being without reality and managers had little control of the activity level. The principle 
of responsibility relies on the manager’s control over costs, revenues, and activities. 
When this control does not exist, managers cannot be held responsible for department 
or directorate performance. Accounting information was not considered important 
in decision-making at the operational level. It was only considered as supplementary 
information. So, it can be concluded that clinical responsibility was managed by medical 
logic rather than the logic of management. This matched with the research by Witman 
(2008) who concluded that, based on the medical habitus, a physician does everything 
in his power to help his patient as possible. Time, cost, and effort are minor.
Allocation of decision rights and use of (case-mix) accounting systems 
Several studies showed that the formal allocation of decision rights to physicians resulted 
in a significantly greater use of case-mix accounting information in the management 
of clinical activities. Abernethy and Vagnoni (2004) examined the impact of authority 
structures on the use of Accounting Information Systems (AISs) for decision control 
and decision management in large public hospitals in Italy. They made a distinction 
between formal and informal authority structures. Formal authority results from a 
deliberate choice by top management to delegate particular decisions to lower levels. 
Chapter 3
84
Informal authority was defined as the ability of an individual or group to influence 
organization decisions and activities in ways that are not sanctioned by the formal 
authority system. For example, the power of clinicians stems from their ability to 
control revenue generation and also because their claim to have specialized knowledge 
and skills, which are critical to the functioning of the hospital. There appeared to be a 
significant relationship between formal authority and the use of the AIS for decision 
management and control. The formal allocation of decision rights to physicians results 
in a significantly greater use of AISs by physicians in the management of clinical 
activities and has a positive effect on cost-consciousness but this operates via the AIS. 
However, the power of dominant physicians in hospitals has been argued to seriously 
limit attempts by hospitals to implement strategies directed towards improved resource 
management. The higher the level of power of physicians, the less they are likely to be 
committed to using resources efficiently. 
 
According to the research by Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann (20071), the participation of 
physicians in management appeared beneficial in controlling costs, maintaining quality, 
and bringing about organizational change. The implication was that training in the 
administrative side of management might pay off as it allowed CEOs to use typical 
management information in broader ways than just determined by their education. They 
concluded that being confronted with the administrative side of management earlier in 
their career would make clinical managers more effective in building and using the 
management repertoire. Another finding was that (case-mix) accounting systems would 
become particularly useful to physicians when they could demonstrate the connection 
between achieving management goals of efficiency and the effective performance of the 
hospital’s output goals. Furthermore, they found it necessary that clinical managers are 
empowered and trained to improve the quality, relevance, and understanding of data. 
The management of the conflict between professional commitment and organizational 
responsibilities by physician managers will not be easy. This can be promoted through 
management development programs which not only include training in control 
techniques and processes but also in conflict resolution and conflict management 
(Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1991; Succi & Alexander, 1999). Such training would 
provide these leaders with the skills needed to integrate diverse viewpoints and promote 
a common vision among all physicians on the medical staff.
3.4.4 The (hospital) organization
Within the hospital organization behavioral and organizational variables, organization 
structure, and power relations prove to be important.
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Behavioral and organizational variables
Shields (1995) developed a comprehensive theoretical model that could be useful for 
our research about case-mix information systems. He examined, from 143 firms in the 
United States, the degree of success of ABC (Activity Based Costing). He identified 
seven behavioral and organizational variables as being important to the implementation 
of cost management systems: Top management support (1) is crucial because they can 
focus resources, goals, and strategies on initiatives they deem worthwhile and provide 
the political help needed to motivate or push aside individuals and coalitions who 
resist the innovation. Linkage to competitive strategy (2), performance evaluation, 
and compensation (3) are important to motivate and reward employees to their firm’s 
competitive position and profits. Sufficient internal resources (4) have to be provided 
to allow employees the opportunity to learn about ABC and to experiment with 
alternative designs and design methods. Training in designing, implementing and 
using ABC (5) is an important way to interrelate ABC among strategy, performance 
evaluation, compensation, and ABC objectives. It also provides a mechanism for 
employees to understand and accept ABC as well as to feel comfortable with it. Since 
ABC information is intended to be used by a variety of employees for analysis and 
action, such training also is a good method for creating non-accounting ownership (6). 
Non-accounting ownership (that is ownership of people that are not accountants) also is 
the result of top management support for ABC and the linkage of ABC to competitive 
strategy, performance evaluation, and compensation. Finally, consensus on clarity of the 
objectives of the system among designers and users (7) are necessary to ensure that ABC 
systems and information are produced efficiently and are effectively used. 
In addition Abernethy et al (2010) demonstrated that also leadership characteristics 
of top management and the operating context of a firm influence the design and use 
of management control systems (MCSs). Their findings underlined the importance of 
leadership style in explaining control system choices. Leadership style is a significant 
predictor of both the use of the Planning and Control system and the use of performance 
measures for compensation and promotion. In particular, they found that top 
management with a consideration leadership style would use the Planning and Control 
system as an interactive communication device to informally reveal their preferences to 
subordinates and to obtain input from subordinates. Consideration is the degree to which 
a leader involves others in decision-making, considers the opinions of subordinates, 
and shows concern for their wellbeing. This supports the management literature that 
demonstrates the importance of strong interpersonal leadership traits as a means of 
sharing and communicating top management’s vision and to inspire subordinates with 
the confidence to meet their expectations. They also found that initiating structure 
influenced the interactive communication use of MCSs but the use is less intensive 
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than it is for those with a consideration leadership. Initiating structure is the degree to 
which top management structures the work environment by implementing uniform 
procedures and by defining roles and responsibilities. Managers that are strong on this 
leadership dimension will express themselves in their use of formal systems with specific 
targets and then take actions based on results. 
However, it has to be noted that the variables found in the industry might not be fully 
applicable to the hospital sector. Cardinaels et al (2004), for example, did research among 
120 hospitals to find out which factors determined the stage of a cost system development. 
The results indicated that general drivers of activity-based costing (ABC) adoption 
from other industries (such as cost variables, quality link, etcetera) were less crucial for 
promoting cost system change in hospitals. Apparently, typical features of the health care 
sector such as the support of medical parties and the type of contracts with the physicians’ 
should be considered if hospitals refine their cost system. Also the significance of interest 
of physicians in the process of redesigning cost systems should not be underestimated. 
Organizational structure of hospitals 
In many respects, much work in hospitals is work in project teams, performing joint 
tasks in patient treatments. Collaboration between team members in patient situations 
may not follow the lines of administrative accountability. The fragmentation of hospitals 
into hierarchies, sub-specialties, and functions makes knowledge-sharing difficult. One 
main problem in hospital settings when creating accounting entities is the hierarchical 
and functional organization of the institution which in turn is based on an organization 
of departments (Nyland & Pettersen, 2004). By making new accounting entities, 
hierarchical lines of responsibility may deviate from the functional lines of responsibility 
that follow clinical decisions on the treatment of patients. Patients are administered 
within a hospital according to clinical decisions and as they travel through the hospital 
they may cross numerous administrative boundaries. Thus, accountability in areas where 
ambiguous boundaries are found will make it difficult to operate an accounting system 
set up to control and measure the results of the entities’ activities. 
Kastberg & Siverbo (2013) make a distinction between horizontally and vertically 
oriented systems. Vertically oriented systems are designed for line organization to allocate 
responsibilities among managers at different levels. Although mostly these systems are 
used in practice, these systems can create boundaries, make cooperation harder, produce 
dysfunctional incentives, do not stimulate change orientation and flexibility, and lead 
to focus on the short term instead of continuous improvements. Horizontal-oriented 
systems are designed to support the horizontal dimension, that is, to support decisions 
and control behavior in process. In literature on process orientation, design and use 
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have generally been given a secondary role. Implementation of DRG-based information 
is then problematic, because this is not process information but vertical information. 
Power relations in hospitals
According to the literature, there is a greater potential for conflict, resistance, and 
system failure if the introduction of accounting systems shifts power relations within 
the organization (Markus & Pfeffer, 1983). This can be explained by the so-called power 
theory (Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004). This theory describes what happens to actors when 
power is acted upon them. According to this theory, there is a general tendency among 
those subject to power and controlling resources to resist by means of circumventing 
or diverting to their own ends. That means that there is a greater potential for conflict, 
resistance, and system failure, if the change in the organization shifts power relations 
within organizations. This can be demonstrated with regard to case-mix information 
systems: actors (for example, administrators) can use the institutional pressure to 
introduce such a system in the hospital and use it for surveillance practices in which 
individuals, departments, or services are categorized by objective calculations. By doing 
this, power is redistributed from physician to administrator with a technical solution. 
Physicians can, in their turn, resist by discussing the system or diverting it to its own 
hands, like claiming more budget.
Hospitals display the characteristics that enable power to become the dominant logic 
or behavior: they have conflicting goals, information for decision-making is ambiguous, 
and the cause and effect relationship between actions and outcomes is uncertain and 
unknown. The power of physicians within hospitals exacerbates goal conflict and is 
potentially problematic for implementing effective management control systems. 
Conflict arises when physicians pursue goals that increase their status as a professional 
but which are not congruent with achieving organizational goals that are critical to 
maintaining the resource base of the hospital (Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1991). When 
physicians become powerful and are able to pursue their own goals rather than those 
of the organization, there is evidence that this will lead to a strong resistance to AIS 
implemented by top management to control or curtail their behavior (Abernethy & 
Vagnoni, 2004). 
Robbins (2007) examined the implementation of new public management (NPM) 
ideas in an Irish hospital, such as the attempts to engage clinicians in management, 
and increased emphasis on management accounting information. He describes many 
obstacles. One explanation was the lack of trust between management and clinicians. 
There was a struggle to determine who had control over the resources. Hospital 
management believes that it is doctors who control activity and therefore the consumption 
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of resources. Yet doctors believe that management is attempting to increasingly control 
their work. A further obstacle to successful implementation of NPM reform in the 
hospital was found in the lingering bureaucratic practices. The organization was still 
caught in the constraints of tradition, such as a very restricted view of budgeting. There 
was a failure to link resources consumed with the services delivered. Hospital and health 
board management seek greater control and accountability through engagement of ‘new 
managers’ without supplying them with the tools to do their job. 
3.4.5 The environment
Several studies demonstrate that environmental factors such as  institutional pressure 
(from regulators and insurance companies), financial constraints, increased competition 
and environmental uncertainties, affect the adoption, design and success of (case-
mix) accounting systems in organizations (Doolin, 2001; Hill, 2000; Kurunmäki, 
2004; Lehtonen, 2007; Lapsley & Wright, 2004; Pettersen & Solstad, 2014; Robbins, 
2007; Samuel et al, 2005). These studies particularly provide insights as to why some 
organizations adopt certain systems and why others do not. Important pressures for 
adoption come from the discourse of New Public Management and, more in general, 
from isomorphistic pressures. Institutional theory provides a base for researching these 
multiple institutional pressures.  
Competition and financial pressure
Escalating health care expenditures have brought on the need for restructuring health 
care delivery. Since the 80s, new approaches to public sector management were 
introduced in the sector, characterized among other things, by quasi-market forms, 
increased delegation of resource decisions, more explicit and measurable standards of 
performance and weakening trust in professionals while strengthening the hand of 
managers (Dunlavy and Hood, 1994; Russell and Sherer, 1994 and Hood, 1995). The 
conceptualization of New Public Management was based on the language of managerial 
and economic rhetoric from the private sector (Robbins, 2007). The conceptualization is 
motivated by the desire to make the sector more ´business like´; it implies a perspective 
on performance measurement that is broader than the financial spending indicators 
(Jansen, 2008). In the hospital sector, these changes implied revised organizational 
goals and devolved financial accountability to physicians. They threatened deep-seated 
cultures, and challenged the power between clinicians and administrators (Jones & 
Dewing, 1997). 
A common response to the escalating health care expenditures problem has been to 
seek market-based solutions (Lehtonen, 2007).  Market-based assumptions assume 
that care is a commodity (Samuel et al, 2005). In several countries, product lines for 
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hospitals were devised, such as the diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and diagnosis 
treatment combinations (DBCs) in the Netherlands, with the intention of reducing 
medical costs (see Section 2.5). The DRGs and DBCs are calculative technologies 
that enable managerial control of medical activities from a distance. Moreover, these 
calculative technologies enable the design of markets. Such design involves both the 
design methodologies of engineers (standardization of activities, designation of care 
products) and the assumptions of economists on the functioning of markets.  In the 
course of time, the medical domain has been overshadowed by economic considerations 
and vocabulary: the word ‘patient’ has been replaced by ‘care product’ and new words 
have been introduced like ‘feeders and bleeders,’ ‘portfolio,’ and ‘market share.’ The 
trade in care implies a merger of the physical and the fiscal and puts a ‘price on life’ 
(Samuel et al, 2005). The practice of medicine is organized as an industrial activity and 
decisively colored by the methods of management. Calculative expertise became part of 
the repertoire of practices that doctors could deploy. Thus, medicine was ‘hybridized’ 
(Kurunmäki, 2004). 
   
The new ideology brought the hospitals within a commercial ethos and had many 
organizational implications, such as the involvement of physicians in management (see 
Section 3.4.3) and the adoption and design of accounting information systems in the 
context of the control of professional behavior. Accounting information is central to 
the assumption of economic rationality contained in the NPM-ideology as addressed 
in much of the health reform literature (Jacobs et al, 2004, Coombs, 1987; Lapsley, 
2001; Pettersen & Solstad, 2014). Performance information is needed to set targets 
in management contracts, to focus on efficiency, to compare the targets and actual 
performance, and to emphasize outputs.  However, that does not automatically mean 
that these systems are embraced or even accepted by the clinicians. Attempts to interest 
clinicians in the managerial discourses and practices encounter the generally negative 
opinions about managers and management held by clinicians. Clinicians’ perceptions 
of management are frequently colored by the view that managers are poorly qualified 
and that management is just common sense or easily learned (Doolin, 2001). When 
physicians draw on a powerful professional logic  are able to pursue their professional 
goals rather than those of the organization, there is evidence that this leads to a strong 
resistance to accounting information systems implemented by top management to 
control or curtail their behavior (Abernethy & Stoelwinder, 1995). 
Institutional pressure to adopt (case-mix) accounting systems
Insights from institutional theory have been prominent in theorizing the role of 
accounting systems in public sector organizations. According to institutional theory, 
organizations have to achieve legitimation in the institutional environment in order to 
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survive, by becoming isomorphic with, which is to conform to, a set of institutional beliefs. 
There are three forms of isomorphic change (Järvinen, 2006): coercive isomorphism is 
the response to the pressures that are exerted on organizations by organizations upon 
which they are independent (like the state) and by cultural expectations. Mimetic 
isomorphism occurs when organizations face uncertainty and model themselves on 
other organizations, which means copying other organizations perceived to be more 
successful. Normative isomorphism arises when professionals operating in organizations 
are subject to pressures by occupational/ professional groups. Institutional theory-based 
research provides significant insights into the reasons why organizations adopt case-mix 
accounting systems: is it to improve efficiency (economic fitness), legitimation (social 
fitness) or both? 
Case-mix accounting systems in health care are said to have been adopted largely because 
they affirm conformance to supposedly orderly, objective, and rational organization 
processes. They are a response to the ‘rationalization of modern societies’ (Abernethy 
et al, 2007).  Hospitals may deliberately choose particular courses of action in order 
to confer legitimation, thus getting access to additional resources. However, actors do 
not merely conform to environmental and governmental pressure but might choose to 
resist, subvert, and even extend existing templates. According to Lehtonen (2007), one 
explanation for the high failure-rate of case-mix systems is that relatively symbolic displays 
do not represent the complexities and indeterminacies of internal operating processes. 
In such cases, organizations tend to avoid dysfunction by decoupling these symbolic 
management systems from the internal operating processes (decoupling phenomena). 
An example of decoupling in a hospital is that the hospital uses advanced information 
systems mainly to impress external stakeholders, such as insurers and government 
departments, but within the organization these systems are hardly used. Some external 
pressure is necessary, although not sufficient, impetus to change (Covaleski et al, 1993). 
Several institutional theory based public-sector studies were conducted about the 
adoption of (case-mix) accounting systems. Kantola and Järvinen (2012) examined the 
institutional logics in the Finnish health care sector and investigated why some hospitals 
implemented and adopted DRG-based accounting systems almost twenty years after 
the first adaptors. One explanation for the delay was that hospitals have decided to 
either adopt such accounting systems or not according to whether they consider the 
organization as an independent actor (independence logic) or as part of the public sector 
(public sector logic). The decision of the organization to ignore institutional logic can be 
one important strategy to cope with outside pressure and has the potential to explain the 
timing of management accounting change. A legislative change and a financial reform 
in which responsibility shifted from the state to the municipality had a major impact 
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on changing the balance between the competing reasons and led to a faster spreading 
(diffusion) of the new accounting systems.
Hill (2000) investigated the adoption of hospital costing systems in the US over the 
period 1980 - 1990. He concluded that in addition to the increased environmental 
uncertainty (financial and competitive pressure), the organizational variables which 
included ownership, size, and whether the hospital was part of a multi-hospital system 
or not were significant in impacting on the costing system adoption. The increasing 
magnitude of health care costs necessitates that hospitals adopt costing systems to 
provide better data and greater insights for cost control and cost management. The 
ability to monitor costs in detail, rather than merely aggregating costs, is critical 
because it allows hospitals to track the costs by patient. For example, as competition 
intensifies, decision-makers consider external, non-financial and ex ante information 
to be increasingly important. Hill’s research demonstrates that competition alone is not 
a critical variable in costing system adoption. Revenue constraint plays the dominant 
role in influencing hospitals’ behavior. However, the combination of revenue constraint 
and competition does appear to drive hospitals in more competitive environments to 
adopt costing systems earlier. The research also showed that as the percentage of total 
reimbursement based on the federal rate (PPS) increases, the probability of a hospital 
adopting a sophisticated costing system also increases. 
Finally, Lapsley & Wright (2004) examined the adoption of accounting innovations 
in public sector organizations in Scotland. The results of their survey indicated that 
adoption of accounting innovations by public sector organizations was largely affected 
by government influence. For the healthcare sector, the introduction of new accounting 
techniques was to a substantial extent due to government instigation. The internal 
market was a major catalyst in accounting innovation for the National Health Service 
(NHS), with a larger responsibility upon the accountants to accurately cost services. The 
high reported use of resource management had arisen as a result of this development. 
Conclusion
Based on the literature review, five factors were identified that might affect the failure or 
success of CMIs: characteristics of the design and implementation of the CMI, the target 
group of (hospital) managers, the (hospital) organization, and the environment. These 
factors were incorporated in our design-oriented research as described in the next chapters.
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Abstract
In the field of management accounting and control, research on (case-mix) accounting 
systems is mainly based on contingency research with a strong emphasis on statistical 
techniques. However, this type of research has disadvantages, such as that in reality there 
is often multi-causality involved, results are not easily transferable to other contexts, 
and it often ignores power struggles as well as rationalities other than technical ones, 
which are likely to greatly influence the diffusion of new practices.   Consequently 
there is a utilization problem because in the end, the scientific knowledge has to be 
applied by professionals who solve real-world problems. Design-oriented research can 
be considered as supplementary to the traditional empirical research. It is essentially 
a process of gaining knowledge on the basis of reflection on the functioning of the 
regulative cycle in a class of cases. It is case study research, done in order to understand 
a complex system in practice. The regulative cycle involves a structured organizational 
problem-solving process. Key elements are problem formulation, problem diagnoses, 
design, implementation, and evaluation of the effects of an innovation. The iterative 
process continues until a satisfactory solution crystallizes that works well for the 
specified class of problems. In the -case study of the AMC, the regulative cycle used was 
to some extent adjusted. It consisted of process design, object design, implementation, 
and evaluation. The regulative cycle was passed through several times from 2006 until 
2014. During the study, the questions of how successful the CMI project had been so 
far and which factors facilitated or obstructed its success, were examined. In addition to 
the regular evaluations, two extensive reflections took place. Data were collected from 
multiple sources, such as questionnaires, unstructured and semi-structured interviews, 
documents and by ‘being around’. 
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter provides a description of the methodology of design oriented research. In 
Section 4.2 we advocate a development towards the production of design knowledge in 
management accounting.   Section 4.3 further explains what design-oriented research is 
and how scientific theories and practical design knowledge can be gained on the basis of 
reflection on the functioning of the regulative cycle.  In Section 4.4 the methodology of 
our design-oriented research is presented.
4.2 Towards design oriented knowledge in the field of management 
accounting
The ultimate objective of design oriented research is to develop and to use reliable and 
valid knowledge in the design of solutions to problems in the field. On the one hand, 
the design knowledge must be founded scientifically and on the other hand it must 
be applicable by practitioners such as managers, controllers, and (chief ) physicians. 
According to Van Aken (2004), the problem with much research in management is 
that it is description-driven and based on explanatory sciences and as such on the 
notion that the mission of all science is to understand, i.e. to describe, explain, and 
possibly to predict. He calls this mode 1 knowledge production, predominantly driven 
by academic concerns. However, this knowledge does not solve the practical problems 
of the practitioner and does not meet the criteria of managerial relevance. In the 
field of management accounting a substantial body of research has resulted in such 
mode 1 knowledge. Mainstream research on accounting or control systems is based 
on contingency research where the accumulation of knowledge is gained through an 
empirical cycle with a strong focus on statistical methods (Vosselman, 1996; Ahrens & 
Chapman, 2006). However, this type of research has disadvantages. First, in reality there 
is often multi-causality involved: a combination of explanatory factors that are difficult 
to isolate. Second, relationships are found in certain contexts (time, organization) and 
are not easily transferable to other contexts. Third, positivist research in management 
(accounting) often ignores power struggles as well as rationalities other than technical 
ones, which are likely to greatly influence the diffusion of new practices. 
Van Aken (2004) advocates a research paradigm that is not oriented towards the 
production of positive knowledge, but towards the production of design knowledge. 
He is strongly in favor of a development from description-driven towards prescription-
driven research. Van Aken calls prescription-driven research mode 2 knowledge production: 
a transdisciplinary form of research with intensive interaction between knowledge 
production and knowledge dissemination and application. Prescription-driven research, 
also called design-oriented research, may be both quantitative and qualitative. It typically 
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applies a case-method approach. The researcher adopts the role of a ‘change agent’ as 
a person who supports the participants of the organization in their learning processes 
(Kasanen et al, 1993). In Table 4.1 the main differences between description-driven and 
prescription-driven research are summarized 
Table 4.1: Main differences between description-driven and prescription-driven research 
Characteristic Description-driven research Prescription-driven research
Dominant paradigm Explanatory science Design science
Focus Problem focused Solution focused
Perspective Observer  Player
Logic Hindsight Intervention outcome
Typical research question Explanation Solutions for a class of problems
Typical research product Causal mode, quantitative outcome Tested and grounded technolog-ical rules
Nature of research product Algorithm Heuristic 
Justification Proof Saturated evidence
Type of resulting theory Organization theory Management theory
Van Aken, 2004, p. 236
Design-oriented research has been scarce in the field of management accounting so far. 
One explanation for this may be that much of the research is based on the social sciences 
that are strongly aimed at explaining reality. Another reason may be that the design of 
useful managerial constructions takes place in external consulting (ICT) firms where 
designers have limited access to the world of management and it inherently limits the 
possibility of publishing the results because of commercial reasons. 
4.3 Design-oriented research in management accounting research 
The mission of design-oriented research is to develop reliable and valid knowledge 
to be used in designing solutions to real-world management problems in the field 
in question (Van Aken, 2004). It deals – as noticed previously - with the practical 
application of scientific results whereby the knowledge is developed in cooperation with 
the professionals. Examples of solutions are the design of plans, models, a new language 
(such as Morse, Braille or computer language), managerial constructions (like a new 
budgeting system, the Return On-Investment measure in profit center accounting), or – 
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in the context of this thesis – a CMI. This type of research is also called the constructive 
approach: managerial problem solving by designing constructions (Kasanen et al, 1993). 
Design-oriented research is essentially a process of gaining knowledge on the basis 
of reflection on the functioning of the regulative cycle. The regulative cycle involves 
a structured organizational problem-solving process. Key elements of this process are 
problem diagnoses, problem selection, design, implementation, and evaluation of 
the effects of an innovation (see Figure 4.1). The iterative process continues until a 
satisfactory solution crystallizes that works well for the specified class of problems. 
Within design knowledge, prescriptions or technological rules are an important category. 
Many prescriptions in design science are of a heuristic nature such as: “If you tend to 
achieve Y in situation Z, then something like action X will help” (Van Aken, 2004). 
Something like action X means that the prescription is to be used as a design exemplar. 
A design exemplar is a general prescription which has to be translated to the specific 
problem at hand. Heuristics are based on a reflection on the operation of instruments 
in similar cases. Through testing the prescriptions by following a reflective cycle, one 
can gain insight into indications and contra-indications for successful applications. A 
person who engages in the reflective activity ‘learns as much from his failures as from 
his successes.’
Field tested and scientifically tested
The output of the regulative cycle entails a theory of practice or ‘mini theory’ (Heusinkveld 
& Reijers, 2009) that is applicable to only the individual case. In the scientific process of 
reflecting, this mini theory may be generalized to multiple cases. The reflection process 
particularly concentrates on analyzing the effectiveness of the design. In order to show 
that the method of construction is scientific, it is not enough to show that a certain 
managerial construction works in its proper context. One also has to show that the 
construction is grounded on scientific knowledge, i.e. that it is part of a theoretical 
framework and that the construction in question would also work in other instances 
than its original field. 
Legitimation in design knowledge
When design knowledge is both field tested and scientifically tested, this knowledge is 
not necessarily recognized, accepted, and widely drawn upon in other organizational 
praxis. The implementation processes in other organizations will be enhanced when 
adequate institutional entrepreneurship is included in the reflection process. Therefore, 
linking the steps in the reflective process to the presence of committed actors and 
suitable persuasive activities encourages the process of developing design knowledge. 
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Second, the process will be enhanced when the reflection concentrates on how the 
contents of the knowledge may fit the institutional context in which the development 
activities are located. In other words: the success of design knowledge relates not only 
to its technical performance but also to its social and institutional acceptance. In Figure 
4.1 the process of gaining design knowledge on the basis of reflection on the regulative 
cycle is visualized.
Figure 4.1: Knowledge development in organizational design 
Heusinkveld & Reijers,  2009, p. 868
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4.4 Design-oriented methodology of this research project
In our case study in the AMC, we aimed to solve a specific problem (lack of information) 
of hospital practitioners by constructing a solution (CMI) in a Dutch university medical 
center (field of question). Figure 4.2 depicts the applied design-oriented methodology 
of our research project. 
Figure 4.2 Design-oriented methodology of the research project
Phases in the regulative cycle 
During the longitudinal case study, a case-mix information system (CMI) was designed 
and implemented at the AMC. During the research period, which took place from 
2006 until 2014, the regulative cycle was passed through several times, following the 
spiral model of Boehm (see also Section 3.4.1). Although the boundaries between the 
different phases are permeable, the following iterative phases in the regulative cycle were 
distinguished: process design, object design, implementation and evaluation.  
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In the process design phase, there was determination of what CMI products would be (re)
designed and implemented in the coming  period and by whom, based on the evaluations 
of the existing CMI and new developments, such as external developments and related 
developments at the level of the AMC. The external developments particularly concerned 
the development of the DBC product structure and changing demands from insurers 
and the Ministry of Health. Internal developments included financial pressure, changes 
in the internal budgeting, available ICT capacity, and prioritization by the Board of 
Directors. In the object design phase, the products of the CMI were technically designed 
in several pilot groups (in 2006, 2007, 2010 and 2012), consisting of members of the 
CMI project management and the (potential) end users: chief physicians of clinical 
departments, division (or cluster) managers, central managers and business analysts. 
Each pilot focused on a specific topic and the composition of groups differed per pilot. 
During this period, several physical and non-physical case-mix information products 
were designed. In line with Boehm’s spiral model, the object design phase was an iterative 
process in which prototypes in different phases of development were judged by the end 
users. In each phase the pilot group could adjust or refine the specifications of the CMI. 
The implementation phase related both to technical issues (making the CMI available to 
the users) and organizational issues (communication, training, etc.). In this phase, the 
CMI was actually adopted and used and the effects of use occurred. In the evaluation 
phase, the interim success of the CMI project was assessed on the basis of informal and 
formal evaluations and the factors that had promoted or obstructed its success.  In 
addition to the regular evaluation phases, two extensive reflections were conducted (in 
2008/ 2009 and 2014) with the aim to gain contemplative knowledge about several 
topics over a longer time period. The opinions of the project were requested from all 
the people in the target group and not from only the people from the pilot groups, 
thus creating a more representative picture. The results were used to assess whether the 
project as a whole was on the right track and to identify what measures were necessary 
to increase the acceptance and use of the CMI. In February 2014, it was concluded that 
the CMI had been completed and the objectives of the project had been fulfilled, so the 
project was finished. In Chapter 7, the end products of the CMI are described in detail.
Data collection
Both qualitative and quantitative research methods were used. Triangulation was 
sought by collecting data from multiple sources, such as interviews, questionnaires, 
documents, and by ‘being around’. In the regular phases of process design, object 
design, implementation and evaluation phase data were collected by several unstructured 
interviews with pilot group members, (medical) managers, business analyst, the ICT 
department and F & C department.  During these phases data external and internal 
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documents were used to describe relevant developments, such as policy letters from 
the Ministry of Health and the Dutch Health Care Authority (NZa) and a range of 
internal documentation, such as annual reports, budgeting letters, internal memos and 
presentations. Sometimes limited questionnaires were used, for example to evaluate the 
user training sessions Furthermore, the researcher (FA) worked at the AMC and was 
thus in constant contact with his research environment. From the beginning of the 
project, he was project leader and involved in the design and implementation of the 
CMI and attended numerous meetings with managers. By ‘being around’ he saw and 
heard all kind of things that might be relevant for these phases. With regard to the 
formal extensive reflections solely questionnaires and semi-structured interviews were 
used.  Finally, the conclusions of this research were presented to several experts of the 
AMC to test the reliability, completeness, and relevance.

PART II: 
CASE STUDY AMC 2006 - 2014

Chapter 5
 Case study AMC 2006 – 2008
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Abstract
In 2006, the Ministry of Health announced that from 2008, 70% of hospital care would 
be freely negotiable. Given the fact that the AMC already had a budget deficit and that it 
was predicted that this would increase because of the new reimbursement, the Board of 
Directors decided to design a case-mix information system (CMI) for their top medical 
and non-medical managers, in order to increase insight about patients, decision support, 
planning, monitoring, legitimization, and process optimization. In the design of the 
CMI, the patient groups of the AMC were put centrally because. It was assumed that 
the patient groups had a large impact on the performance in all core tasks and funding 
and therefore had to be put centrally in management and associated (management) 
information.  The CMI was iteratively designed and gradually implemented in the 
AMC organization. In 2006, a pilot group defined what types of information were 
minimally required to define medical policy. These data were collected and presented 
to the pilot specialties by a Standard Report Patient Care and Portfolio Matrix. After 
the pilot, these products were rolled out to all medical specialties to support them when 
defining their plans for the following year. In 2008 26 medical specialties participated 
in the CMI project.  At the end of 2008, an interim reflection on the project took place 
by means of a survey followed by semi-structured interviews. Chief physicians, division 
managers and central managers, were asked to participate in the interim reflection 
(N = 35). The respondents agreed with the statement that the CMI had added value to 
the AMC and themselves.  Because of the increasing competition and financial pressures, 
they expressed the need to make case-mix decisions in a more rational and explicit 
way and expected that the CMI would support this. The majority of the managers 
had used the information regularly.  The CMI was most used for getting more insight, 
decision support and, although to a lesser extent legitimization. However, doubts about 
the quality of the data, particularly the DBC and cost data, appeared to be a major 
obstacle to the acceptance and use of the information. Also several medical managers 
indicated that they had insufficient knowledge and skills on how the CMI could be used 
for decision making. Moreover, they found it difficult to really implement choices into 
practice.  On balance, the positive effects of the instrument outweighed the negative 
effects. About two thirds of the respondents had perceived the CMI project as (very) 
successful for themselves, but it was also concluded that several necessary measures for 
improvement had to be taken to further increase the success of the CMI.
 Case study AMC 2006 – 2008
C
ha
pt
er
 5
107
5.1  Introduction 
In this chapter, the first phase of the case study in the AMC over the period 2006 to 
2008 is described. In this phase, the project ‘Patient Care Profiles’ started on behalf of 
the Board of Directors (see Section 2.8). The initial information products based on 
DBC data were designed and implemented in cooperation with the top medical and 
non-medical managers. In Table 5.1, an overview is presented of the most important 
research-related developments between 2006 and 2008.
Table 5.1: Overview of the most relevant developments for this research, 2006 - 2008
Dutch hospital 
sector
 
Year
 
AMC
General event Evaluation of the CMI
Design of the 
CMI
Implemen-
tation of the 
CMI
Introduction of 
the DBC system
2005
 
Predicted budget 
deficit in 2006 of 12 
M euro
10% B segment 
(free negotiable 
care)
Decision of Board 
of Directors to 
design the case-mix 
information system 
(CMI)
   
Introduction of 
the new Health 
Care Insurance 
Act, Health 
Care Market 
Regulation Act 
and Health Care 
Institutions (Ac-
creditation) Act 
2006 Definition ‘Strategic goals 2006 - 2010’
Evaluation 
pilot ‘Patient 
Care Profiles’ 
2002 - 2005, 
Evaluation 
pilot I
Question-
naire, mini-
mal data-set, 
Standard 
Report 
Patient Care, 
Portfolio 
Matrix
Roll out 
Standard 
Report Patient 
Care, Portfolio 
Matrix
  2007   Evaluation pilot II
20% B segment 
(free negotiable 
care)
2008   Interim reflection
Standard 
Report 
Patient Care 
and Portfolio 
Matrix in 
Cognos 8
Roll out CMI 
in Cognos
8
8 The AMC uses Cognos as a management information system. Cognos is a brand name used by IBM 
for activities in the field of business intelligence and business performance management. The software is 
designed to enable business users without technical knowledge to extract corporate data, analyse it, and 
assemble reports. 
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To better understand the context of the case study, in Section 5.2, the most relevant 
research-related developments in the Dutch hospital sector and AMC over the period 
2006 to 2008, are described. In Section 5.3, there is a demonstration of how the yearly 
regulative cycle of problem solving (see Chapter Four) was passed through. In addition, 
an interim reflection on the project took place at the end of 2008 to reflect extensively 
over a longer period of time and gain contemplative knowledge about several topics. The 
results of the interim reflection are presented in Section 5.4. In Section 5.5, the interim 
conclusions are summarized. 
5.2 Developments in the Dutch hospital sector and the AMC 
The Dutch hospital sector
In 2004, the Ministry of Health presented its plans for the liberalization of care for the 
next few years (VWS, 2004). One of the plans was that, starting from 2008, health 
care providers would be able to negotiate on the prices of the products for over 70% of 
hospital care with the aim of giving insurers and health care providers more opportunity 
for initiative and responsibility, in a way consistent with the philosophy of health 
insurance (see also Section 2.4). In 2007, the final plans regarding the funding and 
reimbursement of hospitals were presented for 2008 to 2011 and it was determined 
that in 2008 the free negotiable segment (B-list DBCs) would be expanded from 10% 
to 20% rather than 70% (VWS, 2007). Other plans included the replacement of the 
budget system by a DBC-based reimbursement system in 2009, and the development 
of the DOT system, which is a simplification of the DBC system (see Section 2.5). For 
the UMCs, it was determined that their funding had to match the DBC system as much 
as possible, but the additional costs associated with the top referral and innovation 
function would still be funded by the academic budget. 
In 2008, the Ministry of Health evaluated the previous years’ changes. According to 
them, the introduction of the B-segment had led to a better access to care, a decrease 
in waiting times, and more attention to quality, innovation, and creativity in the sector 
(VWS, 20081). Despite these positive developments quality needed to have a more 
important role in the negotiation with, and contracting of, providers. Based on these 
evaluations, VWS announced the introduction of the new DBC product structure 
DOT in 2010 and the extension of the B segment in 2009 up to 34%. It was also 
determined that the introduction of a full DBC-based reimbursement system would be 
postponed because there were too many risks. This meant that in 2009 most of the care 
(A-list DBCs) was still reimbursed through the budget system, but funding was based 
on the DBCs. In addition to this, the Ministry of Health announced budget cuts for 
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the hospital sector increasing from €160 million in 2008 to €400 million from 2011, 
structurally. In December 2008, VWS announced that the introduction of the DBC 
reimbursement system would take place in 2011 (VWS, 20082). Altogether it can be 
concluded that the liberalization of care had taken place in a much slower pace and more 
limited way than planned. 
The AMC
The introduction of the liberalization of care and the increasing pressure on financial 
resources had impact on the strategy of the AMC as defined in the strategic goals of 
2006 to 2010 and the annual budget letters.
Strategic goals 2006 - 2010
In 2006, the AMC defined their strategic goals for the next four years. In this document, 
it was stated that the external developments and financial pressure made it necessary to 
select the right patients because they determined how the AMC performed on the core 
tasks of patient care, research, and training:
More than ever in the existence of the AMC, the patient is placed centrally in our strategy. We will 
have to ensure that the patient finds our expertise and attention to the level which they are entitled. 
At the same time, the shortage of medical care compels us to use the available capacity as efficiently as 
possible. (…). Patient Care Profiles determine the care that we have to offer. Choices with regard to 
type of patients are inspired by the way we fulfill our three core tasks. The AMC has shown in recent 
years that the introduction of the ´Patient Care Profiles´ increased our ability to manage the influx of 
patients better (AMC, Strategic Goals 2006 - 2011).
Budget letter
In the budget letter AMC 2006, a budget deficit of €6.6 million was expected for 2005 
and €12 million for 2006. Based on the deficits and the ambition to achieve a net 
result of 2% for innovation, cost savings of 20 million euro were required. The AMC 
wanted to realize this through a combination of measures, such as the freeze on hiring 
temporary medical specialists and nursing staff, by analyzing the budget deficits, and 
by making new savings plans. When the financial policy and budgets for 2008 were 
presented, it was announced that, despite the fact that the annual accounts of 2007 
had shown a positive result, the budgets for 2008 were more sobering. At the central 
level, 10 million euro had to be invested in new activities and growth in core areas. 
For patient care, production growth was capped at 1%. To support the right choices in 
patient care, the Board of Directors decided that the instrument ‘Patient Care Profiles’ 
had to be updated and developed further for new purposes, including the integration of 
patient profiles in the 2008 budget. This meant that all clinical departments were asked 
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to indicate the desired volumes per patient group. In assessing the plans of the divisions, 
the Board adopted the principle that priority be given to five areas9 and the plans would 
be evaluated on impact with regard to finance and capacity. In 2008, internal budgeting 
was still based on the budget parameters and not on the DBCs, because it was not 
possible to make a good split between the A- and B-list DBCs. Finally, it was announced 
that in 2009 the internal budgeting would become more DBC-based. 
5.3 The regulative cycle of the AMC
The case-mix information system (CMI) was iteratively designed and implemented 
at the AMC and gradually spread across the organization. Between 2006 and 2008 
the regulative cycle was passed through annually. The cycle consists of the phases of 
evaluation, process design, object design, and implementation of the CMI (see Section 
4.4). 
5.3.1 2006
1. Evaluation of the instrument ‘Patient Care Profiles’ 
In 2006, the Finance & Control department (F & C) evaluated the strengths and 
weaknesses of the instrument ‘Patient Care Profiles,’ which was developed between 
2002 and 2005 (see Section 2.8). The evaluation took place with four people who had 
previously been involved in the project. The interviewees were positive about the further 
development of the instrument, because they recognized the need to better understand 
the consequences of medical practice and that specific choices in the portfolio had to 
be made due to market forces and pressure on resources. In Table 5.2, the perceived 
strengths and weaknesses of the instrument ‘Patient Care Profiles’ are summarized.
2. Process design 
Based on this evaluation, the F & C department concluded that in order to solve the 
problems with the ‘Patient Care Profiles’ and given the expected increase of competition 
and financial pressure, this ad hoc instrument had to be transformed into a real 
information system with regard to patients: a case-mix information system (CMI). 
As in 2006 there were no ready-made CMIs available for the Dutch hospital sector, 
the F & C department decided to design its own system. The system was designed 
primarily for the top medical and non-medical management, i.e. both within the divisions 
9 Cardiovascular diseases, gastrointestinal oncology, infection and immunity diseases, and the Cardiovascular 
diseases, gastrointestinal oncology, infection and immunity diseases, and the children’s hospital.
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Table 5.2: Strengths and weaknesses of the ‘Patient Care Profiles’ 
Strengths Weaknesses
• It supported a way of defining medical 
policy and priorities;
• The patient groups were consistent with 
the experience and language of the depart-
ment;
• The patient group was an appropriate level 
of aggregation of care and suitable for 
different purposes.
• The patient groups were only described in qual-
itative terms and not based on data. Therefore it 
was not possible to quantify the patient groups, 
for example, in terms of volume, capacity, and 
money. As a result it was not possible to monitor 
if the medical policy was realized and there was no 
insight in the consequences of medical policy;
• In the Minimal Dataset, several relevant data for 
making case-mix decisions were missing, for exam-
ple financial data and (care) market data;
• The definition and quantification of patient groups 
were limited to the areas of focus, not for all 
activities;
• The definition and quantification of patient groups 
was optional for the medical departments and had 
no part in the annual cycle of planning & control;
• The process of data collection took place irregularly, 
was labor intensive and error sensitive;
• The data of the patient groups was recorded in 
tables, and was not useful as management informa-
tion for the internal dialogue about budgets and 
cost.
(chief physicians, division management) and central management (Board of Directors,
Corporate Controller, and Director of Patient Care), because they were considered to be 
the key decision-makers.
The CMI had to serve different functions. For management within the divisions the 
CMI should mainly serve the decision facilitating function (see Section 3.4.1), which 
meant that it would give insight (into the case-mix and underlying care processes and 
these insights would support management in taking (policy) decisions with regard to 
the case-mix and process optimization. This matched with the AMC management 
principle of the ‘professional in the lead’ at making decisions in the primary process 
(see Section 2.8). For central management, the CMI should mainly serve the decision 
control function, which meant that it could be used for planning (capacity, money) and 
monitoring of the policy plans, and for external legitimation purposes (negotiating with 
the insurance companies). For the design of the CMI several principles were defined, 
such as: the system should match with the processes and language of the medical 
departments, the workload should be limited, it should not lead to new registrations, 
and the design process should be transparent, repeatable, and documented.
Chapter 5
112
To start with, two information products had to be designed: a Standard Report Patient 
Care and a Portfolio Matrix. The Standard Report Patient Care had to present the most 
relevant data with regard to the patient groups and had to replace the current data tables 
of the project ‘Patient Care Profiles’. A Portfolio Matrix is a technique for classifying 
current or new businesses or products into categories on the basis of their rankings 
in two or more dimensions of performance (Walker & Rosco, 1988). The idea of the 
Portfolio Matrix originated from the Boston Consultancy Group and was primarily 
developed for the commercial industry. The F & C department presumed this to be a 
powerful tool for medical managers to assess their mix of patient groups in a systematic 
way. The design of the Standard Report and Portfolio Matrix would be done by Pilot 
group I10. The deadline for the pilot was June 2006 because, if the system was successfully 
completed, it could be used hospital-wide for the definition of annual plans by medical 
department, the budget, and production agreements with insurers in 2007.
3. Object design
Design of information products
In this phase the Standard Report Patient Care and Portfolio Matrix were designed. The 
Standard Report contained quantitative and qualitative data per patient group and per 
medical specialty. The data were classified by topic: patient characteristics, relevance, 
capacity, health care market, and finance. These subjects were considered as relevant 
by the pilot group for the preparation of the annual plans. The patient groups were 
presented side by side to allow comparison with each other and to evaluate strategic 
alternatives. In Table 5.3, an example of the Standard Report of the Plastic Surgery 
department is presented with regard to the subject characteristics of the patients and 
finance. 
The financial data consisted of costs and revenues per patient group. Since the real 
costs were not registered in the ledger per patient but by cost center, these costs were 
estimated by multiplying the volumes of the underlying care activities of the DBC 
trajectories by the unit costs. The unit costs of care activities were calculated annually 
by the F & C department and included all direct and indirect costs with regard to 
patient care. The AMC had designed and implemented their own unit cost model since 
2002 (Asselman & Snijders, 2005; Asselman, 2007). The costs for research, training and 
10 Pilot group I consisted of chief physicians of Cardiology, Ophthalmology, Neurology, Gastrointestinal 
and Liver diseases, Paediatric oncology, Plastic surgery, and Radiology. It was a combination of portal 
and supporting specialties, representative for the AMC. Other participants were a nursing director, two 
employees of the F & C department, one employee of Directorate Patient Care and a business office 
employee. In total, 12 people participated in this first pilot group. 
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Table 5.3: Example of Standard Report of the medical specialty Plastic Surgery (*)
Consult, 
conser-
vative 
treatment
Hand/ 
wrist Tumors
Breast 
recon-
struction
Characteristics of patients Source
# DBC trajectories DBC system 180 565 280 250
% top referral care Chief physician 75% 60% 25% 25%
% of patients within 
Amsterdam Patient system 50% 40% 50% 40%
% patient s <= 18 years old Patient system 7% 7% 90% 10%
 
Referred by general practi-
tioner Chief physician sometimes sometimes seldom sometimes
Referred by other specialties 
AMC Chief physician sometimes often often sometimes
Referred by other hospitals 
within Amsterdam Chief physician sometimes often often sometimes
Referred by other hospitals 
outside Amsterdam Chief physician sometimes often often sometimes
Finance
Costs per DBC F & C 615 684 1.080 1.787
Returns per DBC F & C 508 985 1.811 1.419
Financial coverage per DBC F & C -107 301 731 -368 
Financial coverage per DBC 
(%) F & C 83% 144% 168% 79%
Total costs DBCs F & C 107.019 386.416 244.097 418.191
Total returns DBC F & C 88.392 556.525 409.286 332.022
Total financial coverage 
DBCs F & C -18.627 170.109 165.189 -86.169
 
(*) Table contains fictitious data
education were excluded by using several assumptions. The revenues were determined 
by the tariffs (A-list DBC) or selling prices (B-list DBCs) of the DBC trajectories. Since
the calculated costs included also the costs for top referral care, these costs were about 
25% higher than the revenues of the DBC trajectories. These additional costs had to be 
covered by the academic budget (see Section 2.7). The Portfolio Matrix was designed by 
adjusting the measures on the X and Y-axis of the original matrix of Boston Consultancy 
Group to the setting of the AMC. In Figure 5.1, an example is displayed of the Portfolio 
Matrix of the AMC.
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Figure 5.1: Example of the Portfolio Matrix of the AMC (*)
 
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
In this Matrix, the medical relevance (Y-axis) was determined per patient group by 
the chief physicians. They were asked to specify in terms of percentages how much of 
the patients’ treatments per year were relevant for the clinic, research, training, and 
education (see Table 5.4). For example, of the patient group ‘Tumors,’ there was an 
indication that 70% had been enrolled in scientific research. The overall relevance score 
was calculated by averaging the unweighted percentages of the individual scores.
Table 5.4: Calculation of the relevance scores by patient group of the medical specialty 
Plastic Surgery (*)
Patient group It is relevant for the clinic
It is relevant 
for research
It is relevant 
for training
It is relevant 
for education
relevance 
score (un-
weighted)
Consult, conservative 
treatment 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Hand/ wrist 40% 100% 100% 75% 79%
Tumors 50% 70% 100% 75% 74%
Breast reconstruction 10% 75% 10% 75% 43%
 
(*) Table contains fictitious data
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The financial relevance (X-axis) was determined by comparing the average cost and 
tariffs (A-list DBC) or selling prices (B-list DBCs) of the underlying care products. If 
the financial relevance was above 100%, the patient groups were profitable; below 100% 
the patient groups were unprofitable. Each bulb in Figure 5.1 represents a patient group, 
wherein the size of the bulb was determined by the number of patients per year. 
As a result, the degree of medical relevance was plotted against the degree of financial 
relevance per patient group. For each quadrant of the Portfolio Matrix, actions could be 
defined so as to optimize the portfolio. For example, if a patient group such as ‘Hand/
wrist’ was very relevant for the different core tasks, but was unprofitable at that moment 
(upper left quadrant), one could decide to stabilize the volumes but focus on process 
optimizing and investigate if there were opportunities to increase the selling prices. On 
the other hand, if a patient group such as ‘Breast reconstruction’ was not very relevant 
for the core tasks but profitable (bottom right quadrant), one could decide to increase 
the volume and use the profit to subsidize patients from the upper left quadrant. The 
Standard Report and the Portfolio Matrix were generated for all medical specialties of 
the pilot group.
Design process
The design of the Standard Report and Portfolio Matrix was done by a pilot group (pilot 
group I)11. The pilot served as a test laboratory. During the pilot, both plenary sessions as 
well as one-on-one interviews were organized. The design process of the Standard Report 
and Portfolio Matrix consisted of several steps. In step 1, the existing Minimal Data Set 
(i.e. what data is minimally required per patient group) as used for the original ‘Patient 
Care Profiles’, was revised to match the CMI to the needs of management. The Minimal 
Data Set was revised on the basis of criteria such as relevance, usability, workload, and 
validity. On this basis, a new Minimal Data Set was defined, see Figure 5.2. 
11 Pilot group I consisted of chief physicians of Cardiology, Ophthalmology, Neurology, Gastrointestinal 
and Liver diseases, Paediatric oncology, Plastic surgery, and Radiology. It was a combination of portal 
and supporting specialties, representative for the AMC. Other participants were a nursing director, two 
employees of the F & C department, one employee of Directorate Patient Care and a business office 
employee. In total, 12 people participated in this first pilot group.
Chapter 5
116
Figure 5.2: Minimal Data Set 2006
The main changes were related to the fact that new types of data were incorporated, 
such as financial data, and health care market data (such as the size and number of 
competitors). Moreover, the integration with other medical specialties was made visible. 
Besides this, chief physicians were asked to indicate how these patients could be traced 
in terms of DBC. Because of this it became possible to quantify the patient groups. In 
step 2, it was described how the data could be collected. A distinction was made between 
system and non-system data. 
System data are quantitative data that are registered in digital hospital systems. For the 
collection of system data queries were defined. Non-system data are data that are not 
registered in systems, such as opinions about patient groups, and can only be obtained 
by asking the medical departments. For the collection of these data, a questionnaire was 
designed. The list contained mostly fill-in options so the completion time was limited to 
five to ten minutes per patient group. 
In step 3, the chief physicians were asked to categorize their patients into clinical 
subgroups and accordingly to complete a questionnaire per patient group. The questions 
related to the type and relevance of care, current and desired volumes, use of diagnostics 
and surgery, and distinctiveness on the health care market. Because of manageability, the 
number of patient groups was limited to a maximum of fifteen groups per department 
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of average size. They had to classify at least 80% of their patients. The patient groups had 
to be traceable in the existing registrations and chief physicians were strongly advised 
to make use of DBC data such as DBC diagnosis, procedure, age of the patient or a 
combination of these data. In step 4, the system and non-system data were collected and 
aggregated in a data warehouse. In step 5, the Standard Report and Portfolio Matrix per 
medical specialty were generated in Excel. 
4. Implementation of the CMI
In the summer of 2006, the Board of Directors decided to roll out the Standard Report 
Patient Care and Portfolio Matrix to all medical specialties of the AMC to support 
them when defining their plans for the following year. In this way, the information 
products were incorporated in the Planning & Control (P&C) cycle. In this context, all 
specialties were asked first to define their patient groups and complete the questionnaires. 
Accordingly, they had to indicate the desired volumes per patient group in order to 
remain within the financial budget in terms of growth, stabilization, or decline. They also 
had to define the areas of focus in patient care, in research, and education. Eventually, 
26 medical specialties participated and a total of 350 patient groups were defined. Each 
medical specialty received a Standard Report, Portfolio Matrix, and explanation of the 
report and figures. The roll out of the Standard Report and Portfolio Matrix in 2006 
took place earlier than planned, because the financial deficit of the AMC had worsened. 
In the period from September to November the Standard Report and Portfolio Matrix 
were generated for all medical specialties. Unfortunately, many deliveries were later 
than planned so several meetings had to be postponed. The reasons for the delays were 
that medical specialties were too busy, there was a lack of priority, and there was a 
lack of willingness. The annual plans of the medical departments were discussed in 
group meetings that were attended by the chief physician, division chairman, corporate 
controller, and director of patient care. After these meetings, the annual plans were 
finalized and established by the Board of Directors. Based on these plans, the Board of 
Directors determined the priorities for negotiations with the insurers.
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5.3.2 2007
1. Evaluation of the CMI
Evaluation of the information products 
In February 2007, pilot group I evaluated the completion of the pilot and the roll out 
of the Standard Report and Portfolio Matrix with the Board of Directors. On balance, 
the first experiences that were positive. The pilot group was convinced of the value of 
this information and saw it as necessary for the future. In general, the Standard Reports 
and Portfolio Matrices were appreciated by medical managers because they led to major 
new insights into the composition of current patient groups, the interrelation between 
departments, the working capacity, and the required collaboration with referring 
physicians and other hospitals. They, therefore, definitely contributed to the substantive 
discussions on choices in patient care. It also turned out that the Portfolio Matrix had a 
good filter function in finding patient groups where specific analyses were needed. The 
discussions between the division chairman and the chief physicians were experienced 
as constructive and satisfactory and the pilot group was convinced of the importance 
of these discussions. In many cases, the medical specialties got more enthusiastic in the 
course of time, especially after they had seen the results of the analysis. Based on this 
conclusion, the Board of Directors decided to continue the project but also concluded 
that multiple improvements were needed to increase the acceptance and use of the 
information.
With regard to both the Standard Reports and Portfolio Matrices there were serious 
doubts about the quality of the data used. First, the non-system data (such as relevance 
scores, type of referrer, distinctiveness) were called subjective. Second, the quality of 
several types of system data, particularly of cost data and DBC data were considered 
poor. This was not surprising, because it was the first time that chief physicians were 
confronted with this, and certainly with the method of presentation. Explanations 
for the poor quality of cost data were that many chief physicians were not personally 
involved in the cost calculation and did not know whether they could trust them or not. 
The process of cost calculation consisted of a large number of steps and assumptions 
and therefore the costs were easily experienced as subjective and unreliable. Explanations 
for the poor quality DBC data were that chief physicians had hardly been involved in 
the registration so far (DBC data were automatically derived by algorithms as much 
as possible), that they had little financial relevance in a proper registration and that 
DBCs were perceived as part of an artificial language that did not reflect the physicians’ 
experience. The poor quality was also due to errors in the computer systems, such as 
failing algorithms, incorrect linkages between care activities and DBCs and the leakage 
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of data. The result was that they did not recognize the reported numbers of DBCs in 
the Standard Report. However, it should be noted that perceptions about the quality 
of the data could differ from the actual quality in terms of timeliness, completeness, 
and reliability. Through analyses in some departments, the actual quality of the DBC 
data turned out to be not as bad as the (medical) managers thought. However, the fact 
remained that the doubts about the quality were still a major obstacle to the acceptance 
and use of the information and that actions on this should therefore be undertaken. 
Finally, there was a general need to make the collected data AMC-wide accessible so that 
others, such as staff advisors, could use it. 
Evaluation of the design and implementation strategy
With regard to the design and implementation strategy, it was concluded that the 
choice by the F & C department to have the project managed corporate-wide had 
both advantages and disadvantages. An important advantage was the direct contact 
between chief physicians through which the risk of bias was reduced and the knowledge 
and experience in one specialty was used in other specialties. The main criticism of 
the project was that the business offices of the divisions were hardly involved in the 
project. Their involvement, however, might have been important for the coordination 
of their activities (e.g. preparing the annual plan) and for creating support within the 
organization. The F & C department made a plea for the business offices to be given a 
more substantial role in the next stage of the project. 
The process of generating the Standard Reports and Portfolio Matrices was fairly labor-
intensive. This was partly the consequence of the size of the project: it involved all clinical 
departments of the AMC and much data had to be collected, checked, and aggregated. 
This was the result of the fact that many departments (because of their knowledge and 
experience) were consciously given freedom in the composition of the patient groups, but 
as a consequence the process was not easy to standardize. Furthermore, the distribution 
of reports led to many additional questions and further analysis. In the process only a 
few employees of the F & C department and the ICT department were involved, which 
made the process vulnerable. 
2. Process design
Based on the evaluations the CMI project management planned a number of actions for 
the further design and implementation of the CMI. First, the quality of the information 
products had to be increased; second, in order to increase the accessibility of the data, 
a Data Cube had to be designed in Cognos by the ICT Department, containing the 
system and non-system data as reported in the Standard Report and Portfolio Matrix. 
This would mean that the data could be retrieved by anyone who had access to Cognos. 
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These actions had to take place with the help of a new pilot group. The pilot had to 
be finished by May 2007 so that the information products could be used again for 
the support of the medical managers in the preparation of the annual plans and the 
information could be integrated in the regular Planning & Control cycle by monitoring 
developments in the quarterly management reports. Finally, the F & C department 
would investigate for what other purposes the information products could be used. 
3. Object design
Design of the information products 
The Standard Report Patient Care was improved in several ways. The report was extended 
with several types of system data. The volumes of DBC trajectories of the previous years were 
added to make volume trends visible. Further, several data with regard to (scarce) capacity 
were added, such as the number of outpatient visits, nursing days, surgery hours, and MRIs, 
because these were considered as relevant when making and defining the annual plans. 
Also, the quality of the cost and DBC data was improved in several medical departments. 
Furthermore, a Data Cube in Cognos was designed by the ICT department. The Data 
Cube contained the same information as the Standard Report that was generated in Excel. 
Design process
As in 2006, the further design of the Standard Report took place through a pilot group 
(pilot group II)12. The pilot group revised the minimal dataset again and examined if 
the non-system data could be replaced by system data to make the data quantitative and 
more objective. This was mainly possible for the capacity data. Further, the quality of 
cost data and DBC data was reviewed. This led to several findings such as that for many 
essential procedures no costs were calculated, many procedures were not linked to a 
DBC, and wrong diagnoses were registered. As a result, several assumptions in the cost 
calculation process were adjusted and general improvements were made including better 
technical links between the cost and DBC. Furthermore, several causes were identified 
for the poor registrations, such as the lack of central guidelines, a lack of discipline 
at medical specialties, a lack of proper systems and time, and the absence of urgency. 
The problems with the quality were so huge and urgent that they were arrested AMC-
wide. The F & C department gave several suggestions to the Board of Directors for 
how to tackle this, for example by increasing the link between DBC registrations and 
internal budgets, the definition of a policy with regard to the registration of DBC data, 
12 Pilot group II consisted of chief physicians of Gastroenterology and Hepatology, Throat-, Nose- and Ear 
disorders, Orthopedics, Ophthalmology, Nuclear medicine and Gynecology. They were selected on basis 
of estimated willingness, scope and nature of the department. In addition, director operations, a nursing 
director and member of the directorate Patient Care board were invited. In total, 14 people participated in 
the second pilot group.
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involvement of the chief physicians in the process of cost calculations, and to further 
analyze the DBC data in cooperation with business offices of the divisions.
Exploration of new applications of the information products
The F & C department explored new applications of the Standard Report and Portfolio 
Matrix in cooperation with head nurses and the chief physician of the medical specialty 
Gastroenterology. The head nurses examined which data could be used to determine the 
short and long-term volume of nursing staff. As a result, it was decided to add data to the 
minimal dataset which might be predictive of needed nursing care and to make it useful for 
planning, such as data with respect to the age and health condition of the (surgical) patient. 
With the help of the chief physician of the medical specialty Gastroenterology, it was 
investigated how the multidisciplinarity of patient groups could be determined. This 
specialty needed this insight because the more medical specialties and specialists were 
involved in a short time, the more risk of miscommunication there was. On the basis of 
the DBC data, it turned out to be possible to determine the number of different treating 
medical specialists per patient group (see Figure 5.3) and to determine where actions were 
needed to reduce the risk of miscommunication. As a result of this exploration, it was 
decided to appoint a case manager and a nurse practitioner for the high risk patient groups 
and to organize multidisciplinary meetings for them. On the basis of this pilot it was also 
decided to add the number of treating specialists per patient group to the Minimal Dataset. 
Figure 5.3: Number of medical specialties involved per patient group, medical specialty 
Gastroenterology 
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4. Implementation 
In 2007, the case-mix information was used in several ways by means of the Standard 
Report Patient Care, the Portfolio Matrix, or directly from the data warehouse. 
Annual plans
In August 2007, the improved Standard Reports and Portfolio Matrices were updated 
by the F & C department and sent to all medical specialties, business executives, and 
the Board of Directors to support them in the preparation of the annual plans for 2008. 
An explanation of the data was added. As in 2006, the medical specialties were asked 
to define the desired volumes per patient group. Now, they also had to motivate them 
and to explain how these volumes could be realized. Also, criteria for making case-mix 
decisions were specified by the Board of Directors, such as ensuring the continuity of 
the core tasks and connecting choices to the expertise of personnel and the demand for 
care. By improving and updating the cost data, the financial results for several patient 
groups were very different from the results in the previous year. For example, the overall 
negative financial results for the surgery department increased substantially because the 
rate of kidney transplants was reduced and the cost of the blood products were now 
included in the DBC. The F & C department tried to explain the differences where 
possible, but in many cases the differences were due to differences in the DBC product 
structure or calculation model. Because of this, several of the medical managers became 
more suspicious about the data in spite of the efforts to improve its quality.
Monitoring expected versus desired volumes
During 2007, all medical specialties were asked to explain the relevant deviations 
between the expected and desired volumes. They received a table with the number of 
DBC trajectories per patient group for the years 2006 and 2007, see Table 5.5:
Table 5.5: Example of monitoring volumes of the Otolaryngology department (*)
Patient group # DBCs 2006
# Expected 
DBCs 2007
Mutation in 
2007 relative 
to 2006
Desired 
volume
Explana-
tion of the 
deviation
Children’s otolaryngology 1.231 1.013 -18% Stable
Otology, audiology 2.310 2.413 4% Increase
Mucosal path. v. nose and sinuses 1.134 1.069 -6% Increase
Nose Surgery 436 458 5% Stable
Maxillofacial surgery exc. nose 
Surgery 472 447 -5% Increase
Acute ENT 504 439 -13% Decrease
 (*) Table contains fictitious data
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This was the first time that medical specialties had to report on the volume of patients, 
rather than on budget parameters. The medical specialties reacted that the numbers 
were not recognized, and in general were too low. Further investigation revealed that the 
data regarding a large number of DBCs were not yet complete and therefore were not 
included in the information products. 
Alliances with other healthcare providers
Several medical specialties had used the information to discuss possible cooperation 
with other care providers, for example, to transfer basic care to general hospitals. For 
these discussions, data about volume, capacity, the healthcare market, and finance were 
useful.
Process optimization
The information was used for process optimization in several ways. The head nurses used 
the information to measure the intensity of care per nursing department and determine 
trends in the demand for care. The department of Quality Process and Innovation used 
the data to analyze the pathway for a specific patient group of the gynecology department 
and defined standard clinical pathways.
Negotiations with health insurers
In the context of the negotiations on price, volume, and quality of the B-list DBCs, 
and using data from the data warehouse different analyses were made by the F & C 
department, for example the cost/selling prices ratio by DBC, determining market 
shares and top referral care.
Internal Review Committee
The Standard Report Patient Care was also used by the Internal Review Committee to 
discuss with medical specialties about their policy with regard to patient care and to gain 
insight into the actual waiting times compared to the standards, to define what actions 
were needed, and how these would be monitored.
External legitimation
The data from the data warehouse were used in various ways for external legitimation 
purposes, for example to define the percentage of top referral care in the annual account 
and to influence the rate of the A-list DBCs.
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5.3.3 2008
1. Evaluation of the CMI
Evaluation of the information products 
In 2008, the CMI was again evaluated by the F & C department (AMC, 2008). It 
was concluded that the quality of the data and the classification of patient groups had 
improved and that the use of the information had increased. The greatest value of the 
instrument still lays in the fact that the language of patient groups appeared to be 
useful for management, the relevance of the financial and non-financial information for 
decision-making, and the presentation of the information in just a few pages and figures. 
However, in discussions between F & C and medical specialists there were still a large 
number of users who doubted the quality of the data. An additional problem was that 
the financial data could vary dramatically per year, for example by changes in the DBC-
registration, cost calculations, and DBC rates. The fluctuations were not understood by 
the chief physicians. Also, the estimated costs included the costs for top referral care and 
were about 25% higher than the revenues of the DBC trajectories, because the DBC 
tariff did not cover these additional costs (see Section 2.7). This was discouraging for 
the medical specialties, because they had the perception that they generated financial 
loss for the AMC whereas they worked hard. Furthermore, many medical managers still 
had little knowledge about the DBC structure and therefore did not recognize the data. 
Finally, several chief physicians indicated that they had insufficient knowledge and skills 
on how they should deal with priority issues and how the Standard Report and Portfolio 
Matrix could be used for decision making. Moreover, they found it difficult to really 
implement choices into practice. 
Evaluation of the design and implementation strategy
The process of generating the Standard Reports Patient Care and Portfolio Matrices 
was still fairly labor-intensive and error sensitive. It still took a lot of effort to generate 
the Standard Reports and Portfolio Matrices for all medical specialties and accordingly 
to check and send them. The result was that the medical specialties did not receive the 
information until August and for several departments this came too late, because they 
had already started drawing up their annual plans in the summer.
2. Process design
Given the fact that in the AMC one was generally convinced of the usefulness and 
necessity of the CMI and the fact that the information was already used for many 
different purposes, it was decided to continue ‘full swing’ with the CMI project. First, 
several actions were defined to further improve the quality of the data. An external audit 
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would be carried on the process of calculating unit costs and the unit cost themselves 
would be validated. Furthermore, the key assumptions in the calculation of unit costs 
would be checked with the medical specialties and the additional costs for top referral 
care would be excluded in future calculations. Also, several projects were started AMC-
wide to improve the DBC registration. Second, it was decided to carry over the entire 
process of generating the case-mix information from the F & C department to the IT 
department. 
In this context, the F & C department instructed the IT department to design the 
following information products in Cognos: the Standard Reports, drill-through reports, 
Portfolio Matrices, and the ‘Intranet Page Management Information Patient Care’. The 
aims of this were to increase the accessibility of the information for users including 
underlying details, to accelerate and standardize the process of generating the information 
products, to make the quality of the process more secure, and to update the information 
more frequently so developments in the patient groups could be better monitored. An 
external auditor and an employee of the Internal Auditing Department became involved 
to ensure that the design process would comply with external audit requirements related 
to transparency, accountability, and documentation. Third, the case-mix information 
would be further embedded in the regular Planning & Control cycle by using it for the 
assessment of the annual plans by the F & C department. Fourth, training would be 
organized by chief physicians to increase the knowledge and skills in using the case-mix 
information. Finally, other measures that were desirable or necessary to increase the 
acceptance and use of the CMI would be identified at specialty level. In this context, it 
was decided that in addition to the regular evaluations, an extensive interim reflection 
among chief physicians, division managers, and central managers had take place to 
reflect extensively over a longer time period and gain contemplative knowledge about 
several topics. Hereby all people in the target group were requested to give their opinion 
on the project instead of just the people from the pilots, creating a more representative 
picture. The interim reflection took place after the drawing up of the annual plans, see 
Section 5.4.
3. Object design
Design of information products in Cognos
In 2008, the Standard Report Patient Care and the Portfolio Matrix were designed in 
Cognos. The Standard Report became available in Cognos and was a digital version 
of the report which had been earlier generated in Excel. The main advantages for 
users were that they could retrieve their Standard Report at any time (and also that of 
other medical specialties), that the quantitative data were updated weekly, and that it 
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became possible to drill-down to the underlying data with ‘drill-through reports’13 to 
get a deeper understanding about the sources of the information used in the analysis. 
Two types of ‘drill-through reports’ had been designed consisting of (a) core data per 
DBC trajectory and (b) care activities per DBC. The drill-through report ‘Core data per 
DBC’ contained the most relevant data for the selected DBCs such as: DBC ID, patient 
number, diagnosis, and use of capacity, costs, and returns (see also Section 7.4). This 
report could be exported to Excel and further analyzed. The drill-through report ‘Care 
activities per DBC trajectory’ could be retrieved by clicking on a specific DBC ID in the 
drill-through report core data per DBC and contained data about the executed care 
activities such as: type of care activity, volumes, producing department and related costs. 
This report gave detailed insight on the composition of the total costs. 
The Portfolio Matrix became available in Cognos and was a digital version of the Portfolio 
Matrix which had been previously distributed on paper (see Section 5.3.1, Figure 5.1). In 
Figure 5.4, an example of a digital Portfolio Matrix of the medical specialty Reproductive 
Health is shown. The advantages of this digital version were that these analyses were 
generated automatically, the financial data were updated weekly and users were able to 
drill down to the underlying data when clicking on the bulb of a specific patient group. 
Figure 5.4: Digital Portfolio Matrix in Cognos, medical specialty Reproductive Health (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
13 A drill-through report is a report with detailed data that can be retrieved by clicking on a specific patient 
group.
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Design of an Intranet Page Management Information Patient Care
An Intranet Page called ‘Management Information Patient Care’ was designed. This 
Intranet Page contained a selection menu by which the Standard Report Patient Care 
could be downloaded by selecting a specific medical specialty. The Intranet Page also 
contained background information about the project regarding ten frequently asked 
questions that included: what are the aims of the case-mix information, what data 
sources are used, and how are the costs and returns of patient care determined? The aim 
was to share basic knowledge from the F & C department about several topics (such as 
finance, negotiations with health insurers, and the health care market) in an efficient 
way, and to be transparent. 
Improvement of the quality of the data
Several adjustments were made with regard to the cost calculations, both in the process 
of cost calculations, and the refinement of assumptions at several medical departments. 
As planned, the costs for top referral care were excluded. In this context, agreements 
were made with the Dutch Health Care Authority (NZA) and other university medical 
centers (UMCs) on the way of doing this. In summary, it was assumed that the cost for 
top referral care was equal to the academic budget and these costs had to be excluded 
from the costs of a limited set of care activities, such as outpatient visits and nursing days.
4. Implementation of the CMI 
Implementation of the information products
Those who previously received the Standard Report and Portfolio Matrices on paper 
were automatically authorized for Cognos. Authorization was given to: the Board of 
Directors, division managers, chief physicians, business managers, employees of business 
offices and F & C department. If other employees wanted access to Cognos, written 
permission from the director of operations was needed. 
Use of the information products
In July 2008, the Standard Reports and Portfolio Matrices were sent to the medical 
specialties in order to support them again in defining their annual plans for 2009. As 
in 2006 and 2007, the medical specialties were asked to define in their annual plan the 
desired volumes per patient group and how they thought to realize this. The Board of 
Directors defined on what criteria the proposals would be evaluated, such as: whether 
it belonged to the areas of focus, the relationship between costs and revenues, demand 
for capacity, and regional cooperation. The divisions’ annual plans were assessed by the 
F & C department. They concluded that almost all divisions had defined their policy 
more explicitly than in previous years. Possible explanations for this were that the Board 
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of Directors had appointed priority areas already in advance, which gave direction to 
the prioritization of the divisions and the awareness of divisions to make critical choices 
due to increasing market pressure and capacity constraints. There were no defined 
priorities that seriously conflicted with the AMC objectives and there were no major 
inconsistencies between divisions. Because the divisions had defined the desired volumes 
for each patient group, an estimate of the impact of choices could be made based on 
the available underlying data, for example, with regard to required capacity and money. 
Based on this analysis, it was concluded that no capacity problems would arise if these 
plans were realized.
User trainings
The F & C department held two training sessions for medical managers, focusing 
on making policy decisions on the basis of case-mix information. In total, about 30 
managers participated. During this training, the types of available case-mix information 
and how this could be used for their practice was demonstrated.
Dutch press
In 2008, in Dutch national newspapers several articles were published about the CMI 
project at the AMC, see the headlines below. This demonstrates that at that time the 
AMC was a forerunner with respect to making explicit case-mix decisions by means of 
this information and the identification of the cost of care at detailed level.
 ‘AMC starts to select patients’ (Volkskrant, 2008)            ‘What does an appendectomy cost?’ (Trouw, 2008)
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5.4 Interim reflection on the CMI project
At the end of 2008 an interim reflection on the project took place to reflect extensively 
over a longer period of time and gain contemplative knowledge about several topics.
Selecting participants 
To obtain the maximum number of respondents and a good representation of the 
different medical specialties and divisions of the AMC, all chief physicians, division 
managers and central managers, were asked to participate in the interim reflection; 36 
managers in total. Eventually, 35 managers participated in the study, consisting of 22 
chief physicians, 7 division managers and 6 central managers14, see Table 5.7.
Survey and interviews
The reflection took place by means of a survey using an extensive questionnaire, 
followed by semi-structured interviews. The participants completed the questionnaire 
consisting of a mix of open and closed questions. Depending on the content of the 
closed questions, participants were asked to fill in their answers using multiple choice 
categories, seven or ten point Likert scales, or rank answer categories on their relevance. 
The questionnaire was sent electronically to the (medical) managers. Separately, two 
appendices were sent to them: a current Standard Report Patient Care for the specific 
entity of the respondent (AMC, division or medical specialty) and a Portfolio Matrix. 
The questionnaires for chief physicians and division managers were the same; there were 
only some textual differences: in the questionnaire for the chief physicians there was 
reference to their departments; in the questionnaire for the division managers there 
was reference to their divisions. These questionnaires consisted of 126 items. For the 
questionnaire for the central managers, some questions were omitted, for example with 
regard to the affinity with management and detailed questions about the information 
products. This questionnaire consisted of 88 items. Participants had three weeks to 
respond. During and after that period, several emails were sent to the people to remind 
them about the deadline. 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted by the researcher (FA) and took place 
through one-on-one meetings with managers and lasted about one hour. During the 
interviews, the following key topics were discussed in-depth: the background of the 
manager, experience of institutional pressure, the influence of actors on the case-mix, 
the case-mix decision-making process, the CMI, and conditions to make the CMI 
successful. These topics were selected, because according to the literature research and on 
14 The central managers consisted of three members of the Board of Directors, one director Staff Office of 
the Board of Directors, one director Patient care, and one Managing Director in charge of corporate-wide 
projects.
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the success of the CMI. We extensively discussed the case-mix decision-making process, 
because we considered this as the most relevant, but also the most complex phase of the 
strategic management cycle to be supported by the CMI. The interviews also focused 
on specific pronounced results of the survey. At the beginning of the interviews, the 
confidentiality of the results was explicitly discussed and the managers were assured that 
the results would be anonymized. All the interviews were tape recorded.
Research variables
In the questionnaires, a distinction was made between the potential success factors 
and outcomes (Figure 5.5). The success factors consisted of design and implementation 
variables, organizational and environmental variables (managers, organization, and 
environment). All variables were selected on the basis of the literature search (Chapter 
3) and on gained practical knowledge during the regulative cycle. The outcome variables 
focused on the adoption, use and effects of the CMI, as well as the respondents’ perceived 
overall success of the CMI project. The ‘overall success of the CMI project’ was selected 
as the primary outcome measure, because ‘success’ was considered a general reflection 
of the various (interacting) success factors and outcome measures (in terms of use, and 
effects of use, of the CMI). 
Figure 5.5: Success factors and outcome measures examined in the interim reflection
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Data analysis
Survey data were analyzed using simple descriptive statistics. In view of the explorative 
nature of this interim reflection, the important focus on the qualitative data collected 
during the interviews, and the relatively small sample size, we did not perform formal 
statistical testing on score differences. Neither did we pay statistical attention to the 
impact of the success factors on their outcomes as we felt that at that moment in time 
the information products were too premature and that the period of use was too short 
to draw firm conclusions about possible associations. 
5.4.1 Results: verification of the assumptions made in the design of the CMI
A number of assumptions were made in the design phase of the CMI. These assumptions 
were based on the literature (Chapter 3), the experiences from earlier pilot studies, and 
interviews with several managers. In Table 5.6, there is a summary of which assumptions 
were verified and what the findings were.
Table 5.6: Overview of the assumptions in the design process
N. Research variable Assumption Summary of findings
1 Design of the CMI
The case-mix has a large 
impact on the perfor-
mance in core tasks and 
funding.
The assumption was largely shared by the respondents; 
only the impact of the case-mix for the core task educa-
tion and returns was rated relatively low. 
2 (medical) Manager
The target groups are the 
key decision-makers with 
regard to the case-mix 
The assumption was largely shared by the respondents. 
In addition, chief physicians and staff members could 
be considered as key decision-makers and there were 
several actors who influenced the case-mix in a more 
indirect way, like referrers, and insurers.
3 (medical) Manager
The target groups are 
able to manage their 
case-mix.
The assumption was partly shared by the respondents. 
Some managers experienced severe hurdles to manage 
their case-mix, because of their type of patients and the 
imposed budgets.
4 (medical) Manager
The target groups have 
much decision power 
within the organization.
The assumption was partly shared by the respondents. 
Several chief physicians indicated that their power was 
relatively limited, because they had no direct influence 
on the budgets and on specific costs, like staff and 
investments. 
5 (medical) Manager
The chief physicians are 
primarily responsible for 
the medical and financial 
policy.
The assumption was largely shared with regard to the 
medical policy, but to a lesser extent with regard to the 
financial policy.
6 (medical) Manager
The target groups feel 
the need to change the 
way of making case-mix 
decisions.
This assumption was partly shared by the respon-
dents. Several respondents indicated that because of 
increasing competition and financial pressures, they 
were willing to make decisions in a more rational 
and explicit way. Other respondents were satisfied 
with their way of decision-making and felt no urge to 
change this. 
Chapter 5
132
Assumption 1: The case-mix has a large impact on the performance in core tasks and 
funding
The principle of ‘putting the patient at the center’ of the decision-making processes 
of managers and supporting information system had already been applied in the pilot 
‘Patient Care Profiles 2002 - 2005’ and had also been a key element in the design of the 
CMI since 2006. This principle was also used in the strategic aims for 2006 to 2011 
(see Section 5.2) and was based on the assumption that the case-mix had a large impact 
on the performance of core tasks (patient care, research, education, and training) and 
money (costs and returns). The respondents largely shared this assumption (see Figure 
5.6, survey results).
Figure 5.6: Impact of patient groups on core tasks and finance AMC total (N = 35*)
(*) Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which the case-mix of their department or division has 
an impact on the performance on the core tasks (patient care, research, training, education) and money 
(costs, returns). Level of impact was scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (no impact) to 7 (much 
impact). More detailed analysis of the data is available on request.
The survey results (Figure 5.6) showed that the case-mix had a profound impact on both 
the performance in core tasks and finance (median of the average impact scores = 5.6). 
The case-mix tended to have somewhat more impact on their costs (mean = 5.4, SD = 
1.6, median = 6.0) than on their returns (mean = 4.9, SD = 1.7, median = 6.0). This is 
probably explained by the fact that the budgets of the medical specialties were not based 
on the invoiced DBCs, but still on the historic budgets that were determined by the 
F & C department. Furthermore, the impact of patient groups on teaching (mean = 
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4.5, SD = 1.5, median = 5.0) was perceived as lower compared to the other core tasks.
Assumption 2: The target groups are key decision-makers with regard to the case-mix 
This assumption was based on the pilot in 2006 and interviews with several managers 
and matched with the management principle of ‘professional in the lead’ (see Section 
2.8) where the medical professionals were expected to make the appropriate decisions, 
based on their knowledge and involvement in the primary process. The assumption was 
largely shared by the respondents with regard to the chief physicians and staff members 
(Figure 5.7, survey results). 
Figure 5.7: Influence of actors on the case-mix in the AMC (N = 34*) 
(*) N = 1 missing. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which a number of predefined actors 
have influence on the case-mix of their medical department/ division. Level of influence was scored on an 
11-point scale, varying from 0 (no influence) to 10 (much influence). More detailed analysis of the data is 
available on request.
During the interviews there was discussion on how the different actors could have an 
influence on the mix of patient groups. Chief physicians and staff members were clearly 
considered as key decision-makers. Chief physicians had the most influence on case-mix 
decisions because of their hierarchical position and expertise. Also staff members had 
a lot of influence on the case-mix because part of their patient population was related 
to their specific field of clinical expertise. Division managers had a key position between 
the medical departments and the Board of Directors. The division management got the 
budget and therefore had the means to allocate it. They also assessed the annual plans of 
the medical departments. In general, the division management was not directly involved 
in case-mix decisions, only when the budgets were exceeded. 
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The opinions of the respondents about the influence of the Board of Directors on the 
mix of patients varied. Some argued that they had little influence because they didn’t 
select and treat the patients. Others argued they had much formal power because they 
had to provide the facilities, agreed with infrastructure investments and staff expansion, 
defined the core areas, and appointed loyal division managers and financial managers. 
Some had the feeling that much was decided for the medical specialty by the Board 
of Directors. Referrers could influence the case-mix, for example by referring patients 
because of specific expertise or reputation. Health insurers had several instruments to 
influence the case-mix of the AMC. They could, for example, determine the maximum 
growth rate, define minimum levels for a specific patient group, and decide whether to 
contract patient groups or not. Furthermore, they had their own policy / key areas where 
they wanted to profile themselves. The influence of nurses, the director of operations and 
the concern controller on the case-mix was considered as relatively limited. 
Assumption 3: The target groups are able to manage their case-mix
The selection of chief physicians, division managers, and central managers as the primary 
target groups of the case-mix information system was also based on the assumption that 
they were able to actually manage the case-mix. The validity of this assumption was 
discussed during the interviews. This assumption was partly shared. Several managers 
indicated that the space for case-mix decisions was limited due to several reasons. First, 
many choices had already been made in the past and had attracted staff with specific 
knowledge and skills for that reason. One could not easily decide to start something 
completely different. See, for example, the quotation below:
In your questionnaires there are some assumptions which do not reflect reality: (1) that medical 
specialties are like sailing boats that can react quickly on developments and (2) that policy can be 
changed by making this information available. On the contrary: developments are not so spectacular 
and space for choices is limited. At least 80% of what one is doing is determined and is ‘business as 
usual’. Our department is more like a tanker. (Chief physician)
Second, the volumes of patients were strongly determined by the available (historical) 
budgets and capacity, which were very constant and did not enable significant changes in 
the case-mix. Third, it appeared that the characteristics of medical specialties had impact 
on the use of the case-mix information. For example: medical specialties with a high 
percentage of emergency patients or chronic patients indicated that their possibility of 
managing their case-mix was limited and therefore their need for case-mix information 
was also limited. Fourth, some specialties, such as Plastic Surgery and Radiology, were 
(mainly) supporting portal specialties and had no, or little, influence on the case-mix. 
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Assumption 4: The target groups have much decision-making power within the 
organization 
Another assumption was that the defined target groups were not only the key decision-
makers because of their function, but that they actually had much decision-making 
power within the organization. The assumption was partly shared by the respondents 
(Figure 5.8, survey results).
Figure 5.8: Extent of influence per topic (N= 34*)
(*) N = 1 missing. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they have influence on a number 
of predefined topics on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (no influence) to 7 (much influence). More detailed 
analysis of the data is available on request.
This figure indicates that the managers had most influence on type of patients (mean = 
5.2, SD = 1.4, median = 5.5) and methods of treatment of patients (mean = 4.9, SD = 
1.5, median = 5.0). The managers seemed to have relatively less influence on the budget 
(mean = 3.6, SD = 1.9, median = 3.0), probably because the budget was still determined 
by historically defined budgets, and not on the DBC revenues. During the interviews, 
it turned out that the managers also had limited influence on the cost, see the quotation 
below. Concerning costs and returns, the target groups lacked some decision-making 
power, for example with regard to the appointment of staff (at the nursing department 
or outpatient clinic), expensive materials, and making investments. 
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They also had no direct influence on the budget, since the budget was still determined 
by historically defined budgets, but not on the DBC revenues. 
We have no influence on the budget because we don’t negotiate with the insurers. Also we 
have no influence on new machines, like a laser. You have to write a business plan, but we 
are no business plan writers, we are medical specialists. We have little influence on outpatient 
clinic staff, nurses, administrative staff, desk staff, et cetera. It is a big frustration for us 
because patients are not kindly assisted at the desk. (Chief physician)
Assumption 5: The chief physicians are primarily responsible for the medical and 
financial policy
It was assumed that chief physicians were responsible for the medical policy and finance 
of the medical departments. The assumption was largely shared by the respondents with 
regard to the medical policy (mean = 6.6, SD = 0.8, median = 7.0), but to some lesser 
extent with regard to the financial issues (mean = 5.4, SD = 1.2, median = 5.0). Survey 
results are presented in Figure 5.9.
Figure 5.9a: Medical responsibilities (N = 35*)                   Figure 5.9b: Financial responsibilities (N = 35*)
(*) Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement that it is right that 
the medical responsibility and financial responsibility has been assigned to the chief physicians. Level of 
agreement was scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
This result was further discussed during the interviews. All target groups thought that 
the chief physician was primarily responsible for medical policy, but the opinions of the 
financial responsibility varied. Some thought that the chief physician was responsible 
for finance; others thought this was the responsibility of the director of operations. The 
reason for this lack of clarity was probably that there were no clear job descriptions of 
chief physicians with committed tasks and responsibilities. 
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Assumption 6: The target groups feel the need to change the way of making case-mix 
decisions. 
This assumption was based on the expectation that, because of the increasing competition 
and financial pressure, the target groups would feel the need to optimize the decision-
making processes and make decisions more rational, and explicit. The assumption was 
to some extent shared by the respondents (mean = 4.3, SD = 1.5, median = 4.0), see 
Figure 5.10 (survey results).
Figure 5.10: Need to change the way of making case-mix decisions (N = 34*) 
(*) N = 1 missing. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement that 
they feel the need to change. Level of agreement was scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
This result was further explored during the interviews. Frequently mentioned arguments 
in favor of this assumption were that many case-mix decisions were irrational, personal, 
unstructured, labor intensive, and debatable. Also the increase of competitive pressures 
and financial pressures were seen as arguments for changing their way of making 
decisions, see the quotation below: 
It is necessary to change our way of decision-making because we still are not given the facilities to 
realize our core areas. We want everything but don’t make choices. We never decided that we can’t do 
everything. (Chief physician).
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On the other hand, several respondents indicated that they were satisfied with their way 
of making case-mix decisions and they felt no urge to change this. Another argument was 
that, the AMC was considered as a rather political organization where many decisions 
were taken implicitly without using (hard) criteria or information, by ‘wheeling and 
dealing,’ and this would not change. Some wanted to keep it that way, for example, 
because it gave them freedom, others wanted to change this because they believed 
that this would improve the decisions and would create more equal opportunities for 
everybody.
5.4.2 Results: reflection on the design and implementation factors
The design and implementation success factors related to [1] the design and quality of 
the CMI and [2] the implementation strategy (see Figure 5.5).
1. Design of the CMI
Quality of the case-mix information system
Participants were asked to assess the quality of the different types of information in the 
Standard Reports and portfolio analyses with regard to relevance, reliability, detail, and 
presentation (Figure 5.11, survey results). 
All presented types of information were considered relevant (median of the average 
relevance scores = 8.4), whereas the degree of detail (median of the average detail scores 
= 6.9) and presentation (median of the average presentation scores = 7.4) were generally 
rated as sufficient. However, the reliability of the CMI was judged more critically 
(median of the average reliability scores = 6.0). This matched with earlier findings by 
the pilot groups. 
With regard to the DBC data, it was concluded that these data appeared to provide good 
opportunities for the design of the CMI. The DBC data gave insight into the type of 
care, such as the type of diagnosis or treatment. This was useful for the dialogue about 
the care provided and for the classification and valuation of patient groups. 
The choice to have the patients classified into groups by the chief physicians was also 
supported by most medical managers, because it was consistent with the language of 
medical departments and with the strategic aims. Because of this, it became possible to 
define medical policy per patient group and to translate it in terms of volumes, capacity, 
and money. In other words, medical policy, logistical, and financial policy became 
connected. This was a strong improvement with respect to the previous instrument 
‘Patient Care Profiles’. However, for some medical specialties the DBC product structure 
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did not represent the complexity of academic care enough. Additional data were needed.
Figure 5.11: Quality of types of case-mix information (N = 26*)
(*) N = 9 missing. The high non-response was partly due to the fact that respondents found it difficult to 
assess the actual quality of the CMI. Participants were asked to assess the different types of information 
with regard to relevance, reliability, detail, and presentation on an 11-point scale, varying from 0 (very poor 
quality) to 10 (excellent quality). More detailed analysis of the data is available on request.
to classify the patient groups, such as the AMC-diagnoses, a patient’s age, and specific 
medical procedures. Furthermore, several respondents doubted the quality of the 
underlying DBC data, partly due to the DBC system itself, partly due to the poor 
quality of the DBC registration, see the quote below.
The DBC-data are the ‘Achilles heel’ of the system, since they are not properly registered. The figures 
are insufficiently mature to make choices on. (Central manager)
With regard to the DBC system, the problems related to the fact that the DBC was 
considered by most respondents to be an artificial and administrative language, derived 
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from complex (accounting) algorithms that did not reflect the experience and language 
of the target groups. As a result one found it difficult to make the switch to this new 
language. So, these data were not recognized and understood by the (medical) managers 
and easily gave the perception that they were not reliable. Furthermore, the DBC related 
to the entire care process and could pass several medical departments and several calendar 
years. However, this did not match with the other regular management reports that were 
used internally (for example, with regard to finance or HR) where information was 
presented per medical specialty and per calendar year. In this way, the CMI was a stand-
alone project. Another disadvantage mentioned was that the case-mix information gave 
a too simplistic view of reality.
If someone does not immediately recognize his or her activities in the Portfolio Matrix, then they feel 
they do not even exist. (Chief physician)
In my specialty, there exist hundreds of ICD codes, whereas in DBC language these are reduced to only 
two groups. So the doctor does not recognize it. (Chief physician)
Furthermore, the national DBC product structure and related tariffs (A-list DBCs) could 
change substantively per year, which made the data unpredictable. It also took a long 
time to reach agreement with health insurers about volumes and prices (B-list DBCs) 
of the care products and as a result the prices became available in the CMI late in the 
current year. Finally, the tariffs, or the A-list DBCs, were only used for administrative 
purposes, and did not determine the actual returns because these returns were still based 
on the budget system. Therefore, the presented returns of the A-list DBCs were only 
virtual and users could easily draw the wrong conclusions when making decisions. This 
reduced the usefulness of the CMI considerably, since it was not possible to determine 
the financial coverage per care product or patient group. Finally, chief physicians had no 
financial interest in a proper registration of the DBC data, because their budgets were 
still based on historical budget, and not on DBCs. 
We don’t know if some procedures have to be registered. We get no feedback. DBC information is not 
considered relevant because care is largely budget financed. We miss motivation and insight. (Chief 
physician)
With regard to the cost data, the respondents’ perceived problems related to the 
fact that the data were the result of a complex process consisting of a large number 
of technical steps and assumptions that many chief physicians were not personally 
involved in. Furthermore, the costs for top referral care had to be excluded in the cost 
calculations, because these costs were covered by a separate, academic budget. In this 
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context, agreements were made with the Dutch Health Care Authority (NZA) and 
other university medical centers (UMC) on the way of doing this. Because of this, the 
costs as presented by the CMI were no longer only a reflection of reality, but also of a 
political process. Moreover, the presented costs did not match with the actual costs as 
registered in the ledger, because in the CMI, the costs per patient group could only be 
approximated by multiplying the volumes of the underlying care activities of the DBC 
trajectories by the unit costs. By this, an over or under-approximation of actual costs 
was created, called the calculation fiction. Although this effect was inevitable, the result 
was that the cost data were not recognized and easily experienced as subjective and 
unreliable. Finally it should be noted that perceptions about the quality of the DBC and 
cost data could differ from the actual quality in terms of timeliness and completeness. 
Through analyses with some departments, the actual quality of the DBC data turned 
out to be not as bad as they thought. In many cases, the data proved to be (technically) 
correct, but the managers did not know exactly how the data were generated. 
Non-system data, such as the relevance and distinctiveness of care, and relevance of 
patient groups, was by definition considered unreliable, since these data were personal 
opinions or estimations of the chief physicians and not hard facts, but soft and subjective. 
Chief physicians could fill in this information strategically and influence the results of the 
Portfolio Matrix. Although the project group realized this in advance, they hoped that 
the chief physicians would provide the most realistic data and that these data would be 
discussed with division management. However, in practice this did not happen everywhere. 
Some chief physicians did not take this seriously and several division managers found it 
difficult to discuss this with them. In that case, the non-system data were not useful and 
it became difficult to compare the matrices between medical specialties. 
Advantages and disadvantages of the CMI
The participants were also asked what advantages or disadvantages they had experienced 
so far in the use of the CMI. In Figure 5.12 (survey results) these (dis)advantages are 
presented.
Frequently mentioned advantages of the information were that it reduced the complexity 
of patient care into manageable groups (compactness), provided a basis for further 
analyses and legitimization, formed a good basis for dialogue, and led to better decisions. 
These advantages were also expressed by respondents during the interviews.
In very limited time, you will quickly understand what your business looks like; you quickly learn to 
read this. The perspective from patient groups is very useful, so you work and think as a doctor. (Chief 
physician)
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Figure 5.12a: Advantages of using the CMI (N = 21*)     Figure 5.12b: Disadvantages of using the CMI (N = 21*)
(*) N = 14 missing. The high non-response was partly due to the fact that participants found it difficult to 
establish direct relationships between the use of the CMI and perceived (dis)advantages). Participants were 
asked to indicate for a number of predefined (dis)advantages of the CMI if they had experienced them and 
to hierarchically rank them as: 1 most important (dis)advantage, 2 = second most important (dis)advantage, 
etc. 
The Portfolio Matrix is interesting, as you can see how the department argues. You can understand 
why someone is doing something and you may or may not intervene there. You can discuss earlier on 
in the process of decision-making or exchange of ideas instead of being confronted with the outcome 
afterwards. In this way, the situation gives you time to look forward so that you can start talking to each 
other and possibly intervene. (Central manager)
It helps in the thinking about the portfolio (why so much, why so expensive) and can be an incentive 
to start a conversation with a doctor. For example: why are you treating patient group X when they 
are not relevant and unprofitable. Doctors are intelligent people with whom you can discuss the use 
of resources. With the CMI you are able to show in detail how doctors deal with a medical issue and 
you get a tool to do something with it (this must change because everybody is doing it), Or: how 
many patients do you need for research? In this context it is a dialogue tool, not a decision tool. (Chief 
physician)
The CMI shows garbage in the registration that without it would remain. Our department looked and 
at the registration and found a lot of money missing. If you get money it also changes your position in 
the AMC. You reward yourself with a better appreciation by division directors and pay back at a later 
time. (Division manager)
In line with the earlier finding (Figure 5.11), doubts on the quality of the information 
were by far the most reported disadvantage. Other disadvantages mentioned relatively 
frequently were that the CMI provided a too simplistic view of the reality and it presented 
the situation of full (internal) DBC funding whereas this was not yet the reality. These 
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disadvantages were also expressed by a respondent during the interview.
The comparison of cost/ tariffs is nonsense to look at it because we are still lump sum financed. The 
only thing you are doing is creating fuzz. (Chief physician)
2. Implementation of the CMI 
Participants also assessed the quality of the project organization in terms of available 
knowledge on implementing the CMI and the strategy used in the design and 
implementation process. 
The project organization
Twenty-four of the 33 respondents (73%) agreed to strongly agreed (scores ≥ 5) with 
the statement that the project organization had enough knowledge to implement the 
CMI successfully (mean = 5.0, SD = 1.4, median = 5.0), see Figure 5.13, survey results. 
Four respondents (12%) had a more neutral opinion (score = 4) about the project 
organization. 
Figure 5.13: Knowledge of the project organization (N = 33*)
(*) N = 2 missing. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement that 
the project organization has sufficient knowledge and skills to design and implement the CMI successfully. 
Level of agreement was scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
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Design and implementation strategy
In Figure 5.14, the participants’ assessments of the design and implementation strategy 
are presented.
Figure 5.14: Design and implementation strategy (N = 34*)
(*) N = 1 missing. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with four statements 
about the design and implementation strategy of the project organization. Level of agreement was scored 
on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). More detailed analysis of the 
data is available on request.
On balance, the strategy was assessed moderately positive (median of the average quality 
scores = 4.9). The participants largely disagreed with the statement that the target groups 
should be left free in the use of the CMI (mean = 3.3, SD = 1.5, median = 3.0). On 
the contrary, during the interviews, the respondents expressed the opinion that the 
use of the case-mix information should not be voluntary, in order to reduce the risk 
that people would keep using their own information system and would use the system 
opportunistically.
5.4.3 Results: reflection on the organizational and environmental factors
The organizational and environmental success factors related to the characteristics of [3] 
the (medical) managers, [4] the organization, and [5) the environment (see Figure 5.5).
For this research, some socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents were 
registered, such as sex, age, and years of experience. Furthermore, in the survey and 
during their interview, respondents were questioned about their management and 
financial knowledge and their case-mix decision making process. These characteristics 
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of the (medical) manager were selected because during the previous pilots (see Section 
5.3) there were indications that these factors might have an influence on the success of 
the project.
3. (Medical) manager
Socio-demographics
The socio-demographic data of the respondents are presented in Table 5.7. Of the 35 
respondents, 26 (74%) were male. Twenty-four managers (69%) were fifty years or older. 
With the exception of the division managers, on average the respondents had more than 
four years management experience. The chief physicians had the longest experience as 
manager and they also had a long experience as physician.
Table 5.7: Socio-demographics of the respondents (N = 35)
Characteristic Chief physicians(N = 22)
Division mana-
gers
(N =7)
Central 
managers
(N = 6)
Total
(N = 35)
Sex
 Male 18 3 5 26
 Female 4 4 1 9
Age
< 40 years 0 2 0 2
40 - 50 years 6 1 2 9
50 - 60 years 12 4 4 20
> 60 years 4 0 0 4
Background
Medical background 22 4 3 29
Financial background 0 3 3 6
x̄ ± sd Years of Experience
as physician 21.2 (6.7)
as (medical) manager 7.3 (4.4) 1.9 (1.2) 4.2(2.3) 5.6 (4.3)
Available management and financial knowledge
The chief physicians were asked to indicate whether they needed more management 
knowledge and financial knowledge to perform their role as manager well. The survey 
results are presented in Figure 5.15. With regard to the need for more management 
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knowledge, 9 of the 22 (41%) respondents agreed to strongly agreed (scores ≥ 5) with 
this statement (mean = 4.1, SD = 1.7, median = 4.0). Five respondents (23%) had a 
neutral view (score = 4). Eight of the 22 (36%) respondents (strongly) agreed with the 
item regarding the need for more financial knowledge, and 8 respondents had a neutral 
opinion about this topic (mean = 4.2, SD = 1.5, median = 4.0). 
Figure 5.15a: Need for management knowledge (N= 22*)    Figure 5.15b: Need for financial knowledge (N = 22*)
(*) Chief physicians were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement that they need 
more management knowledge (Figure 5.15a) and financial knowledge (Figure 5.15b). Level of agreement 
was scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
During the interview, both topics were further discussed. Most chief physicians had 
followed some kind of management training, like leadership styles, financial courses, 
managing professionals, time management, communication, and intervision meetings, 
but on balance the amount of training was limited. Most considered management trai-
ning as useful, but some were not so impressed and thought that one needed to have 
the skills by nature. Several chief physicians considered a financial course program as 
relevant. Some argued that this training was only useful when they had the possibility to 
influence costs and returns, see the quotes below.
I followed a financial training course for three days, but it was not useful. Conclusion was that if you 
grow in the B-list DBCs, you will receive extra money. Well, I haven’t seen it. If management organizes 
such training sessions you expect that you get the opportunity to play with it. (Chief physician)
I did a financial course, but don’t want to know everything. Someone explained the funding of the 
AMC but I thought: leave it, don’t make me a financial expert! (Chief physician)
Relevant factors when making case-mix decisions 
Respondents were asked to indicate for a number of predefined factors their impact on 
case-mix decisions. This question was meant to determine what type of management 
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information was required and to what extent this matched with the available CMI. The 
results could be used for the adjustment of the minimum data set and to determine 
whether it was necessary to customize the information products. In Figure 5.16, the 
survey results are shown. 
Figure 5.16: Impact of factors on case-mix decisions (N = 33*)
(*) N = 2 missing. Participants were asked to indicate for a number of predefined factors the extent to which 
the factors have an impact on their case-mix decisions. Level of impact was scored on an 11-point scale 
varying from 0 (no impact) to 10 (much impact). More detailed analysis of the data is available on request.
The figure showed that in case-mix decisions, all factors played a role to some extent and 
most of them had a more or less equivalent impact (median of the average impact scores 
= 6.7). During the interviews, several respondents stated that many case-mix decisions 
were first taken intuitively and then accordingly were made rationally. The impact of 
factors could also change over the course of time, see the quotation below: 
First we wanted to grow in basic care, especially because of financial reasons. This money was used for 
the core tasks of research and education. Now we focus more on top referral care. (Chief physician)
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The available capacity and expertise was considered as the most prominent factor 
that determines the number and type of patients that could be treated. For example, 
surgical specialties are highly dependent on the available operating room and intensive 
care capacity. Scientific profiling was reported as a relevant factor too because UMCs 
are expected to do research and patients are the ‘primary oxygen’ for it. Fulfilling the 
last resort obligations was also perceived as relevant, because UMCs are the last option 
for patients with severe and non-routine diseases. The expertise and ambitions of chief 
physicians, physicians, and nurses determined what kind of patients could be treated, 
because they are the most important actors in the hospital and therefore have much 
power when making policy plans. 
Doctors in the UMCs don’t work for the money but for intellectual challenges and work pleasure. You 
get that by working with patients you are interested in. If you skip that you are losing the fundament 
of the department. (Chief physician)
Although the fit to strategic goals of the organization were considered as relevant, most 
respondents stated during the interviews that these goals were not very well known 
and too generally formulated. This made it difficult for them to translate these to their 
own policy. The health care demand, which is determined by several factors like socio-
demographics, technology, etc., was mainly found relevant for long term planning. 
Meeting the training and education requirements was also found sufficient relevant, 
because these are the core tasks of an academic center. However, these obligations are 
often not so directly connected with specific patient groups but more with the total 
delivery of care. Furthermore, as stated by the respondents, this core task seemed to have 
less impact compared to complex patient care and research. Potential health benefits were 
to some extent taken into account when making case-mix decisions, but more implicitly 
for example when making appointments with patients or the use of an operating room. 
As long as there is a lack of capacity or money one has to set priorities. However, several 
respondents argued that potential health gain was a political and ethical issue for which 
doctors couldn’t be expected to make these decisions. 
Someone with 30% or 80% chance of survival, it does not matter. You just look where the patient can 
be treated; it is simply a social principle. (Chief physician)
The participants also felt the need to meet basic care obligations in the immediate region, 
but several respondents indicated that this type of care did not necessarily have to be 
done by a university hospital like AMC itself, but in cooperation with other hospitals. 
For example, the AMC had agreed with a general hospital in the region that some low-
complexity surgery procedures could be executed there and the complex procedures 
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could be performed at the AMC. Most participants argued that policy decisions were not 
primarily determined by the financial cost and returns, but only in extreme cases. Several 
reasons were mentioned for this. First, some argued that there was insufficient financial 
pressure for money to be taken into account when making such choices. Second, several 
managers had the opinion that they could manage their cost and returns only to a limited 
extent (see the quote below) and there was insufficient relationship between the type of 
patient groups being treated and the costs and benefits of the medical departments. 
Also, if they made a profit, it would not go to them but to the division management. 
We have no influence on the budget because we don’t negotiate with the insurers. Also, we have no 
influence on new machines, such as a laser. You have to write a business plan, but we are no business 
plan writers, we are medical specialists. We have little influence on outpatient clinic staff, nurses, 
administrative staff, desk staff, etc. It is a big frustration for us. (Chief physician)
Third, funding was considered to be so complex that it was almost impossible to 
quantify the effects of decisions on patient groups. Fourth, some argued that the 
financial information was not reliable enough to use. Finally, some patient groups could 
be unprofitable for the AMC but not for the department. It could also be desirable to 
keep unprofitable patient groups because it was good for their reputation or because 
they belonged to their focus areas. The following citations illustrate how some managers 
think about the financial aspects of case-mix decisions:
Financial information is mainly relevant for central management so they know what they have to 
negotiate. We keep doing what we think we should do. (Chief physician)
Nobody will decide to start treating patients because of money. They do what they think they have 
to do. If we use financial information, you suggest that money makes the difference. When treating a 
patient we don’t want financial barriers. (Chief physician)
Finance is secondary. We have a social function, and go for it. We do not deviate from the system but 
hope that the system adapts. (Central manager)
 4. Organization
In 2008, it was concluded that up until then, the case-mix information had been mainly 
used for gaining insight and as a tool for conducting policy discussions about patient 
care at various levels, but it was insufficiently embedded into the decision-making 
processes of the chief physicians (see Section 5.3.3). As decision-making support was a 
key objective of the system, we needed more knowledge about the extent to which the 
chief physicians and division managers received incentives to make case-mix decisions 
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and to perform better on core tasks and finance.
Incentives for policy making and improving performance
In Figure 5.17, the survey results are presented with regard to the incentives received to 
define policy about patient groups and finance. 
Figure 5.17: Incentives received to optimize the case-mix (N = 28*)
(*) N = 1 missing. Chief physicians and division managers were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they agree with the statements that they are stimulated and rewarded by their managers. Chief physicians 
are managed by the division managers, division managers are managed by the central managers. Level of 
agreement was scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly) agree. 
In general, chief physicians and division managers seemed to be stimulated by their 
managers to define policy with regard to the case-mix (mean = 5.2, SD = 1.8, median = 
6.0) and finance (mean = 4.7, SD = 1.7, median = 5.0), and to take measures when case-
mix policy could not be realized (mean = 4.3, SD = 1.8, median = 5.0). Chief physicians 
and division managers seemed to be rewarded less when they performed better on core 
tasks (mean = 2.3, SD = 1.2, median = 2.0) and finance (mean = 2.7, SD = 1.6, median 
= 2.5). The quotation below illustrates that chief physicians missed (financial) incentives 
to take policy measures. 
Division managers believe it is important that policy is made, but you are not rewarded. If you work 
hard to work more efficiently, you rather get told that you can do it with less. (Chief physician)
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The division board thinks that it is important that policy choices are made but never check this. There 
is no performance incentive from the board. (Chief physician)
The most important costs are the internal transfer costs. We see them but don’t know what to do 
with them. We never hear from division management that we have to do something about it. (Chief 
physician).
Until now there was great emphasis on finance and that is not surprising considering where we come 
from. Talks about the case-mix are still very marginal, but have to happen (Chief physician).
Support of Board of Directors
The chief physicians and division managers were also asked to indicate to what extent 
the Board of Directors communicated about the CMI and made them interested in 
using it (Figure 5.18, survey results). 
(*) Chief physicians and division managers were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the 
statements that the Board of Directors communicates well about the CMI (N = 2 missing) and stimulates 
them enough to use the CMI (N = 1 missing). Level of agreement was scored on a 7-point scale, varying 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Eight of the 27 (30%) respondents agreed to strongly agreed (scores ≥ 5) with the 
statement that the Board of Directors communicated well about the CMI (mean = 
3.4, SD = 1.6, median = 3.0), see Figure 5.18a. Five of the 27 (19%) respondents had 
a neutral view (score = 4). Eight of the 28 (29%) respondents agreed to strongly agreed 
(score ≥ 5) with the statement that the Board of Directors stimulated them enough to 
use the CMI (mean = 3.5, SD = 1.6, median = 4.0), see Figure 5.18b. Seven of the 28 
(25%) had a neutral opinion. 
During the interviews, the vast majority of the participants stated that the board 
Figure 5.18b: Stimulation by Board of Directors
 (N = 28*)
Figure 5.18a: Communication by Board of Directors 
(N = 27*)  
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supported the project sufficiently in words but not in actions: the information was hardly 
discussed in quarterly meetings; the board used other control instruments, and accepted 
that the quality of (departmental) information was poor. This was partly to do with the 
fact that they applied the principle of ‘professional in the lead,’ providing the medical 
departments and divisions considerable decision-making freedom. A disadvantage of 
this principle was that the use of the CMI was voluntary, with the risk that it was used 
opportunistically. Another disadvantage was that divisions continued to design their 
own management information resulting in different types of available information on 
patient groups that often did not match with each other. 
5. Environment
Financial and competition pressure
The participants were asked to indicate to what extent they experienced financial pressure 
and competition pressure because the literature had shown that these environmental 
factors could affect successful implementation of innovations in organizations (see 
Section 3.4.4). The survey results are presented in Figure 5.19. 
     
(*) Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statements that they 
experience financial pressure and competition. Level of agreement was scored on a 7-point scale varying 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Respondents experienced to some extent financial pressure (mean = 4.8, SD = 1.6, 
median = 5.0) and competition pressure (mean = 4.6, SD = 1.9, median = 5.0). During 
the interviews, most respondents stated that they expected the financial pressure to 
increase over the following years because of the growing production, cost of expensive 
drugs, budget cuts and increasing severity of illness of the patients, and the liberalization 
of health care. Furthermore, because the DBC system had many shortcomings, it was 
Figure 5.19a: Perceived financial pressure (N = 35*) Figure 5.19b: Perceived competition pressure (N = 35*)
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expected that certain academic care would not be funded enough in the future. 
Financial pressure is clearly present and the expectation is that it will increase more and more: the 
demand for care will continue to increase and thus the macro budget will be exceeded. This will lead 
to budget cuts. (Central manager)
Due to adverse effects of market mechanisms, the financial pressure has increased because general 
hospitals are shifting complex and expensive patients to the AMC earlier than before. The mechanisms 
that are really at play are different than those assumed theoretically. It seems better and safer for the 
patient to have patients regulated by the government and not by the market. (Central manager)
With regard to the pressure of competition, several respondents concluded that there 
were too many patients instead of too few and they welcomed new health care suppliers. 
However, there were differences observed between medical specialties; see the quotes of 
chief physicians below:
There is a lack of medical specialists. It is a lazy position; we don’t have to do our best to attract patients. 
There is some competition in basic care but that is not our core business, we need these patient groups 
for training purposes. (Chief physician)
 
We experience competitive pressure from general hospitals with regard to basic care, not in top referral 
care. We try to be in harmony with other UMCs by being complementary. (Chief physician) 
Competitive pressure was considered both positive and negative. The positive aspects 
were that it kept physicians sharp, it stimulated them to cooperate with other health 
care suppliers, and it gave them opportunities to leave some (basic) care to others. The 
negative aspects were that the respondents were afraid that because of the liberalization, 
other health care supply would focus on the profitable patient groups and the university 
hospitals would have to focus on the unprofitable patients, because they couldn’t refuse 
them. For the upcoming years, it was expected that competitive pressure would increase 
slightly. 
5.4.4 Results: reflection on the outcomes of the CMI
The outcomes of the CMI related to the [6] adoption, [7] use of the CMI, [8] effects of 
use, and [9] the overall success of the CMI project for the user (see Figure 5.5).
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6. Adoption of the CMI
The questions regarding adoption issues focused on the extent to which the respondents 
perceived an added value of the CMI.
Added value of the CMI 
In general, the respondents agreed with the statement that the CMI had added value to 
the AMC and themselves (median of the average value scores = 5.6, see Figure 5.20), 
because the CMI brought the AMC ahead of other hospitals and that the AMC would 
need it anyway in times of financial pressure and market forces.
Figure 5.20: Added value of the CMI (N = 34*)
(*) N = 1 were missing. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with four 
statements about the added value of the CMI. Level of agreement was scored on a 7-point scale varying 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). More detailed analysis of the data is available on request.
7. Use of the CMI
Participants were questioned on their use of the Standard Report Patient Care and the 
Portfolio Matrix (for further details of these products see Section 7.3.1 and 7.3.2. They 
were additionally asked for what purposes they had used these products. In Figure 5.21 
the survey results are shown. 
Thirty-one of the 35 respondents (89%) had used the CMI. All non-users were chief 
physicians. The majority of the respondents had used the CMI three to five times in 
the previous year. The case-mix information was most frequently used for gaining more 
 Case study AMC 2006 – 2008
C
ha
pt
er
 5
155
insight, decision-making support and legitimization, although to a lesser extent. These 
reasons were also noted during the interviews.
Figure 5.21a: Use of the CMI (N = 35*)                  Figure 5.21b: Aims of use (N = 22*) 
(*)  Participants were asked how often they had used the Standard Report Patient Care and Portfolio Matrix 
that were sent to them in September 2006, Augustus 2007, and June 2008 (5.21a). They were also asked for 
which of the predefined aims they had used them and to hierarchically rank these aims (5.21b): 1 = most 
important aim, 2 = second most important aim, etc.; N = 13 missing (the high non-response was partly due 
to the fact that participants found it difficult to establish direct relationships between the use of the CMI 
and the predefined aims).
We used the case-mix information several times to show the staff members what the department is 
confronted with. We gave them an empty portfolio and asked them to put the patient groups in the 
quadrants so they started thinking about the costs. It was a nice discussion with different pictures and 
generated thoughts about what you can take into account when making decisions. (Chief physician)
I used the case-mix information very differently per division. At division X we used it mainly to 
demonstrate to the Board of Directors that the DBC structure and tariffs were not correct. At division 
Y, we had more substantive discussions and defined the core areas. At division Z, the discussions were 
much easier because most departments already had experience with the free market and had to make 
choices before. (Division manager who worked for several divisions)
We used the CMI to translate the strategic aims: are we doing the right things? The CMI makes 
this very visible for us. Although chief physicians are in the lead, we can support them to make the 
department better. However, we haven’t discussed it yet with the medical departments, because it is not 
appreciated by them if we interfere with their content. (Division manager)
I presented the CMI at a meeting with CEOs of other UMCs. I showed how we made the medical 
environment visible to the medical professional. That we compare medical relevance with financial relevance, 
how dangerous that may be and that we use it not directly to make decisions on it but for consciousness and 
to detect remarkable things, for example, that we allocate less capacity to our core activities. (Central manager)
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We discussed it with the Supervisory Board. These are experienced people with a scientific background 
and they looked at it more carefully. They are reluctant and fear that one focuses on the large patient 
groups and repels the small unprofitable patient groups. You should use it prudently. (Central manager)
The information was used relatively less for planning purposes (Figure 5.21b). Several 
reasons were mentioned for this in the interviews. First, the production of the medical 
department was very stable so it was more or less what they had done the previous year 
and did not require an advanced planning tool. Second, some departments used their 
own planning system and used their own data because the CMI data were not considered 
reliable enough to use. Finally, the quality of planning the capacity of staff was discussed.
We ask for more operating hours but the only response is lack of personnel. Once we 
calculated very precisely how many sessions we needed but we got our request back 
with the wrong definitions. They are not able to make good plans, so you don’t need a 
sophisticated planning system. (Chief physician)
The case-mix information was only used for monitoring in the larger departments (Figure 
5.21b). During the interviews it became clear that for smaller departments, the need for 
a monitoring instrument was limited because they already had a good awareness of the 
trends in patient groups because of the daily patient discussions and visits at the clinic. 
There were several reasons why one was not using, or hardly using, the CMI. Some users 
found the CMI irrelevant, especially supporting departments (like radiology, clinical 
genetics) or for specialties that have their own information systems. Other argued that 
their division management had no interest in it, case-mix decisions had already been 
made, and one was not able to influence the case-mix because one has no power over 
the entrance of patients or one is not allowed by management to change patient groups.
I have not discussed the CMI with staff members because they are not interested. It was discussed a 
little with division management. Further, only a part of the (capacity) information is relevant to them. 
(Chief physician)
I have discussed it with the management team, but they don’t understand the relevance scores. They 
recognize the material; it is just another way of putting your policy on paper. Only the costs are new, 
but they are not relevant for them. They feel no incentive to get a bulb in the Portfolio Matrix to 
another quadrant. It may change if costs become more important. (Chief physician)
 We have our own information system and a daily patient discussion, so we already have quite a good 
understanding. It is good that information is generated ‘upstairs’. Does it help in policy, decision-
making? Theoretically, yes; in practice, no. This has nothing to do with the instrument but with the 
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way decisions are made ‘upstairs’: it is unclear; the department has never been asked something, many 
things are arranged between intimates (Chief physician).
Another obstructing factor was that several medical managers lacked the knowledge and 
skills to use the CMI in a responsible way. One explanation for this could be that the 
majority of them were relatively old (see Table 5.7). This meant that they were mainly 
familiar with the era of fixed budgets without elements of a free health care market.
8. Effects of the CMI
Participants were questioned if they had noticed positive effects from using the case-
mix information. These effects related to task performance, processes (registrations, care 
processes) and outcomes. The survey results are summarized in Figure 5.22.
With regard to the most positive effects, it was frequently mentioned that on the basis 
of the case-mix information, agreements had been made with others, sometimes by 
individual managers, sometimes in agreement with division management or other 
hospitals. Second, more cost consciousness was reported. The explanation for this 
is probably that before the introduction of the CMI, most respondents had never 
seen costs or income at such a detailed level as patient groups, diagnosis, or medical 
procedures. The financial information was therefore the most innovate part for users and 
had therefore added the most value. 
Figure 5.22: Most important positive effects of using the CMI (N = 20*)
(*) N = 15 missing. The high non-response was partly due to the fact that participants found it difficult to 
establish direct relationships between the use of the CMI and positive effects). Participants were asked to 
indicate for a number of predefined positive effects if they had experienced them and if so to hierarchically 
rank these effects: 1 = most important positive effect, 2 = second most important positive effect, etc.
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It has provided more insight into the type and number of patients and the importance we attach to it. 
Furthermore, it contributed to the choices we want to make in the free capacity. It helped in talking to chief 
physicians and division managers about patient flows, which rarely happened before. (Central manager)
The information has especially helped in the beginning by making clear what the focus points are in 
the research. Some had as many as twenty, others five. Furthermore, chief physicians had no idea of  
costs and now they have. (Division manager)
Some negative effects were also mentioned in the interviews. One chief physician 
had the feeling that unprofitable patient groups were avoided purely on economic 
grounds. A division manager indicated that the CMI had further undermined her 
faith in management information. Finally, it was mentioned that the CMI can result 
in undesirable discussions about care; for example, that other people think that some 
care does not belong in the AMC and make decisions based on it. Some managers 
experienced no effects from the CMI.
Has something changed? No, we didn’t receive any more money. You have to fight for every cent, but 
we did this also before the CMI. (Chief physician)
9. Overall success of the CMI project
Overall success of the CMI project 
The ‘overall success of the project’ was selected as the primary outcome measure, because 
as mentioned in Section 5.4, ‘success’ was considered a general reflection of the various 
(interacting) success factors (such as environmental and organizational factors, quality 
of the CMI, design and implementation strategy) and outcome measures in terms of 
use, and effects of use of the CMI. 
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement 
that the CMI project was successful so far for them, taking all aspects into account. The 
survey results are presented in Figure 5.23. 
The majority of the 31 respondents (21/31= 68%) perceived the CMI project 
as successful to very successful (scores ≥ 5) for themselves (mean score = 4.7, SD = 
1.5, median = 5.0). However, the success scores varied to some extent. Six of the 31 
respondents (19%) had a more neutral opinion about the general level of success (score 
= 4), indicating that they had experienced both advantages and disadvantages of the 
CMI project. The respondents were asked during the interviews to describe in own 
words when the CMI project would be a success for them. The different quotations 
below demonstrate that the expectations of the CMI were different. For example, some 
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Figure 5.23: Overall success of the CMI project (N = 31*)
(*) N = 4 missing. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement that 
the CMI project was successful for them. The level of agreement was scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
expect the CMI to be an answering machine, others a dialogue machine, and others a 
budget generating machine. 
The CMI project will be successful when...
… you recognize the data, it matches with the picture in your head, and you are able to discuss them. 
(Chief physician)
… the CMI is used hospital-wide and decision-making really changes. (Chief physician)
… expensive things are funded, if the budget matches with the core business. (Chief physician)
… the Board of Directors looks at it. (Chief physician)
 … it has indicators to assess whether you have met your policy and when it is useful for planning. 
(Chief physician)
… there is general acceptance, when the information is available periodically, when it is included in the 
Standard Report, and when it has a formal status. (Central manager)
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… you can retrieve all the data you want to know, for example, costs and patient satisfaction, and costs 
and quality targets, etc. (Chief physician)
It is already successful because we have thoroughly discussed the information already. (Chief physician)
Finally, the participants were asked what measures were necessary to improve the success 
of the CMI. The survey results are depicted in Figure 5.24. Improvement of the quality 
of information was most often reported as a necessary step for further development and 
implementation of the CMI. 
Figure 5.24: Necessary measures for improvement of the CMI (N = 26*)
(*) N = 9 were missing. The high non-response was partly due to the fact that participants found it difficult 
to indicate which measures were needed). Participants were asked to indicate for a number of predefined 
measures of improvement which they find necessary and to hierarchically rank these improvements: 
1 = most necessary measure, 2 = second most necessary measure, etc. 
The necessary improvements were explored in-depth during the interviews and several 
suggestions were given. The most frequently mentioned suggestions are presented in 
Table 5.8. Based on these suggestions, a plan was drawn up for the following years, see 
Section 6.3.
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Table 5.8: Suggested measures for improvement 
Variables Suggested measures for improvement
Design of 
the CMI
Better quality of data:
• The axes of the Portfolio Matrix (Y-axis) have to be discussed again.
• More checks must be done on data before they are distributed.
• Demonstrate that the data are correct. 
• Give departments (financial) interest in quality of data.
Design & 
implemen-
tation  
strategy
Better access to the CMI:
• The CMI should become more widely accessible, both for managers and business 
analysts.
• The case-mix information must be distributed more frequently.
(Medical) 
manager
• Structuring and standardization the process of making case-mix decisions (portfolio 
strategy).
• The (medical) managers and business analysts have to be trained how to use the CMI.
• The share of negotiable care must be increased (B-list DBCs).
Organiza-
tion
Embedding the CMI in the Planning & Control cycle:
• The CMI must be embedded in the planning (budgeting) process
• The internal budgets have to be based on DBCs.
• The CMI must get more attention it in the yearly budget talks and quarterly meet-
ings. 
Support of the Board of Directors/ division management:
• The Board of Directors have to define a clear long term policy.
• (Re) confirmation by the Board and division management that the CMI has high 
priority and this is propagated in the AMC. 
Environ-
ment The DBC structure has to be improved for some medical specialties.
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5.5  Interim conclusions 
Based on the case study between 2006 and 2008 and the interim reflection, several 
interim conclusions can be drawn. 
Design and implementation variables
The patient groups, as defined by the chief physicians, appeared to be a good ‘language’ 
to use in the CMI, because the types of patients were considered crucial for performance 
on all core tasks and for finance. The process of defining these patient groups was 
experienced as useful by the chief physicians since it stimulated them to think actively 
about their case-mix and to discuss the patient profiles with their staff members. Besides, 
through this process, the opinions of chief physicians were systematically collected 
around these patient groups; their ideas were now made explicit. The patient groups 
reflected the perceptions of the (medical) managers. Because of these patient groups, 
the contents of the care were automatically displayed. Also, the patient groups reduced 
management information to manageable units. This made it possible for the managers 
to discuss medical policy with the physicians. 
The need for types of case-mix information varied across the (medical) managers, but 
there was quite a consensus between them about what types of information per patient 
group should be minimally provided in the CMI: volumes, patient characteristics, 
medical production, process, quality, finance, and healthcare market. The DBC data 
appeared to provide good opportunities to design these types of information. It became 
possible to identify and quantify the patient groups and to connect the strategy with 
medical, logistical, and financial policies. Thereby, the different ‘worlds’ between medical 
and financial professionals, which were previously widely separated, could be integrated. 
It also led to several types of new information, for example, about the content and 
complexity of care, the full cycle of care, the financial coverage of patients, and the 
relationship between types of data. It now became possible to define medical policy per 
patient group and to translate it in terms of volumes, capacity, and money. With regards 
to the information about the budget parameters, this was a big improvement. Some 
types of information, such as relevance and quality of care were not registered in systems 
and could only be obtained by asking the medical specialties; they were, therefore, by 
definition, considered as subjective. 
The strengths of the Standard Report Patient Care and Portfolio Matrix were that they 
were ready-made, easily accessible, with standardized and highly aggregated information, 
and presented by powerful visualizations with clear explanations. It also turned out that 
the Portfolio Matrix had a good filter function for finding patient groups where specific 
analyses were needed. However, there was a widely spread perception of unreliable data, 
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in particular of the DBCs, cost data, and non-system data. With regard to DBC data, 
the problems related to the complexity of the DBC system (artificial and administrative 
language), the mismatch with the other regular management reports, the volatility and 
unpredictability of the data, and the lack of proper registrations. For some medical 
specialties, the DBC product structure did not sufficiently represent the complexity of 
academic care. It also took a long time to reach agreement with health insurers about 
volumes and prices (B-list DBCs) of the care products and, as a result, the prices became 
available in the CMI only late in the current year. Besides this, the tariffs of the A-list 
DBCs were only used for administrative purposes and did not determine the actual 
returns because these returns were still based on the budget system. Therefore, the 
presented returns of the A-list DBCs were only virtual numbers and users could easily 
draw the wrong conclusions when making decisions. This reduced the usefulness of the 
CMI considerably since it was not possible to determine the financial coverage per care 
product or patient group. Finally, chief physicians had no financial interest in a proper 
registration of the DBC data, because their budgets were still based on the historical 
budgets and not on DBCs. 
With regard to the quality of the cost data, the problems related to the fact that the 
data were the result of a complex process consisting of a large number of technical and 
political steps and assumptions that many chief physicians were not personally involved 
in. Furthermore, the presented costs did not match with the actual costs as registered in 
the ledger because, in the CMI, the costs per patient group could only be estimated by 
multiplying the volumes of the underlying care activities of the DBC trajectories by the 
unit costs. Because of this, an over- or under-approximation of actual costs was created, 
called the calculation fiction. Although this effect was inevitable, the consequence was 
that the cost data were not recognized and easily experienced as subjective and unreliable. 
Finally, it should be noted that perceptions about the quality of the DBC and cost data 
could differ from the actual quality in terms of timeliness and completeness. Through 
in-depth analyses with medical specialties, the actual quality of the DBC data turned 
out to be not as bad as they thought. In many cases, the data proved to be (technically) 
correct, but the (medical) managers did not know exactly how the data were generated. 
The non-system data, such as the relevance and distinctiveness of care, were personal 
opinions or estimations of the chief physicians and not objective facts. Some chief 
physicians did not take this seriously and several division managers found it difficult 
to discuss this with them. In that case, the non-system data were not useful and it was 
difficult to compare the matrices between medical specialties. 
Regarding the quality of the project organization and the design and implementation 
strategy, the respondents in the interim reflection were rather positive. One supported 
Chapter 5
164
the strategy of gradual design and implementation of the CMI in close cooperation with 
the target groups and thought this was the right time, given the internal and external 
developments. The discussions between the division managers and the chief physicians 
about the CMI were experienced as constructive and satisfactory. In general, the chief 
physicians and division managers indicated that the Board of Directors supported the 
CMI project sufficiently in words but not in action. This was partly due to the fact 
that the Board applied the principle of ‘professional in the lead,’ providing the medical 
departments and divisions considerable decision-making freedom. A disadvantage of 
this principle was that the use of the CMI was voluntary, with the risk that it was used 
opportunistically. Another disadvantage was that divisions continued to design their 
own management information resulting in different types of available information on 
patient groups that often did not match with each other. 
Organizational and environmental variables
The CMI was designed primarily for the chief physicians, division managers and central 
managers, because it was assumed that they were the key decision makers of the AMC. 
This assumption was largely shared by the respondents in the interim reflection. Chief 
physicians had the most influence on case-mix decisions because of their hierarchical 
position and expertise. Also staff members had a lot of influence on the case-mix because 
part of their patient population was related to their specific field of clinical expertise. 
Division managers had a key position between the medical specialties and the Board 
of Directors. The division management got the budget and therefore had the means to 
allocate it. They also assessed the annual plans of the medical specialties.
For the design of the CMI, it was assumed that the chief physicians, division managers, 
and central managers had much decision-making power. However, the interim reflection 
revealed that this assumption was only partly true as the chief physicians experienced 
serious barriers to actually manage their case-mix, costs, or returns. For example, the 
possibility to manage the case-mix turned out to be related to the type of medical specialty. 
If a specialty treated relatively many acute or chronic patients, the chief physicians saw 
few opportunities to manage the type and volumes of patients. Furthermore, no drastic 
case-mix decisions by the medical management could be expected because the case-mix 
was a result of accumulated expertise and infrastructure that did not change overnight. 
With regard to costs and returns, the (medical) managers lacked some decision-making 
power, for example, concerning the appointment of staff members, expensive materials, 
and making investments. They also had no direct influence on the budget, since the 
budget was still determined through historically-defined budgets rather than the 
DBC revenues. There were also no clear job descriptions with committed tasks and 
responsibilities.
 Case study AMC 2006 – 2008
C
ha
pt
er
 5
165
Almost all (medical) managers supported the design of the CMI. Because of the 
increasing competition and financial pressures, they expressed the need to make case-
mix decisions in a more rational and explicit way and expected that the CMI would 
support this. On the other hand, several respondents indicated that they were satisfied 
with their way of making case-mix decisions and they felt no urge to change this. Besides, 
the interim reflection demonstrated that there are limitations of CMIs in supporting the 
case-mix decision-making process. In case-mix decisions, many factors are relevant for 
the (medical) managers, but several factors can not be supported by the CMI, because 
they are qualitative in nature or there is no underlying data available. It was also argued 
that the philosophy of the CMI did not match with the organizational culture of the 
AMC where many decisions were taken implicitly without using (hard) criteria or 
information, by ‘wheeling and dealing,’ and the CMI would not change this culture. 
Another obstructing factor was that several medical managers lacked the knowledge and 
skills to use the CMI in a responsible way. One explanation for this could be that the 
majority of them were relatively old. This meant that they were mainly familiar with the 
era of fixed budgets without elements of a free health care market.
Outcomes of the CMI project
The interim reflection showed that the majority of the managers supported the aims 
of the CMI project and used the information regularly. The CMI was most frequently 
used for getting more insight, decision-making support and, although to a lesser extent, 
legitimization. Frequently mentioned advantages of the information were that it reduced 
the complexity of patient care into manageable groups (compactness), provided a basis 
for further analyses and legitimization, formed a good basis for dialogue, and led to 
better decisions and registrations. The CMI helped the (medical) managers to identify 
the possible case-mix changes and to provide the appropriate arguments. Furthermore, 
on the basis of this information several agreements were made about patient care, 
cost consciousness was increased and registrations were improved, see Figure 5.22. 
However, the users also experienced several obstructing factors to making case-mix 
decisions directly on the basis of CMI data. The CMI was also used less for planning 
purposes. Reasons mentioned for this were that the production of the medical specialty 
was rather stable over the years and did not require an advanced planning tool and 
that some specialties used their own planning system and used their own data because 
the CMI data were not considered reliable enough to use. Some negative effects were 
also mentioned in the interviews such as the fear that unprofitable patient groups were 
avoided purely on economic grounds and the fact the (perceived) poor quality of the 
data had undermined the faith in management information. So far, two thirds of the 
respondents had perceived the CMI project as (very) successful for themselves.
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Abstract
In the period from 2009 to 2014, the liberalization of Dutch hospital care gradually 
expanded. The percentage of free negotiable care increased and in 2012, a performance-
based reimbursement replaced the budget system while the DBC system was replaced by 
the DOT system at the same time. Furthermore, the growth of expenses in the Dutch 
hospital sector was limited to 2.5% per year. For the AMC, these developments implicated 
that competition and financial pressure further increased and it was concluded that the 
strategic aims could only be realized by setting priorities in the case-mix and further cost 
reductions. To support the top (medical) management, the existing Standard Report 
Patient Care and Portfolio Matrix (as well as other information products) of the CMI 
were redesigned. In addition to this, new information products were developed, such as 
the Interdependency Analysis, Portfolio Checklist, and Benchmark Analysis Resource 
Use Profiles. During this period the number of users of the CMI increased significantly. 
The CMI was increasingly embedded in the strategic management cycle and was used 
for gaining insight, conducting a dialogue on portfolio choices, external legitimization, 
process optimization, cost reduction, and cost-effectiveness studies. However, the 
replacement of the DBC system by the DOT system in 2012 had a major negative 
impact on the CMI project. It meant not only a major technical change of the CMI, but 
also a substantive change as users had to understand this new system and related case-
mix information. Furthermore, it still took much time to negotiate about volumes and 
prices with the health insurers and this meant that during the year essential data were 
missing and the CMI could not be used to gain insight into the actual financial coverage 
per care product or patient group. Although the DOT system certainly had advantages, 
the data were still perceived as unreliable, even more so than the DBC data. This 
reduced the number of possible applications and the use of the CMI in several ways, for 
example in the use of case-mix decisions and budgeting. Because of this, the managers 
lost the interest to optimize their case-mix and their interest in case-mix information. 
Other obstructing factors were that managers still experienced several legal and practical 
barriers in managing the case-mix and that new priorities arose at the AMC such as 
the implementation of the electronic patient system and the proposed administrative 
merger with VUmc. In 2014, the CMI was technically completed and it was concluded 
that the highest possible aims had been achieved and the project could end. 
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6.1  Introduction 
This chapter describes the second phase of the case study at the AMC in the period 
from 2009 to 2014. In this phase, the CMI was redesigned and completed on the basis 
of reflection on the success of the existing CMI in 2008 (Section 5.4) and unexpected 
developments in the Dutch hospital sector and the AMC (Section 6.2). In Section 
6.3, what was (re)designed, and why and how, will be explained. A distinction is made 
between the periods from 2009 to 2011 and from 2012 to 2014. The reason for this is 
that in 2012 a fairly new period begins because of the transition from the DBC to the 
DOT system (see also Section 2.5) and the replacement of the national budget system 
by a new performance-based reimbursement system. In Section 6.4, several interim 
conclusions are drawn. In Table 6.1, an overview is given of the most relevant research-
related developments between 2009 and 2014.
6.2  Developments in the Dutch hospital sector and the AMC 
In the period from 2009 to 2014, several unexpected developments in the Dutch hospital 
sector and the AMC took place, which had an impact on the design, implementation, 
and use of the CMI.
Developments in the Dutch hospital sector 
In 2009, the Dutch Health Authority evaluated the developments in the hospital care 
market (NZa, 20091). They concluded that overall, the positive developments of the 
liberalization of care were apparent: quality played an increasing role in health care 
purchasing, waiting times had stabilized, the volume of production remained steady, 
and there was a substitution of clinical admissions to outpatient treatment. As a result 
the liberalization of the Dutch hospital care continuously expanded. In the period from 
2009 to 2014 the percentage of B-list DBCs was increased from 34% to 70%. In the 
period from 2009 to 2011, hospitals’ revenues for patient care were still determined in 
two ways: by the budget system (A-list DBCs) and the free market (B-list DBCs). 
In 2011, an official committee concluded that the Dutch hospital sector was ‘stuck 
in the middle’ and caught between a supply and a regulated demand-driven system 
(Inspectie der Rijksfinanciën, 2010). On the one hand, hospitals already had had more 
freedom; on the other hand, the current hospital budgets provided too few incentives 
for quality and innovation (VWS, 20112; Asselman & Snijders, 2010). Therefore, it 
was concluded that the switch from supply-driven to demand-driven health care had 
to be made as soon as possible and it was announced by the Minister of Health that in 
2012 performance-based reimbursement would be implemented (i.e. the abolition of 
the budget system) and the new DBC product structure (DOT) would be implemented 
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Table 6.1: Overview of most relevant developments for this research, 2009 - 2014
Dutch 
hospital 
sector
Year
AMC
General 
event
Evaluation 
of the CMI (Re) Design of the CMI
Implemen-
tation of the 
CMI
34% B 
segment 
(free 
negotiable 
care)
2009  
Expert meet-
ing about 
the Portfolio 
Matrix 
 Redesign:
Minimal dataset, 
Standard Report Patient 
Care, Portfolio Matrix, 
Intranet Page Manage-
ment Information
 Design:
Interdependency 
Analysis, Management 
Game , Data Cube Care 
Products (Cognos)
Further embed-
ding of the CMI 
in the Planning 
& Control cycle  
 
The CMI was 
used for specific 
business cases, 
the improve-
ment of registra-
tions, external 
legitimization 
and cost effecti-
veness studies 
Organization 
of Manage-
ment Games 
and Computer 
Training
  2010
New chair-
man of Board 
of Directors
Evaluation 
pilot III
Design: 
Portfolio ChecklistRaid by 
the Dutch 
Competition 
Authority 
National 
hospital 
budget 
cuts of 314 
M euro, 
growth of 
expenses 
capped at 
2.5%
2011
Announce-
ment of in-
ternal output 
budgeting in 
2012
Design: Standard views 
(Cognos)
Replace-
ment of 
the DBC 
by the 
DOT 
structure
2012
 
 
New vice 
chairman 
of Board of 
directors 
Evaluation 
pilot IV
Redesign:
Standard Report Patient 
Care, Portfolio Ma-
trix, Data Cube Care 
Products, Intranet Page 
Management Informa-
tion 
Design:
Benchmark Resource Use 
Profiles, Data Cube Care 
Activities, Data Cube 
Market Shares,
Forecasting model, 
Top Referral Care Mo-
del, Information Policy
Implementation 
of the Standard 
Report Patient 
Care, Portfolio 
Matrix, and 
Data Cubes 
with the provisi-
onal DOT data
Reimbur- 
sement on 
basis of 
DOT with 
safety net 
(95%),
SLIM project 
to reduce 
costs structur-
ally by 65 M 
euro
Use of the 
Benchmark 
Analysis 
Resource Use 
Profiles for the 
SLIM project
70% B 
segment15 
(free nego-
tiable care),
Abandon-
ment of in-
ternal output 
budgeting 
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Table 6.1: Overview of most relevant developments for this research, 2009 - 2014 (cont.)
Dutch 
hospital 
sector
Year
AMC
General 
event
Evaluation 
of the CMI (Re) Design of the CMI
Implemen-
tation of the 
CMI
Reimbur-
sement on 
basis of 
DOT with 
safety net 
(70%)
2013
Introduc-
tion of A3 
methodology, 
selection 
electronic pa-
tient system, 
proposed 
administrative 
merger with 
VUmc
 
 
Integration 
of the CMI 
information 
in the A3 
score card
Reimbur-
sement on 
basis of 
DOT, no 
safety net 
2014
New member 
of Board of 
Directors 
End reflec-
tion  Completion of the CMI
Use of the 
CMI for the 
preparation 
of the ad-
ministrative 
merger with 
the VUmc
CMI 
nominated 
for the Porter 
prize 2014
(i.e. the abolition of the budget system) and the new DBC product structure (DOT) 
would be implemented (see Section 2.5). To reduce the systematic risks of the transition, 
for each hospital a ‘transition amount’ was determined by comparing the turnover of the 
hospital under performance-based reimbursement (DOT turnover) and the turnover 
equal to the production it would realize under the existing hospital budget system. The 
transition amount was then multiplied by a transfer rate decreasing in 2012 to 95% and 
in 2013 to 70%. 
15
To ensure that the structural expenditure in hospital care remained within the national 
budget, ‘additional security measures’ were taken. For example, it was established by law 
that when the macro budget of hospitals was exceeded because of the changes in the 
reimbursement, the budget of all hospitals would be cut in proportion to their market 
share. As a result, in 2011 the total budgets of the hospitals were reduced by 314 M euro 
because of the excess of the macro budget in 2009 (VWS, 20101). Furthermore, in 2011 
a Gentleman’s Agreement was signed by the Minister of Health, hospitals and health
15 These are average percentages for all hospitals in the Netherlands. However, for university medical centres, 
these percentages were significantly lower because they provide relatively more complex care of whose care 
products are in the regulated segment (A-list DBCs). 
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insurers that would limit the growth of expenses in the Dutch hospital sector to 2.5% 
(excluding wage and price adjustments) for the period from 2012 to 2015 (VWS, 20111). 
Also, in parallel with this, between 2012 and 2014 the financial risks for insurers further 
increased by phasing out certain compensation payments. As a result, the insurers tried 
to limit their risks by making agreements with hospitals about the maximum turnover 
(turnover ceiling) and sharper negotiations about prices and volumes. 
In July 2013, the Minister of Health concluded that, although the transition model 
had contributed to a careful transition to performance-based reimbursement, the 
combination with the introduction of the DOT system had made it complex (VWS, 
2013). As a result, it took a long time for the contracting between hospitals and insurance 
companies and the extra time needed for the annual accounts of hospitals. The Minister 
strived to further accelerate contracting in the coming years. 
Developments in the AMC
The increasing competition and the financial pressure were serious challenges for the 
AMC; they had to do more for less money. As a result, in 2010 the AMC redefined their 
strategic goals for 2011 to 2015. The emphasis was put on strengthening the clinical 
functions and top referral, cooperation in the region, patient safety, innovation in 
education and training, as well as quality improvement, and focus on research (AMC, 
Strategic Goals 2011 - 2015). Regarding academic cooperation in the region, the 
existing collaboration with the Free University Medical Center (VUmc) was expanded 
and in 2013, the Boards of Directors of the AMC and VUmc signed an agreement for a 
proposed administrative merger. It was concluded that the strategic aims could only be 
realized by setting priorities in patient care and cost reductions.
Setting priorities was promoted by putting more and more focus on the content of care 
policy (rather than the budget parameters) in the Planning & Control cycle. As in the 
previous years, divisions were asked to define their medical policy for each patient group, 
not only by indicating what the desired volumes were, but also to how to motivate this 
and to explain how they thought to achieve it. To ensure that scarce resources were used 
for the defined focus areas; in 2011 a more explicit link was established between the 
desired medical substantive policy and the allocation of capacity and money. This meant 
that when allocating scarce capacity, such as operating rooms, the relevance of patients 
to the performance of the core tasks and the profiling of the AMC, would be taken 
into account. It was also announced that in 2012 internal budgeting would be linked 
to external funding, i.e. the DOT care products, but the Board of Directors decided 
to abandon these plans because the DOT data were too volatile. It took, for example, 
almost a year to obtain the first DOT data and accordingly it took a long time to make 
agreements with health insurers about volumes and prices of the care products. 
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Cost reductions were realized by reducing the budgets of the divisions and services 
year by year and by initiating projects to improve efficiency and quality. In 2012 these 
projects were bundled into one central program: SLIM (meaning: SMART). The 
purpose of SLIM was to reduce costs structurally by 65 M euro in 2014, to realize the 
strategic aims by making the right choices and improving the processes and quality. 
Furthermore, in 2013, the so-called ‘A3 methodology’ was introduced, which is a 
change agenda for an entity in which new activities or desired improvements in quality 
and efficiency are defined. The aim of this was to work and manage in a more result-
oriented way. Divisions were asked to define measurable indicators in their annual plan 
and also to formulate objectives for them. The A3 year plans replaced the previous 
year’s plans. With the A3 year plans, the ‘A3 meetings’ were also introduced where two 
times a year the Board of Directors and divisional managers talked about the progress 
on the outcomes on the indicators and about the future. The outcomes concerned 
different topics such as finance, human resources, and patient care and could be related 
to each other. To monitor the outcomes, an ‘A3 dashboard’ was designed containing 
qualitative information (annual plan in words) and quantitative information (outcomes 
on indicators) per entity (division or medical specialty). 
Finally, in 2013, the decision was made to purchase a new electronic patient system 
(called EPIC). This system would replace almost all existing computer systems related 
to patient care and was a major change program. The implementation was scheduled 
for October 2015. 
Impact of the developments on the (re)design of the CMI
The external and internal developments had an impact on the (re)design and use of the 
CMI in several ways. The further increase of pressure on competition (because of the 
liberalization) and finance (because of cost reductions) strengthened the need for more 
detailed case-mix information, for example, about the complexity of care, care processes, 
and finance. This meant that the existing information products had to be extended (see 
Section 6.3). Also, more external data were needed, such as market shares (for case-
mix decisions and sales strategy) and benchmark data per care product (for process 
optimizing). The announcement that internal budgets would be linked to the DOT 
products in 2012 meant that users of the CMI needed insight into the financial impact 
of this for their division and medical specialty. For this purpose, also new figures had to 
be designed in the Standard Report Patient Care. 
The replacement of the DBC structure with the DOT structure had a huge impact 
on the CMI. First, the existing information products had to be technically redesigned 
because the DOT data were generated in a different way and based on different sources 
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than the DBC. Second, the DOT product structure implicated a substantive change: 
the contents and terminology of care products were different from the DBC, which 
meant that users of the CMI had to be trained to understand the DOT system and 
to interpret the related case-mix information. Third, as a result of the technical and 
substantive change it took about nine months before the first DOT data became 
available and agreements could be made with health insurers about volumes and prices. 
This implied that in 2012, the prices became available late in the current year in the 
CMI. This reduced the usefulness of the CMI considerably, since it was not possible to 
determine the actual financial coverage per care product or patient group. Fourth, as 
with the DBC product structure, the DOT product structure changed continuously. As 
a consequence the volumes, costs, and prices per care product fluctuated considerably. 
This made the data unpredictable and strengthened the perception of the users of the 
unreliability of the data and made them reluctant to use the CMI. Finally, the fact that 
the Board of Directors decided to abandon their plans to link the internal budgets to the 
DOT production, but to retain the historical budgets, meant that the medical managers 
lacked the incentives and opportunities to optimize their case-mix which reduced their 
need for case-mix information.
 
With the ‘A3 dashboard,’ a new management information tool was introduced at the 
AMC, which also contained information regarding patient care. This not only meant 
that the information in the CMI had to match with the information as presented in the 
‘A3 dashboard,’ but also that it became possible to link the case-mix information to other 
information, such as finance and human resources. For the CMI the implementation of 
the new electronic patient system also implied that in 2015 all data sources would have 
to be replaced and the existing information products had to be redesigned. Moreover, 
the new system would provide opportunities for new types of case-mix information, 
because new and better data were recorded in the system. On this basis, in 2013 it was 
decided that until then no more large investments would be made in the CMI.
Finally, there were some other developments which had an impact on the CMI, but in 
a more indirect way. Between 2010 and 2014, all members of the Board of Directors 
were replaced. This was relevant to the CMI, since the former chairman had been the 
initiator and thus a major sponsor of the project. It was uncertain what the change of 
these members meant for the support of this project. Furthermore, in 2010, the Dutch 
Competition Authority (NMa, Nederlandse Mededingings Autoriteit) conducted an 
“unannounced visit” to the Free University Medical Centre (VUmc) and the AMC, 
because they suspected them of making forbidden agreements. The NMa investigation 
focused on the exchange of statistical data including patient flows and actual production 
data. The NMa saw competition risks because the hospitals could change their strategic 
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behavior as a result of the exchange and could use the information in negotiations with 
health insurers. The hospitals promised to adjust their exchange of information. The 
NMa accepted the commitment and closed the investigation. This event was relevant 
for this research project, because several medical managers incorrectly saw this as a signal 
that apparently they were legally not allowed to manage patient groups and therefore 
it made the case-mix information less relevant for them (see also Sub-Section 6.3.1 ).
6.3 The regulative cycle of the AMC
In the period from 2009 to 2014, the existing CMI was redesigned, expanded, and 
completed. Most of the measures of improvement as suggested in the interim reflection 
(see Table 5.8) were realized. The design and implementation of the CMI still took 
place by passing through the regulative cycle, but for several reasons, not so frequently 
and strictly as it did in the period from 2006 to 2008. First, since 2009 the CMI 
increasingly became embedded in the processes and minds of the users and its innovative 
character diminished. Second, in consultation with the Board of Directors the project 
group had decided to create a more stable period where not too many innovations 
were implemented and the organization was not burdened too much with evaluations. 
Therefore, in the next sections several years are grouped together. A distinction is made 
between the period from 2009 to 2011 and from 2012 to 2014. The reason is that in 
2012 substantial changes were made to the CMI because of the transition from the 
DBC to DOT product structure and a fairly new era began.
6.3.1 2009 to 2011
In this section, the phases of the regulative cycle which were passed through between 
2009 and 2011 are described.
1. Evaluation of the CMI.
Between 2009 and 2011, several formal and informal evaluations of the project took 
place. Some were a follow-up of the interim reflection on the success of the existing 
CMI (see Section 5.4); others were caused by new developments (see Section 6.2). 
Evaluation of the Portfolio Matrix 
In 2009, the Portfolio Matrix (see Figure 5.1) was evaluated because the interim 
reflection had shown that several users perceived the quality of the axes as unreliable 
(Section 5.4). An expert meeting with several users16 was organized to (re)discuss the 
axes of the Portfolio Matrix. With regard to the medical relevance (Y-axis of the Matrix) 
16 The meeting was attended by 10 persons consisting of chief physicians and delegates of the Research 
Council, directorate patient care and the F & C department.
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it was discussed how the different relevance scores (e.g., relevance for the clinic, research, 
training, and education) could best be weighed. In the current method all scores were 
weighted equally (see Table 5.4). According to the participants, the advantages of the 
current method were the simplicity and the fact that all key tasks were involved. However, 
a disadvantage was that the core tasks of training and education were weighted too heavily 
in relation to the other tasks and therefore in some cases the wrong patient groups were 
shown as the most relevant. Consequently these patient groups got too much attention in 
the debate. In the end, it was decided to arbitrarily weigh training and education by half. 
It was also discussed whether the relevance scores could be more objectified, for 
example, by complementing them with quantitative data (about the complexity of care, 
number of publications, etc.) or by a critical review by division managers or other chief 
physicians. It was concluded that these methods also had disadvantages. With regard 
to the use of data, it was argued that it was often difficult to link some data to specific 
patient groups. Critical reviews by colleagues were not seen as an option because it was 
expected that other managers would not have the knowledge to do this or would not 
do this seriously because they were colleagues. Eventually, it was decided not to further 
quantify because one agreed that by definition it involved opinions rather than facts; 
further quantification might mistakenly suggest that ‘the truth’ was represented.
With regard to the financial relevance (the X-axis of the Matrix) it was argued that 
finance could dominate too much in the discussions. Moreover it was questioned if this 
information was relevant to the patients in the A-list DBCs, because for this part the 
AMC was still budgeted (See also Section 2.5). Despite these objections, it was decided 
to maintain the current axis, because it contributed to cost awareness and made the 
possible consequences of the new performance-based funding visible.
Evaluation of the use of the CMI in making case-mix decisions (portfolio strategy)
In 2010, the use of the CMI in making case-mix decisions was evaluated because the 
interim reflection had shown that users experienced obstructing factors to making these 
decisions directly on the basis of this information (Section 5.4). A new pilot (pilot group 
III) named ‘From analysis to decision’ (also called “the portfolio strategy”) was launched 
with the aims of investigating how the process of making case-mix decisions could be 
optimized, what (case-mix) information was necessary for this, and to what extent the 
current CMI met the requirements. First, there was an inventory of how the processes 
of defining portfolio strategy took place at the pilot specialties17. All specialties defined 
17 Nine medical specialties participated in the pilot: Gastroenterology, Orthopaedics, ENT, Ophthalmology, 
Neurosurgery, Neurology, Obstetrics, Radiotherapy, and Rehabilitation. Two meetings were organized 
with  this pilot group III, consisting of 13 persons people, such as chief physicians, director of operations, 
business office assistant, and employees of the F & C department.
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their portfolio strategy in long term plans, generally every three to five years. However, 
there were significant differences between the departments in the process and contents 
of the plans. All specialties had used the CMI as a support for their portfolio strategy. 
The pilot group discussed the factors that promoted or obstructed the use of the case-
mix information so far. The results are summarized in Table 6.2 (AMC, 2010).
Table 6.2: Success promoting and obstructing factors of the CMI
Variable Promoting factors Obstructing factors
Design of 
the CMI
• Provides insight into DBC structure, 
case-mix, registrations, calculations
• Combination / presentation type of data
• Support the dialogue, decision making
• Fast access to detailed data at patient level
• Leads to a change of mind
• Quality of DBC system
• Quality of information 
• Inaccessible information
• Difficult to work with Cognos
• Information relates to the past only
Design & 
imple-
mentation 
strategy
• Involvement medical departments
• Phased implementation
• Voluntary use of the CMI
• Insufficient involvement of business 
offices
• Voluntary use of the CMI
(Medical) 
manager
• Need for more/ better information
• Much competition/ much financial 
pressure
• Much decision autonomy
• Lack of knowledge / experience/ time
• Little competition/ little financial 
pressure
• Little decision autonomy
Organiza-
tion
• The size and complexity of AMC
• Lack of alternative information systems
• Lack incentives for performance 
improvement
• Lack of clarity / absence strategy
• Management information from other 
initiatives 
• Culture of ‘wheeling and dealing’
• Barriers between divisions and 
specialties
Environ-
ment • Competition pressure
• Continuously changing conditions 
(policy plans)
• Bottlenecks in DBC structure
• Legal barriers to manage on patients
These findings largely matched with the results from the interim reflection (Section 5.4) 
and a number of necessary improvements, as defined in Table 5.8, were already planned 
to tackle the obstructing factors. But there were also new findings, as a consequence of 
increased experience with CMI including the new information products in Cognos, and 
of new events that had occurred since then. 
First, it was concluded that the design of the CMI was based on several assumptions 
that were theoretically correct but did not correspond to the practice of the AMC. For 
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example, the assumption that patient groups were the central carriers of management 
information was supported by most medical managers (see Section 5.4.1), but in practice 
management talks still focused on the traditional budget parameters and finance. This 
confirmed the need for patient groups to get more attention in the Planning & Control 
cycle and in the quarterly meetings. Another assumption was that case-mix decisions 
were made on the basis of objective criteria and information. This was supported by 
most medical managers, but in practice, many decisions were still made on the basis 
of ‘wheeling and dealing’ between people. The pilot group concluded that the process 
of defining the portfolio strategy had to be more structured and standardized, with 
objective decision criteria and information, and that the CMI could well support this.
Second, the raid of the NMa in 2010 (see Section 6.2) was seen by some chief physicians 
as a signal that they were legally not allowed to manage patient groups and therefore 
it made no sense to think about portfolio strategy (“we must obviously accept every 
patient”). During the meeting it appeared that the knowledge about the options to 
manage patient groups, both practically and legally, strongly varied per medical manager 
and it was concluded that users of the CMI had to be better informed about this, 
for example through training. Third, the experiences with the information products 
designed in Cognos (see Section 5.3.3.) were mixed. Advantages that were mentioned 
were that the CMI provided access to detailed data at the patient level and the data had 
become widely available, also for the business administrators. However, several chief 
physicians found Cognos too complex, even after they had received training. This was a 
relevant finding, because until then the project group was of the opinion that all medical 
managers had to be able to work with Cognos, since it was the prevailing business 
intelligence tool. It was decided that user training had to continue, but a distinction had 
to be made between training for medical managers and for business analysts because 
these users had different roles in the strategic management cycle and therefore had 
different needs and skills with regard to the CMI. 
Evaluation of the use of the CMI in the Planning & Control cycle
In 2010, the use of the CMI in the Planning & Control cycle was evaluated by the 
F & C department because at the interim reflection it was concluded that the CMI 
should be better embedded in this cycle (The F & C department concluded that the 
CMI could support the planning process in several ways. First, with the CMI, relations 
between medical substantive policy and logistical / financial policy could be established 
in a more systematic and concrete way. Second, the CMI could be used to translate the 
policy plans of the medical portal specialties to the supporting specialties, such as the 
operating room and diagnostic departments. Until then, the departmental plans were 
often very global as the content of care was hardly taken into account. Third, the CMI 
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made it possible to quantify the impact of policy plans on capacity and money. As a 
result, it was decided to take the patient groups (type and number) of the AMC as a 
starting point in the planning process and to use the CMI for their quantification.
2. Process design 
Based on the results of the interim reflection and the new developments, in 2009, a 
plan was drawn up for the (re) design and implementation of the CMI in the following 
years. With regard to the target groups, pilot group III was asked to structure the process 
of making case-mix decisions and to determine what adjustments to the CMI were 
necessary to support this. Regarding the Planning & Control cycle, it was decided to 
deploy the possibilities of the CMI much more, both for the divisions and for the 
F & C department. As concerned the CMI, several measures were planned for improving 
the quality of the data, such as the increase of automated checks in the processes of data 
collection and distribution, the validation of the data by the internal audit department 
and the organization of an expert meeting to discuss the quality the Portfolio Matrix. 
The Minimal Dataset would be revised on the basis of the interim reflection and the 
new pilot project. Finally, to increase access and the analytical capabilities of the CMI 
for the business analysts, data cubes would be designed in Cognos18. With reference to 
the implementation strategy, it was planned that the case-mix information would be 
available earlier for the users so they could use them for the budgeting process. 
3. Object design 
Between 2009 and 2011 both for the (medical) managers and the business analysts 
existing products were redesigned and several new information products were designed. 
Redesign of the existing information products in the CMI
The Minimal Data Set (see Section 5.3.1) was extended several times. The extensions 
related to the complexity of care (including the health condition of surgical patients), 
characteristics of the patient (socio-economic class, age, and gender), more detailed 
cost data (cost components), and the link between patient groups and focus points of 
the AMC. Data had been collected over several years and trend data became available. 
These data were added to the existing data warehouse and Standard Report Patient 
Care. Regarding the Portfolio Matrix, the overall relevance score was now determined 
by weighing training and education by half. Finally, in the course of time, the ‘Intranet 
Page Management Information Patient Care’ (see Section 7.4.4) was further improved 
and expanded on the basis of feedback from the users.
18 Cognos is a brand name used by IBM for activities in the field of business intelligence and business 
performance management. The software is designed to enable business users without technical knowledge 
to extract corporate data, analyse it, and assemble reports. 
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Design of new information products 
In 2009, an Interdependency Analysis (see Section 7.3.3) was designed for the (medical) 
managers with the aim of providing insight per medical specialty about the extent to 
which the treatment of patients groups was related to patient groups of other specialties. 
This analysis was designed because the interim reflection had shown that medical 
managers needed this insight when making policy choices. It gave insight into which 
departments and patient groups were affected when changes occurred with respect to 
the type and volume of patient groups. The F & C department also used this analysis to 
assess the consistency of the defined volume trends per patient group between medical 
departments.
Also in 2009, the project organization designed a Management Game (see Section 7.5.2). 
The game was a response to the (medical) managers’ need for education about the use of 
the CMI. This game related to a fictional case where case-mix decisions had to be made 
and operationalized, supported by case-mix information. The aims of this game were 
to learn to interpret and use the case-mix information that was available at the AMC, 
dealing with different roles and interests and shared decision-making.
For the business analysts, in 2009 a Data Cube Care Products was designed in Cognos (see 
Section 7.4.1). This cube was designed because the interim reflection clearly indicated 
that business analysts needed better access to the underlying data of the Standard Report 
and Portfolio Matrix to support the medical managers. Because of this a unique set of 
data was created that could be used for different purposes. The advantages of the cube 
were that appropriate analyses could be made at various levels (AMC-wide, per division, 
per patient group, per diagnosis, etc.); data could be easily selected, combined (e.g., 
the relationship between the origin of the patient and the diagnosis) and presented. 
Additionally, in 2011 Standard Views19 on this data cube were designed for them so that 
users no longer required advanced Cognos skills. 
In 2010, a Portfolio Checklist was designed for the (medical) managers, see Section 7.3.5. 
The aim of this product was to support them in assessing their case-mix in a systematic 
way on the basis of the different types of case-mix information, and translating their 
outcomes to decisions relating to the case-mix and the underlying care processes. The 
Portfolio Checklist was designed because the interim reflections had shown that several 
managers felt the need to structure and standardize the case-mix decision-making process. 
The Checklist contained a generic set of twelve standards that might be relevant to assess 
their current portfolio. Based on the checklist, the medical managers could assess whether 
their case-mix was ‘in balance’ and whether actions were necessary to optimize this. 
19 A standard view is a specific selection of the data cube that can be stored.
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Design process
The project management defined the specifications for the (re)design of the Minimal 
Data Set and information products. The specifications per information product related 
to the layout, contents, definitions, sources, and which checks had to be made. They 
had to decide what information would be made available through the Standard Report 
Patient Care and what through the Data Cubes. The dilemma was that some managers 
needed a lot of detailed data and others did not. It was decided to add data to the 
Standard Report only if the majority of the users asked for it. The concern controller 
instructed the ICT department to design the products to conform to the specifications. 
The prototypes were presented to and tested by some end users, at an early stage. 
The Interdependency Analysis was designed by the project management on the basis of 
DBC data. As each patient was recorded for what diagnosis and by what medical specialty 
he or she was treated, it was possible to calculate the degree of interdependence between 
medical specialties on the basis of data over several years and to visualize this. Prototypes of 
the Interdependency Analyses were designed and tested with several medical specialties. 
The Portfolio Checklist was designed by pilot group III. This pilot focused on the 
optimization of the phases analyzing, (case-mix) decision-making and implementation 
of the strategic management cycle of the AMC (see Section 2.8), because these phases 
were considered by the participants as the most relevant, but also the most difficult. 
First, the pilot group defined what criteria were relevant for making case-mix decisions. 
As a basis for discussion, a quadrant model for portfolio strategy20 was used. In this 
model it is assumed that in the portfolio strategy of hospitals four quadrants are relevant: 
professional, social, market, and business. The objective for the (medical) managers was 
to keep these quadrants ‘in balance’ as much as possible. Accordingly, the pilot group 
defined three generic standards per quadrant that they considered as relevant and useful 
for the assessment of their case-mix. Defining these 12 standards was experienced by 
the participants as useful: it was a way to gain more insight into the performance of the 
department, and it forced them to reflect better and make appropriate decisions. Then, 
for each standard the pilot group determined what type of information was needed in 
order to test whether one complied with the standard. It was also discussed what the 
source of this information should be and how it could be monitored if the portfolio met 
the standards. Accordingly, the checklist was designed as a tool to systematically assess 
the portfolio on the basis of the scores on the 12 standards. 
Finally, the members of the pilot group tested the checklist by using it for the assessment 
of their own case-mix. Based on the outcomes, the group defined measures to optimize 
20 This model was designed by an external consultancy office (Zorgconsult)
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their portfolio and underlying care processes. As a result of this, the whole process from 
analysis to decision-making was completed. Although this checklist was experienced as 
useful by the pilot group and led to some real policy decisions, the medical specialties 
involved the pilot were reluctant to implement it corporate wide. One reason for this 
was that it proved impossible to apply generic standards for each medical speciality and 
these standards had to be customized per type of specialty. It was therefore difficult to 
implement this checklist corporate wide. But there was also some fear among chief 
physicians that division managers or the Board of Directors would use the checklist to 
assess them and thus their decision-making power would be limited.
4. Implementation of the CMI
Implementation of the information products
In the course of time, the redesigned and new information products were implemented, 
i.e. became available for the authorized users. At every implementation, users were 
informed by email about the available information products, about how to use them, 
and about the content of the changes compared to the previous versions. Furthermore, 
users were requested to validate their own data, to read the manuals, and to provide 
feedback about their findings, questions, and suggestions to the project organization. 
In addition, the project organization planned meetings with all medical specialties to 
discuss the information personally.
Use of the information products 
Between 2009 and 2011, the CMI was further embedded in the Planning & Control 
cycle by establishing the relationships between medical, logistical, and financial policy 
in a systematic way, see Figure 6.1. 
For the planning phase, the medical specialties were asked to indicate the desired 
volumes per patient group and to provide qualitative input, such as focus points and 
distinctiveness (step 1). For this step, the chief physicians and divisional managers used 
the Standard Report Patient Care, Portfolio Matrix, and Interdependency Analysis to 
get insight in their current case-mix and the relations with other specialties. Accordingly, 
the F & C department used the CMI to assess the annual plans (step 2). They checked 
the content of the plans, such as the fit of the desired volumes with the strategic aims 
and consistency of the plans, using the Interdependency Analysis. Furthermore, they 
calculated the impact of the medical plans on capacity (logistical) costs and returns 
(financial policy). On the basis of this assessment it was determined whether adjustments 
of the annual plans were necessary or not. The final annual plans served as input for the 
sales strategy (step 3). The F & C department attempted also to rationalize the allocation 
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Figure 6.1: Use of the CMI in the budgeting process
of operating room capacity to the medical specialties on the basis of CMI data but this
failed. Reasons for this were the perceived poor quality of the data, but also because of 
political and historical influence in the budgeting process. The Board of Directors was 
afraid that budget changes would lead to discussions between divisions.
For the control phase, the chief physicians and division managers used the Standard 
Report Patient Care during the year to monitor if the actual volume trends matched 
with the desired volume trends. Twice a year, the divisional managers were asked to 
report to the Board of Directors about possible significant differences between actual 
and desired volumes and to explain these differences and what action would be taken.
Furthermore, the CMI was used for other purposes such as specific business cases, the 
improvement of registrations and external legitimization. For example, in 2011 the 
Dutch Health Care Authority presented the DOT product structure and the maximum 
tariffs per care product (regulated segment) for 2012. On the basis of the CMI the 
AMC was able to demonstrate that for various specialties (Pediatrics, Cardiology and 
Neurosurgery) the rates by far did not cover the actual costs and objected to these rates. 
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As a result, the rates were significantly increased. Finally, in the context of health care 
efficiency research the AMC Clinical Research Unit repeatedly used the CMI database to 
perform cost-effectiveness studies which were published in scientific journals (Dijksman 
et al, 2008; Saltzherr et al, 2013; Bartels, S. et al; 2011). The CMI project management 
hereby advised of the availability and quality of the data and how these data could be 
used, for example, regarding the unit cost data. 
User training
Several training sessions were organized for the target groups of the case-mix information. 
In 2009, the developed Management Game (see Section 7.5.2) was played at the yearly 
strategic conference for the top managers, consisting of the Board of Directors and 
divisional management. The game was played by 35 (medical) managers and was 
experienced as successful by them. For all chief physicians, in 2010 a training session 
was organized, called ‘Optimization of Care.’ In this training session, the current CMI 
system was presented. Examples of how this information could be used for portfolio 
strategy and process optimization were given. After the implementation of new versions 
of the information products in Cognos several Computer Training sessions (see Section 
7.5.2) were organized for the business analysts. During these sessions there were 
demonstrations of how the information could be used in practice and how it could 
be interpreted. The training sessions were positively evaluated by the participants and 
the evaluations showed that the training had increased their skills, knowledge, and 
willingness to use the CMI. 
6.3.2  2012 to 2014
In this section, the phases of the regulative cycle which were passed through between 
2012 and 2014 are described. In this period all existing information products were 
redesigned because of the introduction of the DOT product structure and earlier 
reflections on the success of the CMI. Furthermore, several new information products 
were designed. In 2014, it was concluded that the design of the CMI was completed and 
that the highest possible aims of the system has been achieved.
1. Evaluation 
Evaluation of all existing information products 
In 2012, all existing products of the CMI were re-evaluated. The main reason was that 
in 2012 the DBC product structure was replaced by the DOT product structure and 
a new internal budgeting system had to be implemented (Section 6.2). Other reasons 
were that there was still the need to improve and extend the current information 
products. Some needs were already identified at the interim reflection (Section 5.4); 
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others emerged as result of new projects such as SLIM and the A3 methodology (see 
Section 6.2). For this purpose, the F & C department decided to start the project 
‘Revision Management Information Patient Care.’21 The project group concluded 
that all existing information products had to be technically redesigned. Furthermore, 
the content of the existing information products had to be adjusted in several ways. 
Standards in management information should be incorporated and there should be 
more visualization. Furthermore, benchmark data per care product were needed (for 
the SLIM project). Finally, new useful data became available. For example, with the 
introduction of the DOT, all hospitals were required to register the type of referrer of 
the patient (general practitioner or other hospital). This provided new and interesting 
information, because the type of referrer reflects to some extent the complexity of care. 
Evaluation of the use of data and management information in the AMC
In 2012, a project group ‘Data Management’ was formed22, because various problems 
with regard to the use of data and management information in the AMC had been 
identified, not only in the field of patient care, but also in finance and HR. The problems 
related both to the quality and the organization of data. Much data were difficult to access 
and not formally validated. Some data were also conflicting and there were problems 
with the availability of data. Moreover, there were no clear procedures for designing and 
implementing management information, Clear procedures were also lacking with regard 
to access, privacy and confidentiality of data. 5. To solve these problems, the project 
group concluded that a formal policy with regard to management information in the 
AMC had to be developed. 
End reflection
In 2014, a second and final extensive end reflection on the project took place by surveying 
53 (medical) managers. They were asked to complete a comprehensive questionnaire 
about the final CMI, the perceived outcomes and the factors that promoted or obstructed 
its success. The results of the end refection are presented in Chapter 8.
21 The project group ‘Revision Management Information Patient Care’ was managed by the F & C 
department and consisted of 19 people including chief physicians, division managers, employees of the F& 
C department, business analysts and DBC consultants. 
22 The project group ‘Data Management’ consisted of 10 people including the concern controller, directors 
IT, advisors of the F & C department, and the department of Quality Process and Innovation. 
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2. Process design 
Based on the results of the project ‘Revision Management Information Patient Care,’ 
(RMIPC) there were plans about what had to be (re)designed and when. Priority was 
given to the information products that were needed for Planning & Control and sales,
such as the Standard Report Patient Care and underlying Data Cubes in Cognos. The 
reason for this was that because of the introduction of performance-based reimbursement
the revenues of the AMC were determined by the production and delivery of DOT 
products rather than budgets. Therefore accurate information about volumes and 
turnover was required. The RMIPC-project group ‘defined the specifications for the 
(re)design per information product in terms of layout, contents, definitions, sources 
and checks. The concern controller instructed the ICT department to (re)design the 
products in line with the specifications. 
3. Object design 
In this phase, the existing information products Standard Report Patient Care, Portfolio 
Matrix, Cognos Data Cube Care Products and Intranet Page Management Information 
were redesigned again. In addition to this, new products were designed. The products 
consisted of information products (Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles, Cognos 
Data Cube Care Activities and Cognos Data Cube Market Shares), intermediate 
products (Forecasting Model, Top Referral Care Model). Finally, an Information Policy 
was defined. 
Redesign of the existing information products in the CMI
In 2012, the Standard Report Patient Care, Portfolio Matrix and Cognos Data Cube Care 
Products were based on the new DOT data instead of DBC data. Furthermore, other 
adjustments took place. 
With regard to the Standard Report Patient Care, new types of information were added 
(such as type of referrer, waiting times, forecasts, and market shares) and several standards 
were added (for example, budgets and waiting times). Some figures were included by 
the project management because they were convinced that this was in the interest of the 
organization, for example, figures related to the quality of the registration and financial 
coverage in the course of time. They tried to make the (medical) managers more aware 
of their role in the administrative process, to increase cost awareness for the full cycle of 
care and to improve registrations. Next, the Standard Report was not only made available 
per medical specialty, but also per division and at corporate level. The Standard Report at 
corporate level showed information per division, the report for the divisions per medical 
specialty and at the medical specialty per patient group. Third, at the request of the 
chief physicians, the Standard Reports for the medical departments Internal Medicine 
and Pediatrics were divided by sub-specialty (such as Oncology, Infectious diseases, and 
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Pediatric surgery). Finally, the Standard Reports could be downloaded by the users at any 
time and at any organizational level (AMC, division or medical specialty) by means of a 
selection menu on the Intranet Page Management Information (see Section 7.4.4). This 
increased the timeliness and accessibility of the Standard Report significantly. In 2014, 
the Standard Report was adjusted again on the basis of the end reflection (see Section 8.2).
As concerned the Cognos Data Cube Care Products, several new types of data were 
included with respect to the old Data Cube For example, the names of the referring 
general practitioners and hospitals were added to provide insight on who referred the 
patients to the AMC for what diseases. Furthermore, the names of the treating physicians 
were added. As a result, it became possible to show the production per physician and to 
create new combinations of data, for example, between physician and internal transfer 
cost for the use of imaging, see Section 7.4.1. This additional information was requested 
by the chief physicians because it enabled them to discuss with physicians about their 
productivity and cost reductions. 
The Intranet Page Management Information Patient Care was significantly expanded 
and professionalized. Download menus were designed that allowed users to download 
the Standard Reports Patient Care, as well as detailed data from the server of the ICT 
Department. The advantage of this was that users could generate this data themselves and 
were no longer dependent on ICT capacity. Furthermore, the intranet page contained 
links to all available information products with regard to patient care and the associated 
manuals. 
Design of new information products 
A Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles was designed for the medical managers that 
showed per DOT product or diagnosis what care was delivered against what costs, and 
compared this information with other UMCs (see Section 7.3.4). This analysis was 
designed because all managers had to reduce costs structurally to realize the strategic 
aims of the AMC and meanwhile also had to improve the quality of their care processes 
(see Section 6.2). The aims of the analysis were to examine the current efficiency by 
comparing costs and activities per care product with other UMCs and by trying to 
explain possible deviations. A summary of the Benchmark Analysis was sent to the 
medical managers. The full database with detailed data could be retrieved via a download 
menu on the Intranet page.
Furthermore, a Cognos Data Cube Care Activities was designed for business analysts with 
detailed data on medical activities), such as the type of activity (outpatient clinic, clinic, 
laboratory, etc.), type of related care product and diagnosis, patient characteristics, and 
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finance (see Section 7.4.2.) These data were needed to get a complete financial picture in 
the Standard Report Patient Care, because there were many medical activities that were 
charged separately to insurers (for example intensive care days, expensive drugs) and not 
through care products. Furthermore, there was a great need by business analysts for this 
type of information so that they could perform specific analyses for example at doctor 
level or medical specialty level.
The Cognos Data Cube Market Shares was also designed (see Section 7.4.3). This Data 
Cube contained the number of care products at the AMC compared with other UMCs, 
top clinical hospitals, and general hospitals23. With this cube, insights could be obtained 
about the market share per type of care product and about diagnoses. This was considered 
relevant for making case-mix decisions and for the sales strategy. The market shares per 
patient group were incorporated in the chapter on the health care market of the Standard 
Report Patient Care. At a more detailed level, it also provided insight into how the patient 
characteristics (age, gender) and treatment setting of the AMC differed from other hospitals. 
Design of intermediate products: Forecasting Model and Top Referral Care Model
Data with regard to forecasts and percentages of top referral care were added to the 
Standard Report and Data Cubes. However, these data were not registered in the 
computer systems, but had to be calculated. To realize this, calculation models were 
developed. Regarding the forecasts, a Forecasting Model was designed by which the 
volumes and turnover of care products and care activities could be predicted. This model 
was based on extensive statistical analyses. To measure the percentages referral care, a Top 
Referral Care Model was designed. Since there were no clear national definitions about 
what top referral care was, the AMC used its own definition based on patient’s travel 
distance and type of referrer. 
Design of an Information Policy
On the advice of the project group ‘Data Management’, in 2013 an Information Policy 
was completed (see Section 7.5.3). It contained topics such as principles for management 
information and responsibilities of parties involved in the process of providing and 
using management information. Important principles were that the F & C department 
was in control of the design and prioritization of management information, that the 
central Standard Reports (such as A3, Standard Report Patient Care) were the focus in 
the quarterly meetings and that these reports should be validated by the internal audit 
service to ensure quality. Because of this, the Standard Report Patient Care was given a 
more formal status in the management meetings. 
23 Data are made freely available to all Dutch hospitals by a national organisation bythe Dutch Hospital 
Data.
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Design process
In June 2012, the Standard Report Patient Care, Portfolio Matrix, and Cognos Data 
Cube Care Products were redesigned and tested by the RMIPC-project and several other 
managers. However, at that time there were no actual data available with regard to DOT 
production and selling prices. For several reasons, the replacement of the DBC product
structure by the DOT structure was more complex and extensive than expected. First, 
it took about nine months before the first DOT production data became available. 
The reasons for this were that the computer algorithms did not work properly and 
that essential data for deriving the DOT care product were missing. Second, since the 
DOT data were generated in a different way by different computer algorithms and in 
different systems, a test grouper of the Dutch Health authority (NZa) had to technically 
examine how these data could be collected. Third, since the DOT care products differed 
considerably from the DBC products in terms of content and terminology, it had to 
be examined how the content of the data could be interpreted, what the quality of the 
data was, and what this meant for the design and implementation of the CMI. Fourth, 
the introduction of the DOT also implicated that, as in previous years, it still took a 
long time to complete the negotiations with the insurers). As a result, until then the 
agreements about volumes and selling prices were missing in the CMI and no cost / 
benefit analyses could be carried out. Finally, because of the introduction of the DOT, it 
was in many respects no longer possible to compare data from previous years, so much 
trend data was lost. The (re)designed information products were filled with provisional 
data24 to be tested by the RMIPC-project group ‘. On the basis of their findings, the 
products were technically completed in June 2014. 
With regard to the Standard Report Patient Care, it was chosen to provide clear 
explanations on used sources and selections and on the interpretation of the figures. 
The dilemma was that the more explanation that was given, the more likely it was 
that it would not be read or that the figure would be mistrusted. Therefore it was 
decided to keep the notes in the report as short and powerful as possible. Another 
dilemma was that the presented revenues still did not match with the actual revenues 
of the divisions because the internal budgets were, contrary to earlier announcements, 
not linked to the DOT production. This led to heated discussions, both within 
the F & C department and between the F & C department and users as to whether this 
information should be displayed or not. Opponents argued that this information should
not be displayed because they feared that wrong conclusions could be easily drawn. 
24 The DOT production for the period January to June 2012 was sent to a test grouper of the Dutch health 
authority (NZa), with the result that about 70.000 provisional DOT products were derived. With the largest 
health insurers provisional agreements were made about volumes and selling prices of the care products.
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Also the sales department objected to displaying this information, but for other reasons. 
They negotiated the selling prices and made strategic choices herein. As a result the 
selling prices did not reflect the real costs. By giving insight into the revenues, they 
feared discussions with the medical departments. Proponents argued that displaying this 
information was useful, because they expected that in the future the link between internal
budgets and DOT revenues would be established anyway, and because they thought 
that users needed to understand the current financial coverage of health care products to 
increase cost awareness and quality of registrations. In the end, the decision was made to 
continue displaying the information with regard to revenues but in combination with 
explanations. Finally, the decision that the Standard Report for the medical departments 
‘Internal Medicine’ and ‘Pediatrics’ were divided by sub-specialty, meant that for each 
sub-specialty the patient groups had to be redefined by the sub-chief physician and non-
system data had to be collected again (such as relevance scores). This also implied that 
new users of the case-mix information emerged: the sub-chief physicians, who had to be 
trained on the use of this information. This was a major operation and resulted in a high 
use of the capacity of the ICT and F & C department which was not actually available.
The Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles was designed by the F & C Department 
in cooperation with an external organization which maintained the DOT product 
structure (‘DBC onderhoud’). The benchmark was based on production data of all 
Dutch hospitals in 2010. During the design of the benchmark, several choices were 
made. For example, it was decided to benchmark the Resource Use Profiles at the most 
detailed level (i.e. per diagnosis and care product), because we expected that we needed 
these details for the further discussions with the medical specialties. The Cognos Data 
Cubes Care Activities and Market Shares were designed by the ICT department in line 
with the instructions of the concern controller.
The Forecasting Model was also designed by the F & C department through extensive 
statistical analyses. With the DBC product structure it was quite difficult to make 
accurate forecasts. Because of the closing rules of the DBCs (see Section 2.5) it could take 
a long time before it was known what the definite care product of the DBC trajectory 
would be. This was especially true for follow-up DBCs, which were often closed after 
one year. Furthermore, due to major changes in the product structure, for several care 
products the statistics of the previous year were of very limited usability. The F & C 
department faced the problem that in 2012 there was no historical DOT data available. 
It was expected that in the course of time, the model could be improved more and more 
on the basis of production data and new insights.
The Top Referral Care Model was designed by the F & C department to calculate the 
percentage of top referral care per care product. This information was needed to gain 
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insight into the complexity of care and monitor if the actual percentage met the norm 
as defined in the A3 methodology, see Section 6.2. Since there were no clear national 
definitions about what top referral care was, F & C used their own definition and 
designed business logics to quantify top referral care. The outcomes of the model were 
discussed with a small number of chief physicians and on the basis of their findings 
the model was refined. The percentages of top referral care were weekly calculated for 
the care products and could be broken down into each desired level, such as patient 
group, diagnosis, and medical specialty. The percentages were presented in the Standard 
Report Patient Care and Cognos Data Cubes. It should be noted that this was an initial 
and global approach that certainly had limitations. First, the outcomes were largely 
determined by the quality of the registration of referrers. Second, several other criteria 
might also determine whether care is regular care or top referral care. Factors such as the 
interaction between care and research and the use of specific (high tech) procedures are 
also relevant. During this project, a more advanced model was designed by all UMCs 
together. This model consisted of eight different labels to determine the level of top 
referral care. Interestingly, the outcomes of the pragmatically oriented AMC model were 
very much in line with the outcomes of the more advanced model.
4. Implementation of the CMI
As mentioned before, the further increase of pressure on competition (through 
liberalization) and finance (because of performance-based reimbursement) strengthened 
the need for more, and better, case-mix information. When in mid-2012 there were still 
no DOT production data and selling prices available, the project organization decided 
to implement the redesigned Standard Report Patient Care, Portfolio Matrix, and Data 
Cubes with the provisional data, which had been tested earlier, to all authorized users. 
The project organization thought that it could not withhold this information any longer 
from the users. With the introduction of the DOT, a detailed understanding of these care 
products, underlying activities, revenues, and costs was necessary. Chief physicians and 
division managers needed this information to gain insight into their DOT production 
for 2012, the quality of the registration, and the preparation of the yearly plans for 
2013. The Concern Controller needed this information for the negotiations with health 
insurers. F & C needed feedback from the users to validate the quality of the data 
and to further improve the information products. Because the data of the information 
products were incomplete and not validated, there were risks in using this information. 
For these reasons, the project organization determined for what purposes the CMI could 
be used (getting insight in DOT production, registrations, cost awareness) and not be 
used (taking case-mix decisions directly based on the CMI). These were described in 
disclaimers and were added to the information products. 
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Implementation of the Standard Report Patient Care
In the second half of 2012, the redesigned Standard Report Patient Care was discussed 
with all chief physicians, division managers, central managers, and business analysts. 
These meetings were used to explain the new report, to collect comments, and to 
actualize the classification of patient groups and the non-system data. Although users 
reacted positively on the new types of information, there was a wide frustration that no 
actual production data were available. Furthermore, several chief physicians and division 
managers indicated that the financial figures were still less relevant to them, because the 
presented revenues did not match with their budgets that were still not linked to the 
DOT production. Moreover, within the types of information the relevance and usefulness 
of information varied per medical specialty. Surgical departments needed management 
information about operating rooms, such as delays, minimum interventions and surgery 
hours. Clinical departments needed information on the length of stay, and number 
of (day) admissions and outpatient visits. Medical specialties that make considerably 
use of supporting medical departments (laboratory, imaging) needed management 
information on the internal transfer costs. So, although a standard set of management 
information was available hospital-wide, there was a strong desire of the users to adapt 
and modify the standard information to their specific needs. 
During 2013, more and more DOT production data became available and the Standard 
Report Patient Care was further improved. The improvements particularly concerned 
the layout and explanations of the figures in the reports and the forecasts of volumes 
and returns of the DOT products. Furthermore, several figures in the Standard Report 
were incorporated in the ‘A3 dashboard’ (see Section 6.2) to give insight into trends 
and to give possible explanations for the performance of care indicators. In this way, 
the CMI and A3 methodology were connected and it became possible for users to relate 
care indicators to other performance indices, for example the number of staff. The 
integration of the CMI information in the A3 dash board made the CMI no longer a 
standalone system. It was now embedded it in the Planning & Control cycle. Because of 
this, the CMI information got more attention in budget talks and quarterly meetings. 
At the end of 2013, the final version of the Standard Reports Patient Care were sent to 
all chief physicians, division managers and Board of Directors, including a summary 
of the most relevant findings for their entity. Through this, it was explained to them 
how the figures in the report could be interpreted, what conclusions could be drawn, 
and what actions could be taken. Although this was a very labor-intensive operation, it 
provided several new insights. As of 2014, the Standard Report Patient Care was sent 
automatically to chief physicians, division managers, central managers, and business 
offices on a monthly basis. 
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Implementation of other information products 
In 2012, the outcomes of the Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles were made 
available to all managers and business analysts through the intranet page. However, 
the analyses were not actively promoted, because the project management had noticed 
that it was very labor intensive to discuss the outcomes of the analyses with the medical 
specialties in a responsible way. The decision was made to use the analyses for the SLIM 
project and to focus only on the four medical specialties where the costs of the care 
products were significantly higher than the average of the other university medical 
centers. In this way, most efficiency gains could be expected. 
The redesigned Intranet Page Management Information and the new designed Data 
Cube Care Activities and Data Cube Market Shares in Cognos were implemented in 
2012 for the business analysts. All users were informed about the contents of these 
products, of the changes compared to previous versions, and disclaimers. 
Between 2012 and 2014, the CMI was still used in the Planning & Control cycle, but in 
a different way than before. For the planning phase, the medical departments were still 
asked to indicate the desired volumes, but per care product rather than per patient group. 
The reason for this was that as of 2012 the negotiations with health insurers had become 
more detailed and patient groups were too aggregated for this discussion. For this first 
step in the cycle, the chief physicians and division managers used the Standard Report 
Patient Care, Portfolio Matrix and Interdependency Analysis with provisional data to 
gain insight in their current case-mix and the relation with other medical specialties. 
For the control phase, the chief physicians and divisional managers used the Standard 
Report Patient Care during the year to monitor if the actual volume trends matched 
with the desired volume trends. However, it was not possible to monitor if the actual 
DOT volumes and turnover matched with budgets, because F & C had not allocated 
the budgets to the medical specialties and divisions. 
The outcomes of the Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles were discussed with four 
medical specialties. Per specialty, three meetings took place with the chief physicians, 
the medical staff and members of the SLIM project team. During these meetings, 
participants discussed the possible causes of the differences in costs between AMC 
and other UMCs. In addition, internal benchmark analyses were conducted revealing 
variation in provided care per physician. Finally, several actions were defined in order to 
optimize the care processes and to reduce costs, such as the admission of the patient on 
the surgery day (rather than the previous day) and weekly discussion about the average 
length of stay on the departments. These meetings were experienced as useful by the 
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participants and demonstrated that efficiency gains really could be realized, particularly 
by sharing knowledge between physicians and by standardizing care processes. On the 
other hand, there was also criticism on the Benchmark Analyses. For example, it was 
unknown if the registrations and types of patients of the AMC were similar to those 
of the other UMCs and if the data were actual. For the latter, it was decided that the 
benchmark analyses had to be updated first, before implementing it actively AMC-wide. 
Furthermore, the CMI database was used by the department of Quality, Process & 
Innovation to analyze the care processes of a selected number of surgical patient groups. 
The bottlenecks in the processing times and the degree of variation within the process 
were examined. For these patient groups, the corresponding DBC data were obtained 
from the CMI, for example information on diagnoses and care activities. Finally, the 
CMI was used for the preparation of the administrative merger with the VUmc. To 
draw up the plans, AMC and VUmc were allowed to exchange DBC data from the 
previous years. The classification of the AMC’s patient groups formed the basis to cluster 
the DBC data of both UMCs in the same way. Because of this, insight was gained 
about which patient groups overlapped or which complemented each other’s activities. 
The classification of AMC patient groups turned out to be very usable for the chief 
physicians of the VUMC and was only minimally adapted to identify specific patients 
of VUmc.
User training
In 2012 and 2013, several user training sessions were organized. For the managers, a new 
management development program was launched that was meant for chief physicians, 
work place managers, and head nurses. For this program, a Web Seminar was recorded 
in which managers received explanations about external and internal developments 
and about the available case-mix information to fulfill their roles as managers. The big 
advantage of this webinar was knowledge sharing. The Management Game was also 
played at several training sessions. For the business analysts, several computer training 
sessions took place in which participants were informed about the available information 
products and learned to interpret and use the new case-mix information.
End of the CMI-project
At the end of 2013, the Board of Directors and the project management concluded that 
the design of the CMI was ready and that the aims were sufficiently achieved, given the 
restrictions. With the total set of products, information with regard to patient care was 
available from a variety of perspectives: from strategic to operational, from historical to 
prospective, from standard to ad hoc, and from internal information to information 
from other hospitals. A presentation was sent to all authorized users with an overview of 
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all available information products and examples of use in practice. After this, the project 
that started in 2006 formally ended. 
In 2014, several actions were taken to secure the CMI for the future, such as the embedding 
of ownership of the CMI in the organization and to ensure that the case-mix information 
would be kept available in 2015 when the new electronic patient system (EPIC) would 
be implemented. At the end of 2014, the AMC’s CMI project was nominated for the 
European Porter prize25. According to the Jury report, the CMI showed great potential 
for cost effectiveness within the full cycle of care and was on the right track to increasing 
patient value by balancing between patient outcomes and costs (Porter prize, 2014). 
 
6.4 Interim conclusions 
Several interim conclusions can be drawn based on the second part of the case study 
(2009-2014). Some conclusions were a confirmation or adjustment of earlier conclusions, 
others were new perspectives. 
Design and implementation variables
In the period from 2009 to 2014, the CMI was redesigned, expanded, and completed 
on the basis of reflections on its success against the background of new developments. 
During this period, the number of users increased and more experiences were gained with 
existing and new information products. In the meantime, several major developments 
took place, both in the hospital sector and in the AMC, which had an impact on the 
design, use, and effects of the CMI (see Section 6.2). 
With regard to the design of the CMI, several conclusions could be drawn. First, the DBC 
data still appeared to be very useful. Since the product structure had both a medical and 
financial component, these data could well be used for the steps in the Planning & 
Control cycle, such as preparing and assessing the annual plans and allocating budgets 
(see Figure 6.1). The replacement of the DBC product structure by the DOT product 
structure in 2012 had also some positive effects. For some specialties, the academic care 
of severely ill patients was in this way better reflected, and new data had to be registered, 
such as the type of referrer. Because of this, relevant information could be designed, such 
as the percentage of top referral care. 
Second, the design and use of the new information products led to new insights. For 
example, the Interdependency Analysis appeared to be useful too since it visualized how 
the medical specialties were interrelated and where coordination of medical policy was
25 The Porter prize is intended to give additional recognition to inspiring initiatives in health care 
that provide both excellent treatment outcomes and optimal patient orientation and involvement.
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 needed (see Section 6.3.1). The design of the Portfolio Checklist showed that the process 
of design itself was already useful because it forced managers to actively think about 
which factors were relevant for their case-mix (see Section 6.3.1). This proved that, 
similar to the process of defining patient groups (see interim reflection I), the process 
of designing the CMI produces positive effects, regardless of the use of it. However, it 
appeared to be difficult to implement this checklist corporate-wide, since several generic 
standards of the checklist needed to be specified per medical specialty. The Benchmark 
Analysis Resource Use Profiles showed that these analyses could seriously contribute to a 
dialogue about medical practice, efficiency gains, and cost reductions (see Section 6.3.2). 
The strengths were that the practice of the AMC was compared with the other UMCs 
only (rather than general hospitals) and the outcomes were presented at a detailed level. 
Unfortunately, the quality of the data was unknown and turned out to be outdated, 
which made it possible to reject the results of the analyses. The Data Cubes in Cognos 
increased the accessibility of the CMI and analysis capabilities significantly. However, 
it was concluded that Cognos was too complex for (medical) managers to use and the 
Cubes did not match their needs (see Section 6.3.1) This was an important finding, 
because until then there had been the company principle that all managers in the AMC 
must be able to work with Cognos, since it was the prevailing Business Intelligence 
tool. This meant that for the redesign of the CMI a distinction had to be made between 
information products for management and for business analysts. 
Third, there was a persistent perception of poor quality of the data and it even deteriorated 
when the DBC system was replaced by the DOT system in 2012. Explanations for this 
were that the DOT data were generated by (more) complex computer algorithms and 
therefore less recognized and understood; the lack of actual data (volumes, selling prices) 
and the continuous changes in products structure, rates, and calculation models made 
the data unpredictable. As a result, many (medical) managers judged the quality of 
the DOT data as even more unreliable than the DBC data. This reduced the possible 
applications of the CMI significantly. The Board of Directors decided in 2012 to 
abandon the plans to link the internal budgets to DOT production. Because of this, 
an important aim of the CMI could not be achieved and reduced the need to use it. 
Although understandable from a management perspective, this was a major setback for 
the project because through this decision the relevance of the DBC information to the 
divisions and medical specialties decreased substantially. Besides, this was seen by several 
(medical) managers as a confirmation that the Board of Directors had also lost their 
confidence in the DOT data and therefore the CMI. 
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Also, other obstructing factors, which were identified earlier, still existed. For example, 
until 2011 the tariffs or the A-list DBCs were only virtual and did not represent the actual 
returns (see Section 2.5). The presented costs were therefore not recognized because of 
the complexity of the calculation process and calculation fictions. Furthermore, it still 
took much time to negotiate about volumes and prices with the health insurers and this 
meant that during the year essential data were missing and the CMI could not be used 
to gain insight into the actual financial coverage per care product or patient group. Also, 
there was a persistent perception that qualitative (non-system) data such as the relevance 
scores were of poor quality, despite the various measures taken to improve it. Suggestions 
from the project organization to objectify the qualitative data by supplementing it with 
quantitative data or by validation by colleagues were discussed during an expert meeting 
but rejected because the qualitative data were considered to be opinions and not facts. 
As a result nothing changed and the qualitative data remained debatable. The case study 
showed how complex it was to use qualitative, non-system data in the CMI, especially 
for medical managers who are used to guiding their clinical work by objective facts. 
As concerning the implementation of the CMI, the project organization experienced 
major problems after the introduction of the DOT, because no reliable data were 
available. At the same time, the need for information was high because external 
performance-based reimbursement was introduced and financial risks had increased. 
As a result, it was decided to implement the information products based on the DOT 
data, but with provisional and non-validated test data, because we could not withhold 
this data any longer from the users. Because of this, users got their first insights into 
their DOT productions and their registrations and measures of improvement could 
be taken. However, the negative effects of this incomplete dataset were that there were 
risks of using this information and disclaimers had to be added to the information 
products. For example, a warning not to make case-mix decisions on basis of the CMI. 
Furthermore, the case study demonstrated that for the implementation of the redesigned 
information products (Standard Report Patient Care) and new information products 
(Interdependency Analysis and Benchmark Analysis Resource Use profiles), substantial 
support from the project organization was required. 
The organizational and environmental variables
With regard to the (medical) managers, it was concluded that, in line with earlier 
findings, the increase of competition pressure and financial pressures increased their 
need for case-mix information. This was evidenced by the fact that more and more 
managers became interested in the CMI, such as the sub-chief physicians of the medical 
specialties Pediatrics and Internal Medicine. Most information needs were related to 
the formulation of austerity measures, better arguments in their discussions with staff 
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members about their productivity and transfer costs, and to the negotiations with health 
insurers. Also the business analysts needed better access to the underlying data of the 
CMI to support the medical managers. 
Pilot group III (see Section 6.3.1) demonstrated that many managers found it difficult 
to analyze and translate case-mix information into case-mix decisions or underlying 
care processes. Explanations for this were the detailed level and perceived poor quality 
of the information, and the legal and practical barriers to managing the case-mix. It 
was also concluded by this pilot group that, in line with the interim reflection, the 
value of case-mix information should not be overestimated. Not all factors could be 
expressed with data and in the practices in the AMC many decisions were still taken 
on the basis of ‘wheeling and dealing’ between people. Several examples illustrated that 
the principles of the CMI did not always match with the organizational culture of the 
AMC. For instance, Pilot group III concluded that the design of the CMI was based 
on several assumptions that were theoretically correct, but did not correspond with 
the practice of the AMC. The assumption that the patient groups had to be the central 
focus in management meetings was supported by most (medical) managers (see Section 
5.4.1), but in practice these meetings still focused on the traditional budget parameters 
and finance. The intention that case-mix decisions should be taken on the basis of 
objective criteria and information was agreed on by most medical managers as well, 
but several attempts to operationalize rational decision making in practice failed. The 
implementation of the Portfolio Checklist with objective and measurable standards to 
assess the portfolio in a uniform manner did not succeed because the chief physicians 
were afraid to lose autonomy and the decisions would be made for them by the division 
managers of central managers rather than by themselves. Also endeavours to objectify 
the relevance scores of the Portfolio Matrix with the use of quantitative data failed, with 
the argument that this had to remain an opinion, not a fact (see Section 6.3.1).
Attempts to link the annual plans of the medical specialties directly to operating room 
budgets were unsuccessful too because the Board of directors was afraid that it would 
lead to discussions between divisions (see Section 6.3.1). Furthermore, a number of 
(medical) managers still perceived barriers to managing patients, capacity, and finance. 
Concerning the management of patients, there were experiences not only of practical 
barriers (because of the type of patients, functional organization structure, allocated 
budgets, etcetera) but also of legal barriers. The NMa’s raid in 2010 (see Section 6.2) was 
also seen as a confirmation that they were not allowed to ‘really’ manage patients. With 
regard to the management on capacity and finance, the responsibilities and decision-
making power of chief physicians and division managers remained unchanged. Budgets 
on capacity and finance were still determined by the F & C department, were quite 
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fixed, and historically based. In the course of time, the budgets had shrunk more and 
more due to budget cuts. These barriers implied that changes in the case-mix were 
smaller than previously thought and therefore the expectations about the value of the 
CMI had to be tempered. 
The support of the CMI by the Board of Directors decreased during the course of 
time. Quarterly meetings between division managers and the Board still focused on 
the traditional budget indices and not on case-mix. The Board did not want to rely on 
the DOT data and revisited the old budget parameters (such as number of outpatient 
visits, nursing days) to monitor the care production in a global way. The focus on costs 
increased because of the urgency to reduce costs. However, the cost information provided 
by the CMI could not be used for the management meetings because reimbursements 
related only to patient care (not the other core tasks) and it represented only approximate 
costs that did not match with the general ledger. Also, new developments such as the 
proposed merger with the VUmc and the introduction of the electronic patient system, 
led to a shift of focus in the management meetings. 
The success of the CMI 
The CMI improved and expanded with several information dimensions (forecasts, 
benchmarking) and redesigned and new information products. Also, the number of 
users increased significantly because of the inclusion of the sub-chief physicians as users 
and the design of the data cube in Cognos for the business analysts. The CMI was 
further embedded in the Planning & Control cycle by establishing the relationships 
between medical, logistical, and financial policy in a systematic way. There were also new 
developments that promoted the use of the CMI, such as the (persistent) announced 
internal performance reimbursement, the SLIM project, and the preparation for the 
administrative merger with the VUmc. Furthermore, the CMI appeared to be useful 
for other purposes such as specific business cases, the improvement of registrations, 
external legitimization and to conduct cost-effectiveness studies. However, there were 
still several factors that obstructed the success of the CMI. The replacement of the 
DBC system by the DOT system had a major negative impact on the CMI project. 
Other obstructing factors were that managers still experienced several legal and practical 
barriers in managing the case-mix. 

PART III: 
THE FINAL CMI OF THE AMC

Chapter 7
The final case-mix information system of the AMC 
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Abstract
In this chapter the designed and implemented information products of the CMI system 
are described. The end products were divided into information products designed for the 
(medical) managers and products primarily designed for the business analysts because 
these users have different needs and skills with regard to information. The information 
products targeting the (medical) managers were: the Standard Report Patient Care, 
Portfolio Matrix, Interdependency Analysis, Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles, 
and Portfolio Checklist. Some information products were implemented corporate wide, 
other products were only implemented for some of the medical specialties or were still 
in the pilot phase. The information products supporting the business analysts were: 
the Data Cube Care Products, Data Cube Care Activities, Data Cubes Market Shares, 
and Intranet Page Management Information Patient Care. All products expressed their 
information in a common clinical language, namely the patient group, which made 
it possible to connect and compare information with each other. Other products that 
directly originate from the design and implementation processes are also described, 
namely the classification and valuation of patient groups, the user training modules, 
and the information policy. The chapter concludes with a global presentation of the 
technical infrastructure of the CMI. 
. 
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7.1  Introduction
In this chapter the designed and implemented end products of the CMI are presented. 
In section 7.2 the functions and target groups of the CMI are described. In Sections 7.3 
and 7.4, an overview is given of the key information products and their characteristics. It 
is also explained how these products are connected to each other. In Section 7.5, we focus 
on the information products that directly originate from the design and implementation 
processes. Finally, Section 7.6 presents, in global terms, how the information products 
were constructed (technical infrastructure).
7.2  Functions and target groups of the CMI 
The case-mix information system (CMI) of the Academic Medical Centre was iteratively 
designed and implemented. The CMI was primarily designed to support the top managers 
in the different stages of the strategic management cycle, which included gaining 
insight, decision-making, planning, implementation, monitoring, and legitimization 
(see Section 2.8). The top managers were chief physicians of the clinical specialties, 
division (or cluster) managers, and central managers. They were selected as the primary 
target groups of the CMI because they were considered the key decision makers of the 
AMC, (see Section 5.4.1). Within the strategic management cycle, different types of 
top managers fulfilled different roles at different stages. The final CMI served multiple 
functions for multiple users at the same time. To serve these functions, several products 
were designed and implemented in close cooperation with the different users. Some 
information products were implemented corporate wide (Standard Report Patient Care, 
Portfolio Matrix, Interdependency Analysis), other products were only implemented for 
some of the medical specialties (Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles) or were still 
in the pilot phase (Portfolio Checklist).
Gaining insight, decision-making, implementation 
Since the management principle of ‘professional in the lead’ was used (see Section 2.8), the 
chief physicians and division managers were in the lead at the first stages (gaining insight, 
decision-making) and implementation. For this project, the focus was on medical policy 
decisions with regard to the case-mix (type and volume of patient groups) and underlying 
care processes, and related to the longer term. The case-mix was put centrally, because 
our research showed that the type and number of patients in the hospital treated had a 
significant impact on the performance on core tasks and finance (see Section 5.4.1). At 
this stage, insight was needed in (trends in) the case-mix from different perspectives (such 
as medical, capacity, financial, health care market), for exploring and evaluating strategic 
alternatives. To fulfill these functions, several information products were designed which 
were ready-made and contained information at a highly aggregated level, see Section 7.3. 
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The Standard Report Patient Care (see Section 7.3.1) was designed to give an extensive 
insight into the most relevant topics with regard to the case-mix (volumes, patient 
characteristics, production, processes, finance, and health care market) contained 39 
figures. The Portfolio Matrix was designed to give a quick insight into the medical and 
financial relevance per patient group and to conduct the dialogue about the portfolio. The 
Interdependency Analysis was designed to give insight into what the interdependency 
was between medical specialties and where coordination of medical policy was necessary. 
The Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles product was designed to define cost 
reduction measures with regard to the care processes by comparing costs and activities 
per care product from the AMC with other UMCs. The Portfolio Checklist was designed 
as a tool to assess the current portfolio of the medical specialties on the basis of the 
previously mentioned information products and to translate the outcomes to policy 
measures. 
During these stages, the chief physicians and division managers were supported by the 
business analysts from the business offices. They gave explanations about the background 
and interpretation of the case-mix information and made in-depth analyses. So, the 
business analysts had a different role in the strategic management cycle with different 
needs and skills with regard to CMI (see Section 5.3.2). To fulfil this, the Intranet 
Page Management Information Patient Care and several data cubes in Cognos26 were 
designed, such as the Data Cubes Care Products, Care Activities and Market Shares. The 
Intranet Page contained extensive background information about the CMI (manuals, 
FAQ), and download menus, and gave access to all the information products. The Data 
Cubes contained the detailed data of the Standard Report Patient Care and had options 
to drill down in the data to patient level and correlate medical data, patient data, and 
financial data.
Planning and legitimization
Central managers (the Board of Directors, concern controller) were in the lead in the 
stages of planning (budgeting) and legitimization (such as negotiations with health 
insurers). During these stages they were supported by the business analysts from the 
F & C department. They assessed the policy plans at the corporate level, fixed the 
budgets, and made agreements with the funders. For these stages, the relationships 
between medical policy, logistical, and financial policy had to be established. To fulfill 
these functions, several information products were designed in Cognos such as data 
cubes and standard views (see Section 7.4). These information products made it possible 
26 The AMC used Cognos as management information system. Cognos is a brand name used by IBM 
for activities in the field of business intelligence and business performance management. The software is 
designed to enable business users without technical knowledge to extract corporate data, analyse it and 
assemble reports.
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to quantify the impact of the medical policy plans into capacity and money, and could 
be used as input for the negotiations with the health insurers. 
Monitoring
Monitoring took place by all types of managers. The chief physicians and division 
managers needed to monitor the extent to which the medical policy was realized during 
the year, for example, with regard to volumes, top referral care, waiting times, length 
of stay, financial coverage, and where adjustments were needed. The central managers 
and F & C department needed to monitor the extent to which the forecasted DOT 
volumes and revenues matched with the agreements with the health insurers. To fulfill 
this function, a Forecasting Model and Top Referral Care Model were designed and the 
outcomes of these models were included in figures in the Standard Report Patient Care 
and the Cognos Data Cubes. 
Table 7.1 presents a summary of what information products were designed, for whom, 
and with what functions.
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Table 7.1: Functions and target groups of the CMI
Function of the CMI in the strategic management cycle
Information 
product Section Description
Analy-
zing
Decision 
making Planning
Imple-
menta-
tion
Monito-
ring
Legitimi-
zation
Primarily designed for (medical) managers
Standard 
Report Patient 
Care
7.3.1
report per medical specialty, 
division and AMC wide about 
the key topics with regard to 
the case-mix
X X X X X X
Portfolio 
Matrix 7.3.2
matrix per medical specialty in 
which the medical and financial 
relevance per patient group are 
summarized
X X   X    
Interdepen-
dency Analysis 7.3.3
analysis per medical specialty 
in which the interdependen-
cies between patient groups 
and medical specialties are 
summarized
X  X  X   X    
Benchmark 
Analysis 
Resource Use 
Profiles
7.3.4
analysis per diagnoses/ care 
product in which the activities 
and cost of the AMC are com-
pared with other UMCs
 X  X   X    X
Portfolio 
Checklist 7.3.5
checklist to assess the portfolio 
on the basis of standards and 
translate the outcomes to 
policy measures
  X X X    
Primarily designed for business analysts
Cognos Data 
Cube Care 
Products 
7.4.1
data cube with detailed data 
with regard to the DOT care 
products
X   X X  X X
Cognos Data 
Cube Care 
Activities
7.4.2
data cube with detailed data 
with regard to the care activities 
(procedures)
X X  X   X X  X 
Cognos Data 
Cube Market 
Shares
7.4.3
data cube with detailed data 
with volumes per care product 
of AMC and other Dutch 
hospitals
X  X        X 
Intranet Page 
Management 
Information 
Patient Care 
7.4.4
intranet page with background 
information about the CMI 
and portal to all information 
products
X          
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Integrated information system
All information products were part of the CMI and what they had in common was that 
the information was expressed in the same language, namely the patient group. This made 
it possible to connect and compare information with each other. Furthermore, for all 
products, the same sources and definitions were used as much as possible. The difference in 
products mainly related to the type of the information and the level of detail. The number of 
different information products was minimized as much as possible and they were designed 
in such a way that they could be used for multiple purposes. In Figure 7.1, an overview is 
presented on how the different information products were integrated into the CMI.
Figure 7.1: The final CMI of the AMC
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Information dimensions
With the total set of information products, the case-mix information was available 
from a large number of different dimensions (see Figure 7.2): aggregated and detailed, 
pre-perspective (past) and pro-perspective (future), at functional level (per specialty, 
department, or division) and process level (per disease or patient group), own organization 
and other (university) hospitals, facts and opinions. Because of this, the CMI had a broad 
scope of information and was quite flexible. It could serve different functions for different 
types of users (managers and business analysts) at the same time.
Figure 7.2: Information dimensions of the CMI of the AMC
7.3 Information products for (medical) managers 
For the chief physicians, division managers, and central managers, the following 
information products were designed: a Standard Report Patient Care, a Portfolio Matrix, 
an Interdependency Analysis, a Benchmark Analysis, and a Portfolio Checklist.
7.3.1 Standard Report Patient Care
The Standard Report Patient Care was designed for the chief physicians, division 
managers, and central managers in order to serve multiple functions. First, it could give 
insight into the developments of the most relevant topics of patient care. It provided 
an extensive information set in the context of learning, because the uncertain decision-
making context in the AMC required information that was much broader than the 
narrow financially-oriented data provided by traditional management accounting 
systems (Kurunmäki, 1999). This insight could be used accordingly in the strategic 
management cycle to conduct the dialogue with the medical specialties and divisions, to 
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make decisions with regard to the case-mix and to optimize the underlying care processes. 
Second, the Standard Report could serve the monitoring function by providing the 
most accurate information compared to standards (such as budgets, quality standards). 
Third, the Stand report could be used for internal legitimization purposes. The design of 
the Standard Report took place in close cooperation with the managers by pilot groups. 
The Standard Report was available on three levels: corporate (one), division (eight) and 
medical (sub) specialties (forty-seven). 
Figure 7.3: Example of A Standard Report Patient Care for the division Surgery (in Dutch)
In the Standard Report at corporate level, the information was presented per division, 
for the divisions it was presented per medical specialty, and for the medical department 
it was presented per patient group. Due to limited resources, choices need to be made 
in the case-mix. The Standard Report simply highlighted the trade-offs of those choices. 
The data were updated weekly. The report could be downloaded from the Intranet Page 
Management Information at any time and was automatically emailed monthly as a PDF 
file to the (medical) managers. 
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The Standard Report Patient Care consisted of six chapters: 
1. Volumes: information about volumes of care products and patients. The volumes were 
presented in different ways like trends (past twenty-four months), forecast, distinction 
between new and existing patients, and focus points and non-focus points, etc. 
2. Patient characteristics: information about the characteristics of the patients treated, 
such as travel distance to the hospital, age, referrer, and number of medical specialties 
involved. These characteristics were selected because they could be indicators for 
complexity of care. 
3. Production: information of key production like number of outpatient visits, (day) 
admissions, nursing days, and operating time. It gave insight into what production 
was done and how it was divided between organizational levels and patient groups. 
4. Process: information about the process of care like average length of stay, average 
number of outpatient visits, and waiting times for the outpatient clinic and surgery. 
5. Finance: financial information about the care products, like costs, returns, top five 
profitable/ unprofitable care products, and types of costs. 
6. Health care market: information about market shares per medical specialty or patient 
groups in the region or the whole country.
In total, the Report contained 39 different figures, see Appendix 1. Most figures consisted 
of an explanation (about data sources, definitions, how to use it), a graph, and a data 
table, see Figure 7.4.
Figure 7.4: Example of figure regarding the waiting time for the outpatient clinic, in Dutch (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
The final case-mix information system of the AMC 
C
ha
pt
er
 7
213
Several types of graphs were used, such as time series graphs, (stacked) bar graphs, and 
maps, dependent on the subject. Time series bars were used for showing trends over 
a time period (twelve or twenty-four months), for example, with regard to volumes, 
financial coverage, waiting times, and length of stay. Bar graphs were used to compare 
values to each other, for example, per patient group, which enabled the exploration 
and evaluation of strategic alternatives. Stacked bar charts were used to emphasize the 
total, for example the use of (scarce) capacity and cost per patient group. Maps were 
used for showing the origin of patients. Also, in the report, several standards were used, 
for example, with regard to turnover, top referral care, waiting times and timeliness of 
registrations. The standards were derived from the strategic aims, the patient manifesto, 
and agreements with insurers. Because of this, deviations between reality and standards 
could be monitored. In Appendix 1, the figures of the Standard Report are presented.
7.3.2 Portfolio Matrix 
The Portfolio Matrix was designed for the chief physicians and division managers 
to provide for each medical specialty a quick insight into the medical and financial 
relevance of their patient groups (see Figure 7.5). The matrix served as a starting point 
to support the dialogue on making (strategic) policy choices regarding the case-mix and 
the implementation of efficiency measures. 
Figure 7.5: Portfolio Matrix of the AMC (*) 
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
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The idea of a Portfolio Matrix originates from the Boston Consultancy Group and 
was primarily developed for the commercial industry. Portfolio Matrix is a group of 
related techniques for classifying current or new businesses (or products) into categories 
on the basis of their rankings in two or more dimensions of performance (Walker & 
Rosko, 1988). Portfolio Matrix can help for putting focus, and the distribution of scarce 
resources, on the provision of care (Zijlstra & Dröge, 2010). 
The AMC adjusted the Portfolio Matrix to the setting of an UMC by replacing the 
measures on both axes: medical relevance (Y-axis) and financial relevance (X-axis). 
The medical relevance was determined per patient group once in a year by the chief 
physicians on the following criteria: relevance for the clinic, research, training, and 
education. The relevance was quantified by percentages that indicated what share of 
the patient group was relevant to these criteria. To calculate the medical relevance per 
patient group, the percentages for training and education were weighted as half because 
the impact of patient groups on these core tasks was less direct and they were considered 
as less relevant than the other core tasks, see Section 6.3.1 The horizontal grid line (cut 
off point) presented the average medical relevance for that medical specialty. 
The financial relevance was determined by comparing the estimated costs and selling 
prices of the underlying care products. The vertical grid line represented the breakeven 
point: patient groups to the right of this grid line had a positive financial coverage, to the 
left side, a negative financial coverage. The financial data were updated weekly. The size 
of the bulbs was determined by the number of patients per year. The Portfolio Matrix 
report was automatically emailed monthly as PDF file to the (medical) and there was a 
digital version available in Cognos. The advantages of this digital version were that users 
were able to drill down to the underlying data when clicking on the bulb of a specific 
patient group and find quickly explanations for the financial relevance. The Portfolio 
Matrix could lead to two different outcomes, see Figure 7.6a.
Accordingly, for each quadrant of the Portfolio Matrix, policy measures could be defined 
to optimize the portfolio, see Figure 7.6b. For example, if the portfolio was not optimal 
in terms of composition, one could decide to change the type or volumes of patient 
groups. In the situation that the portfolio was optimal in terms of composition, but 
unprofitable at that time, one could decide to stabilize the volumes, but focus on process 
optimization and investigate if there was any opportunity of increasing the selling price. 
7.3.3 Interdependency Analysis
The Interdependency Analysis was designed for the (medical) managers in order to 
provide insight in the interdependency between patient groups and medical specialties. 
These insights were needed because the AMC mainly supplied tertiary and top-
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Figure 7.6a: Possible outcomes of the Portfolio Matrix 
Figure 7.6b: Possible policy measures per quadrant of the Portfolio Matrix
specialized care. This care often required costly infrastructure, personnel, (small) sub-
specialties and an intensive multidisciplinary approach, see also Section 2.7. The degrees 
of interdependence were determined by statistical analyses on the basis of the DBC data 
per patient over several years. The analysis showed which medical specialties and patient 
groups were affected when changes occurred with respect to the type and volume of 
patient groups (see Figure 7.7). 
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Figure 7.7: Example of Interdependency Analysis of the medical specialty Internal Medici-
ne - Oncology (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
In this figure, an Interdependency Analysis of the medical specialty Oncology is shown. 
The columns show the patient groups of this specialty, such as ‘malignancy digestive 
system’ and ‘breast cancer.’ In the rows, the patient groups of related specialties are 
presented. In this example, 57% of the patient group ‘breast cancer’ had also been 
treated by the medical specialty surgery. These insights could be used by the chief 
physicians and division managers to determine where coordination of medical policy 
between specialties was necessary when making and implementing case-mix decisions. 
These analyses could also be helpful to identify the risk of miscommunication in patient 
care; the more medical specialties and specialists are involved in a short time, the more 
risk of miscommunication. Finally, these analyses could also be utilized by the central 
managers to assess the consistency of the different annual plans. The Interdependency 
Analyses were generated at different levels: at medical specialty, diagnosis, or AMC level. 
The analyses at diagnosis level were useful for specific business cases. The analysis at the 
AMC level could be used for the planning of activities after the administrative merger 
with the VUmc, because it showed which groups of medical specialties were inextricably 
linked to each other. 
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7.3.4 Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles
The Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles was designed to optimize the care 
processes in the AMC by comparing costs and activities per care product with other 
hospitals. The benchmark was based on production data from all Dutch hospitals in 
2010. The Benchmark Analysis showed per diagnosis and care product, the average 
type and number of care activities (such as outpatient visits, nursing days, lab tests) 
and unit costs at the AMC, compared to other types of Dutch hospitals (UMCs, top 
clinical hospitals and general hospitals), depending on the type of care. It provided a 
view on clinical practice that highlighted variances between the performances of clinical 
specialties. This technique is also called physician profiling: a report that compare a 
physician’s resource consumption to a benchmark figure (Evans et al, 1995). In Figure 
7.8, an example of a Benchmark Analysis of a fictitious care product of Surgery is 
presented. The example shows that the AMC care product contains on average more 
outpatient visits and nursing days than the benchmark hospitals, but less CTs and lab 
tests.
Figure 7.8: Example of Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles of a care product of 
Surgery (*)
AMC Benchmark
Division Medical Specialty Class of activity Care activity 
Avg. 
volumes 
Avg. Unit 
cost  
Avg. 
volumes 
Avg. Unit 
cost  
B Surgery Outpatient clinic Outpatient visits 3,2 35 3 32
B Surgery Clinic Nursing days 5,4 350 5,3 360
B Surgery Imaging CT scans 0,6 43 0,8 45
B Surgery Laboratory Lab tests 2,6 2,2 3 2,5
 
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
The aims of the Benchmark Analysis were to analyze if the care provided matched with 
the clinical guidelines and to identify the deviations from other UMCs. Accordingly, the 
outcomes could be discussed with medical specialties and broken down to causes, such 
as differences in registrations, patients’ characteristics, and efficiency. As a result, policy 
measures could be defined in order to optimize the processes of care and to reduce costs. 
From this perspective, it was an attempt to influence doctors’ behavior towards ‘normal’ 
work practices through the comparative application of performance information (Chua 
& Degeling, 1993). 
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Benchmark data require a careful explanation of their use, and must be discussed with 
the medical specialties concerned, in order to validate the conclusions and to achieve 
acceptance of the results. Medical specialists can possibly explain outliers and other results 
and should therefore be involved in drawing conclusions from these data. The SLIM project 
team (see Section 6.3.2) organized workshops for four medical specialties27 where the costs 
of the care products were significantly higher than the average of the other UMCs and 
most efficiency gains were expected. During the workshops the benchmark and additional 
analyses were presented by figures and discussed, see for example Figure 7.9. 
Figure 7.9: Benchmark Analysis of the medical specialty Gastroenterology, Crohn’s disease (*)
 
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
In this figure, an example of outcomes of the Benchmark Analysis regarding Crohn’s 
disease is presented. This figure was discussed with the department of Gastroenterology. 
The Benchmark Analysis showed that both the average number of day nursing and 
associated costs were significantly higher at the AMC than at the other UMCs. As the 
deviation could not be explained by a difference in complexity of care, several measures
were taken to reduce unnecessary activities and costs, such as lowering prescription 
drugs costs by better following the clinical guidelines. 
7.3.5 Portfolio Checklist
A Portfolio Checklist for the chief physicians was designed to assess the performance 
of the current portfolio (case-mix) by means of the available case-mix information
27 Gastroenterology, Cardiology, Othopedic Surgery and Intervention Radiology. 
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(Standard Report Patient Care, Portfolio Matrix, Interdependency Analysis, and 
Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles) and to translate their outcomes to policy 
decisions with regard to the case-mix or underlying care processes. The Portfolio 
Checklist was developed because several (medical) managers felt the need for a tool 
to assess in a more structured and evidence-based way whether their portfolio was ‘in 
balance’ or not (see Section 6.3.1) and to set priorities fairly. It offers useful guidance 
for developing fair and publicly accountable priority-setting processes under resource 
constraints (Gibson et al, 2004). The checklist contained a set of priority-setting criteria 
and generic oriented standards that might be relevant to determine whether the current 
care portfolio was optimal. These criteria and standards were defined from different 
perspectives: professional, social, market, and business (see Figure 7.10). The standards 
were selected on the basis of the criteria of relevance and measurability. The aim was to 
optimize the portfolio as much as possible by identifying deviations from the standards 
and taking measures where necessary. Although this Portfolio Checklist was experienced 
as useful by the pilot group and led to some real policy decisions, it has not been 
implemented corporate wide yet. One reason for this was that several standards would 
need to be further developed and validated per medical specialty in consultation with 
the profession and the management.
7.4. Information products for business analysts 
Business analysts supported the managers at different stages of the strategic management 
cycle. The business analysts of the business offices of the divisions supported the chief 
physicians and division managers, for example, by answering questions, conducting 
in-depth analyses, and advising them on strategy and business operations. The 
business analysts from F & C department supported the Board of Directors and 
concern controller by drawing up the budget letter, assessing the annual plans of the 
medical specialties and divisions, fixing the budgets, and making agreements with 
the funders. To fulfill this function, several Data Cubes in Cognos28 and an Intranet 
Page Management Information were designed for them. The Data Cubes allowed 
multidimensional data analysis with drag-and-drop features. Rows and columns could 
be switched and drill-up and drill-down could be used to get a deeper understanding 
about the sources of the information used in the analysis. The Data Cubes also served as 
a source for the generation of the Standard Reports Patient Care, the Portfolio Matrix 
and Interdependency Analysis. Because of this, the data in the information products for 
the (medical) managers matched exactly with the information products for the business 
analysts. In 2014 about 40 business analysts used these products regularly.
28 The AMC uses Cognos as management information system. Cognos is a brand name used by 
IBM for activities in the field of business intelligence and business performance management.
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Figure 7.10: Example of the Portfolio Checklist
Professional standards Information 
needed
Available case-mix 
information
Score Policy 
decision
there are sufficient patients per 
patient group to be treated in 
order to meet the requirements 
of quality, efficiency and training
numbers of pa-
tients per year
Standard Report Patient 
Care, Portfolio Matrix    
at least minimum 85% of the 
patients is enrolled in research
patients enrolled 
in research
Standard Report Patient 
Care    
the care processes match with 
the clinical guidelines and are 
efficient
care profiles per 
diagnosis/ care 
product
Benchmark Analysis 
Resource Use Profiles    
Social standards
the average access time for out-
patients may not exceed 2 weeks
average waiting 
time outpatients
Standard Report Patient 
Care    
the average waiting time for 
the operating room for cancer 
patients should not amount to 
more than 3 weeks
average waiting 
time OR cancer 
patients
Standard Report Patient 
Care    
the proportion of top referral 
care should be at least%
% top referral 
care
Standard Report Patient 
Care    
Market standards
the focus points must be demon-
strably distinctive from other 
providers (technology, quality, 
etc)
market position, 
quality
Standard Report Patient 
Care    
the market share within the 
NFU is for the department at 
least ....%
market share 
within UMCs
Standard Report Patient 
Care    
the market share within the 
Netherlands is for the depart-
ment at least ....%
market share 
within The 
Netherlands
Standard Report Patient 
Care    
Business conduct standards
there is sufficient connection 
to the focus points of related 
medical specialties
share of care be-
longing to AMC 
focal points
Interdependency 
Analysis    
the budgeted production are 
realized
budgeted pro-
duction versus 
realization
Standard Report Patient 
Care    
on balance, a positive financial 
coverage of …% must be reali-
zed to make new policy 
costs & revenues 
of care
Standard Report Patient 
Care, Portfolio Matrix, 
Benchmark Analysis 
Resource Use Profiles
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7.4.1 Cognos Data Cube Care Products
The Cognos Data Cube Care Products were designed for the business analysts to enable 
them to make a wide range of in-depth analyses on the DOT care products at different 
levels of aggregation, such as division, medical specialty, and patient groups. In Figure 
7.11, an example of the data cube is presented.
 
Figure 7.11: Example of the Cognos Data Cube Care Products (in Dutch) (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
On the left side of the cube, a range of data dimensions and measures are presented; the 
data dimensions relate to the medical data (diagnosis, specialty, and health status), patient 
data (sex, age, postal code) and the care product data (type of care products, segment, 
and insurer); the data measures relate to the volumes (number of care products, patients), 
use of capacity (outpatient visits, nursing days, surgery time), relevance of care, and 
finance (costs, revenues). The dimensions and measures could easily be correlated and 
presented. On the right side of the cube, the outcomes of the selected dimensions and 
measures are shown. Since 2012, about 750.000 care products had been registered, so 
it was an extensive database. In Figure 7.12, two possible analyses with the data cubes 
are presented.
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Figure 7.12: Examples of analyses with the Cognos Data Cube Care Products (in Dutch) (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
In example 1, the average length of stay was calculated for patients with a specific 
diagnosis (sickle cell anemia), over the period 2010 to 2012. It provided insight into 
how the length of stay in this time period. This analysis could be performed for any given 
diagnosis. Example 2 shows the relationship between the average costs per patient for 
hip/ knee surgery and the health status of the patient in terms of an ASA score. This type 
of analysis could be useful for making price agreements with insurers (legitimization) or 
for planning and monitoring purposes. With this data cube it was also possible to drill-
down to the level of the patient ID and a specific care product. For this aim, several types 
of drill-through reports were designed for the cube DBC care products. A drill-through 
report was designed with core data for the selected DBC IDs (product ID, patient ID, 
capacity, and finance). This report could be exported to Excel and further analyzed. 
Within this drill-through report, there could be further drill-through by product ID 
or patient ID. The drill-through report per care product ID showed details about the 
underlying care activities (type, volumes, producing department, and costs). The drill-
through report per patient ID showed what care products and diagnoses were registered 
by what medical specialty. It gave insight into the medical history of the patient.
7.4.2 Cognos Data Cube Care Activities
The Cognos Data Cube Care Activities were designed to make a wide range of in-depth 
analyses on the care activities (i.e. medical procedures such as outpatient visits, nursing 
days, and lab tests) at different levels of aggregation, such as division, medical specialty 
and patient groups. Most care activities are associated with DBC care products that 
together make up the DBCs resource use profile (see Section 2.5). There was a great need 
by business analysts for this type of data to make specific analyses possible, for example, 
per physician or per medical department. The data per physician could, for instance, be 
used to get insight into the productivity and applied diagnostics with associated costs. 
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These data were also needed to get a complete financial picture, because there were 
many care activities that were charged separately to insurers (such as intensive care days, 
expensive drugs) and not through care products. The data per medical department could 
be used to gain insight into what medical departments produced for what diagnoses and 
medical specialties. An example of the data cube is presented in Figure 7.13.
Figure 7.13: Example of the Cognos Data Cube Care Activities (in Dutch) (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
On the left side of the cube, a range of data dimensions and measures are presented. 
The data dimensions relate to the medical data (diagnosis, specialty, and health status), 
patient data (sex, age, postal code) and the care product data (type of care products, 
segment, and insurer). The measures relate to the volumes (number of care activities) 
and finance (costs, revenues). The dimensions and measures could easily be correlated 
and presented. On the right side of the cube, the outcomes of the selected dimensions 
and measures are shown. Since 2012, about 15 million care activities were registered, so 
it was an extensive database. In Figure 7.14, two possible analyses with the Data Cubes 
are presented.
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Figure 7.14: Examples of analyses with the Cognos Data Cube Care Activities (in Dutch) (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
Example 1 shows which divisions and departments were AMC-wide involved in the 
treatment of patients with ‘heart valve disease’ and at what cost. This analysis provided 
insight into the interdependencies between medical departments and could be used 
for planning purposes. Example 2 shows per time period the most prevalent medical 
diagnoses of patients admitted to a certain nursing department. This kind of information 
could be useful for the dialogue about the complexity of patient care and nurse staff 
planning. 
7.4.3 Cognos Data Cube Market Shares
The Cognos Data Cube Market Shares contained the number of care products and 
diagnoses of the AMC compared to other UMCs, top clinical hospitals, and general 
hospitals. With this Data Cube, insight could be obtained into the market share which 
was considered as relevant for making case-mix decisions and the sales strategy (see 
Section 6.3.2). The Data Cube Market Shares enabled the business analysts to make a 
wide range of in-depth analyses on the market shares, patient characteristics, and type 
of treatment of the AMC in comparison with other Dutch hospitals. In Figure 7.15, an 
example of a Data Cube Market Shares is presented.
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Figure 7.15: Example of the Cognos Data Cube Market Shares (in Dutch) (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
On the left side, all different data dimensions and measures are shown. The data 
dimensions relate to the medical data (diagnosis, specialty), patient data (sex, age) 
and the care product data (type of care products, segment) and type of hospital. The 
measures relate to the number of DBCs. On the right side of the cube, the outcomes of 
the selected dimensions and measure are shown. The DBC data were made available by a 
national organization, Dutch Hospital Data, and were freely accessible for all hospitals. 
The AMC enriched these data with their own data (e.g., patient groups, organizational 
structure) to integrate them into the other information products of the CMI. In Figure 
7.16, some possible analyses with the data cube are presented.
Figure 7.16: Examples of analyses with the Cognos Data Cube Market Shares (in Dutch) (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
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Example 1 shows the market share per diagnosis of the medical specialty neurology. 
This analysis could be used for making policy choices and negotiations with health 
insurers. Example 2 shows that in the AMC fewer patients were treated in day care for 
the diagnosis of vertigo than in other hospitals. This type of analysis could be used for 
optimizing the care processes.
7.4.4 Intranet Page Management Information Patient Care
The Intranet Page Management Information Patient Care was designed for the business 
analysts to provide extensive background information about the CMI (using manuals 
and FAQ), to give access to the information products of the CMI, and to enable them 
to download detailed data. To fulfill these functions, several blocks were designed on this 
intranet page (see Figure 7.17).
Figure 7.17: Print screen of the Intranet Page Management Information Patient Care
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The blue block contained background information in the format of ten FAQs / FAQ’s, 
such as: what kind of information is available, for what purposes can this information be 
used, and how are the costs and returns of patient care calculated? These questions were 
those most asked by users in the course of the design process. Regarding the calculation 
of costs, detailed explanations was given about the quality and the content of the cost 
model and the underlying assumptions. As concerned the calculation of revenues, 
there was an explanation of how the negotiations with health insurers took place. The 
blue block also contained links to frequently used documents, such as unit costs per 
procedure, selling price per product, and websites. In the dark red block, the Standard 
Report Patient Care could be downloaded by selecting an organization level: AMC, 
division, or medical specialty. Authorized users had access to all reports, including from 
other entities. The report could be downloaded in either HTML or pdf format. The 
orange block contained links to the Data Cubes in Cognos and related manuals. The 
green block contained download options. With selection buttons, several tables with 
detailed information could be downloaded from the server of the ICT department.
7.5 Other products 
Several other products directly originated from the design and implementation processes 
of the CMI, namely the classification and valuation of patient groups (Section 7.5.1), 
user training modules (Section 7.5.2) and information policy (Section 7.5.3).
 
7.5.1 The language of patient groups
Classification of patient groups
In the CMI, the patients were put centrally because they had much impact on the 
performance on core tasks and finance of the organization (see Section 5.4.1). The chief 
physicians of the medical specialties categorized their patients into groups (see Section 
5.3.1). With the classification of patient groups, a new language was created, which made 
it possible to focus the case-mix information on the content of care and to reduce the 
complex world of patient care to manageable groups. The principles used were that the 
classification had to match with the language and perceptions of the medical specialty as 
much as possible. The number of patient groups per specialty was limited to a maximum 
of 15 groups of average size, at least 80% of their patients had to be classified, and the 
patient groups had to be traceable in the computer systems. In Figure 7.18, an example 
of the classification of number patient groups of Internal Medicine is shown. 
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Figure 7.18: Example of classification of a number of patient groups of Internal Medicine 
In total, 47 medical (sub) specialties defined their patient groups. Most specialties 
used the DBC diagnoses as criteria, but several specialties used additional criteria like 
more detailed diagnoses (for specific top referral diseases), care products (for specific 
procedures) and age of the patient (adult or child). In total, 530 patient groups were 
defined, but there was much overlap between them. Accordingly, the opened DBCs 
per patient groups were linked to the focus points as defined in the strategic aims 2011 
to 2015 (see Section 6.2) to get insight whether the provided care matched with the 
strategic focus points over time (see Figure 7.19). 
Figure 7.19: Number of DBCs per focus point AMC (in Dutch) (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
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The figures shows per month (x-axis) the number of opened DBCs (y-axis), broken 
down by type of focus point (which include among other things: cardiovascular disease, 
immunology and infectious diseases, gynecological oncology, specialized care in early 
pregnancy, and pediatric oncology) and non-focus point (dark blue). It gives insight 
whether the intended strategic aims are realized. 
The classifications of patient groups at the AMC were also used for the preparation 
of the administrative merger with VUmc (see Section 6.3.2). The DBC data of AMC 
and VUmc were clustered in the same way and presented to the chief physicians of 
both hospitals. In this way, insight was gained about which patient groups overlapped 
or which complemented each other’s activities. The classification of AMC patient 
groups turned out to be very usable for the chief physicians of the VUmc and was only 
minimally adapted to identify specific patients of VUmc.
Valuation of patient groups 
The chief physicians of the medical specialties valued their patient groups on the degree 
of relevance for the core tasks and distinctiveness on the health care market. These 
data were not available in the computer systems but were needed for the design of 
the CMI. With regard to the relevance for the core tasks, chief physicians indicated 
per patient group what percentage was relevant for the clinic, research, education, and 
training. Accordingly, relevance scores were calculated per patient group by adding up 
the scores of several questions. The scores on the questions with regard to education 
and training counted only for 50% because they had less priority in comparison with 
the core tasks of patient care and research (see Section 6.3.1). The relevance scores were 
used for the Portfolio Matrix (see Section 7.3.2). As concerned the distinctiveness of 
the health care market, chief physicians were asked to indicate per patient group, or 
diagnoses, the extent and reason of distinctiveness on the health care market (see Figure 
7.20 This information could be used for internal discussions about case-mix decisions 
and negotiations with health insurers. The process of defining and valuing the patient 
groups itself was experienced as useful by the chief physicians since it stimulated them to 
think actively about their portfolio and discuss this with their staff members. 
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Figure 7.20: Example of the valuation of patient groups of the Department of Urology (in Dutch) (*)
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7.5.2 User training
Several types of user training sessions were organized, depending on the type of user (manager 
or business analyst) and skills and experience of the user, such as a Management Game, 
Computer Training sessions, and a Webinar. These products were needed to empower the 
(medical) managers and business analysts to use the CMI in an effective and responsible way
Management Game
A Management Game was designed for the medical managers to test their understanding 
of the case-mix information. The game was a response to their need for more education 
about the use of the CMI. Management Games are consistent with education theory 
that advocates ‘learning by experience’ (Cromwell et al, 1998). The Management Game 
was played at working conferences and management development programs.
The game typically has 12-15 participants and is played for half a day. During the game, 
the different phases of the strategic management cycle are simulated by means of a 
fictitious case. The game concerns a medical department of a university medical center, 
managed by a team with a chief physician, financial director, nursing manager, teacher 
in medicine, and researcher (see Figure 7.21). The medical department treats eight 
different patient groups. Each participant in the game fulfills a role and receive a card on 
which his or her interests are described and which (s)he as to defend. 
Figure 7.21: Fictitious management team in the Management Game 
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The Management Game begins at the end of a financial year and consists of several 
rounds. In the first round, the management teams define their optimal portfolio strategy 
for the next year, given their interests. They are supported by different types of case-
mix information per patient group (such as volumes, quality scores and opinions about 
relevance) with uncertainties and conflicts of interests, but without capacity issues and 
financial information. In this round the participants are asked not to take the available 
resources (capacity and money) into account, but focus on professional and social goals. 
In the second round, financial, capacity, and benchmark information per patient group 
are introduced and it appears that when realizing the desired portfolio of the first round, 
there will be insufficient capacity available in terms of nursing days and operating room-
hours and a significant negative financial result will arise. The management team has 
to define measures by which the agreed portfolio can be realized within the available 
capacity. The solutions can relate to cost reductions by efficiency measures or increasing 
revenues. In the third round the management team has to decide which performance 
indicators and standards have to be used for their department. 
Although the case is fictitious, it is quite realistic because it simulates the real practice of 
the medical managers of the AMC as much as possible, for example, with respect to the 
type of decisions to be taken, involved actors and their interests and available case-mix 
information. Through this game, participants learn how case-mix information can assist 
in the different game rounds and how to interpret and use this type of information. They 
also learn to deal with different roles and interests, and shared decision-making. The 
Management Game was played at working conferences and management development 
programs and was well-received on each occasion.
Computer Training
Several Computer Training sessions were designed for the business analysts. In these 
training sessions, one learned to answer various types of information questions, based on 
the available information products. These questions were frequently asked by (medical) 
managers in practice. The emphasis was put on the right use of the information. In 
Figure 7.22, an example is given about how business analysts learned to analyze the 
financial coverage of the Plastic Surgery Department in steps. 
In step one, the Portfolio Matrix of the department of Plastic Surgery showed that 
the patient group ‘defects and scars’ had negative financial coverage. In step two, the 
financial coverage was reproduced in the Cognos data cube care products and there 
was a drill down to the underlying diagnoses of this patient group. The main negative 
result appeared to be mainly caused by diagnosis 24. In step three, the data was drilled 
down to the details of its underlying DBC products and in step four, the financial results
The final case-mix information system of the AMC 
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Figure: 7.22: Analyzing the financial coverage of the medical specialty Plastic Surgery (in Dutch) (*)
(*) Figure contains fictitious data
per DBC were put on a graph. In this example, it could be concluded that one DBC 
caused major negative financial coverage because of a long length of stay. The whole 
analysis process from aggregated to detailed information could take place within a few 
minutes. Afterward, all tasks and results were discussed in a plenary session. There were 
Computer Training sessions designed for beginners and advanced users. 
Webinar
A Webinar29 was recorded in which managers received explanations about external and 
internal developments and what type of case-mix information was available to them 
to fulfill their role as a manager. The Webinar was organized during a management 
development program for medical managers (workplace managers and head nurses). 
The advantage of this Webinar was that the presented knowledge could easily be shared. 
29 A Webinar is an online seminar or lecture, workshop, lecture or similar presentation or form of knowledge 
that takes place through the internet
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7.5.3 Information Policy
During the project, various problems with regard to the use of data and management 
information in the AMC were identified, not only in the field of patient care, but also
in finance, HR, and research, (see Section 6.3.2). The problems related both to the 
organization and to the quality of the data and management information. To solve these 
problems, an ‘Information Policy’ was defined. It contained topics such as principles 
for management information and the responsibilities of parties involved in the process 
of providing and using management information, a procedure for the design of new 
management information, and data governance. Examples of principles were that the 
F & C department was in control over the design and prioritization of management 
information, the central Standard Reports (such as A3, Standard Report Patient Care) 
were at the forefront for the quarterly meetings, and that these reports must be validated 
by the Internal Audit Services to ensure quality. Because of this, the Standard Report 
Patient Care was given a formal status in the organization and validation of the data 
became a prerequisite. 
7.6 Technical infrastructure
This section presents, in global terms, how the information products were generated 
(technical infrastructure). A distinction was made between information products that 
were generated and updated weekly by the ICT department and information products 
that were generated irregularly by the F & C department. 
Generating information products by the ICT department
The Standard Report Patient Care, Portfolio Matrix, and Data Cubes in Cognos were 
generated weekly (at the weekend) and these processes were highly automated. Figure 
7.23 depicts the overall process to generate the information products. 
Figure 7.23: Process to publish the information products in Cognos 
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In step one, all data were collected into a Data Warehouse. In the Minimal Dataset was 
defined what data were required for the CMI and how these data could be connected 
(see Section 5.3.1). The data consisted of system and non-system data and were recorded 
in different sources. The system data related for example to the medical data (DBC 
trajectories and care activities) and patient data (age, zip code) and were actualized 
weekly. In addition, a large number of reference tables were used, such as the DBC 
product structure and unit costs per medical procedure. The non-system data related for 
example to opinions of the chief physicians regarding the relevance and distinctiveness 
of patient groups. These data were recorded in Excel files. 
In step two, several types of data processing took place by stored procedures, such as the 
categorizing of data (per year, patient group), the labeling of data (focal points, referral 
care), and the calculation of data (cost per DBC, forecasts). For this purpose, various 
business rules were used. The stored procedures were documented in SQL scripts. As a 
result, several large data tables were generated that formed the basis for the information 
products. The used data tables were stored on a central server and were also accessible to a 
select number of users for analysis directly on the database. In step three, the information 
products were generated automatically with the updated data. 
At the start and end of this automated process, or when errors occurred, emails were sent 
to the ICT department to confirm that the processes had taken place. After the weekends, 
several additional checks were done by the staff of the ICT department (step four). The 
checks focused on the completeness of the data warehouse and the consistency of data 
between the different information products. After approval, the information products 
were published and the users informed (step five). From then on, the authorized users 
had access to the information products via the Intranet Page Management Information 
Patient Care, see Section 7.4.4.
Tooling
The AMC used Cognos as a management information system. Cognos is a brand name 
used by IBM for activities in the field of business intelligence and business performance 
management. The software is designed to enable business users without technical 
knowledge to extract corporate data, analyze it and assemble reports. In 2008, the 
AMC bought the Cognos Business Intelligence 8 version. It was a web-based, integrated 
business intelligence suite. It provided a toolset for reporting, analysis, score carding, 
and monitoring of events and metrics. The software consisted of several components to 
meet the different information requirements in a company. Analysis Studio and Report 
Studio were used most. With Analysis Studio users could create analyses of large data 
sources and search for background information about an event or action. The Online 
Analytical Processing (OLAP) technique allows the data to be stored and accessed in 
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the most efficient manner—allowing end-users to traverse the edges of a hypothetical 
‘Cube’ of many dimensions.
The cube’s dimensions are associated with facts (also called measures). Multidimensional 
analysis allows for identifying trends and understanding of anomalies or deviations 
that are not obvious in other types of reports. Drag-and-drop features, elements, and 
key performance indicators can be included in the analysis, rows and columns can 
be switched, drill-up and drill-down can be used to get a deeper understanding of 
the sources of the information used in the analysis. Report Studio is used to create 
management reports. It enables users to create any type of report, including charts, 
maps, lists, and repeat functions.
Generating information products by the Finance & Control department 
The Interdependency Analysis, Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles and Portfolio 
Checklist were generated by the F & C department. The Interdependency Analyses were 
generated by performing statistical analyses on DBC data using Access. As each patient 
was registered by diagnosis medical specialty, it was possible to calculate the correlations 
between diagnoses and medical specialties on the basis of DBC data over several years. 
For this purpose, several queries were designed. The outcomes per medical specialty were 
visualized in Excel sheets. The Interdependency Analyses were updated once every two 
or three years for all medical specialties. The Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles 
was designed in cooperation with an external organization which maintained the DOT 
product structure (“DBC onderhoud”). All data of the Benchmark Analyses were stored 
in an Access database and were made available for users through download options on 
the Intranet Page Management Information Patient Care. The Portfolio Checklist was 
designed in Excel.


PART IV: 
REFLECTION AND DISCUSSION

Chapter 8
End reflection on the case study AMC
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Abstract
In April 2014, an end reflection on the CMI project took place by surveying 53 
(medical) managers. The reflection related to the design and implementation variables, 
organizational and environmental variables and the outcomes of the CMI. Most of the 
respondents used the CMI mainly for getting insight into their case-mix, and to some 
extent for monitoring, internal legitimation, and decision support. The central managers 
particularly used the CMI for (annual) planning purposes, monitoring (A3 score card), 
process optimization (SLIM project), and the preparation of the administrative merger 
and for external legitimation (negotiations with health insurers. In accordance with 
the interim reflection, doubts over the quality of the CMI were the most frequently 
cited disadvantage. The CMI was eventually not used for budgeting and the allocation 
of capacity. As a result the CMI lost significance, as the idea of internal performance 
budgeting disappeared. In general, the respondents agreed with the statement that the 
CMI had an added value to the AMC and themselves. The CMI was especially found 
useful in the context of the present market and financial pressure. Frequently mentioned 
positive effects of using the CMI were an improved registration and cost savings. 
However, no substantial case-mix decisions immediately resulted from the functioning 
of a CMI. This was probably due to the several barriers which were experienced by 
the user apart from the (perceived) poor quality of the data, such as the lack of skills 
and knowledge, lack of decision power, the persistent complexity and volatility of the 
DBC system, existing organizational structure/ culture and legal barriers. Respondents 
also reported negative effects of the CMI, such as confusion and discussion about the 
data, information overload and selective and incorrect use. Overall, the CMI project 
was perceived as moderately successful for the users themselves, whereas the majority 
of the respondents perceived the CMI project as (very) successful for the organization. 
The chapter concludes with our final conclusions of the CMI project at the AMC. 
These conclusions are based on the results of both the interim reflections and the end 
reflection. A summarized overview of the factors that have promoted or obstructed 
successful outcomes of the CMI-project are also presented.
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8.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the end reflection on the CMI project. This end reflection had 
taken place between April and June 2014. The results are presented in Section 8.2. 
8.2 End reflection on the CMI project
8.2.1 Aims of the end reflection
The aim of the end reflection was to evaluate the CMI project extensively for the second 
and final time. This end reflection added knowledge in different ways to the interim 
reflection (Section 5.4). First, with this end reflection we got a final judgment by the 
users about the final CMI as implemented at the AMC, the perceived outcomes and 
the factors that promoted or obstructed its success. Compared to the interim reflection, 
the final CMI encompassed both existing products that were redesigned after the 
interim reflection (Standard Report Patient Care, Portfolio Matrix) and new products 
(Interdependency Analysis, Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles, Portfolio 
Checklist, Data Cube Care Activities and Data Cube Market Shares. Second, where 
possible, we compared the outcomes of the final CMI and its associated success factors 
with the interim reflection to examine and explain possible changes herein.
8.2.2 Research methods 
Selecting participants 
To obtain the maximum number of participants and a good representation of the 
different clinical specialties and divisions of the AMC, all (sub) chief physicians, division 
managers and central managers, were asked to complete the questionnaire. In contrast 
to the interim reflection, the chief physicians of the sub-specialties of internal medicine 
and pediatrics were also invited, because they had become users of the CMI since 2012. 
A total of 53 of the 62 (85%) invited managers participated in this study. The sample 
consisted of 30 (sub) chief physicians, 17 division managers and six central managers, 
see Table 8.1. The chief physicians represented 29 medical specialties of eight different 
divisions.
Questionnaires 
The reflection took place by means of a survey using a comprehensive questionnaire. 
Contrary to the interim reflection in 2008/2009, no follow-up interviews took place 
among the target groups because it was expected that this would not result in more 
information than was already collected in the numerous pilot groups and interviews 
held over the past years. Respondents, however, were given the opportunity to write 
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down explanatory notes on their answers. The questionnaires partly corresponded 
to the questionnaire from the interim reflection. The majority of the items were 
maintained to assess possible changes over time. Some items were omitted because it 
was expected that they wouldn’t generate new information, and several new items were 
added, mainly with regard to the information products that were designed after the 
interim reflection. The questionnaire consisted of a mix of open and closed questions. 
Depending on the content of the closed question, participants were asked to fill in 
their answers using multiple choice categories, 7, 10 or 11-point Likert scales, or rank 
answer categories on their relevance. The questionnaires were sent electronically to the 
(medical) managers. Separately, a current Standard Report Patient Care (Section 7.3.1), 
Portfolio Matrix (Section 7.3.2) and an Interdependency Analysis (Section 7.3.3) for 
their entity (AMC, division or medical specialty) were sent to them. Like the interim 
reflection, the questionnaires for the chief physicians and for the division managers 
were the same; there were only some textual differences. Both questionnaires consisted 
of 63 items. On the questionnaire for the central managers, a number of questions 
were omitted; particularly the questions about the information products which were 
primarily designed for the division managers and chief physicians (such as the Portfolio 
Matrix and Interdependency Analysis) and the business analysts (Cognos Data Cubes). 
The reason for this was to reduce the completion time as much as possible for them 
and from the expectation that this subgroup did not work with these products. The 
questionnaire for the central managers consisted of 42 items. Participants had three 
weeks to respond. During and after that period, several emails were sent to the people to 
remind them about the deadline.
Research variables 
In the end reflection, the same research variables were examined as in the interim 
reflection (see Figure 8.1). 
The only difference was that in the end reflection, the primary outcome measure ‘overall 
success of the CMI project’ was distinguished between the success for the managers 
themselves and for the organization. The reason for this was that, between 2009 and 
2014, the CMI was also used by other people than the respondents themselves, such as 
the business analysts, the SLIM team and the Sales department (see Section 6.3). These 
types of use of the CMI could also have impact on the success of the project.
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Figure 8.1: Success factors and outcome measures examined in the end reflection
Data analysis
Success factors and outcomes were summarized using simple descriptive statistics. In 
view of the explorative nature of this end reflection we did not perform formal statistical 
testing on score differences. Neither did we consider our sample size sufficiently large (in 
relation to the number of independent variables studied) to assess the impact of success 
factors on outcomes using univariable and multivariable statistical techniques.
8.2.3 Results: reflection on the design and implementation factors
The design and implementation success factors related to [1] the design and quality of 
the CMI and [2] the implementation strategy (see Figure 8.1).
1. Design of the CMI
Quality of the case-mix information system
Participants assessed the quality of the following information products of the CMI: the 
Standard Report Patient Care), the Portfolio Matrix and the Interdependency Analysis. 
Standard Report Patient Care
Figure 8.2 presents the average quality scores of the 39 figures in the Standard Report 
Patient Care per chapter in relation to the criteria: presentation, relevance, and usability. 
Chapter 8
246
Figure 8.2: Quality of the Standard Report Patient Care per chapter (N = 45*)
(*) N = 8 missing. Participants were asked to assess the quality of each figure of the Standard Report (in 
terms of relevance, presentation, and usability) on a 10-point scale, varying from 1 (very poor quality) to 10 
(excellent quality). More detailed analysis of the data is available on request.
In general, the usefulness of the figures was assessed lower compared to relevance and 
presentation. This was probably due to the fact that several factors obstructed the 
usability of the CMI, such as the perceived unreliability of the data, existing barriers 
to actually managing on patients, and the fact that the internal budgets were still not 
based on the DBCs (see Section 6.4). The figures that specifically focused on the type 
of referrers, length of stay, and postponed surgical procedures were assessed as the best 
with average overall quality scores of 7.4, 7.2, and 7.2, respectively (data not presented, 
on request available). 
The figures giving special attention to the costs of unbilled care products, financial 
coverage per declaration type, and distinctiveness on the hospital market, were assessed 
the worst with average overall quality scores of 5.8, 5.6 and 5.4, respectively (data not 
presented, on request available). These topics were included in the Standard Report to 
make the (medical) managers more aware of their role in the administrative process, to 
increase cost awareness for the full cycle of care, and to improve correct registrations (see 
Section 6.3.2). However, the information regarding the costs of unbilled care products 
was examined as less relevant by several managers because they saw it not as their 
responsibility and they felt no financial incentive for a better registration (their budgets 
	 End	reflection	on	the	case	study	AMC
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were not linked to DOT production). The information regarding finance (financial 
coverage, integral costs, and turnover) was examined as less relevant by the managers 
because this information encompassed integral costs (direct and indirect costs) and 
revenues and could only be partly influenced by them. 
Advantages and disadvantages of the Standard Report Patient Care
Participants reported that the biggest advantages of the Standard Report Patient Care 
were that it contained the core information with respect to patient care and, although to 
a lesser extent, provided opportunities for further analyses (Figure 8.3a). In accordance 
with the interim reflection (see Figure 5.12b), doubts over the quality of the CMI were 
the most frequently cited disadvantage (see Figure 8.3b). 
  
(*) N = 14 missing. The high non-response was partly due to the fact that respondents found it difficult to 
determine a direct relationship between the use of the Standard Report and experienced (dis)advantages. 
Participants were asked to indicate for a number of predefined (dis)advantages of the CMI if they experience 
them and to hierarchically rank them: 1 = most important (dis)advantage, 2 = second most important (dis)
advantage, etc. 
Figure 8.3a: Advantages of using the Standard Report 
(N = 39)
 Figure 8.3b: Disadvantages of using the Standard Report 
(N =39)
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The Portfolio Matrix
In Figure 8.4, the average quality scores of the Portfolio Matrix are presented. On 
balance, the quality of the Portfolio Matrix was assessed well. The average scores of the 
Portfolio Matrix with regard to presentation and relevance were 7.6 (SD = 1.5, median 
= 8.0), and 7.5 (SD = 1.6, median = 8.0), respectively. The usability score, however, 
tended to be somewhat lower (mean = 6.5, SD = 1.7, median = 7.0). Several respondents 
gave an explanation of their scores and indicated that the current Portfolio Matrix had 
some disadvantages. Disadvantages mentioned by them were that the manageability of 
patients was often difficult, the determination of the medical relevance was considered 
as subjective and therefore prone to be manipulated, whereas the financial information 
was incorrect and outdated. Besides, the DOT-tariffs were beyond their influence and 
made decent management impossible. Finally, case-mix decisions were considered as 
a dynamic process with many influencing factors such as alliances, staffing, trends/ 
innovations than perhaps reflected here. These findings corresponded largely with earlier 
evaluations of the Portfolio Matrix (see Section 6.3.1). 
 Figure 8.4: Quality of the Portfolio Matrix (N = 32*)
(*) N = 21 missing. An explanation for the large number of missings was that for several medical specialties 
the Portfolio Matrix was incomplete, especially for the subspecialties of Internal Medicine and Pediatrics 
who became users at a later stage. Participants were asked to assess the Portfolio Matrix with regard to 
presentation, relevance, and usability on a 10-point scale, varying from 1 (very poor quality) to 10 (excellent 
quality). 
	 End	reflection	on	the	case	study	AMC
C
ha
pt
er
 8
249
Interdependency Analysis
In Figure 8.5, the average quality scores of the Interdependency Analysis are presented. 
The average presentation and relevance scores of this product were 6.8 (SD = 1.8, 
median = 7.0) and 7.0 (SD = 2.2, median = 8.0), respectively. The usability of this CMI 
product was generally regarded as insufficient (mean = 5.8, SD = 2.5, median = 6.0). 
Some respondents gave an explanation of their scores and indicated that the current 
Interdependency Analysis had disadvantages; for example the medical supporting 
departments (laboratory and diagnostics facilities) were missing and the analyses only 
showed the interdependence between patient groups and medical specialties in volumes, 
but not in finance. 
Figure 8.5: Quality of the Interdependency Analysis (N = 34*)
(*) N = 19 missing. An explanation for the large number of missing respondents was that not all (medical) 
managers had used this Interdependency Analysis; especially the sub-specialties of Internal Medicine and 
Pediatrics became users at a later stage. Participants were asked to assess the Interdependency Analysis with 
regard to presentation, relevance, and usability on a 10-point scale, varying from 1 (very poor quality) to 
10 (excellent quality). 
Quality of other information products 
The participants were also asked to assess the quality of the information products of the CMI 
that were designed primarily for the (medical) managers although not yet implemented 
corporate-wide but in a limited number of medical specialties instead: the Benchmark 
Analysis Resource Use Profiles (Section 7.3.4) and the Portfolio Checklist (Section 7.3.5). 
These products were included in this end reflection to assess their potential success and 
to explore if it would be useful to implement them corporate-wide in the future. The 
number of responders was significantly lower than in the preceding information products. 
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An explanation for this was that several respondents had had no experience with these 
products and therefore were not able to express an opinion. The presented results should 
therefore only be interpreted as first indications of the quality of these products.
Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles
The Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profile was designed for all medical specialties 
of the AMC and made available to the (medical) managers by publishing the analyses 
on Intranet Page Management Information Patient Care. However, as the benchmark 
analyses were only actively used in the context of the SLIM project (Section 6.3.2) 
most of the respondents had little or no experience with this product and were asked to 
assess its potential quality. In Figure 8.6, the quality scores of this product are presented. 
Overall the scores with regard to presentation (mean = 6.7, SD = 1.6, median = 7.0), 
(potential) relevance (mean = 7.2, SD = 1.5, median = 7.0), and (potential) usability 
(mean = 6.0, SD = 2.2, median = 7.0) were sufficient. 
Figure 8.6: Quality of the Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles (N=31*)
(*) N = 22 missing. Participants were asked to assess the (potential) quality of the Benchmark Analysis 
Resource Use Profiles with regard to presentation, relevance, and usability on a 10-point scale, varying from 
1 (very poor quality) to 10 (excellent quality). 
Some respondents gave an explanation of their scores. The main drawbacks mentioned 
about this product were that they did not know the quality of the data in other hospitals 
and were in need for more regional benchmark information (rather than national) and 
better visualization of the data.
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Portfolio Checklist
In Figure 8.7, the average quality scores of the Portfolio Checklist are presented. The 
presentation (mean = 6.5, SD = 2.1, median = 7) and relevance (mean = 6.8, SD = 2.0, 
median = 7.0) of this information product were considered as sufficient. However, the 
usability scores (mean = 5.3, SD = 2.1, median = 6.0) turned out to be low.
Figure 8.7: Quality of the Portfolio Checklist (N=34)
(*).N = 19 missing. Participants were asked to assess the (potential) quality of the Portfolio Checklist with 
regard to presentation, relevance, and usability on a 10-point scale, varying from 1 (very poor quality) to 
10 (excellent quality). 
Some (medical) managers gave an explanation of their scores. They argued that this pro-
duct has potential for the future but for now suffered from several shortcomings. First, 
the checklist was not yet used AMC-wide, so for several managers it was considered as 
a theoretical tool. Second, some indicated that the predefined generic set of standards 
should be further developed and validated in consultation with the profession and the 
management. 
 
2. Implementation of the CMI 
Participants were questioned on the quality of the project organization in terms of avail-
able knowledge and skills and on the strategy used in the design and implementation 
process. 
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The project organization
Twenty-seven of the 44 respondents (61%) agreed to strongly agreed (scores ≥ 5) with 
the statement that the project organization had enough knowledge and skills to im-
plement the CMI successfully (mean = 4.6, SD = 1.2, median = 5.0), see Figure 8.8a. 
This percentage was lower than the interim reflection (73%, See Figure 5.13). Eight of 
the 44 respondents (18%) had a more neutral opinion (score = 4). Only 16 of the 43 
respondents (37%) agreed to strongly agreed with the statement that they had received 
sufficient support by them (mean = 3.8, SD = 1.6, median = 4.0) see Figure 8.8b. Seven 
of the 43 respondents (16%) had a neutral point of view. Possible explanations for this 
critical evaluation were that much personal support was needed to interpret and use the 
CMI after the introduction of the DOT product structure and the number of managers 
using the CMI had increased significantly since the interim analysis (see Section 6.3.2). 
Consequently, the project organization had insufficient capacity to realize this support. 
                    
(*) Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement that the project 
organization has sufficient knowledge and skills to design and implement the CMI successfully (N = 9 
missing) and if they receive sufficient support from them (N = 10 missing). Level of agreement was scored 
on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Design and implementation strategy
In Figure 8.9, the respondents’ assessments of the design and implementation strategy 
are presented. The results are largely in line with the results of the interim reflection (see 
Figure 5.14). On balance, the chosen strategy was assessed moderately positive (median 
of the average strategy scores = 4.5). The (medical) managers in particular agreed with 
the statements that that it was good that the information products were gradually de-
signed and implemented (mean = 4.9, SD = 1.4, median = 5.0), and that the design 
fitted well with the external developments (mean = 4.9, SD = 1.2, median = 5.0). 
Figure 8.8a: Knowledge of project organization (N = 44*) Figure 8.8b: Support of project organization (N = 43*)
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Figure 8.9: Design and implementation strategy (N=44*)
(*) N = 9 missing. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with four statements 
about the design and implementation strategy of the project organization. Level of agreement was scored 
on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). More detailed analysis of the 
data is available on request.
8.2.4 Results: reflection on the organizational and environmental factors
The organizational and environmental success factors related to the characteristics of [3] 
the (medical) managers, [4] the organization, and [5) the environment (see Figure 8.1).
3. (Medical) manager
Socio-demographics
The respondents’ socio-demographic characteristics are presented in Table 8.1. Thirty 
seven (70%) managers were male. Forty three managers (81%) were 50 years or older 
and this percentage had increased since the interim reflection (69%; Table 5.7). Most 
of the participants had a medical background and the chief physicians had the longest 
experience as managers.
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Table 8.1: Socio-demographics of the respondents (N = 53) 
Characteristic Chief physicians 
(N = 30)
Division 
managers 
(N = 17)
Central 
managers 
(N = 6)
Total 
(N = 53)
Sex
Male 24 10 3 37
Female 6 7 3 16
Age
< 40 years 1 2 0 3
40 - 50 years 2 3 2 7
50 - 60 years 19 10 3 32
> 60 years 8 2 1 11
Background
Medical background 30 12 3 45
Financial background 0 5 3 8
x̄ ± sd Years of Experience
as (medical) manager 7.2 (5.2) 5.9 (5.6) 3.5 (2.1) 6.4 (5.1)
Management knowledge and financial knowledge of the chief physicians
Thirteen of the 29 chief physicians (45%) agreed to strongly agreed (scores ≥ 5) with 
the statement that they needed more management knowledge (mean = 4.1, SD = 1.7, 
median = 4.0) (Figure 8.10a). This percentage was quite similar to the interim reflection 
(41%, Figure 5.15a). Five of the 29 respondents (17%) had a neutral opinion. Fourteen 
of the 29 chief physicians (48%) also strongly indicated that they needed more financial 
knowledge to fulfill their manager role (mean = 4.2, SD = 1.7, median = 4.0) (Figure 
8.10b). This percentage was higher than in the interim reflection (36%, Figure 5.15b) 
and could probably be explained by the fact that since 2012 the sub-chief physicians 
for the sub specialties of internal Medicine and Pediatrics became new users of the CMI 
who had generally less financial responsibilities and therefore less financial knowledge 
than the chief physicians. Four of the 29 respondents (14%) had a neutral point of view.
Relevant factors when making case-mix decisions 
In line with the interim reflection, many factors played a role when making case-mix 
decisions (median of the average impact scores = 5.1, Figure 8.11). An important finding 
was that since 2008 the ranking of impact factors hardly had changed (see also Figure 
5.16). Scientific profiling, meeting last resort obligations, and available capacity and 
expertise were still considered as the three most important factors. Developments in other 
hospitals, finance (cost benefits), and meeting basic care obligations were considered as 
relatively least relevant, probably because the internal budget system had not changed in 
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the period between 2009 and 2014. 
  
(*) N = 1 missing. Chief physicians were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statement 
that they need more management knowledge (Figure 8.10a) and financial knowledge (Figure 8.10b). Level 
of agreement was scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Figure 8.11: Impact of factors on case-mix decisions (N = 51*)
(* ) N = 2 were missing. Participants were asked to indicate for a number of predefined factors the extent to 
which the factors have an impact on their case-mix decisions. Level of impact was scored on a 7-point scale, 
varying from 1 (no impact) to 7 (much impact). More detailed analysis of the data is available on request.
Figure 8.10a: Need for management knowledge (N= 29*) Figure 8.10b: Need for financial knowledge (N = 29*)
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4. Organization
Support of Board of Directors
Nine of the 39 (23%) chief physicians and division managers agreed to strongly agreed 
(scores ≥ 5) with the statement that the Board of Directors communicated well about 
the CMI (mean = 3.4, SD = 1.5, median = 3.0), see Figure 8.12a. This percentage was 
somewhat lower than in the interim reflection (30%, Figure 5.18a). Five of the 39 
(13%) respondents gave a neutral score. Ten of the 38 (26%) respondents agreed to 
strongly agreed with the statement that the Board stimulated them enough to use the 
CMI (mean = 3.3, SD = 1.5, median = 3.0; Figure 8.12b). This percentage was in line 
with the interim reflection (29%, Figure 5.18b). Five of the 38 (13%) respondents had a 
neutral opinion on this topic. On balance, these support scores were still below average. 
Possible explanations for the relatively low support by the Board of Directors may be 
that their perception of the quality of the data had worsened due to the introduction 
of the DOT system, (see Section 6.3.2), change in composition of the Board, and that 
between 2009 and 2014 other, more urgent, topics emerged such as cost reductions, the 
proposed merger with the VU University Medical Centre and the introduction of an 
electronic patient system. 
Figure 8.12a: Communication by Board of Directors 
(N = 39 *)
 Figure 8.12b: Stimulation by Board of Directors
 (N = 38*)
(*) Chief physicians and division managers were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the 
statements that the Board of Directors communicates well about the CMI (N = 8 missing) and stimulates 
them enough to use the CMI (N = 9 missing). Level of agreement was measured on a 7-point scale, varying 
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
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5. Environment 
Financial and competition pressure 
There was a high perceived financial pressure (median = 6.0), see Figure 8.13a, and this 
pressure seemed to have increased since the interim reflection (median = 5.0, see Figure 
5.19a). The increasing pressure was already predicted by the respondents in the interim 
reflection because of the growing production, increasing use and costs of expensive 
drugs, budget cuts, and the liberalization of healthcare. Furthermore, because the DBC 
system had many shortcomings, it was in the interim reflection already anticipated that 
certain academic care would not be funded enough in the future. At that time the 
managers also thought that due to adverse effects of market competition, the financial 
pressure would increase because general hospitals were shifting complex and expensive 
patients to the AMC earlier than before. Furthermore, because the DBC system had 
many shortcomings, it was in the interim reflection already hypothesized that certain 
academic care would not be funded enough in the future. Finally, at that time the 
managers expected that due to adverse effects of market mechanisms, the financial 
pressure would increase because general hospitals were shifting complex and expensive 
patients to the AMC earlier than before. 
The competition pressure was perceived as moderate (mean = 4.4, SD = 1.6, median = 
5.0), see Figure 8.13b, and was comparable with results of the interim reflection (mean = 
4.6, SD = 1.9, median = 5.0, see Figure 5.19b). This was a rather surprising finding as in 
the period from 2009 to 2014, the liberalization of Dutch hospital care was continuously 
expanded and the percentage of B-list DBCs was substantially increased (see Section 6.2). 
Apparently these developments had not led to an increase of this type of pressure. 
Figure 8.13a: Perceived financial pressure (N = 52*) Figure 8.13b: Perceived competition pressure (N = 52*)
(*) N = 1 missing. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with the statements 
that they experience competition and financial pressure. Level of agreement was scored on a 7-point scale 
varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
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Usefulness of the DOT product structure for the CMI
In contrast to the interim reflection, chief physicians and division managers were now 
asked to give an opinion on the DOT product structure. The reason for this was that 
in 2012 the CMI was technically fully redesigned because replacement of the DBC 
structure by the DOT structure and this could have impact on the success of the CMI 
project. Thirty of the 40 (75%) chief physicians and division managers indicated that 
the current DOT system was only to a limited extent useful (scores ≤ 3) for generating 
case-mix information, see Figure 8.14. Explanations for this were that the quality of 
the DOT data was experienced as poor by the managers because (a) DOT data were 
generated by complex computer algorithms and therefore insufficiently recognized and 
understood; and (b) the lack of actual data and the continuous changes in product 
structure made the data unpredictable (see Section 6.3.2). This was a remarkable finding 
as the CMI was to a large extent based on the DOT data. 
Figure 8.14: Usefulness of the DOT product structure for the CMI (N = 40*) 
(*) N = 7 missing. Chief physicians and division managers were asked to indicate the extent to which 
they agree with the statement that the national DOT product structure is useful to generate case-mix 
information. Level of agreement was scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree).
8.2.5  Results: reflection on the outcomes of the CMI
The outcomes of the CMI related to the [6] adoption, [7] use of the CMI, [8] effects 
of use, and [9] the overall success of the CMI project for the user and organization (see 
Figure 8.1).
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6. Adoption of the CMI
The items regarding adoption issues focused on the extent to which the respondents 
perceived an added value of the CMI.
Added value of the CMI 
In general, the respondents agreed with the statement that the CMI had an added value 
to the AMC and themselves (median of the average value scores = 5.2; see Figure 8.15). 
The value scores were comparable with the scores of the interim reflection (see Figure 
5.20). This was a promising finding: despite the disadvantages of the CMI, such as the 
perceived poor data quality of the data and the fact that the budgets were still not based 
on the DOT production (see Section 6.4), the managers still seemed to support the 
information system. The CMI was especially found useful in the context of the present 
market and financial pressure (mean = 5.9, SD = 0.9, median = 6.0).
Figure 8.15: Added value of the CMI (N = 44*)
(*) N = 9 missing. Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agree with four statements 
about the added value of the CMI. Level of agreement was scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). More detailed analysis of the data is available on request.
7. Use of the CMI
The Standard Report Patient Care
All participants were questioned on their use of the Standard Report Patient Care in 
the previous year. The chief physicians and division managers were additionally asked 
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for what purposes they had used it. Forty-five of the 50 respondents (90%) had used 
the Standard Report Patient Care (Figure 8.16a). Most of them had used it three to 
five times in the previous year. Almost all users wanted to receive this Standard Report 
on a regular basis, most of them per quarter or per month. The five non-users did not 
expect to use the Standard Report Patient Care in the future. The Standard Report was 
mainly used by the chief physicians and division managers for gaining insight into their 
case-mix, for monitoring reasons and internal legitimation, and to a lesser extent for 
decision-making (Figure 8.16b).
Figure 8.16a: Use of the Standard Report (N = 50*) Figure 8.16b: Aims of the Standard Report (N = 41*) 
(*) Participants were asked how often they had used the Standard Report Patient Care that were sent to 
them in the previous year (N = 3 missing). The chief physicians and division managers (N = 47, 6 missing) 
were additionally asked for which of the predefined aims they had used the Standard Report. 
The Portfolio Matrix 
Chief physicians and division managers were also questioned on their use of the Portfolio 
Matrix. Of the 38 respondents, 30 (79%) had used the Portfolio Matrix in the previous 
year (Figure 8.17a). Most respondents had used the Portfolio Matrix once or twice, 
probably when drawing up the annual plans. Of the eight non-users, six expected to 
start using the Portfolio Matrix in the future. In line with the Standard Report, the most 
important reason for using the Portfolio Matrix was for getting more insight into their 
case-mix, see Figure 8.17b.
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Figure 8.17a: Use of the Portfolio Matrix (N = 38*) Figure 8.17b: Aims of the Portfolio Matrix (N = 38*) 
(*) N = 9 missing. Chief physicians and division managers were asked how often they had used the Portfolio 
Matrix in the previous year and for which of the predefined aims they had used the Matrix.
The Interdependency Analysis
Chief physicians and division managers were questioned about the Interdependency 
Analysis. As the Interdependency Analysis was updated corporate wide only once every 
two to three years, not all respondents had used this analysis, especially the sub-chief 
physicians of Internal Medicine and Pediatrics who became users of the CMI at a later 
stage (see Section 6.3.2). The chief physicians and division managers were therefore asked 
to indicate if they expect to use the analysis in the future and if so for what purpose. Of 
the 35 respondents, 21 (60%) expected to start using the analysis the following year, 
(see Figure 8.18a), especially for the purpose of gaining more insight into their case-mix 
(Figure 8.18b). 
Figure 8.18a: Use of the Interdependency Analysis 
(N = 35*)      
Figure 8.18b: Aims of the Interdependency Analysis 
(N = 35*)
(*) N = 12 missing. Chief physicians and division managers were asked if they expect to use the 
Interdependency Analysis the next year and for what aims.
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The Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles and Portfolio Checklist
The chief physicians and division managers were asked to indicate if they expected in 
the future to use the CMI’s information products designed primarily for the (medical) 
managers but not yet implemented corporate wide: the Benchmark Analysis Resource 
Use Profiles (Section 7.3.4) and Portfolio Checklist (Section 7.3.5). Seventeen of the 27 
chief physicians and division managers (63%, n = 20 missing) expected to start using 
the Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles in the following year, whereas 17 of the 
38 respondents (45%, n = 9 missing) expected to start using the Portfolio Checklist in 
the next year. 
8. Effects of the CMI
Participants were questioned if they had experienced positive or negative effects of the 
CMI. The positive effects are summarized in Figure 8.19.
 
Figure 8.19: Most important positive effects of using the CMI (N = 29*)
(*) N = 24 missing. The high non-response was partly due to the fact that respondents found it difficult to 
determine direct relationships between the use of the CMI and positive effects. Participants were asked to 
indicate for a number of predefined positive effects if they experience them and if so to hierarchically rank 
these effects: 1 = most important effect, 2 = second most important effect, etc.
The advantage of an improved registration (of diagnoses and care activities) was 
mentioned most frequently by the respondents. A greater appreciation for their work 
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by their management and cost savings were also relatively frequently mentioned. The 
CMI did not seem to lead to a pronounced change in the case-mix. This was probably 
due to the several barriers which were experienced by the users, such as the lack of skills 
and knowledge, lack of decision power, the persistent complexity and volatility of the 
DBC system, the (perceived) poor quality of the data, existing organizational structure/ 
culture and legal barriers (see also the interim conclusions in Sections 5.5 and 6.4). 
Concerning the negative effects, 19 of the 34 respondents (56%, n = 19 missing) also 
reported negative effects of the CMI, such as the complexity of financial data and DOT 
data, overlap and inconsistency with other types of information, information overload, 
mismatch with internal funding and selective and incorrect use of the information.
9. Perceived overall success of the CMI project
Overall success of the CMI project was selected as the primary outcome measure of 
the CMI project. In the questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate the extent to 
which they agree with the statement that the implementation of the CMI was successful 
so far, for them and for the organization, taking all aspects into account.
Figure 8.20a: Success for the user (N = 46*) Figure 8.20b: Success for the organization (N = 45*)
(*) Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed with the statement the CMI was 
successful for themselves (N = 7 missing) and for the organization (N = 8 missing). Level of agreement was 
scored on a 7-point scale, varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
The CMI project was assessed as moderately successful for the users themselves. Of the 
46 respondents, 20 (43%) perceived the CMI project as successful to very successful 
(scores ≥ 5) (mean = 4.0, SD = 1.4, median = 4.0), see Figure 8.20a. Twelve of the 
46 respondents (26%) had a neutral opinion. The success scores were lower than at 
the interim reflection (See Figure 5.23, where 68% had perceived the project as (very) 
successful; mean= 4.7, SD = 1.5, median = 5.0). Probably the most important explanation 
for the lower scores was the fact that in 2012 the DBC system was replaced by the DOT 
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system which had a negative effect on the quality, availability and understandability of 
the data. This drastic change in 2012 and the continuous changes in the years afterwards 
in product structure, rates, and calculation models made the data to some extent less 
predictable. One consequence of this was that the Board of Directors decided in 2012 to 
abandon the plans to link the internal budgets to the DOT production. Because of this, 
an important aim of the CMI could not be achieved. Although understandable from a 
management perspective, this was a major setback for the CMI project. Besides, in the 
management meetings, the focus shifted to other current and urgent issues, such as cost 
reductions, the proposed merger with the VUmc and the complex implementation of an 
electronic patient system, rather than the case-mix project. Consequently, this shifting 
focus impaired the motivation of division managers and chief physicians to use the CMI 
(Section 6.4). Possible explanations for the neutral score were that these respondents 
had experienced both advantages and disadvantages of the project or that they found it 
difficult to determine the actual project outcome.
The respondents with success scores ≤3 worked mainly in the departments of supporting 
specialties (rehabilitation, genetics) and subspecialties of Internal Medicine and 
Pediatrics. Possible explanations for low success rates on the supporting specialties were 
that parts of the case-mix information were not applicable for them or that they had 
fewer opportunities to manage their case-mix. Possible reasons for the low success rates 
on the sub-specialties were that they had become CMI users at a later stage (in 2012) 
and were directly confronted with the negative effects of the implementation of the 
DOT system and the fact that for several sub-specialties the case-mix information was 
incomplete. An encouraging result was that 26 of the 45 respondents (58%) perceived 
the CMI project as successful to very successful for the organization (mean = 4.3, SD 
= 1.5, median = 5.0), taking also into account the use of the CMI by others like the 
F & C department (negotiations with insurers, budgeting, legitimation in the annual 
accounts), clinical researchers (cost-effectiveness studies), and cooperation with other 
hospitals (see Figure 8.20b). 
Reasons why the respondents perceived the CMI more successful for the organization 
then for themselves are probably related to the fact that they observed a corporate-wide 
system, used by various users and for different purposes, both within their own division 
and beyond. Moreover, there was the general believe that a CMI is necessary anyway 
in the context of the present competition and financial pressure (see also Figure 8.15). 
 Seven of the 45 respondents (16%) had a more neutral point of view of the outcome 
of the project.
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8.3 Final conclusions
In this section, the final conclusions of the CMI project at the AMC are discussed. The 
conclusions are based on the results of the qualitative and quantitative results of the 
interim reflections and the just presented end reflection.
Outcomes of the CMI project
The outcome variables focused on the adoption, use and effects of the CMI, as well as 
the respondents’ perceived overall success of the CMI project, both for the managers 
themselves and the organization.
Adoption of the CMI
In 2006, the CMI was adopted by the Board of Directors, because the top managers 
experienced increasing pressure on capacity, finance, competition, and external 
accountability. They felt the need for more detailed case-mix information (see Section 
2.8). At the end of the project in 2014, most managers found that the CMI still had added 
value for themselves and the organization (see Figure 8.15). This was an encouraging 
finding: despite the disadvantages of the CMI, such as the perceived poor quality of 
the data and the fact that the budgets were still not based on the DOT production, the 
managers still seemed to support the CMI.
Use of the CMI
During the CMI project, the number of users increased significantly. In the course of time 
more medical specialties made use of the CMI and. Since 2012 the sub-chief physicians 
of the medical specialties of Internal Medicine and Pediatrics were additionally included 
as target groups. In addition to this, as off 2009 the business analysts joined the project 
(see Section 6.3.1). The business analysts of the divisions’ business offices supported 
the chief physicians and division managers, for example by making in-depth analyses 
and by advising them on strategy and business operations. The business analysts of the 
F & C department supported the Board of Directors and concern controller by assessing 
the annual plans of the medical specialties and by making agreements with the funders. 
The CMI’s underlying (big) database consisting of medical, patient, and financial data 
was also used by clinical researchers to conduct cost-effectiveness studies. 
In 2014, most chief physicians and division managers had used the Standard Report 
Patient Care and Portfolio Matrix (see Figures 8.16a and 8.17a), which were the key 
information products of the CMI for them, and a number of them used these products 
regularly. The (medical) managers used both information products mainly for getting 
insight into their case-mix, and to some extent for monitoring, internal legitimation, 
and decision-making support (see Figures 8.16b and 8.17b). The central managers, in 
Chapter 8
266
particular, used the CMI for (annual) planning purposes, monitoring (A3 score card), 
process optimization (SLIM project), the preparation of the administrative merger 
and for external legitimation (negotiations with health insurers (see Section 6.3.2). 
The Standard Report Patient Care was also used by the Internal Review Committee 
to discuss with medical specialties about their policy with regard to patient care and 
to gain insight into the actual waiting times compared to the standards, to define what 
actions were needed, and how these would be monitored (see Section 5.3.2). The CMI 
database was used in various ways for external legitimation purposes, for example to 
define the percentage of top referral care in the annual account, to influence the tariffs 
of the A-list DBCs and for cost effectiveness studies. The CMI was eventually not used 
for the allocation of budgets. The continuous and dramatic changes in the product 
structure and associated selling prices generated too many uncertainties to implement 
output budgeting in a responsible way. The CMI was also used less for the planning of 
capacity. Reasons mentioned for this were that the production of the medical specialty 
was rather stable over the years and did not require an advanced planning tool and that 
some specialties used their own planning system and used their own data because the 
CMI data were not considered reliable enough to use.
Effects of the CMI
It is difficult to determine exactly what the contribution of the CMI has been to the AMC, 
because during the research period the CMI project was one of several measures that were 
taken to resist the increasing competition and financial pressure. Because of the CMI, 
the amount of available information was significantly increased and improved, which 
had led to several positive effects, both for the individual managers and the organization. 
These positive effects became evident from the various (interim) evaluations during the 
project (see Chapters 5, 6, and 8). Although the perceived effects of the CMI differed 
per manager, it can be concluded that the CMI contributed to the identification of 
possible case-mix changes and to provide the appropriate arguments, agreements were 
made about patient care, cost consciousness was increased, an improved registration of 
diagnoses and care activities, a greater appreciation for their work management, cost 
savings and the increase of some tariffs of A-list DBCs. The CMI, however, did not seem 
to lead to pronounced changes in the case-mix (see Figure 8.19). Some negative effects 
were also experienced. By far the most important one was the (perceived) poor quality 
of the information. Respondents also reported other negative effects of the CMI, such 
as information overload and selective and incorrect use of the CMI.
Perceived overall success of the CMI project
In the final refection the (medical) managers assessed the CMI project as moderately 
successful (Figure 8.20a) for their own functioning. The perceived success seemed to 
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have decreased somewhat in the course of time, probably because of the introduction of 
the DOT system, the decreasing support of the Board of Directors and the abandonment 
of internal performance funding (Section 6.4). The interim reflection had already 
demonstrated that the expectations of the CMI were different per manager: some 
expected the CMI to be an answering machine, others a dialogue machine and others 
a budget generating machine (see Section 5.4.4). Despite this, at the end of the CMI 
project the majority of the managers still supported the CMI from an organizational 
perspective (Figure 8.15). The CMI was found especially useful in the context of the 
present competition and financial pressure. We conclude that the overall success of the 
CMI can be further increased when the technical capabilities of the CMI are fully used, 
for example, including by the aims of case-mix decision-making, budgeting, and sales 
strategy.
Success factors
The outcomes of the CMI project were determined by several elements: the design and 
implementation of the CMI, and factors related to the organization and environment. 
Design of the CMI
Several characteristics of the CMI have promoted its success. This case study 
demonstrated that the CMI’s surplus value was mainly determined by the fact that 
medical data, patient data, and financial data were collected at patient level and 
integrated into one system. This made it possible to establish relationships between 
these types of information and to aggregate information at each desired level and added 
value with respect to other (regular) information systems (see Section 5.4.2). The CMI 
was available from a large number of different dimensions. Because of this, the CMI had 
a broad scope of information and was quite flexible. The case study demonstrated how 
by the design of different information products a CMI can fulfill different functions 
for different stakeholders in the phases of the strategic management cycle (see Chapter 
7). The strengths of the information products for the managers were that they were 
ready-made and easily accessible, that they provided standardized and highly aggregated 
information presented by powerful visualizations with clear explanations. 
The patient groups, as defined by the chief physicians, appeared to be the best ‘language’ 
to be used in the CMI, because they were considered crucial for performance on all core 
tasks and on finance (See Figure 5.6). It also reflected the perceptions of the medical 
managers (see Section 7.5.1). Because of these patient groups, the contents of the 
care were automatically displayed. This made it possible to substantively connect and 
compare different types of information with each other, to reduce the management 
information to manageable units and to link the patient groups to the focus points as 
Chapter 8
268
defined in the strategic aims. The Standard Report Patient Care and Portfolio Matrix 
contributed to better insights and a better dialogue about care (see Figures 5.22, 8.16b 
and 8.17b). The Interdependency Analysis appeared to be useful since it was a visual 
representation of how the medical specialties were interrelated and where coordination 
of medical policy was needed (see Figure 8.18b). The Benchmark Analysis Resource 
Use Profiles showed that these analyses could seriously contribute to a dialogue about 
medical practice, efficiency gains, and cost reductions (see Section 6.3.2 and 7.3.4). The 
strengths were that the practice of the AMC was compared with the other UMCs only 
(rather than with general hospitals) and that the outcomes were presented at a detailed 
level. The Data Cubes in Cognos significantly increased the CMI’s accessibility and 
analytical capabilities (see Section 7.4). 
However, some of the CMI’s characteristics obstructed the success of the project. The 
persistent perception of poor data quality was the most important obstructing factor. 
This was particularly true for DBC data (and from 2012, the DOT data) and cost data. 
One explanation for this was that these data were derived data; they were the result of 
complex processes consisting of a large number of steps, algorithms, and assumptions 
in which many managers were not personally involved. Another explanation was that 
costs per patient group were not registered in the financial systems but could only be 
estimated through unit costs and consequently over- or underestimated the actual costs 
as registered in the general ledger. This gave a distorted picture of the financial situation. 
Although this effect was inevitable, it was substantial and confusing for the users of the 
CMI. Also, in order to use the unit costs as a basis for negotiations with health insurers 
and to compare them with the selling prices, the unit costs had to be adjusted for several 
components that were covered by a separate (academic) budget, such as top referral care 
and training. The adjustments were made on the basis of agreements with other UMCs 
and the Dutch Health Authority (NZa). Because of this, the adjusted costs as presented 
by the CMI were no longer a representation of medical processes but the results of a 
political process. Both regarding the DBC and cost data, there was a high uncertainty 
between cause and effect. For these types of information, the CMI couldn’t function as 
an answer machine or a dialogue machine, but more as a ‘learning machine’ or an ‘idea-
generating machine’ (see Section 3.4.1). For many managers this was disappointing 
because they expected to get hard facts that would give them ‘the right answers’. Finally, 
some types of information, such as relevance and quality of care were not registered in 
systems, could only be obtained by asking the medical specialties and were therefore by 
definition considered as subjective.
Yet this research shows that these learning and idea-generating functions could still be 
very useful. Although the CMI did not represent the ‘truth’, it gave relevant indications 
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about costs and financial coverage and this knowledge formed the basis for the dialogue 
on case-mix, thereby increasing cost-consciousness and improving registrations (See 
Figure 5.22 and 8.19). This also applied to the qualitative, non-system data that was by 
definition considered as soft and subjective. These data appeared to be useful, for example 
for the Portfolio Matrix, where non-system data (medical relevance) was combined with 
system data (financial relevance), see Section 5.3.1. Furthermore, a disadvantage of 
standardizing the case-mix information for all types of managers and medical specialties 
was that some parts of the case-mix information were not applicable for all users (such 
as the supporting medical specialties), and created a feeling of information overload 
(see Section 8.2.5). Finally, the BI tool Cognos appeared to be too complicated for the 
managers to work with (see Section 6.3.1).
Implementation of the CMI
The CMI project was managed by the F & C department. During the interim and 
end reflection, the majority of the managers (strongly) agreed with the statement that 
the project organization had enough knowledge and skills to implement the CMI 
successfully (see Figure 5.13 and 8.8a). The advantages of the project organization were 
that the needed competences were concentrated within one department and that the 
participants were approached in a uniform way. However, there was insufficient capacity 
at the project organization (see Section 6.3.2). In practice, the project organization 
consisted of only two permanent members (the project leader and an ICT consultant); 
the other members were temporary members and participated mainly in the pilot groups. 
This made the project very person dependent, and besides this, the project organization 
was not able to sufficiently support the managers to interpret and use the CMI in-depth. 
There was also competition from other projects that demanded capacity from the F & C 
and ICT departments, such as the implementation of the new electronic patient system 
and the A3 methodology. 
Regarding the implementation strategy, several characteristics were assessed moderately 
positive by the respondents, such as the gradual design and implementation of the CMI, 
the active involvement of users by means of pilot groups and the fact that the design 
fitted well with the external developments (See Figures 5.14 and 8.9). However, several 
respondents expressed the opinion that the use of the case-mix information should 
not be voluntary, in order to reduce the risk that people would keep using their own 
information system and would use the system opportunistically.
From this research the advantages and disadvantages of the self-design of a CMI became 
visible. One advantage was that the designers knew the complex external and internal 
context of a UMC well and were familiar with the users and their management problems. 
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Second, the designers had the flexibility to set their own priorities in the design of 
products and to tailor information products to the users. So, it became possible to 
ensure that the information products complied with the users’ requirements as much 
as possible. This, probably, could not be realized with an external, ready-made CMI 
where external (ICT) standards would have to be taken into account. Furthermore, this 
research showed that the process of designing itself was useful because it stimulated the 
users to think actively about their case-mix and decision-making criteria (see Section 
6.3.1). Finally, the fact that the AMC decided to design the CMI directly after the 
introduction of the health care reforms made them a frontrunner in Dutch hospitals 
and this remained until the end of the project in 2014 (Groene Amsterdammer, 2014). 
The AMC was timely in its preparation for the era of full performance reimbursement. 
This also gave the AMC the opportunity to influence national developments, such as the 
improvement of the DBC tariffs (see Section 6.3.1).
However, there were also several disadvantages. First, it took a lot of (scarce) time, 
capacity, and energy to design the CMI from scratch. The more attention that was 
paid to this development phase, the less attention could be paid to the follow-up 
phases. Second, because of the iterative approach, the CMI was continuously under 
construction. As a result, the CMI was seen by the users as a test product with test 
data and it had to be repeatedly explained to them what could and could not be done 
with the CMI. It was a process of trial and error, with failures and successes. Examples 
of failures were that some products (such as the Standard Report Patient Care) were 
implemented too early because they contained insufficient or even incorrect data (see 
for example Section 5.3.2) These failures lingered long and it took quite some time to 
restore confidence among users. Third, some data were eventually insufficiently accepted 
by the health insurers and therefore after this project it was decided to outsource the 
Forecasting Model to a software supplier and to replace the Top Referral Care Model by 
a common model for all UMCs (see also Section 6.3.2).
(Medical) manager
The case study demonstrated that the decision to designate the chief physicians, division 
managers, and central managers as the primary target groups of the CMI was justified. 
They had substantial decision-making power, for example regarding the case-mix (see 
Figures 5.7 and 5.8) because of their hierarchical position and expertise. They thus 
had a lot of influence on the performance on core tasks and finance of the AMC. 
However, some chief physicians perceived little power to manage the case-mix. This was 
particularly true for medical specialties with a high percentage of emergency patients or 
chronic patients and internal referrers (see Section 5.4.1). Several managers also stressed 
that the space for case-mix decisions is relatively limited, because the case-mix is a result 
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of accumulated expertise and infrastructure where often multi-year research programs 
are associated with patient groups and that does not change overnight. The (medical) 
managers had relatively less influence on the budget and on the total cost of the DBC. 
The majority of them felt the need for case-mix information to make case-mix decisions 
in a more rational and explicit way to realize their core areas in times of increasing 
competitive pressures and financial pressures (see Section 5.4.1). They therefore 
supported the CMI and were prepared to participate in its design. Some (medical) 
managers did not feel the need to change their way of decision making, for example, 
because it gave them freedom.
The need for types of case-mix information varied by manager, but it revealed that there 
was quite a consensus between the managers about what topics should be minimally 
covered in the CMI: volumes, patient characteristics, medical production, process, 
quality, finance, and the health care market (see Section 5.3.1).However, within these 
topics, the information needs differed considerably by type of manager and type of 
medical specialty in terms of level of detail and content of the information. The difference 
between the needs of the managers could be explained by differences in personality traits, 
the presence of supporting personnel, and the availability of alternative information. 
Some managers wanted to receive a wide range of case-mix information in order to be 
as informed as possible; others wanted to receive only a (filtered) summary to prevent 
information overload. 
The managers were particularly interested in information on topics that they could 
influence themselves and/or were made formally responsible for, such as the type 
of patients, length of stay, waiting times, top referral care, and the use of expensive 
materials and diagnostics (see Section 8.2.3). Other topics were considered much 
less relevant, for example the registration, health care market, and invoicing. One 
obstructing factor with regard to finance was that the target groups experienced barriers 
to actually managing their case-mixes, costs, or returns. With regard to the case-mix it 
appeared that the possibilities of managing were related to the type of medical specialty 
(see Section 5.4.1). If a specialty treated relatively many patients with either acute or 
chronic diseases, managers saw few opportunities to manage. Furthermore, no drastic 
case-mix decisions could be expected because the case-mix was a result of accumulated 
expertise and infrastructure that did not change overnight. With regard to costs and 
returns, the target groups lacked some decision-making power. They were not allowed to 
appoint staff (at the nursing department or policlinic), to order expensive materials, and 
to make investments. They also had no direct influence on the budget, since the budget 
was still determined by historically defined parameters, and not on the DBC revenues. 
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Finally, there were no clear job descriptions with committed tasks and responsibilities. 
Another obstructing factor was that several medical managers lacked the knowledge and 
skills to use the CMI in a responsible way (see Section 5.5 and 6.4). One explanation 
for this could be that the majority of them were relatively old, which meant that these 
managers were mainly used to fixed budgets and not to a free health care market. Finally, 
several managers with a medical background found it difficult to combine the different 
logics of medicine and management. 
Organization
On the basis of this research it can be concluded that some characteristics of the 
organization have promoted, but also obstructed its success. First, the AMC is a 
university hospital. This creates a positive culture to design and test evidence-based 
innovations where people are willing to participate in studies. Furthermore, similar to 
other UMCs, the AMC is a large organization with excellent ICT facilities. Second, 
the AMC has three core tasks (care, research, and education) which are inextricably 
interwoven. The (medical) managers have overall responsibility for all these core 
activities. This research revealed that the case-mix has a major impact on all the core 
tasks (see Figure 5.6). This makes the decision-making process complicated. Moreover, 
it proved difficult to support several decision-making criteria with system data, because 
in practice activities for the core tasks, such as patient care and research, are registered 
and financed separately. Also, in some cases, artificial adjustments had to be made to the 
cost data to make them comparable to general hospitals. Third, the AMC supplies largely 
tertiary and top-specialized care to complex patients. Academic care requires costly 
infrastructure, personnel with (small) sub-specialties and a multidisciplinary approach. 
The interdependence of various medical disciplines is much greater than in non-
academic hospitals. Multi-disciplinary work requires continuous coordination between 
medical specialties. This implies that the responsibility for case-mix decisions cannot be 
assigned to a single medical specialty. Fourth, the case-mix of a UMC is often a result of 
longitudinal accumulated expertise and infrastructure, where often multi-year research 
programs are associated with patient groups. Therefore, chief physicians do not feel the 
urge and the possibility to change the mix regularly. Fifth, because of their large size, in 
most UMCs vertically-oriented organizational structures are used where responsibilities 
are primarily allocated to divisions and subsequently medical departments. This means 
that the internal control and information systems are also vertically oriented. In our case 
study the implementation of the DBC-based and process-oriented CMI was difficult 
because the divisional structure remained unchanged. Therefore there was a missing link 
between the process information of the DBC and the vertically allocated responsibilities 
and regular management information. For example, a DBC contains all of the direct and 
indirect activities and associated costs that can be attributed to the DBC (so including 
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the medical and non-medical supporting departments), whereas the (medical) managers 
are only responsible for the activities and costs within their own specialty or division.
Finally, in the Dutch UMCs all (medical) managers are employed, so they have no 
personal economic interest in the financial effects of the case-mix of their division 
or medical specialty. In the case study of the AMC, the financial consequences were 
considered to be least relevant when making case-mix decisions (see Figures 5.16 and 
8.11) Because of this, the interest for case-mix information is probably lower in UMCs 
than in general hospitals where a number of medical specialists are self-employed. 
Furthermore, several examples showed that the principles of the CMI did not match 
with the prevailing organizational culture. Some aims and principles of the CMI were 
supported by the managers more in theory than in practice. For example, the aim of 
the CMI was to better rationalize and objectify decision-making processes. But several 
attempts to rationalize in practice failed. The implementation of the Portfolio Checklist 
(see Section 7.3.5) with objective and measurable standards to assess the portfolio in 
a uniform way ultimately didn’t work because the chief physicians were afraid to lose 
autonomy (see Section 6.3.1). Also the attempt to objectify the relevance scores of the 
Portfolio Matrix by quantitative data failed, with the argument that this had to remain 
an opinion, not a fact (see Section 6.3.1). Attempts to link case-mix decisions directly to 
surgery budgets failed because one was afraid that it would lead to discussions between 
divisions (see Section 6.3.1). The principle that the case-mix had to be put centrally 
in management talks and management information, was supported by almost all 
participants, but was not realized in practice. Management meetings were dominated by 
other current and urgent issues, such as cost reductions, the appointments of professors, 
and new priorities such as the proposed administrative merger with the VUmc. 
Although the Board of Directors underlined the importance of the CMI at the outset 
of the project, the actual support given was perceived as too weak to be effective. Also, 
the Board of Directors did not actively encourage a dialogue about using the CMI (see 
Figure 5.18 and 8.12). The principle of ‘professional in the lead’ was still applied (see 
Section 2.8), which gave chief physicians and divisional managers considerable freedom 
as to whether they used the CMI or not. The CMI was offered only as a learning tool, 
not to control or curtail their behavior. One advantage of this approach was that the 
freedom of choice and flexibility of adoption seem to have softened potential conflicts 
and settled disputes. Thereby it enhanced the flexibility in adoption. However, the 
downside of this approach was that several managers lacked the incentive to use the 
CMI. The risk remained that people would keep using their own information system, 
would use the CMI opportunistically, or would ignore the CMI because of a lack of 
interest or priority. This had a negative impact on the outcome of the CMI project. The 
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implementation of performance-based budgeting was an important goal of the CMI, 
but ultimately was not realized and historical budgets were retained. This meant that the 
medical managers lacked the financial incentives and opportunities to further improve 
their case-mix which reduced their need for case-mix information. In summary, the 
organizational culture and budget system remained unchanged, which was an obstacle 
for the success of the CMI. 
Environment
With regard to the environment, it can be concluded that the introduction of market 
mechanisms and increasing financial and legitimization pressure had increased the need 
of the AMC to redefine their strategy, to start developing performance-based budgeting 
and to adopt a CMI (see Section 5.2 and 6.2). However, the effects of the market 
mechanisms took place much slower and in a more limited way than expected and 
eventually decreased the need for a CMI over the years, see Section 6.4. The effects were 
limited because the national performance-based reimbursement system was implemented 
much later than announced (in 2012 rather than 2008), measures were taken at different 
levels to mitigate the effects of the reforms (through a Gentleman’s Agreement and safety 
nets) and negotiations with the health insurers continued to be focused primarily on 
budgets per hospital, rather than on the price and quality per care product. Also, the 
share of freely negotiable care in 2014 was still limited to 50%, because most complex 
care was still regulated (A-list DBCs) and the academic budget remained. As a result, the 
revenues of the UMCs were still rather guaranteed. Competition increased but mainly 
in basic care, which was considered by the UMCs as more of an opportunity to reduce 
their waiting lists than as a threat. Also the fact that the hospitals were covered by the 
Competition Act reduced their opportunities to make agreements with other hospitals 
about their case-mix and reduced their need for the CMI (see Section 6.3.1). 
The national DBC system (and since 2012 the DOT system) provided good 
opportunities for the design of the CMI, because new types of data were registered in a 
uniform manner and it became possible to connect the medical, patient, and financial 
data (see Section 5.5 and 6.4). Through this, it became possible to identify and quantify 
the patient groups and to connect the strategy with medical, logistical and financial 
policies. The different ‘worlds’ between medical and financial professionals which were 
previously widely separated, could then be integrated. However, the DBC system also 
had several drawbacks. The DBC-data were considered as an artificial and financial 
administrative language and therefore insufficiently recognized by the (medical) 
managers. Furthermore, it did not sufficiently represent the academic care, and did not 
match with the allocated responsibilities in the UMCs. Also, until 2011, the tariffs or 
the A-list DBCs were only virtual and did not represent the actual returns (see Section 
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2.5). Furthermore, the DBC system was too detailed and too volatile to be used for 
free negotiations between the AMC and health insurers. Every year it took between 
nine to eleven months to make agreements with insurers regarding volumes and prices 
per care product and this hardly improved in the course of time (see Figure 2.4). As a 
result, there were no actual prices available during that time and users had no idea of the 
financial coverage of their patient groups. This hampered the managers tremendously in 
using the CMI for decision-making and budgeting. 
The replacement of the DBC structure by the DOT structure was more complex and 
extensive than expected and had a huge impact on the CMI. The existing information 
products had to be technically redesigned because the DOT data were generated in a 
different way and based on different sources than the DBC. It took about nine months 
before the first DOT production data became available. The negative effects of this 
incomplete dataset were that there were risks of using this information and disclaimers 
had to be added to the information products. For example, a warning not to make 
case-mix decisions on the basis of the CMI. The DOT product structure also implied a 
substantive change: the contents and terminology of care products were different from 
the DBC, which meant that users of the CMI had to be trained to understand the DOT 
system and to interpret the related case-mix information. Managers considered the 
DOT system as a deterioration of the DBC system and the majority of them found that 
that the current DOT system was only to a limited extent useful in generating case-mix 
information. This was a striking finding, as the CMI was to a large extent based on the 
DOT data as this was the only way of integrating medical, patient, and financial data. 
Table 8.2 gives a summarized overview of the identified factors that have promoted or 
obstructed successful outcomes of the CMI project in the AMC. 
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Table 8.2: Summarized overview of factors promoting or obstructing the successful outcomes of the CMI-project
Design and implementation factors
Factor Topic Factors promoting successful outcomes Factors obstructing successful outcomes 
Design of 
the CMI
Inte-
grated 
character 
• The integration and correlation of medical 
data, patient data and financial data in one 
system
Function
• Fulfills particularly function as learning, 
dialogue, idea-generating machine
• Fulfils different functions for different 
stakeholders in the phases of the strategic 
management cycle
• Fulfills limited function as answer machine 
because of high uncertainty between cause and 
effect. It doesn't provide hard facts that would 
give ‘the right answers’.
Langua-
ge of 
patient 
groups
• Provides a common language to substantively 
discuss medical policies
• Reflects the perception of the medical manager 
• Reduces the management information to 
manageable units. 
• Makes it possible to connect and compare 
different types of information with each other 
•  Defining and valuing patient groups compels 
to think about portfolio
• Personnel dependent, labor intensive
• There is overlap of patient groups between medi-
cal specialties 
Contents
• Contains the key topics in patient care in the 
strategic management cycle
• Data are collected at patient level and can be 
aggregated at each desired level 
• The CMI is available from a large number of 
different dimensions and is therefore quite 
flexible. 
• The CMI’s underlying (big) database can also 
be used by clinical researchers 
• Some data were not (easily) available in systems, 
such as relevance and quality of care, but can 
only be obtained by asking the medical specialties 
and were therefore by definition considered as 
subjective.
• Some data are not connected with each other, for 
example patient care and research data
• Too broad information set, risk of information 
overload
Presen-
ta-tion
• Ready-made and easily accessible (automatic 
mailing)
• Standardized and highly aggregated infor-
mation 
• Presented by powerful visualizations with clear 
explanations.
• The combination of qualitative, non-system 
data with system data (Portfolio Matrix)
• Some parts of the case-mix information are not 
applicable for all users 
Quality 
of the 
data 
• The CMI triggers to improve the quality of the 
data (registrations, cost calculations)
• (Perceived) poor quality of the data, because of:
• poor registrations, failing computer systems
• data are the result of (complex) methods, defini-
tions, assumptions, and systems
•  subjectivity of the non-system data
•  volatility of the DBC and financial data, 
• lack of data/ outdated data (sales prices) 
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Table 8.2: Summarized overview of factors promoting or obstructing the successful outcomes of the CMI-project 
Implemen-
tation of 
the CMI
Project 
organi-
za-tion
• Concentration of skills / knowledge in project 
organization, 
• uniform approach of (medical) managers
• Person dependent 
• Lack of priority and resources, competition from 
other projects 
Strategy
• Iterative design and implementation
• Active involvement of the users (pilot groups)
• Design fits well with external developments
• The freedom of choice to use the CMI softens 
potential conflicts and settled disputes. 
• The freedom of choice to use the CMI has 
the risk that people would keep using their 
own information system, would use the CMI 
opportunistically, or would ignore the CMI 
because of a lack of interest or priority.
Self 
design
• Designers know the context of a UMC and are 
familiar with the users of the CMI.
• Flexibility to set own priorities, customization 
of products, 
• Positive effects gained during the design 
• Being a frontrunner enables to influence 
national developments at an early stage
• It takes a lot of (scarce) time, capacity, and energy 
to design the CMI from scratch.
• Continuously seen as a test product with test 
results, the CMI is never in a final state
• Process of trial and error. Failures can linger long 
and it takes time to restore confidence among 
users. 
• Some data are insufficiently accepted by external 
stakeholders, such as health insurers and other 
UMCs
Organizational factors
Factor Topic Factors promoting successful outcomes Factors obstructing successful outcomes 
(Medical) 
manager
Decision 
power
• Chief physicians, division managers, and 
central managers are designated as the primary 
target group of the CMI, because they have the 
power to make key decisions
• Some medical specialties (perceive) insufficient 
decision-making power with regard to the 
case-mix (specialties with a high percentage of 
emergency patients, chronic patients or internal 
referrers) 
• No drastic case-mix decisions can be expected 
from the CMI because the case-mix is a result of 
accumulated expertise and infrastructure where 
often multi-year research programs are associated 
with patient groups that do not change overnight.
• Several (medical) managers lack some decision 
power regarding their costs and returns
Need for 
CMI
• (Medical) managers feel the need for a CMI to 
make their (case-mix) decisions more rational, 
and explicit and to realize their core areas in 
times of increasing competitive pressures and 
financial pressures
• There is quite a consensus between the 
(medical) managers about what topics should 
be minimally covered in the CMI  
• Complex and irrational nature of decision-
     making 
• Some (medical) managers fear losing decision 
autonomy because of the CMI
• Within the key topics of the CMI, the informa-
tion needs differ considerably by manager and 
medical specialty in terms of level of detail and 
content of the information
Know-
ledge/ 
skills 
• Several (medical ) managers lack the knowledge 
and skills to use the CMI 
Design and implementation factors
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Table 8.2: Summarized overview of factors promoting or obstructing the successful outcomes of the CMI-project 
(continued)
Factor Topic Factors promoting successful outcomes Factors obstructing successful outcomes 
Organiza-
tion
Charac-
teristic 
of a 
UMC
• The different core tasks and medical specialties 
of an UMC are inextricably interwoven which 
complicates the (case-mix) decision-making 
process and the use of the CMI
• Artificial adjustments have to be made to the 
cost data to make them comparable to general 
hospitals
• All (medical) managers are employed, so they 
have no personal economic interest in the 
financial effects of their case-mix 
Organi-
zation 
culture
• Positive culture to design and test evidence-
based (information) innovations where people 
are willing to participate in studies
• (Unchanged) culture: decision are made by 
'wheeling and dealing' between people
Organi-
zation 
structure
• There is a missing link between the process 
information of the DBC and the vertically 
allocated responsibilities and regular management 
information.
ICT 
facilities
• Good ICT facilities (data warehouse, BI tools)
• Data Cubes in Cognos significantly increased 
the CMI’s accessibility and analytical capa-
bilities
• Options to drill down in the data to patient 
level and
• Cognos is too complicated for the managers to 
work with
• Competing ICT projects (EPIC)
Plan-
ning & 
control
• Announcement of performance-based 
budgeting
• Retainment of historical (fixed) budgets, the 
abandonment of plans to base the internal bud-
gets on the DOT production
Board of 
Direc-
tors
•  The CMI is offered by the Board as a learning 
tool, not to control or curtail their behavior.
•  (Perceived) insufficient stimulation by the Board 
to use the CMI 
• CMI is little discussed in management meetings/ 
competition with other, more urgent, issues 
(merger, EPIC, cost reductions)
• Change of members of the Board of Directors 
(including the initiator of the CMI project.
Organizational factors
Environmental factors
Factor Topic • Factors promoting successful outcomes • Factors obstructing successful outcomes 
Environ-
ment
Introduc-
tion of 
market 
mecha-
nism
• The increasing competition and financial 
pressure increases the need for UMCs to 
redefine their strategy, to start developing 
performance-based budgeting and to adopt 
a CMI 
• Relatively limited freely negotiable care, still 
substantial income with lump-sum character
• (Severely) delayed agreements with insurers 
on DBC/ DOT volumes/ prices, focus still on 
budgets 
• Limited competition in high complex care
• (Perceived) fewer legal opportunities to manage 
the case-mix in consultation with other hospitals 
in the region because of the Competition Act
• (Budget) measures to mitigate the effects of the 
reforms (safety nets, contracting sums)
DBC / 
DOT 
product 
structure 
• Leads to several types of new information, for 
example about the content and complexity 
of care, the full cycle of care, the financial 
coverage of patients and the relationship 
between types of data.
• It enables to connect the medical, patient, and 
financial data. 
•  It becomes possible to identify and quantify 
the patient groups and to connect the strategy 
with medical, logistical and financial policies. 
Thereby, the different ‘worlds’ between 
medical and financial professionals can be 
integrated.
•  Complexity and volatility of DBC / DOT prod-
uct structure
•  Mismatch between reimbursement and funding 
system of the regulated segment (2006 - 2011)
•  Insufficient representation of academic care
•  DBC-data are considered as an artificial and 
financial administrative language and therefore 
insufficiently recognized by the (medical) 
managers 
•  Too detailed and too volatile to be used for 
negotiations with health insurers
•  Mismatch between product structure and 
organization structure / allocated responsibilities
Table 8.2: Summarized overview of factors promoting or obstructing the successful outcomes of the CMI-project 
(continued)

Chapter 9
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Abstract
This chapter reflects on the objectives of the research project, the research methodology, 
the role of the researcher, and the applicability of the research findings to other hospital 
organizations. We concluded that the aims of the CMI project have been partly 
achieved. The CMI was especially used by the (medical) managers for gaining insight, 
monitoring, process optimization, and stimulating the dialogue about the case-mix, 
and decision support. However, no substantial and actual case-mix decisions by the 
managers immediately resulted from the functioning of a CMI. Besides, although the 
CMI was also technically capable of being used for the allocation of budgets and external 
legitimation, this happened only to a limited extend. Explanations for this were that 
output budgeting was ultimately not implemented and agreements with insurers still 
focused on global budgets rather than specific DBC products. The research period had a 
major impact on the results. The case study took place just after the implementation of 
health care reforms. This was a chaotic period. Several organizational and environmental 
variables were very unstable and unpredictable in the course of time. This complicated 
not only the design and implementation of the CMI, but also the exploration of the 
relationships between success factors and outcomes of the CMI. With regard to the 
methodological implications, the conclusion is that design-oriented research may be of 
high value in the accounting discipline, particularly but not exclusively in the domain 
of health care, because it can contribute to the production of relevant knowledge. The 
design-oriented research methodology can be further improved by adding extensive 
reflections to the regulative cycle to gain contemplative knowledge. The multiple roles 
of the researcher (project leader and senior advisor to the Board of Directors) had 
advantages because in this way he had a thorough understanding of the external and 
internal context of the UMCs, its management structure and the organization-related 
problems. However, there were also potential disadvantages of combining work and 
research in the same field in terms of risk of bias and preconceptions of the results. The 
design-oriented knowledge about the Portfolio Matrix, which was a key product of the 
CMI, turned out to applicable to two other UMCs: the UMCG and VUmc. However, 
in the design and implementation of the Portfolio Matrices, different choices had to be 
made.
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9.1 Introduction
Sections 9.2 and 9.3 reflect on the objectives of the research project and the research 
methodology. Section 9.4 describes the advantages and disadvantages of the fact that the 
researcher also worked as project leader and as senior advisor to the Board of Directors. 
In Section 9.5, we explore the applicability of our research findings to other hospital 
organizations.
9.2 Reflection on the research objectives
The research objectives were: 1) to design and implement a CMI for the top medical 
and non-medical management in the AMC and 2) to gain in-depth design-oriented 
knowledge about a CMI (see Section 1.4). Below will be evaluated to what extent these 
objectives have been achieved
1. To design and implement a CMI for the top medical and non-medical management in 
the AMC
The first objective was to design and implement a CMI for the top medical and non-
medical management of the AMC. This objective has been largely achieved. During 
the case study, an advanced CMI has been designed, with different aims, information 
products, and applications (see Chapter 7) that were accessible to all top managers. 
However, the intention was to make the different information products available through 
the same prevailing business intelligence tool (Cognos), but this failed. Several (medical) 
managers found Cognos too complex to work with, even after they had received training 
(see Section 6.3.1). As a result, we decided to design separate information products for 
the (medical) managers, which were ready made and contained information at a highly 
aggregated level, and to design advanced and detailed information products in Cognos 
for the business analysts to support the managers. 
The research was primarily targeted at the management level of chief physicians, division 
managers, and central managers because they were considered to be the key decision-
makers of the CMI and therefore its most important target group of the CMI. However, 
during research project it became clear that the CMI, and its underlying (big) database, 
was also relevant for other target groups, such as managers at lower levels (head of sales 
department, chiefs of the (poli)clinics, head nurses), staff members (physicians), business 
office employees, DBC consultants, and clinical researchers. Although we provided 
some examples of their use of the CMI, we decided not to include them as target groups 
in order to keep the scope limited. Furthermore, to obtain a good representation of the 
different types of medical specialties and top managers, the CMI was designed for and 
implemented at all clinical medical specialties and divisions (contemplative, surgical 
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and supporting specialties). All top managers of these entities were invited to participate 
in the interim (Section 5.4) and end reflection (Section 8.2). In both reflections, the 
response was very high, 97% and 85%, respectively, and therefore the responders 
formed a good representation of the top management of different types of medical (sub) 
specialties. However, a limitation was that only the clinical specialties that registered 
Diagnosis Treatment Combinations (DBCs) were included, and not the supporting 
medical departments such as laboratory, diagnostics, operating rooms, and intensive 
care. Therefore these departments felt less involved in the project, whereas the CMI 
could also provide good opportunities for them, for example, with planning. 
The CMI was designed to support the (medical) managers in all phases of the strategic 
management cycle (see Section 7.2). In retrospect, it can be concluded that the CMI 
was especially used by the managers for gaining insight, monitoring, stimulating the 
dialogue about the case-mix (internal legitimation), and decision support; see Figures 
8.16b - 8.17b. However, no substantial and actual case-mix decisions by the managers 
immediately resulted from the functioning of a CMI (Figure 8.19). Factors that 
hindered real case-mix decisions were perceived poor quality of the data, the complexity 
of case-mix processes, less urgent needs and possibilities for changing the case-mix and 
that in practice, many decisions were still made on the basis of “wheeling and dealing” 
between. Besides, several types of necessary information could not be supported by a 
CMI because the data were not available in the systems, such as qualitative data. The 
CMI was to some extent also used for planning purposes, but only by central managers 
(the concern controller) and at a highly aggregated level. Although the CMI was 
technically capable of being used for detailed planning, for example, for the preparation 
of financial and capacity budgets, this happened only exceptionally. Explanations for 
this were that output budgeting was ultimately not implemented and the historically 
based budgeting did not require an advanced planning tool. Furthermore, the CMI 
data were not considered reliable enough to be used for planning purposes. The CMI 
was also used by central managers for negotiations with insurers, but mainly at a highly 
aggregated level because the agreements still focused on global budgets rather than 
specific DBC products.
The moment in time was a relevant contextual factor for the research project because it 
had a major impact on the results. The research took place just after the implementation 
of the health care reforms, which included the introduction of a new reimbursement 
system, the product structure, and the liberalization of care. There was a mixture of a 
complex internal environment and a chaotic outside world. Several organizational and 
environmental variables were very unstable and unpredictable in the course of time. 
For example, during the research period, the plans for hospital reforms and the DBC 
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product structure changed continuously, the negotiations with health care insurers were 
finalized at a very late date, the plan for internal performance-based budgeting was 
abandoned, the composition of Board of Directors changed, and (medical) managers 
had to get used to the new era of the liberalization of care. Eventually, the free market 
of hospital care did not really come through. As a result, the aims of the CMI changed 
during the research project, as did the basic material to design it, such as the DBC 
data, data sources, and definitions. These factors complicated the design of the CMI 
and implied that eventually some goals of the CMI such as making case-mix decisions 
and budgeting could not fully be achieved (see Section 6.4) and examined. Although 
this is unfortunate, unpredictable time-related events are is inherent to longitudinal 
design-oriented research. On the other hand, there were some positive, unexpected 
developments, which provided new opportunities, such as the use of the CMI for the 
preparation of the administrative merger with the VUmc, determining national rates, 
and cost-effectiveness studies.
Finally, it is difficult to determine and quantify exactly what the impact of the CMI 
has been on the user and the organization. The design and implementation of the CMI 
project was one out of a set of measures taken by the Board of Directors as a response to 
the increasing competition and financial pressure and we cannot provide hard evidence 
on which measure independently contributed to what outcome. However, based on the 
extensive interim and end reflections we can conclude that y the CMI has increased and 
improved the available information regarding patient groups enormously, and that this 
information has contributed to a more systematic thinking about the case-mix, better 
insights, better registrations, more and better external legitimization, increasing cost 
consciousness, increasing transparency, cost reductions and better rates (A-list DBCs), 
see Section 8.3. However, to obtain more robust (statistical) evidence of the positive 
effects of CMIs, additional research in other (academic) hospitals is necessary.
2. To gain in-depth design-oriented knowledge about a CMI
This research contributed in several ways to the knowledge about CMIs, both for the 
management accounting discipline and practice. First, this is the first scientific research 
project on CMIs conducted in the context of Dutch university medical centers (UMCs). 
This context was unique with regard to the type of environment (Dutch hospital sector), 
the reimbursement system (DBC system), the type of organization (UMCs), and in 
terms of momentum (just after the introduction of health care reforms). Through this 
research we gained knowledge of the possible applications, outcomes, and success-
determining factors of the CMI in this specific context and could relate this knowledge 
to the conclusions of similar studies in other countries (see Section 10.2). 
Second, this research related to both the design and the implementation of a CMI, 
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whereas prior accounting research mostly focused on the implementation of an already 
designed CMI. In addition, this research related to an information system where medical 
information, patient information and financial information was integrated, whereas 
many other studies concerned information systems focusing on specific topics such as 
patient or cost (accounting). This resulted in new design knowledge of CMIs. Through 
continuous iterations in the reflective cycle, we gained knowledge about what types 
and combinations of information were useful to whom and about how the information 
system could be implemented in a responsible way. The study demonstrated that a CMI 
can fulfil multiple functions for multiple stakeholders at the same time. Through the 
research the advantages and disadvantages of self-design of a CMI by a UMC became 
apparent (see Section 8.3). 
Third, the outcomes and the success factors of a CMI were examined in-depth, with 
both qualitative and quantitative methods. As a result, detailed insights were gained 
about the factors that hindered or facilitated the success of the CMI, and about the 
ways these obstructions could be reduced. We extensively examined the process of case-
mix decision-making, and discovered why dramatic changes in the case-mix cannot be 
expected of the implementation of a CMI in UMCs. The conclusions on this topic were 
complementary to the ones in previously mentioned studies on CMIs in other than 
UMCs contexts (Chapter 3). The study also explained why a CMI performs particularly 
as a dialogue and learning machine and not as an answering machine. Finally, this 
research clarified that a CMI can have a direct impact on the organization and its 
practitioners, both in positive and negative ways, and it demonstrated that the design 
and implementation of a CMI should be evidence-based.
9.3 Reflection on the research methodology
Until now, design-oriented research was scarcely focused on (case-mix) accounting 
systems in the health care sector (see Section 4.2). Reflecting on the design-oriented 
research methodology the following issues arise.
1. Design-oriented research contributes to new and relevant knowledge in the field of 
management accounting 
Design-oriented research is widely used in technical sciences, mathematics, and clinical 
medicine, but scarcely in management accounting research (Kasanen et al, 1993; 
Vosselman, 1996). On the basis of this study it can be concluded that design-oriented 
research can also be of high value in the accounting discipline, particularly but not 
exclusively in the domain of health care. Design-oriented research distinguishes itself 
from positive accounting research because it is inherently a goal-directed problem-
solving activity and because of its normative or prescriptive nature (Kasanen et al, 
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1993). It always entails an attempt to explicitly demonstrate the practical usability of the 
constructed solution. In this research project, the problem-solving process took place 
in practice through the design and implementation of a CMI in close operation with 
the target groups of top medical and non-medical managers. This resulted in a usefully 
operating CMI that produced solutions to explicit problems for many managers, i.e. a 
lack of case-mix information in the multiple phases in the strategic management cycle. 
Furthermore, with continuous iterations of the reflective cycle we gained new and 
more in-depth knowledge about the outcomes of the CMI and the factors explaining 
its success in this specific context (See Chapters 5, 6, and 8). Another advantage was 
that the effects of certain variables could be observed rapidly and interventions could 
be used for further improvement. Furthermore, the active involvement of the users in 
the design, implementation, and evaluation phases, and the use of qualitative research 
methods (interviews, and ‘being around’) ensured that a lot of focus could be on human 
and social aspects. Topics such as behavior, opinions, power struggles, and resistance 
could be addressed (Briers and Chua, 2001). Finally, the gained knowledge could be 
translated well into guidelines for practitioners in the focal field (see further Section 
10.3). As a result, this study met both the criteria of scholarly quality and managerial 
relevance (Van Aken, 2005).
From this research it can be concluded that the design-oriented research methodology 
may be further improved by adding extensive reflections to the regulative cycle (see 
Section 4.4) as described in the mainstream literature on design-oriented research 
(Heusinkveld & Reijers 2009; Vosselman, 1996). The aim of these improvements is to 
reflect extensively over a longer period of time and to gain contemplative knowledge 
about several topics. The opinions of the project are requested from all the people in the 
target group of the (information) innovation, and not only from the people in the pilots, 
thus creating a more representative picture. This is of particular relevance if a design 
project lasts several years.
2.  Design-oriented research is both qualitative and quantitative
We believe that adding quantitative methods will increase the legitimation of design-
oriented research, which is still not very strong (Heusinkveld & Reijers, 2009). To 
support the results of the qualitative methods, we performed two comprehensive surveys 
using self-report questionnaires that consisted of a mix of open and closed questions. The 
questionnaires during the interim reflections were specially used as preparation for the 
semi-structured interviews so that the participants could be focused on specific topics. 
The quantitative data of the interim and end reflections were only analyzed using simple 
descriptive statistics. Due to the relative small sample size and the large number of 
(sometime unplanned) comparisons no formal statistical testing on score differences was 
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performed. Neither were we able to analyse the (independent) impact of success factors 
on the outcomes of the CMI using univariable and multivariable statistical techniques. 
In future design-oriented research, both an appropriate sample size calculation and a 
thoughtful statistical analysis plan are needed as basis and guide for a more advanced 
statistical approach to validate the results of the qualitative part of the study.
3. Design-oriented research requires a rather stable context
Design-oriented research is essentially a process of gaining knowledge (theories) on 
the basis of reflection on the functioning of the regulative cycle (Vosselman, 1996). 
Advantages of this methodology include that it is a structured organizational problem-
solving process that continues until a satisfactory solution crystallizes that works well 
for the specified class of problems (Heusinkveld & Reijers; 2009). This methodology 
requires a rather stable environment. However, in the CMI-project study several 
organizational and environmental variables were very unstable and unpredictable, see 
Section 2.4. For example, in the course of time the national plans for hospital reforms 
and the DBC product structure changed continuously and dramatically, resulting 
in much-delayed agreements with insurers on DBC prices and volumes and in the 
abandonment of internal DBC-based budgeting. So, according to the definition by 
Snowden & Boone (2007) the context of our research project was rather chaotic. In 
a chaotic context, searching for the right answers becomes pointless: the relationships 
between cause and effect are impossible to determine because they shift constantly and 
no manageable patterns exist—only turbulence. This complicated not only the design 
and implementation of the CMI, but also the exploration of the relationships between 
success factors and outcomes of the CMI. The research variables were constantly 
moving targets. Although we realize that in each empirical research the context will be 
dynamic, we conclude that for design-oriented research a certain degree of stability in 
an organization and environment is required. Beyond those limits, different research 
strategies may be needed. It would be interesting for future research to examine the 
conditions under which design-oriented research can be conducted in the management 
accounting discipline. 
9.4 Reflection on the role of the researcher
The researcher also worked as project leader and as senior advisor to the Board of 
Directors. These multiple roles had several advantages. First, the researcher had a 
thorough understanding of the external and internal context of an UMC, its management 
structure and the organization-related problems. Second, the prolonged personal contact 
between the researcher and the (medical) managers contributed to trust in relationships 
and to a thorough understanding of the managers’ problems, needs, behavior, skills, 
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and opinions. Furthermore, because of his position, the researcher was in continuous 
contact with the research environment. He observed events and processes that might 
be relevant to his research; he had easy access to people, systems, and information, 
and could easily confirm his research findings in practice. However, there were also 
disadvantages of combining work and research in the same field. 
First, in the case of research, there were risks of bias and preconceptions of the results 
because in his role as project leader the researcher might be too strongly involved in 
the project to be objective; and related to his role as senior advisor, he might be not 
independent enough. Moreover, the managers involved in the study were also clients of 
the senior advisor. So the risk existed that they would give strategically or politically correct 
answers. Several measures were taken to reduce these risks of biases as much as possible. 
Triangulation of research methods was used by collecting data from multiple sources, 
like questionnaires, interviews, and by ‘being around’ (see Section 4.4). Furthermore, 
all participants were guaranteed anonymity to ensure that they could honestly say what 
they thought and did not have to be afraid that the results would be used against them. 
Finally, the conclusions of this research were presented to several experts of the AMC to 
test the reliability, completeness, and relevance. Second, the combination of work and 
research made it difficult to share the priorities and available time on these activities. In 
general, daily work received the highest priority, as it often concerned urgent problems 
that called for immediate action. Research was focused on the long term and, in this 
case, had no hard deadline. Therefore, at certain moments, research activities had to be 
postponed or abandoned because there was no time available.
9.5 The applicability of the case study results to other university medical 
centers
This research at the AMC showed that the outcomes of the CMI were partly influenced 
by a number of organization related factors, such as, the existing organization culture, 
organization structure, ICT facilities, Planning & control process, and Board of 
Directors (see Section 8.3). Since these factors may differ per UMC, the results of our 
case study are not automatically generalizable to other UMCs. On the other hand, 
there are several important similarities between the AMC and the other Dutch UMCs: 
all perform the same core tasks, all are large organizations, all staff is employed and all 
were and are confronted with the same hospital care reforms. From this perspective, it 
could be expected that the knowledge gained at the AMC was applicable for the other 
UMCs, at least to a certain extent. To test the external validity of the results, a secondary 
case study was conducted at the University Medical Centre in Groningen (UMCG) 
in 2010 and 2011. During the study, the AMC’s Portfolio Matrix was redesigned and 
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implemented. In 2014, the design knowledge with regard to the Portfolio Matrix was 
also shared with the Free University Medical Centre (VUmc) in the context of the 
intended administrative merger. On the basis of the findings from these UMCs, several 
interesting insights were gained, which are described below.
9.5.1 The University Medical Center of Groningen (UMCG)
In 2010, the UMCG (located in the north of the Netherlands; 9003 FTE per 2013) 
was asked to participate in a design-oriented research project. The UMCG was selected 
because AMC and UMCG were not direct competitors in the field of patient care and 
were therefore legally allowed to share knowledge about strategic tools such as a CMI 
system. The Board of Directors of the UMCG decided to adopt the AMC’s Portfolio 
Matrix (see Section 7.3.2) because they assumed the matrix could contribute to the 
dialogue about case-mix decisions. From the perspective of the AMC researcher, the 
Portfolio Matrix was considered an excellent product for testing its applicability in 
another setting because it represented the key elements of the AMC’s CMI: it was 
based on DBCs, it contained both quantitative (financial) and qualitative (relevance) 
information, the information was presented per patient group, and it was a new way of 
visualizing information. 
The case study UMCG
During the study, the AMC’s Portfolio Matrix was redesigned (tailored to the UMCG 
organization) and implemented at a selected number of medical specialties by passing 
through the regulative cycle. It was expected that by going through the same process for 
this, selected information products would create insight into the extent to which the 
success factors and outcomes matched or differed from the AMC and where revision 
or addition to the gained design knowledge was desirable. Similar to the AMC, the 
reflection took place by means of a survey using self-report questionnaires, followed by 
semi-structured interviews. In total, 14 (medical) managers participated: seven chief 
physicians, seven division managers and two central managers. The medical specialties 
varied with regard to size.  
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The regulative cycle UMCG 2010 - 2011
In 2010 the Portfolio Matrix of the AMC was evaluated by a project group30.1 The 
conclusion was that some adjustments were necessary. First, the way in which the 
relevance scores per patient group were determined in the AMC was considered as too 
personal and subjective and had to be more objectified by quantitative data. There was 
also a strong need to measure and assess the medical specialties in a uniform manner. 
For the determination of the relevance of the patient groups, data were collected, such 
as percentages of top referral, top clinical and basic care, publications in top journals, 
principal investigators and research funding of the last three years. The chief physicians 
were still responsible for the determination of the final relevance scores per core task, 
but if these scores differed significantly from the quantitative data they had to motivate 
it. Second, the axis of the Portfolio Matrix of the AMC were converted to make it their 
‘own’ product and the size of the bulbs represented the turnover per patient group, 
rather than the number of patients as used in the AMC. Like the AMC, the Portfolio 
Matrix was (re)designed and tested first by a pilot group consisting of nine medical 
specialties31,2 a mix of contemplative, surgical and supporting medical specialties. 
The Portfolio Matrix was designed for the pilot specialties and evaluated by the pilot 
group. The pilot specialties considered the Portfolio Matrix as useful and necessary 
(UMCG, 2010). It gave new insights and facilitated the discussion about the strategic 
focus. A large part of the project group indicated that the use of Portfolio Matrix 
should be mandatory for all medical specialties. Based on this evaluation, the Board 
of Directors decided to roll out the Portfolio Matrix corporate wide. In 2011, the 
process for generating the portfolio matrices was further automated. The definition of 
patient groups on the basis of DBC production could be done by the chief physicians 
themselves in Cognos323by using criteria as type of diagnosis, method of treatment and 
age. Furthermore, detailed data were made available at the patient level in Cognos, such 
as the care products and underlying care activities. In 2011 the Portfolio Matrix were 
designed and implemented for all major medical specialties. The matrices were available 
for the chief physicians of the medical specialties, the division (or sector) managers, 
the Board of Directors and the Finance & Control department. These matrices were 
discussed between the medical specialties and Board of Directors during the budgeting 
process
30The project group consisted of the director of Finance & Control, a sector manager, staff members of 
Finance & Control and the researcher of this thesis.
31Cardiology, Otolaryngology, Obstetrics and Gynaecology. Radiotherapy, Cardiothoracic Surgery, Gastro-
enterology, Urology
32The UMCG used Cognos as management information system, like the AMC. Cognos is a brand name 
used by IBM for activities in the field of business intelligence and business performance management. 
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Interim reflection 
 In the second half of 2011, a limited interim reflection on the project had taken place 
by the researcher. In total, twelve (medical) managers participated, consisting of seven 
chief physicians, seven division (or cluster) managers and two central managers. The 
medical specialties334varied with regard to size, and extent of free market. Similar to the 
AMC, the reflection took place by means of questionnaires, followed by semi-structured 
interviews. 
With regard to the design of the Portfolio Matrix, respondents were positive about the 
way in which the relevance scores were determined. There was much support for the 
supplementary data as selected by the staff convent and the allocation of these data to 
patient groups was fairly simple. Chief departments were pleased that they could give 
the final scores. However, there were serious concerns about the quality of the financial 
data used for the Portfolio Matrix, especially the cost data. Few specialties had been 
involved in the calculations so far. An important difference with the AMC was that 
one was largely positive about the quality of the DBC data. This was explained by the 
fact that the UMCG had come significantly into financial difficulties in the past due 
to poor registrations. Since then there had been great emphasis on proper registration. 
Furthermore, it was indicated by the respondents that they had insufficient access to the 
underlying data. 
Regarding the design and implementation strategy, it became clear the UMCG had 
substantially benefited from the AMC; this was already a product that had proven itself 
in practice. If medical specialties had criticism about the Portfolio Matrix this could 
be countered with: “it worked in the AMC too, so why not here”. Furthermore, it was 
appreciated that the staff convent was actively involved in the design and implementation 
process. Finally, as in the AMC the ownership of the design and implementation process 
was transferred to just a few people so knowledge was very concentrated. That made the 
process vulnerable. 
Concerning the (medical) managers, many factors played a role when making case-mix 
decisions and had a more or less equivalent impact. On balance, case-mix decisions 
were mainly based on available expertise and (academic) medical content (tertiary care, 
scientific profiling). Developments in other hospitals and meeting basis care obligations 
were considered as relatively least relevant. These findings were rather in line with the 
AMC. One important difference was that finance (cost/returns) had relatively more 
impact on the decision than in the AMC. With regard to the decision-making power
33 Paediatrics, Internal Medicine, Surgery, Obstetrics & Gynaecology, Neurology, Ophthalmology, 
Radiotherapy, Neurosurgery
 
Reflection on research design and researcher 
C
ha
pt
er
 9
293
 there was a relevant difference between the UMCG and AMC. In the UMC, the staff 
convent (the representation of the medical staff) had relatively a lot of power. They 
had an important advisory role towards the Board of Directors, but also votes in their 
decisions, so also about the adoption of the Portfolio Matrix. On balance, the chief 
physicians and divisions managers indicated that the Board of directors supported the 
project rather well. They appreciated the several meetings which were organized to 
inform them and discuss the Portfolio Matrix. 
With regard to competition pressure the overall conclusion was that there was moderate 
perceived competition pressure, less than the AMC. However, there were some interesting 
differences with the AMC. The UMCG was located in a different region (the north of the 
Netherlands) with just a few care suppliers in the health care market. There was only one 
other hospital within 30 kilometers, while the AMC had twelve other hospitals within 
this range. As a result, the UMCG experienced little competitive pressure. The UMCG 
fulfilled an important regional function and therefore the less complex patients were also 
referred to them because there was no alternative. This reduced their opportunities to 
manage the case-mix. Financial pressure was experienced more at the current time than 
competition pressure and it was expected that this would increase. 
The majority of the respondents used the CMI once or twice, probably when drawing 
up the annual plans. Like the AMC, the Portfolio Matrix was mainly used by the chief 
physicians and division managers for getting more insight and internal legitimation and 
to a lesser extent for decision support. The main advantages of the Portfolio Matrix were 
that it was a good tool to conduct dialogue (mentioned six times) on medical policy, 
and to legitimize themselves on their activities (mentioned five times mentioned). It 
had mainly increased insights in the financial aspects of the case-mix. Like the AMC, 
the medical specialties also experienced several disadvantages from the Portfolio Matrix. 
Doubts on the quality of the data, a mismatch with other information reports and 
insufficient understanding of the interrelationship with other specialties were the most 
mentioned disadvantages (four, three, and three mentioned respectively). Another 
barrier was that they could hardly influence the cost of the support units, while they 
had a significant impact on the total cost of the patient groups. Furthermore, they 
had hardly any influence on the negotiations with health insurers and therefore on the 
financial coverage for their specialty. The Portfolio Matrix was only used shortly and 
therefore it was difficult to indicate the effects of it. Some effects mentioned were that 
it had led to increased budget (mentioned two times), change in type of mentioned 
once) and change in volume of patients (mentioned once). Furthermore, the Portfolio 
Matrix had sometimes confirmed case-mix decisions which were taken earlier. The 
overall perceptions of the success of the Portfolio Matrix differed per respondent. Some 
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respondents found it already successful because they had experienced the positive effects 
of it. Others found it too premature to draw conclusions. In general, the Portfolio Matrix 
was seen as a useful tool for the future, especially if the reliability of the data improved, 
more detailed information was generated and real consequences were attached to it by 
the Board of Directors.
The regulative cycle UMCG 2012 - 2014
During 2012 and 2014 only minor adjustments were made. The process to generate 
the portfolio matrices was a completely automated system as a result of these matrices 
being able to be generated directly by the medical specialty. Furthermore, new reports 
were designed in Cognos which enabled a drill down to the underlying data per patient 
group, including the data as used for the determination of the relevance scores. The 
matrices and underlying data were updated once a year. Like the AMC, it was the 
intention to introduce full internal output budgeting by coupling the internal budgets 
to the external revenues of the DOT production, but this failed too. The problem was 
that because of the continuous and dramatic changes in the DBC product structures 
and associated selling prices in the previous years, there were too few (comparable) 
data and too many uncertainties to implement output budgeting in a responsible way. 
This reduced the usefulness of the Portfolio Matrix. Despite this, in 2014 the Portfolio 
Matrices were still used for the budget meetings between the Board of Directors and 
the medical specialties. Furthermore, the language of the patient groups was also used 
for other purposes such as sales budgets and negotiations with health insurers. Finally, a 
UMCG-wide steering committee was introduced (chaired by the president of the staff 
convent) to advise the Board of Directors on case-mix decisions and sales contracts for 
the following years. The rationale behind this was that these decisions can be better 
taken at the corporate level then at the specialty level, because each chief physician will 
try to obtain the maximum result for their specialty, but this might be suboptimal at 
corporate level.
Conclusions
Based on this case study, it was concluded that the design-oriented knowledge about 
the CMI, as gained at the AMC, was rather applicable at the UMCG. As a result, 
the adapted Portfolio Matrix could be implemented fairly quickly. In line with the 
AMC, the Portfolio Matrix was seen as a powerful tool because it contributed to more 
awareness, more insight in the case-mix and registrations, and better dialogues about 
patient care. Furthermore, as at the AMC, the UMCG’s (medical) managers experienced 
several barriers when using the Portfolio Matrix. The quality of the data was generally 
perceived as poor (mainly the cost information and as a result they also decided not 
to use this product for allocating budgets to the medical specialties. However, the case 
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study also gave some indications that significant differences existed between the AMC 
and UMCG, which had an impact on the outcomes of the CMI. For example, the 
factors that were taken into account when making case-mix decisions seemed to differ 
between the medical centers and led to different needs for case-mix information. For the 
managers at the UMCG, information about the health care market was considered to be 
less relevant than at the AMC, because there is much less competition in the rural region 
of Groningen than in the urban region of Amsterdam. On the other hand, UMCG 
managers attached more value to financial information than the AMC managers. 
Furthermore, some differences were observed with regard to the level of support from 
the Board of Directors, the (perceived) quality of the DBC data, and the organization’s 
culture. For example, at the UMCG, more importance was attached to the objectivity 
of the data and obligatory use of the CMI. These differences in organization and culture 
between both organizations showed that the results of our case study at the AMC are not 
per definition generalizable to other UMC settings. 
Table 9.1 presents the similarities and differences between the AMC and UMCG in 
relation to the success factors of a CMI system as observed by the researcher during the 
two case-studies. 
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9.5.2 Free University Medical Center (VUmc)
In 2014, in the context of the preparation of the administrative merger between AMC 
and VUmc, the classification of patient groups at the AMC (see Section 7.5.1) was used 
to cluster the DBC data of both AMC and VUmc in the same way and presented to the 
joint chief physicians of the medical specialties by ‘plots’ (see Section 6.3.2). Because of 
this, insight was gained about which patient groups overlapped or which complemented 
each other’s activities. The classification of AMC patient groups turned out to be very 
usable for the chief physicians of the VUmc and was only minimally adapted to identify 
specific patients at the VUmc.  
Furthermore, in 2015 the VUmc adopted the Portfolio Matrix for the same reasons as 
the AMC and UMCG. The increasing pressure on resources and competition encouraged 
them to make clear case-mix decisions and they lacked the right tools to support these. 
There were some tools available, but these were mainly qualitative in nature and were only 
related to the (research) focus points, and not to all (basic care) activities. Like the AMC 
and UMCG, the Portfolio Matrix was mainly adopted to facilitate the dialogue about 
the case-mix, especially between the Board of Directors and the chief physicians of the 
medical specialties. The (re)design and implementation of the Portfolio Matrix took place 
through the Strategy and Innovation Department of the VUmc. They adjusted the AMC’s 
Portfolio Matrix in several ways. In line with the UMCG, the Board of Directors of the 
VUmc attached more value to quantitative system data to be used in the Portfolio Matrix 
than the qualitative non-system data at the AMC. After comparing several options, the 
VUmc decided to design two alternative portfolio matrices with alternative axes. One 
matrix consisted of the axes: ‘% top referral care’ and ‘% financial coverage.’ The percentage 
of top referral care was based on a methodology as agreed between the UMCs and the 
Ministry of Health (the so-called Robijn labels). The percentage of financial coverage 
was chosen as the criterion to increase cost awareness and to improve registrations. The 
other matrix consisted of the axes: ‘% top referral care’ and ‘% market share.’ The axes 
were selected because they were objective and rather stable in the course of time. Another 
argument was that the percentage of top referral care was accepted by the environment 
and was considered to be the prevailing measure. In both matrices, the patient groups 
were based on the formal ICD-10 classification rather than on the classifications by the 
chief physicians. Based on the results of the Portfolio Matrices, the Board of Directors 
prioritized seven medical specialties to discuss the case-mix with. In addition to the design 
of the portfolio matrices, the VUmc took various measures to enable changes in the case-
mix, such as making long-term agreements with health care insurers and other health 
care suppliers in the care chain, such as general hospitals and general practitioners. Like 
the AMC and the UMCG, the VUmc concluded that the Portfolio Matrix provided new 
insights and contributed to better dialogues about the case-mix.
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9.5.3 Conclusions
The comparisons between the three UMCs showed some similarities and differences. 
The similarities were that the Portfolio Matrix was considered a powerful tool because it 
presented their case-mix in a simple way and contributed to the dialogue about case-mix 
decisions. Therefore we conclude that the Portfolio Matrix can be implemented at a wide 
range of academic health care settings However, in the design and implementation of 
the portfolio matrices, different choices were made. The differences were determined by 
different factors such as differences in the characteristics of the Board of Directors and 
in organization culture. The VUmc chose a top-down strategy with little participation 
from the medical specialties in the design process and used only (objective) quantitative 
data. The AMC went for a bottom-up strategy with much participation from the 
medical specialties and used both quantitative data and also qualitative, subjective, data. 
Each design and implementation strategy, and alternative of the AMC Portfolio Matrix 
will have advantages and disadvantages. In the future, it would be interesting to study 
the strengths and weaknesses of the different design and implementation strategies to 
determine to what extent these approaches can be standardized or should be tailored to 
a specific UMC organization. 
Applicability of the case study results to Dutch general hospitals
This research only took place at academic hospitals. It can be expected that the outcomes 
of this case study are to a large extent also applicable to general hospitals. Similar to 
UMCs, general hospitals were and are confronted with hospital care reforms, have 
joined the DBC system, and face increasing competition and financial pressure that 
will undoubtedly increase their need for more, and better, case-mix information. 
However, there are some major differences between UMCs and general hospitals. First, 
the differences in core tasks between UMCs and general hospitals may have an impact 
on the design of the CMI. In UMCs, patient care, research, and education are much 
more integrated than in general hospitals. This means that other factors have to be taken 
into account when making case-mix decisions, which need to be incorporated into the 
CMI. Second, there are differences in type of employment of (medical) managers: in 
UMCs, all managers are in paid employment, including the (chief ) physicians, whereas 
in many general hospitals, the (chief ) physicians are self-employed and linked with 
hospitals through contracts. This means that physicians in UMCs have fixed salaries, 
whereas the salaries of physicians in contractual partnerships are directly linked to 
the DOT production. That implies that physicians in general hospitals receive other 
financial incentives than physicians in UMCs do and this may have an impact on their 
information needs. 
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Because of the differences in type of organization and employment, it can also be 
expected that there are differences between chief physicians in UMCs and general 
hospitals with regard to attitudes, entrepreneurship, management style, and skills, which 
may also affect the content, adoption and use of the CMI. Third, the differences in types 
of patients between UMCs and general hospitals may also have a profound impact on 
the CMI. UMCs treat more highly complex patients (with rare diseases) and treatment 
options are more interwoven with other specialties than in general hospitals. These 
differences affect the extent to which the case-mix can be managed, the medical and 
financial responsibilities can be assigned to medical specialties, and case-mix information 
can be standardized. 
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Abstract
In this chapter, the implications of the research project as regards to the management 
accounting discipline are presented. The main design-oriented knowledge claims from 
the case study are described, and we explore whether the knowledge gained was in line 
with the literature and research findings of other research groups. To further expand 
the knowledge of CMIs in health care settings, several suggestions and directions for 
future research are given. Finally, the design-oriented knowledge gained was translated 
into practical guidelines (or recommendations) for a successful implementation of a 
CMI in Dutch university hospitals (UMCs). The guidelines are meant for practitioners 
who can directly or indirectly influence the success of CMIs in UMCs, such as hospital 
managers (Board of Directors, division managers, chief physicians, project managers, IT 
managers) and regulators, (Ministry of Health and health authorities such as the NZa 
and ACM).
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10.1 Introduction
During the case study period, a CMI was iteratively designed and implemented in the 
AMC (Research objective one). The regulative cycle was passed through several times and 
the CMI project was extensively reflected on facilitating and obstructing success factors 
and a range of primary and secondary outcomes. As a result, we gained in-depth design-
oriented knowledge about a CMI (Research objective two).
Section 10.2 summarizes the implications of the research project with regard to the 
management accounting discipline. It describes the main design-oriented knowledge 
claims that can be derived from this case study; it assesses whether the knowledge matches 
with or differs from the existing body of knowledge about CMIs in the management 
accounting discipline, and how this knowledge is complementary. Furthermore, our 
analyses in this study were not complete and left several questions unanswered. Therefore, 
suggestions for future research are given to expand the design-oriented knowledge of 
accounting in health care. Finally, in Section 10.3 the gained knowledge is translated 
into practical guidelines for a successful implementation of a CMI in Dutch university 
medical centers (UMCs). 
10.2 Implications for the management accounting discipline
This study contributes in several ways to the management accounting discipline and 
has several practical implications (see Table 10.1). First, through this research we gained 
in-depth knowledge of the possible benefits of a CMI in the context of Dutch UMCs 
(Implication 1). It demonstrated that the (DBC-based) market mechanisms can be a 
driving force for UMCs to change their organization, but there are also characteristics 
of market mechanisms that can reduce or even obstruct the process of management 
accounting change and the success of a CMI (Implication 2). Second, this research 
related to both the design and the implementation of a CMI, whereas prior accounting 
research mostly focused on the implementation of an already designed CMI. This resulted 
in new design knowledge of CMIs. Through continuous iterations in the reflective cycle, 
we gained in-depth knowledge about what types and combinations of information are 
useful to whom and about how the information system could be implemented in a 
responsible way. The study demonstrates that a CMI can fulfill multiple functions 
for multiple stakeholders at the same time (Implication 3). Through the research the 
advantages and disadvantages of self-design of a CMI by a UMC became apparent. 
Third, the outcomes and the success factors of a CMI were examined in-depth, with 
both qualitative and quantitative methods. As a result, detailed insights were gained 
about the factors that hindered or facilitated the success of a CMI, and about the ways 
through which obstructions can be reduced (Implications 4 - 9). Finally, we conclude 
that the design and implementation of a CMI should be approached in a scientific way 
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(Implication 10). To achieve this, the gained design-oriented knowledge was translated 
into practical guidelines for a successful implementation of a CMI in Dutch (university) 
hospitals (see Section 10.3). The guidelines are meant for hospital managers (Board of 
Directors, medical managers, chief physicians, project managers, IT managers) as well as 
regulators (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and other health authorities such 
as the NZa and ACM), who can directly or indirectly influence the success of CMIs in 
hospitals.
Table 10.1 summarizes the general implications of this research. It provides the main 
design-oriented knowledge claims that can be derived from the case study.
Table 10.1: General implications
1 With a CMI, significant benefits can be achieved for Dutch university medical centers
2 Market mechanisms can promote but also reduce and obstruct the success of a CMI
3 A CMI can serve multiple stakeholders in multiple phases of the strategic management cycle
4 The decision-support function of a CMI varies between types of information
5 No substantial case-mix changes can be expected in UMCs because of a CMI
6 Cultural, structural, and practical barriers can obstruct the functioning of a CMI
7 Negative effects of a CMI are inevitable but can be reduced
8 Using a CMI requires the logic of management and this can be problematic for medical managers
9 Managers are mainly interested in case-mix information on topics they can control and are 
responsible for
10 The design and implementation of a CMI should be approached in a scientific way
1. With a CMI, significant benefits can be achieved for Dutch university medical 
centers
This research demonstrated that in the context of the Dutch UMCs, a CMI can be 
successfully implemented and can have significant benefits. Several benefits were similar 
to those found in earlier studies in other countries regarding CMIs (Abernethy et al, 
2007; Lehtonen, 2007; Lowe, 20001; Lowe & Doolin, 1999; Reid, 2013; Scarparo, 
2006; Sumner & Moreland, 1995) or to similar (cost) accounting systems in hospitals 
(Abernethy and Vagnoni, 2004; Coombs, 1987; Hill, 2000; Kurunmäki, 2003; Lapsley 
& Wright, 2004; Nyland & Pettersen, 2004; Pettersen & Solstad, 2014). The benefits 
included better insights about the case-mix, improved dialogues about care, process 
optimization, more cost awareness, efficiency gains, and better external legitimization. 
In addition to prior studies, some other benefits were detected. The mere process of 
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designing a CMI can have positive effects, regardless of the outcomes of this process. 
The definition of patient groups and the minimal dataset used by chief physicians 
appeared to contribute to more awareness about the relevance and distinctiveness of 
their case-mix. Also the opinions of chief physicians were made explicit. Furthermore, 
the CMI triggered users to improve their registrations and cost calculations. Also, new 
types of insights were gained, such as the interdependency between medical specialties 
and deviations from other UMCs in the care provided. These insights were useful 
for planning purposes. An important side-effect of the study was that the underlying 
(big) database of the CMI consisting of medical, patient, and financial data provided 
new opportunities to conduct cost-effectiveness studies in the context of health care 
efficiency research. 
The case study also showed that the speed and extent to which the maximum achievable 
benefits of a CMI will actually be realized will differ per UMC, per manager and 
per medical specialty. This depends on a number of success factors related to design, 
implementation, organization and environment. The success factors studied were selected 
by combining the strengths of earlier models of the implementation of cost-management 
systems (Shields, 1995), accounting information systems (Gordon & Miller, 1976) 
and clinical guidelines (Grol, 1997, 2001). Extant scientific research regarding clinical 
guidelines appeared to be very useful for research on CMIs because guideline research 
is about implementing innovations for doctors (or medical managers) with the aim of 
changing their behavior. The technical capabilities of a CMI can be optimized when 
market mechanisms actually gets going, when the DBC system becomes more stable, 
and when the quality of the data improves, so that a CMI can actually be used for 
case-mix decision-making, budgeting, and sales strategy. It would be interesting in the 
future to research the use and effects of the CMI again when this situation realized. New 
electronic patient systems (like EPIC) will also create new opportunities for the design 
of CMIs in the future because new types of data, such as patient health outcomes, can 
be documented. The next step could be to add these registered health outcomes to a 
CMI, and to analyze the processes and structures behind each activity to help optimize 
the outcomes of your outcome measures. By learning from data it will be possible to 
identify and disseminate best practices in healthcare.  
We are convinced that many more benefits can be achieved from a CMI than presented in 
this study and probably the best is yet to come! Some information products, for example 
the Benchmark Analysis Resource Use profiles and Portfolio Checklist were designed 
for the (medical) managers but not yet implemented hospital-wide because of a lack of 
time, capacity, or reliable data. However, on the basis of the assessments by the (medical) 
managers, we conclude that these products have the potential to become successful. Our 
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belief in the potential of the CMI was confirmed by the fact that, in 2014, the CMI 
project was nominated for the European Porter Prize and was described as ‘a wonderful 
example of how healthcare in the Netherlands could be more sustainable.’ We hope 
this case study will motivate other researchers to further (re)design and examine these 
products. Further, in EPIC, the data were better structured and integrated than in the 
research period. Now, it became possible to link patient data with scientific research 
projects. By this, for example, the impact of case-mix decisions on research activities can 
be made visible. It might be interesting to research what the electronic patient record 
system can contribute to the success of the CMI. Moreover, it is important to further 
investigate the benefits of CMIs for target groups other than the top management level, 
for example, chiefs of the (poli)clinics, staff members (physicians), head nurses, clinical 
researchers, business office employees, DBC consultants, and head of sale departments. It 
would also be relevant for future management accounting researchers to further explore 
the benefits of CMIs, both in academic and general hospitals. It might for example be 
useful to compare the design, use, and effects of CMIs between UMCs and general 
hospitals and to determine the impact of the type of hospital, employment structure, 
and type of managers on the success of a CMI.
2. Market mechanisms can promote but also reduce and obstruct the success of a 
CMI 
Literature concerning new public management shows that in other countries the 
introduction of (DRG-based) market mechanisms in the hospital sector was for many 
hospitals an incentive to make their organization more business-like and to adopt new 
accounting technologies (Abernethy et al 2007; Doolin, 2001; Kurunmäki, 2004; 
Pettersen & Solstad, 2014; Robbins, 2007; Samuel et al, 2005). In this study we have 
gained a detailed understanding of the impact of the different characteristics of Dutch 
market mechanisms on UMCs. The results of the research confirmed earlier findings 
(Lapsley & Wright, 2004) that adoption of accounting innovations by public sector 
organizations is largely affected by government influence, and that this influence can be 
both positive and negative. In the Netherlands, the (DBC-based) market mechanisms 
were a driving force for UMCs to change their organization. All three participating 
UMCs (AMC, UMCG and VUmc) redefined their strategy, started with performance-
based budgeting, and adopted (parts of a) CMI to better support management. This 
matched with earlier research showing that six of the eight Dutch UMCs changed 
their internal budgeting system after the introduction of the DBC system (Balogh & 
Van Veen-Dirks, 2010). However, on the basis of this study it can be concluded that 
there are also characteristics of market mechanisms that can reduce or even obstruct the 
process of management accounting change and the success of a CMI.  
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The success of market mechanisms will be limited when the effects are mitigated, for 
example, by regulators or health insurers. In this case study, conditions favorable to 
competition were mainly absent and the participants experienced only moderate 
competition pressure because the market mechanisms related mainly to basic care, 
whereas the hospital market for complex care was still heavily regulated. This hardly 
changed during the research period, despite the fact that the liberalization of Dutch 
hospital care was continuously expanded and the percentage of B-list DBCs was 
substantially increased. Financial risks stemming from market pressure were experienced 
less severely than expected, because several measures were taken at different levels to 
mitigate the effects of the market pressure. Negotiations with insurers continued to 
focus primarily on the total contracting sum, with historic budgets as the starting point. 
As a result, the revenues of the UMCs were and are still more or less guaranteed. The 
agreed DBC prices only had a mathematical function and did not represent the true 
market value or costs. Apparently these developments had not led to an increase of 
this type of pressure. These findings were quite similar to an earlier study in Finland 
where market forces were introduced into the hospital sector. Despite the significant 
changes in the rules of the game, the business appeared to continue as usual with only 
slight modifications in its nature (Kurunmäki, 1999). At the end of the case study, ten 
years after the hospital care reforms, market mechanisms had barely taken off for the 
UMCs and were still ‘stuck in the middle’ between a free and regulated market. As a 
result, the effects of market mechanisms and derived incentives (motivators) to adopt a 
CMI by hospital managers were experienced as less severely than expected. The reason 
why hospital top management felt the need to adopt CMIs was mainly the increasing 
financial pressure from insurers, rather than the market mechanisms. This confirmed 
earlier studies (Lehtonen, 2007; Hill, 2000) that revealed that revenue constraints 
played the dominant role in adopting (case-mix) accounting systems to provide better 
data for cost control. 
In addition to earlier studies, our research showed that some aspects of market 
mechanisms can also obstruct the success of a CMI. The longitudinal mismatch between 
the reimbursement and funding of A-list DBCs (see Section 2.5) reduced the added 
value of the CMI substantially because the presented DBC revenues were only virtual 
numbers. This mismatch was considered to be so complex that it was almost impossible 
to quantify the real financial effects of case-mix decisions. Furthermore, although the 
DBC system provided good opportunities for the design of the CMI, it had serious 
shortcomings. The DBC system was not properly tested before it was implemented 
nationwide, and therefore the system and associated DBC rates were continuously 
adjusted over the years. This undermined the confidence in and understanding of the 
system by hospital managers and made the CMI data unpredictable. The DBCs were also 
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considered to be an artificial and financial administrative language. For some medical 
specialties the DBC product structure did not represent the complexity of academic 
care enough. As a result, the DBC data were insufficiently recognized and accepted 
by the managers. A DBC contains integral costs and passes through (administrative) 
calendar years, which is quite different from how responsibilities are generally allocated 
in UMCs. Due to the complex and detailed nature of the DBC system it took much 
effort and time to make yearly agreements between hospitals and insurers regarding 
volumes and prices per DBC. Also, the fact that the strongly interwoven activities of 
UMCs are funded through various funds led to much discussion with funders about 
what cost should be covered by what fund. Due to delayed agreements, during most 
months of the year hospital managers had no insight in the actual financial coverage of 
their patient groups and production budgets. This hindered them in making case-mix 
decisions, because they didn’t know the financial consequences of these decisions, and 
eventually reduced the added value of the CMI for them. 
The quality of the data even deteriorated when the DBC system was replaced by the 
DOT system. As a result, there were no production data available for almost a year and 
it was, in many respects, no longer possible to compare data from previous years, so a lot 
of data on trends were lost. For this reason the Board of Directors of the AMC decided, 
eventually, to abandon the plans to introduce DBC-based performance budgeting and to 
maintain historical budgeting. The Board did not want to burden their organization with 
the chaos of the outside world. From a management perspective, this is understandable 
because ‘loose coupling’ creates persistence and serves as a buffer towards turbulence in 
the political environment (Nyland & Pettersen, 2004). However, as a consequence the 
budgets were hardly linked with the clinical activity and the DBC products, and the 
CMI lost much of its significance. For these reasons, the DBC system was considered 
as the ‘Achilles heel’ of the CMI and led to strong resistance. This resonates with earlier 
research into the DBC system in Dutch mental care (Tummers & Van de Walle, 2008) 
that revealed that health professionals were quite resistant towards the DBC system 
because they believed that the DBCs neither contributed to care quality nor helped to 
control costs. Also, because the UMCs are covered by the Competition Act, they have 
fewer legal opportunities to make agreements with other hospitals about exchanging 
their case-mixes. Thus, it was impossible to make agreements that enabled the UMC 
to concentrate on highly complex care and to leave simple care to other health care 
suppliers. As a result, several managers abandoned their initiatives for cooperation with 
other health care suppliers because they were afraid to risk a fine. Consequently, this 
reduced their need for a CMI. 
 
General discussion
C
ha
pt
er
  1
0
309
These delaying and obstructing effects of introducing the ideology of market mechanisms 
in the health sector may be given more attention in the management accounting 
literature. From a public policy perspective, more research on the Dutch hospital care 
reforms and the manner in which they are implemented could guide policy makers in 
other countries in reaching their objectives for efficient care giving at affordable prices 
that are accessible to all citizens. 
3. A CMI can serve multiple stakeholders in multiple phases of the strategic ma-
nagement cycle
Prior literature has stipulated that a CMI as an integrated system can serve different aims 
for various stakeholders (Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004). In line with this, the AMC case 
study showed that a CMI can be useful in each phase of the strategic management cycle, 
which consists of gaining insight, monitoring, process optimization, stimulating the 
dialogue about the case-mix, and decision support (see also: Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 
20071). Our research project revealed that the added value of the CMI was mainly 
determined by the fact that medical, patient, and financial data are collected at patient 
level and integrated into one system. This makes it possible to establish meaningful 
relationships between these types of information, to aggregate information at each 
desired level, and to provide a broad spectrum of information to managers in the context 
of learning. This matches with the uncertain decision-making contexts of UMCs that 
require an information set that is much broader than the narrow financially-oriented data 
provided by traditional management accounting systems (Chong, 1996; Kurunmäki, 
1999). 
The various stakeholders of a CMI have to be approached and trained differently. 
Managers may not to be distinguished from business analysts, and within the manager 
group chief physicians may need to be distinguished from division managers and 
central managers. Each subgroup fulfils different roles at different stages of the strategic 
management cycle and has different needs and skills with regard to a CMI (Grol & 
Wensing, 2001). At the same time, in a similar way to other studies (Briers & Chua, 
2001), the case study exemplifies that a CMI is also able to mediate between different 
target groups by using a common clinical language in terms of patient groups. Although 
primarily focusing on the use of the CMI by top managers in the strategic management 
cycle, this study provides illustrations of how a CMI can serve other stakeholders as 
well, especially business analysts, but also medical managers at operational levels, clinical 
researchers, and sales people. It would be interesting for further research to examine 
which other opportunities of a CMI can be provided to whom and with what types of 
information products.
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4. The decision-support function of a CMI varies between types of information 
The framework of Thompson & Tuden (Abernethy et al, 2007) demonstrated that the 
support function of a (case-mix) accounting system in the decision-making process varies 
with respect to two key conditions: 1) uncertainty of cause and effect relationships, and 
2) ambiguity of objectives. In addition to this, we conclude that the uncertainty in 
cause and effect relationships depends on the type of case-mix information. With regard 
to medical production and patient data, a CMI functions as an answering machine 
because the cause and effect relationships are fairly straightforward. However, with 
regard to the DBC and cost data, a CMI functions mainly as a learning machine and an 
idea-generating machine because there is a high uncertainty between cause and effect. 
Explanations for this are that these data are the result of (complex) methods, definitions, 
assumptions, and systems, and therefore contain various uncertainties. With regard 
to the cost data, during our project we identified the substantial effects of calculation 
fiction, which occurs when the costs per patient are not registered in the general ledger 
but have to be approximated by unit cost data. This made us aware that cost data are by 
definition arbitrary and do not provide unequivocal answers. 
However, although the CMI did not represent the truth, it served as a tool that could 
be interrogated and used to facilitate debate. And although it gave no accurate answers, 
it gave useful indications about the cost and financial coverage, thus invoking and 
facilitating dialogue. This matched with earlier literature by Merchant and Shields 
(1993) that stated that some purposes of accounting systems are not necessarily best 
served by accurate cost data. This also applied to the qualitative non-system data that by 
definition is considered as soft, subjective, and inaccurate. Yet, these data appeared to 
be useful, particularly in combination with system data. For example, in the Portfolio 
Matrix, medical relevance per patient group was plotted against financial relevance. 
Hereby, the Portfolio Matrix was used not to give answers but to invoke and facilitate 
the dialogue about care. This dialogue function should not be underestimated. We 
conclude, in line with Abernethy et al (2007), that in light of the many environmental 
and organizational uncertainties, medical managers in UMCs should move away from 
the answering machine role for CMIs, towards a dialogue machine role. This would 
encourage learning. In management accounting literature, more attention should 
be paid to the different functions of CMIs. Future research may want to address the 
strengths and limitations of system and non-system case-mix data.
5. No substantial case-mix changes can be expected in UMCs because of a CMI 
Several earlier studies (Covaleski et al, 1993; Lowe & Doolin, 1999; Jones & Dewing, 
1997; Preston, 1992; Pettersen and Solstad, 2014) have pointed to the ineffectiveness of 
CMIs; for example, they hardly influenced the internal processes within an organization. 
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This case study also demonstrates that, in general, the CMI did not seem to lead to 
pronounced changes in the case-mix. The study offers a number of explanations for the 
absence of major changes in case mix. 
  
First, UMCs have three core tasks (care, research, and education) that are inextricably 
interwoven. The managers have overall responsibility for all these core activities. The 
case-mix has a major impact on all the core tasks and this must be taken into account 
when making case-mix decisions. This interwovenness makes the decision-making on 
the case-mix complicated. Particularly in UMCs, the case-mix is a result of longitudinal 
accumulated expertise and infrastructure, where, often, multi-year research programs 
are associated with patient groups. The medical specialties are thus not like sailing 
boats that can react quickly to developments, but more like tankers. Space for choice 
is relatively limited. Therefore, chief physicians do not feel the urge and the possibility 
to change the mix regularly. Besides, at UMCs, all (medical) managers are employees, 
and that means that they have no personal interest in the financial effects of the case-
mix of their division or medical specialty. Because of this, the interest for case-mix 
information is probably lower than in general hospitals where medical specialists are 
generally self-employed and linked with hospitals through contracts. Moreover, because 
UMCs fulfill a last-resort function, academic specialists have fewer opportunities to shift 
their patients to other hospitals. 
Second, UMCs supply largely tertiary and specialized care. This highly complex 
care requires costly infrastructure, personnel from (small) subspecialties, and a 
multidisciplinary approach. The interdependence of various medical disciplines is much 
greater than in ‘non-academic hospitals, which implies that the responsibility for case-
mix decisions can often not be assigned to a single specialty. Another limiting factor is 
that, besides a CMI, a broad range of external factors (alliances, staffing, innovations, 
etc) can have a major impact on the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the case-
mix decision-making processes in UMCs can be improved further by making them 
more systematic, transparent, and evidence-based. For example, the developed Portfolio 
Checklist (see Section 7.3.5), served well as a structured priority-setting tool for managers 
to assess whether their case-mix and underlying care processes need adjustments. This 
tool is complementary to other priority-setting frameworks that have been developed 
previously (Gibson et al, 2004; Mitton et al, 2003, Mitton & Donaldson 2002, 2004; 
Mitton & Patten, 2004). Given the political and historical influence in the current 
process of priority setting and resource allocation in UMCs, future research should 
focus on how case-mix decisions can be made in a more evidence-based way. 
Chapter 10
312
6. Cultural, structural, and practical barriers can obstruct the functioning of a 
CMI
In literature, it is claimed that CMIs in health care are adopted largely because they 
affirm conformance to supposedly orderly, objective, and rational organizational 
processes (Abernethy et al 2007; Lowe & Doolin, 1999). In the AMC the CMI was 
also adopted to better rationalize and objectify processes. The processes were particularly 
embedded in the strategic management cycle and concerned (case-mix) decision-
making and legitimizing. However, our case study showed that organizational culture, 
structure, and practical barriers can be obstacles in making the CMI work in daily 
practice. For example, attempts at rationalizing case-mix decisions by developing a 
Portfolio Checklist led to resistance because chief physicians saw these attempts as an 
undermining of their autonomy and they feared that decision-making was dominated 
by financial criteria and that clinical issues would be ignored. This observation matches 
with study findings of other research groups (Lowe and Doolin, 1999; Doolin, 2004). 
They also observed reluctance on the part of clinicians to have their practices scrutinized 
and their medical privilege and clinical autonomy potentially infringed upon. Attempts 
to rationalize the allocations of budgets of the medical specialties on the basis of DBC 
data failed, not only because of the perceived poor quality of the data, but also because 
of political and historical influences in the budgeting process. The Board of Directors 
was afraid that budget changes would lead to discussions between divisions. The plans 
for performance-based budgeting were important incentives to the design of the CMI. 
Unfortunately, however, in the end the deep-seated organizational culture of ‘wheeling 
and dealing’ and the budget system of the AMC remained rather unchanged, which was 
an obstacle to the success of the CMI. These examples of an obstructing organizational 
culture support the vision of Robbins (2007) who stated that an obstacle to successful 
implementation of accounting change in the hospital is the danger of getting caught in 
the constraints of tradition, such as a very restricted view of budgeting and there being 
no link between resources consumed and the services delivered. Linkage to competitive 
strategy, performance evaluation, and compensation are important for motivating and 
rewarding employees into focusing appropriately and using (case-mix) information to 
improve their firm’s competitive position and profits (Shields, 1995). 
The study also demonstrated that the need to rationalize case-mix decisions and 
allocations of resources may vary per UMC and is influenced by the management style of 
the Board of Directors. For example, one UMC attached more importance to objective 
CMI data and the obligatory use of it than the others and was more ready to attach 
consequences to it (see Section 9.5). This is in line with earlier research by Abernethy 
et al (2010) that leadership characteristics of top management influence the design 
and use of information systems. Furthermore, a DBC-based CMI does not necessarily 
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correspond to the internal organizational structure and control of UMCs. Because of 
the large size, in most UMCs vertically-oriented organizational structures are used where 
responsibilities are primarily allocated to divisions and, subsequently, medical specialties. 
This means that their internal control and information systems are also vertically 
oriented. However, the DBC system is process oriented, has an integral character (all 
direct and indirect activities and costs), often covers several calendar years (instead of 
one calendar year) and therefore crosses numerous administrative boundaries (Nyland 
& Pettersen, 2004). This makes it difficult for the (medical) managers to recognize 
the information and confirms earlier research that vertically-oriented structures may 
be ‘a threat’ to process orientation (Kastberg & Siverbo, 2013). In literature on process 
orientation, information system design and use have generally been given a secondary 
role. A disadvantage of the vertically-oriented organizational structures and associated 
systems is that they can create borders, make cooperation harder, produce dysfunctional 
incentives, do not stimulate change orientation and flexibility, and lead to short-term 
focus instead of continuous improvement (Kastberg & Siverbo, 2013). To tackle this, a 
Swedish hospital experimented with the introduction of a matrix organization where the 
traditional functional division was kept intact but complemented by a process owner, 
a chief process director, who was responsible for non-financial targets such as waiting 
times, guidelines, and standard care plans. In further research, it would be important to 
investigate how the benefits of the process-oriented structure and the vertically-oriented 
structure of the Dutch UMCs can be better integrated. 
Finally, there are practical barriers; for example, the principle that the case-mix had to 
be put centrally in management talks and management information was supported by 
almost all managers but did not become operational in practice. Rather than on case-
mixes, management talks were still dominated by other current and (more) urgent issues, 
such as cost reductions, the new electronic patient system and new priorities such as the 
proposed administrative merger with the VUmc. Also, the Board of Directors did not 
actively stimulate dialogue about the use of the CMI in order to make it more broadly 
implemented. This had a negative impact on the success of the CMI because not all 
managers were intrinsically motivated to use it. The inhibitory effect of the Board is in 
accordance with other studies that demonstrated that top management support is crucial 
because they can focus resources, goals, strategies on initiatives they deem worthwhile, 
and can provide the political help needed to motivate or push aside individuals and 
coalitions that resist the innovation (Shields, 1995; Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 20071). 
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7. Negative effects of a CMI are inevitable but can be reduced
In earlier studies, several negative effects of CMIs in hospitals have been reported 
(Abernethy et al, 2007; Chong, 1996; Coombs, 1987; Doolin, 2004; Pizzini, 2006; 
Lowe & Doolin, 1999). In the AMC case study, negative effects were also experienced. 
By far the most important one was the confusion and irritation about the (perceived) 
poor quality of the information. This matches with the conclusion by Lowe and Doolin 
(1999) that the validity of a CMI is often seen as problematic and the data that the 
system provided might be interpreted in different ways. An in-depth analysis of the 
causes of the (perceived) quality of the data revealed that a distinction should be made 
between the actual quality of the information (in terms of completeness, timeliness, 
reliability) and perceived quality (in terms of recognition and comprehensiveness), 
since there might be a gap between these. The actual poor quality of data was mainly 
caused by the lack of (financial) incentives for proper registration, lack of proper system 
controls, and by missing and outdated data. The perception of the data’s poor quality was 
sometimes worse than the actual quality. The perception of low quality was particularly 
true for DBC data and cost data. As mentioned earlier, these data were derived from 
complex (accounting) algorithms, assumptions, models, and political interventions. As 
a result, the data were not recognized and understood by the (medical) managers and 
therefore easily interpreted as unreliable. To some extent the (perception of ) poor quality 
of the data is probably inevitable, but can be improved by taking targeted measures, 
such as linking the budgets to CMI data, and organizing user training to improve the 
understandability and interpretation of data. However, there will always be managers 
who will use the poor quality of a CMI as an excuse to ignore or disapprove its results.  
Finally, in several studies, it is stated that a CMI contributes to resistance and tensions 
between clinicians and technocrats if it shifts power relations within the organization 
(Abernethy et al 2007; Pizzini, 2006; Markus & Pfeffer, 1983). However, in this study 
conflicts hardly occurred because the CMI did not lead to a redistribution of power 
within the organization. Major explanations for this were that the managers actively 
participated in the design of the CMI and that the use of the CMI was not prescribed 
to them. The CMI was offered as a learning tool, not to control or curtail their behavior 
as found in other studies (Abernethy & Vagnoni, 2004; Jones & Dewing, 1997). It 
was not surveillance as a part of management control (Doolin, 2004). It was also not 
considered as a process leading to managerial colonization of clinicians’ domains and 
therefore it was no potential threat to the autonomy of the chief physicians and division 
managers. Furthermore, the CMI was not used to redistribute power among the various 
organizational actors, for example, by delegating budgets through the system. So, in 
the absence of power shifts there were no power struggles. This is consistent with the 
literature (Lehtonen, 2007; Kasurinen, 2002; Scarparo, 2006) saying that the freedom 
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of choice and flexibility in the use of (case-mix) information systems alleviate conflicts 
and settle disputes. The CMI project did not lead to conflicts between the hospital board 
and the managers. Non-medical managers gained more insight into the medical world 
and they were given new opportunities to understand the medical specialists. Medical 
managers gained more insights into the financial aspects of their case-mix and were 
given the opportunity to confront non-medical management with new ‘facts’ in order to 
get support for their decisions. The study confirms prior research by Lowe and Doolin 
(1999) that demonstrated that information systems are best thought of as enabling 
systems that make a new discursive space possible within which all organizational 
participants can act. 
8. Using a CMI requires the logic of management and this can be problematic for 
medical managers
 Using case-mix information requires specific knowledge about topics such as finance, 
the DBC system, and administration. Furthermore, it encompasses abstract and derived 
information containing several kinds of subjectivities, uncertainties, and contradictions. 
Using this information requires the logic of management and, as this is contrary to 
the logic of medicine, it can be particularly problematic for managers with a medical 
background (Witman, 2008). This is consistent with the idea that the scientific and 
positivistic training of doctors makes it difficult for them to adapt to the more open-ended 
approaches utilized by managers in making decisions on less than perfect information 
(Doolin, 2004). Also in this case study, several medical managers found it difficult to 
combine the different logics of medicine and management. They lacked the skills and 
knowledge to interpret the case-mix information, translate it into action, and to deal 
with uncertainties and conflicts of interests. This is a relevant finding because the vast 
majority of the hospital managers have a medical background. These managers are made 
responsible for both the clinical and the financial part; they become hybrid professionals 
(Llewellyn, 2001; Witman, 2008). The question, however, is to what extent can the 
medical and management roles be combined in one person. In our research project, the 
medical managers interviewed were willing to acquire the necessary managerial skills 
and combine these with their existing clinical knowledge basis, but within limits. It 
would be interesting to further investigate what the limits are of hybridization and what 
the boundaries should be between medical and accounting expertise.
Several studies have shown that the background of the user has an impact not only on 
managerial behavior and strategic choices, but also on the use of information systems 
(Naranjo-Gil & Hartmann, 20071). Managers with a predominantly clinical background 
appeared to focus more on non-financial (or clinical) information for decision-making 
and preferred an interactive style when using a CMI. On the other hand, managers 
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with a predominantly administrative background seemed more effective in establishing 
cost-reduction strategies because of their focus on financial information in combination 
with a diagnostic use of a CMI. One explanation for this is that decisions by managers 
are determined and biased by patterns of knowledge formed by previous experience and 
training. Another explanation is that clinical training and practice over many years has 
imbued a deep-seated ethos based on patient care, almost regardless of costs (Jones & 
Dewing, 1997). Since medical managers are key decision-makers in UMCs and therefore 
have much influence on performance, they must have the right skills and knowledge to 
use a CMI in a responsible way. That also means that their perception of management 
needs to be adjusted: they need to recognize that management is not just common sense 
or easily learned (Doolin, 2001). Doctors and managers have much to learn from each 
other but each group has a unique contribution that needs to be respected and valued 
(Edwards et al, 2003). It is, therefore, important to investigate in future research how 
medical managers can be better trained in using the logic of management and how non-
medical managers, in turn, can be better trained in understanding the complex process 
of medical decision-making. The Management Game, as designed by the AMC, seems 
to be a good training method for this, since it was well-received on each occasion.
9. Managers are mainly interested in case-mix information on topics they can 
control and are responsible for
In our study, the strategy was used to provide the (medical) managers with extensive 
information set on various topics regarding the case-mix. Earlier studies (Abernethy 
et al, 2007; Chong, 1996) had shown that when task difficulty and variability of 
the user of the (case-mix) accounting system are high, broad-scope information is 
continuously required to help the manager understand difficult tasks more clearly. 
This rich information set could be used in the context of learning. In the case study 
AMC, some types of information were included by the project organization to give the 
managers insight into some aspects of the case-mix to the entire organization rather than 
the individual medical specialty or division. One advantage of the strategy to provide 
broad-scope information was that it could serve different functions for different types of 
users at the same time. However, a disadvantage was that several managers experienced 
information overload.  
Our study demonstrated that the need for types of case-mix information varies per 
(medical) manager, but in general managers are particularly interested in information on 
topics that they can control themselves and on topics they are formally responsible for. 
Several medical managers indicated that their ability to actually manage some topics, 
such as their case-mix (type and volume of patients), finances and health care market, 
were limited and made the CMI for these parts less relevant to them. Regarding the 
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case-mix, there are indications that medical specialties with relatively much urgent care 
or many internally referred patients perceive the CMI less often as successful, because 
they had fewer opportunities to actually manage their case-mix. Regarding to finance the 
CMI was examined as less relevant because the presented (DBC) information contained 
(integral) cost and revenues and they could only influence a part of it. They had no 
direct influence on the fixed cost and cost beyond their entities. They had no influence 
on the budget, since the budget was not linked to on the DBC revenues and rather 
fixed. There was no direct link established between strategy, performance evaluation, 
and compensation. So, important motivating factors to use the CMI (Shields, 1995) 
were absent. This is in line with prior studies that demonstrate that when controllability 
does not exist, managers cannot be held responsible for departmental or directorate 
performance and accounting information is not considered important in decision-
making at the operational level (Pettersen & Solstad, 2014). We also conclude that the 
perception of controllability and also responsibility can greatly vary between managers. 
For example, when the job responsibilities of the managers are not clearly described or 
when the principle of shared responsibilities is used, each manager will interpret his/her 
responsibilities in his/her own way. 
These findings have several implications for the management accounting discipline. 
First, more research is needed about the factors (such as the type of organizational 
structure, job responsibilities, personal characteristics and medical specialty) that 
influence the controllability of managers in UMCs, and derived from that the success 
of a CMI. This knowledge may be useful for assessing the potential benefits of the CMI 
for the individual manager and organization and for prioritizing when designing and 
implementing the CMI. Second, our findings pose the question whether it is sensible 
to provide (case-mix) information which is beyond the controllability and responsibility 
of the users. Who will be involved in defining the available management information, 
with what role and with what priorities? To what extent will a particular point of view 
be prescribed because it is thought to be in the interest of the organization? Is it sensible 
to provide (top down) information to managers in order to increase (cost) awareness of 
the integral process if managers are not integrally responsible? Is it wise to expand the 
responsibilities of the manager? Future research may want to address these questions.
10. The design and implementation of a CMI should be approached in a scientific 
way 
The process of design, implementation and outcome evaluation of the CMI project 
at the AMC was approached in a scientific way, because we were uncertain about the 
effects of it on the behavior of people and the organization. In retrospect we conclude 
that this was a sensible approach. As concluded earlier, with a CMI, significant benefits 
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can be achieved for Dutch university medical centers (see Implication 1). However, also 
the risk of negative effects exists, such as power conflicts, discussions about the data or 
incorrect use of the CMI. Because of our scientific approach, there was an extensive 
examination about what case-mix information had to be designed, for whom and 
how it could be interpreted and used in a responsible way. In this context, there were 
many experiments with different types of information products and user training. With 
continuous iterations of the reflective cycle and extensive literature research we gained 
new and more in-depth knowledge about the outcomes of the CMI and the factors 
explaining its success in this specific context. This knowledge will be partly applicable, 
but not per definition be generalizable to other UMC settings. Each specific context will 
require local research into the factors which may determine the success of the CMI, such 
as the design, implementation, organizational and environmental factors. A scientific 
approach of the design and implementation of a CMI requires specific professional 
knowledge and skills from the designers. It would be useful for future research to 
examine by whom a CMI should be ideally designed and implemented: by the hospital, 
by an ICT consultancy firm, or a combination?
10. 3 Practical guidelines for successful implementation of a CMI in univer-
sity hospitals
The intention of this research was to contribute to practice in the following ways. First, 
following this research, a full CMI was designed and implemented at the AMC. Based 
on this, it could be determined whether a CMI could indeed influence and affect the 
way the AMC operated, both in beneficial and in harmful ways, and to what extent. This 
research has demonstrated that a CMI can really contribute to this and the presented 
outcomes can be seen as indicators of the potential benefits from the implementation 
of a CMI in other (Dutch) (academic) hospitals for regulators and hospitals. We expect 
that our findings will have a more general validity and will yield insights that go beyond 
the research setting of UMCs, in, for example, general hospitals. The results could be 
seen as an indicator for the potential benefits gained from the implementation of CMIs. 
We have a common social interest that the patient be treated in the right place with 
the right treatment at the right cost. Furthermore, knowledge from this research design 
can be derived for professionals who are involved in implementing CMIs or similar 
information innovations in a similar context, such as (health) regulators, and hospital 
managers. This research within the Dutch system could also help other countries that 
are considering the introduction of market competition into the hospital sector achieve 
their goals in the right way. Finally, by linking this practice-oriented research to science, 
hopefully the gap can be bridged between the validity of the management accounting 
research and its practical relevance.
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In Table 10.2 the gained design-oriented knowledge is translated into practical guidelines 
(or recommendations) for a successful implementation of a CMI in Dutch university 
hospitals. The guidelines are meant for hospital managers (Board of Directors, medical 
managers, chief physicians project managers, IT managers) as well as (international) 
regulators (Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education and other health authorities such 
as the NZa and ACM), that can directly or indirectly influence the success of CMIs in 
hospitals. It must be emphasized that we are attempting to provide general guidelines 
rather than to prescribe a unique CMI, as we believe that a one size fits all system will 
never be effective in all circumstances. 
Chapter 10
320
 T
ab
le
 1
0.
2:
 P
ra
ct
ic
al
 g
ui
de
lin
es
 fo
r 
a 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
 im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f a
 C
M
I 
in
 u
ni
ve
rs
it
y 
m
ed
ic
al
 c
en
te
rs
 (U
M
C
s)
N
o
Im
pl
ic
at
io
n
G
ui
de
lin
es
 fo
r 
ho
sp
it
al
 m
an
ag
er
s
G
ui
de
lin
es
 fo
r 
re
gu
la
to
rs
1
W
ith
 a
 C
M
I, 
sig
ni
fic
an
t 
be
ne
fit
s c
an
 b
e 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 fo
r 
D
ut
ch
 u
ni
ve
r-
sit
y 
m
ed
ic
al
 
ce
nt
er
s
• 
Be
fo
re
 h
os
pi
ta
l m
an
ag
er
s d
ec
id
e 
to
 a
do
pt
 a
 C
M
I, 
th
er
e 
ha
s t
o 
be
 a
n 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
of
 
w
ha
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
pr
ob
le
m
s e
xi
st,
 to
 w
ho
m
, a
nd
 h
ow
 o
fte
n 
th
ey
 o
cc
ur
. Th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l 
po
sit
iv
e 
an
d 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
eff
ec
ts 
ha
ve
 to
 b
e 
w
ei
gh
ed
 u
p.
 B
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
fin
di
ng
s, 
it 
ca
n 
be
 
co
nc
lu
de
d 
th
at
 a
 C
M
I i
s a
 v
al
ua
bl
e 
op
tio
n 
fo
r s
ol
vi
ng
 th
es
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 
ca
n 
be
 u
se
d 
to
 d
efi
ne
 th
e 
sc
op
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
oj
ec
t, 
th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l u
se
rs
, t
he
 a
im
s o
f a
 C
M
I, 
su
bj
ec
ts,
 p
rin
ci
pl
es
, e
nd
 p
ro
du
ct
s, 
et
c.
• 
It 
ta
ke
s a
 lo
t o
f t
im
e,
 c
ap
ac
ity
, e
ne
rg
y 
an
d 
m
on
ey
 to
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
t a
 C
M
I. 
It 
w
ill
 p
ar
tic
ul
ar
ly
 b
ec
om
e 
pr
ofi
ta
bl
e 
if 
it 
is 
us
ed
 fo
r m
ul
tip
le
 p
ur
po
se
s a
nd
 m
ul
tip
le
 
us
er
s.
• 
W
ith
 th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 a
 C
M
I, 
no
t o
nl
y 
a 
ne
w
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sy
ste
m
 is
 in
tro
du
ce
d,
 b
ut
 
al
so
 a
 n
ew
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
y, 
na
m
el
y 
1)
 th
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 th
at
 th
e 
co
m
po
sit
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ca
se
-m
ix
 
is 
cr
iti
ca
l t
o 
th
e 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
 in
 a
ll 
co
re
 ta
sk
s a
nd
 fi
na
nc
e 
of
 a
 h
os
pi
ta
l a
nd
 th
er
ef
or
e 
ha
s t
o 
be
 p
ut
 c
en
tr
al
ly
 in
 th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t c
yc
le
, a
nd
 2
) t
he
 b
el
ie
f t
ha
t a
 C
M
I c
an
 c
on
-
tr
ib
ut
e 
to
 th
is 
by
 ra
tio
na
liz
in
g 
an
d 
ob
je
ct
ify
in
g 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 p
ha
se
s i
n 
th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
cy
cl
e.
 H
os
pi
ta
l m
an
ag
er
s s
ho
ul
d 
en
do
rs
e 
th
is 
ph
ilo
so
ph
y.
• 
G
iv
en
 th
e 
po
te
nt
ia
l b
en
efi
ts 
of
 C
M
Is
, r
eg
ul
at
or
s s
ho
ul
d 
pr
om
ot
e,
 o
r i
f n
ec
es
sa
ry
, 
pr
es
cr
ib
e,
 th
at
 a
ll 
(a
ca
de
m
ic
) h
os
pi
ta
ls 
an
d 
sta
ke
ho
ld
er
s i
n 
th
e 
ho
sp
ita
l s
ec
to
r s
ta
rt
 
w
or
ki
ng
 w
ith
 a
 C
M
I, 
pr
ef
er
ab
ly
 a
 si
m
ila
r o
ne
, s
o 
th
at
 e
ve
ry
on
e 
sp
ea
ks
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
la
ng
ua
ge
 a
nd
 u
se
s t
he
 sa
m
e 
so
ur
ce
s a
nd
 d
efi
ni
tio
ns
.
• 
 Re
gu
la
to
rs
 sh
ou
ld
 b
un
dl
e 
th
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
of
 C
M
Is
 a
nd
 c
as
e-
m
ix
 d
at
a,
 su
ch
 a
s b
en
ch
-
m
ar
k 
da
ta
, i
n 
a 
na
tio
na
l h
ea
lth
 c
ar
e 
(in
fo
rm
at
io
n)
 o
rg
an
iza
tio
n.
 Th
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
an
d 
(b
en
ch
m
ar
k)
 d
at
a 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 st
ak
eh
ol
de
rs
 in
 th
e 
ho
sp
ita
l s
ec
to
r w
ith
 th
e 
rig
ht
 su
pp
or
t. 
• 
 Th
e 
cu
rr
en
t D
O
T
 sy
ste
m
 h
as
 to
 b
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
. Th
e 
sy
ste
m
 m
us
t b
e 
m
or
e 
co
ns
ist
en
t 
w
ith
 th
e 
la
ng
ua
ge
 a
nd
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
l a
nd
 m
or
e 
ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 
to
 b
e 
us
ed
 fo
r t
he
 in
te
rn
al
 d
ia
lo
gu
e 
an
d 
ne
go
tia
tio
ns
 w
ith
 in
su
re
rs
. Th
is 
ca
n 
be
 
ac
hi
ev
ed
 b
y 
us
in
g 
th
e 
pa
tie
nt
 g
ro
up
s, 
su
ch
 a
s d
efi
ne
d 
by
 th
e 
AM
C
, a
s p
ro
du
ct
 st
ru
c-
tu
re
 ra
th
er
 th
an
 th
e 
ca
re
 p
ro
du
ct
s. 
• 
 C
ha
ng
es
 in
 th
e 
(D
O
T
) p
ro
du
ct
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
ha
ve
 to
 b
e 
pr
op
er
ly
 te
ste
d 
be
fo
re
 it
 is
 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
na
tio
na
lly
. A
fte
rw
ar
ds
, t
he
 p
ro
du
ct
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
sh
ou
ld
 re
m
ai
n 
as
 st
ab
le
 
as
 p
os
sib
le
 in
 th
e 
co
ur
se
 o
f t
im
e.
2
M
ar
ke
t 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s 
ca
n 
pr
om
ot
e 
bu
t a
lso
 re
du
ce
 
an
d 
ob
str
uc
t 
th
e 
su
cc
es
s o
f a
 
C
M
I
• 
Th
e 
be
ne
fit
s o
f a
 C
M
I w
ill
 in
cr
ea
se
 w
he
n 
ho
sp
ita
l m
an
ag
er
s d
el
eg
at
e 
th
e 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 
of
 m
ar
ke
t m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s t
o 
th
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 sp
ec
ia
lti
es
, f
or
 e
xa
m
pl
e 
by
 (p
ar
tly
) l
in
ki
ng
 th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 b
ud
ge
ts 
to
 th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 re
ve
nu
es
 a
s a
gr
ee
d 
w
ith
 h
ea
lth
 in
su
re
rs
.
• 
As
 th
e 
di
ve
stm
en
t o
r i
nv
es
tm
en
t i
n 
pe
rs
on
ne
l, 
in
fra
str
uc
tu
re
, a
nd
 c
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
fo
r 
re
al
izi
ng
 a
 c
as
e-
m
ix
 is
 a
 m
ul
ti-
ye
ar
 p
ro
ce
ss
, m
ed
ic
al
 sp
ec
ia
lti
es
 sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
fa
ce
d 
w
ith
 
th
e 
de
lu
sio
ns
 o
f t
he
 m
ar
ke
t a
nd
 to
o 
vo
la
til
e 
an
nu
al
 re
ve
nu
es
. H
os
pi
ta
l m
an
ag
er
s c
an
 
co
nt
rib
ut
e 
to
 th
is 
by
 m
ak
in
g 
lo
ng
-te
rm
 a
rr
an
ge
m
en
ts 
w
ith
 in
su
re
rs
 a
nd
 b
y 
m
ak
in
g 
th
e 
in
te
rn
al
 b
ud
ge
ts 
no
t f
ul
ly
 d
ep
en
de
nt
 o
n 
th
e 
ou
tsi
de
 w
or
ld
.
• 
 If 
re
gu
la
to
rs
 w
an
t t
o 
in
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
ra
tio
na
lit
y 
of
 d
ec
isi
on
s i
n 
ho
sp
ita
ls 
an
d,
 re
la
te
d 
to
 
th
is,
 th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 C
M
Is
, t
he
 h
os
pi
ta
l m
ar
ke
t h
as
 to
 b
e 
re
al
ly
 li
be
ra
liz
ed
 ra
th
er
 
th
an
 (s
em
i) 
re
gu
la
te
d.
 (B
ud
ge
t) 
m
ea
su
re
s t
ha
t m
iti
ga
te
 th
e 
eff
ec
ts 
of
 m
ar
ke
t m
ec
h-
an
ism
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
m
in
im
ize
d.
 H
ow
ev
er
, i
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 e
va
lu
at
ed
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
m
ar
ke
t 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s a
re
 e
ffe
ct
iv
el
y 
ap
pl
ic
ab
le
 to
 U
M
C
s, 
gi
ve
n 
th
ei
r s
pe
ci
fic
 a
nd
 p
ub
lic
 
fu
nc
tio
ns
. 
• 
 Si
nc
e 
pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
ly
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 p
re
ss
ur
e 
m
ot
iv
at
es
 th
e 
U
M
C
s i
nt
o 
ad
op
tin
g 
C
M
Is
, 
re
gu
la
to
rs
 m
ig
ht
 b
et
te
r s
uffi
ce
 w
ith
 m
or
e 
sim
pl
e 
co
st 
co
nt
ro
l m
ea
su
re
s, 
fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e,
 
by
 c
on
cl
ud
in
g 
ge
nt
le
m
en
’s 
ag
re
em
en
ts 
ab
ou
t h
ea
lth
 c
ar
e 
ex
pe
ns
es
.
• 
 If 
re
gu
la
to
rs
 w
an
t U
M
C
s t
o 
ta
ke
 m
on
ey
 in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 w
he
n 
m
ak
in
g 
C
M
I-
ba
se
d 
ca
se
-m
ix
 d
ec
isi
on
s, 
th
ey
 m
us
t f
ac
ili
ta
te
 fo
r U
M
C
s t
ha
t t
he
y 
ha
ve
 ti
m
el
y 
in
sig
ht
 in
to
 
th
ei
r D
BC
 re
ve
nu
es
 fo
r t
he
 lo
ng
er
 te
rm
. T
o 
ac
hi
ev
e 
th
is,
 re
gu
la
to
rs
 sh
ou
ld
 p
ro
pa
-
ga
te
 o
r e
nf
or
ce
 lo
ng
-te
rm
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts,
 fo
r e
xa
m
pl
e 
fo
r t
w
o 
or
 th
re
e 
ye
ar
s, 
be
tw
ee
n 
U
M
C
s a
nd
 h
ea
lth
 in
su
re
rs
. I
f t
hi
s p
ro
ve
s i
na
de
qu
at
e,
 it
 is
 p
ro
ba
bl
y 
be
tte
r t
o 
fix
 th
e 
ra
te
s n
at
io
nw
id
e 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 n
eg
ot
ia
te
 th
em
 fr
ee
ly.
 
• 
 If 
re
gu
la
to
rs
 w
an
t U
M
C
s t
o 
sp
ec
ia
liz
e 
in
 h
ig
hl
y 
co
m
pl
ex
 c
ar
e 
an
d 
to
 le
av
e 
lo
w
 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 c
ar
e 
to
 o
th
er
 h
ea
lth
 c
ar
e 
su
pp
lie
rs
, t
he
y 
m
us
t f
ac
ili
ta
te
 jo
in
t a
gr
ee
m
en
ts 
be
tw
ee
n 
U
M
C
s a
nd
 g
en
er
al
 h
os
pi
ta
ls.
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3
A 
C
M
I c
an
 
se
rv
e 
m
ul
tip
le
 
sta
ke
ho
ld
er
s i
n 
m
ul
tip
le
 p
ha
se
s 
of
 th
e 
str
at
eg
ic
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
cy
cl
e
• 
Be
fo
re
 th
e 
de
sig
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 a
 C
M
I, 
a 
co
m
pr
eh
en
siv
e 
di
ag
no
sti
c 
an
al
ys
is 
of
 th
e 
ta
rg
et
 g
ro
up
 in
 it
s s
et
tin
g 
ha
s t
o 
be
 c
on
du
ct
ed
: w
ho
 n
ee
ds
 w
ha
t t
yp
e 
of
 in
fo
rm
a-
tio
n,
 w
he
n 
an
d 
w
hy
? D
iff
er
en
t f
un
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 d
iff
er
en
t s
ub
-ta
rg
et
 g
ro
up
s f
or
 th
e 
C
M
I 
w
ho
 m
ay
 b
e 
ap
pr
oa
ch
ed
 d
iff
er
en
tly
 re
ga
rd
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ts 
an
d 
us
er
 tr
ai
ni
ng
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
id
en
tifi
ed
.
• 
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ts 
fo
r m
an
ag
em
en
t n
ee
d 
to
 b
e 
re
ad
y-
m
ad
e 
an
d 
ea
sil
y 
ac
ce
ss
ib
le
, 
an
d 
m
us
t g
en
er
at
e 
hi
gh
ly
 a
gg
re
ga
te
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
by
 
po
w
er
fu
l v
isu
al
iza
tio
ns
 w
ith
 c
le
ar
 e
xp
la
na
tio
ns
. B
us
in
es
s a
na
ly
sts
 n
ee
d 
to
ol
s t
ha
t e
na
bl
e 
th
em
 to
 su
pp
or
t t
he
ir 
m
an
ag
er
s b
y 
an
al
yz
in
g 
th
e 
ca
se
-m
ix
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
at
 a
 m
or
e 
de
ta
ile
d 
an
d 
te
ch
ni
ca
l l
ev
el
.
 
4
Th
e 
de
ci
-
sio
n-
su
pp
or
t 
fu
nc
tio
n 
of
 a
 
C
M
I v
ar
ie
s 
be
tw
ee
n 
ty
pe
s 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
• 
 D
o 
no
t w
ai
t t
o 
im
pl
em
en
t a
 C
M
I u
nt
il 
th
e 
qu
al
ity
 o
f t
he
 d
at
a 
is 
pe
rfe
ct
 b
ec
au
se
 th
at
 
w
ill
 n
ev
er
 h
ap
pe
n.
 Th
e 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 in
co
rr
ec
t d
at
a 
m
ay
 tr
ig
ge
r a
n 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t i
n 
th
e 
qu
al
ity
.
• 
 H
os
pi
ta
l m
an
ag
er
s s
ho
ul
d 
re
al
ize
 th
at
 a
 C
M
I r
ar
el
y 
ac
ts 
as
 a
 m
ac
hi
ne
 to
 p
ro
vi
de
 tr
ut
h 
an
d 
th
e r
ig
ht
 a
ns
w
er
s, 
bu
t m
ai
nl
y 
in
vo
ke
s a
nd
 fa
ci
lit
at
es
 d
ia
lo
gu
e 
ab
ou
t c
ar
e,
 a
nd
 
en
co
ur
ag
es
 le
ar
ni
ng
. 
• 
 U
se
rs
 o
f a
 C
M
I s
ho
ul
d 
be
 tr
ai
ne
d 
on
 th
e 
str
en
gt
hs
 a
nd
 w
ea
kn
es
s o
f e
ac
h 
ty
pe
 o
f i
nf
or
-
m
at
io
n 
an
d 
fo
r w
ha
t p
ur
po
se
s t
he
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ca
n 
an
d 
ca
nn
ot
 b
e 
us
ed
.
• 
 N
on
-s
ys
te
m
 d
at
a,
 su
ch
 a
s o
pi
ni
on
s a
bo
ut
 re
le
va
nc
e 
an
d 
di
sti
nc
tiv
en
es
s o
f p
at
ie
nt
 
gr
ou
ps
 c
an
 b
e 
ve
ry
 u
se
fu
l, 
bu
t m
ea
su
re
s h
av
e 
to
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
so
 th
at
 th
ey
 a
re
 u
se
d 
in
 a
 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 w
ay
.
5
N
o 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l 
ca
se
-m
ix
 
ch
an
ge
s c
an
 
be
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
in
 
U
M
C
s b
ec
au
se
 
of
 a
 C
M
I
• 
 It 
is 
to
p 
m
an
ag
em
en
t’s
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 to
 (t
ry
 to
) f
ac
ili
ta
te
 e
co
no
m
ic
al
ly
 ju
sti
fie
d 
an
d 
m
ed
ic
al
ly
 e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
ca
se
-m
ix
 d
ec
isi
on
s a
nd
 se
t t
he
 ri
gh
t p
rio
rit
ie
s. 
Pr
ov
id
in
g 
a 
C
M
I t
o 
th
e 
ke
y 
de
ci
sio
n-
m
ak
er
s, 
su
ch
 a
s c
hi
ef
 p
hy
sic
ia
ns
, d
iv
isi
on
 m
an
ag
er
s, 
an
d 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
of
 
di
re
ct
or
s c
an
 c
on
tr
ib
ut
e 
to
 th
is.
 
• 
 In
 a
dd
iti
on
, h
os
pi
ta
l m
an
ag
er
s c
an
 fa
ci
lit
at
e 
th
e 
C
M
I-
ba
se
d 
ca
se
-m
ix
 d
ec
isi
on
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 
by
 p
ro
vi
di
ng
 th
e 
re
le
va
nt
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 fo
r o
pt
im
izi
ng
 th
is,
 su
ch
 a
s d
efi
ni
ng
 th
e 
(jo
in
t) 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s o
f t
he
 d
iff
er
en
t s
ta
ke
ho
ld
er
s i
n 
th
e 
pr
io
rit
y-
se
tti
ng
 p
ro
ce
ss
, d
efi
ni
ng
 p
ri-
or
ity
 a
re
as
 a
nd
 p
rio
rit
y-
se
tti
ng
 c
rit
er
ia
, a
nd
 o
rg
an
izi
ng
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
m
ee
tin
gs
. I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 
th
e 
pr
io
rit
y-
se
tti
ng
 p
ro
ce
ss
 sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
su
pp
or
te
d 
by
 le
ad
er
sh
ip
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t a
nd
 c
ha
ng
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t s
tr
at
eg
ie
s.
• 
If 
re
gu
la
to
rs
 w
an
t U
M
C
s t
o 
ta
ke
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 c
ar
e 
in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 w
he
n 
m
ak
in
g 
C
M
I-
ba
se
d 
ca
se
-m
ix
 d
ec
isi
on
s, 
th
en
 u
ni
fo
rm
 a
nd
 c
le
ar
 n
at
io
na
l q
ua
lit
y 
sta
nd
ar
ds
 m
us
t 
be
 a
va
ila
bl
e.
 Th
e 
cu
rr
en
t n
at
io
na
l q
ua
lit
y 
sta
nd
ar
ds
 h
av
e 
to
 b
e 
im
pr
ov
ed
: t
he
y 
m
us
t 
al
so
 re
la
te
 to
 c
om
pl
ex
 c
ar
e,
 m
us
t b
ec
om
e 
pa
tie
nt
-o
ut
co
m
e 
or
ie
nt
ed
, a
nd
 e
as
y 
to
 
op
er
at
io
na
liz
e.
 F
ur
th
er
m
or
e,
 e
ac
h 
he
al
th
 in
su
re
r u
se
s i
ts 
ow
n 
qu
al
ity
 c
rit
er
ia
. Q
ua
l-
ity
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
is 
ne
ce
ss
ar
y 
fo
r a
 c
om
pe
tit
iv
e 
he
al
th
 c
ar
e 
m
ar
ke
t t
o 
w
or
k 
pr
op
er
ly.
 
Th
er
ef
or
e 
ou
tc
om
e 
an
d 
qu
al
ity
 m
ea
su
re
s m
us
t b
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
to
 a
ll 
de
ci
sio
n-
m
ak
er
s.
• 
Th
e 
co
re
 ta
sk
s o
f U
M
C
 (c
ar
e,
 re
se
ar
ch
, a
nd
 e
du
ca
tio
n)
 a
re
 in
ex
tr
ic
ab
ly
 in
te
rw
ov
en
. 
Re
gu
la
to
rs
 c
an
 fa
ci
lit
at
e 
C
M
I-
ba
se
d 
m
ak
in
g 
ca
se
-m
ix
 d
ec
isi
on
s i
n 
U
M
C
s b
y 
al
so
 
in
te
gr
at
in
g 
th
e 
fu
nd
in
g 
of
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 c
or
e 
ta
sk
s.
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6
C
ul
tu
ra
l, 
str
uc
tu
ra
l, 
an
d 
pr
ac
tic
al
 
ba
rr
ie
rs
 c
an
 
ob
str
uc
t 
pu
tti
ng
 th
e 
ph
ilo
so
ph
y 
of
 
th
e 
C
M
I i
nt
o 
pr
ac
tic
e
• 
Th
e 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 a
 C
M
I c
an
 b
e 
a 
m
ea
ns
 to
 st
ar
t m
an
ag
in
g 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
in
 a
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 m
an
ne
r. 
M
an
ag
er
s s
ho
ul
d 
id
en
tif
y 
to
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t t
he
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
y 
of
 th
e 
C
M
I 
is 
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l c
ul
tu
re
, s
tr
uc
tu
re
, a
nd
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
of
 th
e 
U
M
C
 a
nd
 
w
he
th
er
 th
ey
 a
re
 su
ffi
ci
en
tly
 p
re
pa
re
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
es
e 
ch
an
ge
s. 
• 
To
p 
m
an
ag
er
s s
ho
ul
d 
no
t o
nl
y 
pr
om
ot
e 
th
e 
ai
m
s o
f t
he
 C
M
I b
ut
 a
lso
 a
ct
 o
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 
it.
 Th
ey
 sh
ou
ld
 u
se
 it
 th
em
se
lv
es
 a
nd
 d
isc
us
s i
t i
n 
th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t m
ee
tin
gs
. Th
ey
 h
av
e 
to
 a
ct
iv
el
y 
sti
m
ul
at
e 
th
e 
di
al
og
ue
 a
m
on
gs
t c
lin
ic
ia
ns
 a
nd
 a
dm
in
ist
ra
to
rs
 a
nd
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
C
M
I b
ro
ad
ly
 o
w
ne
d.
• 
Th
e 
C
M
I m
us
t b
e 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 in
to
 th
e 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 &
 C
on
tro
l c
yc
le
 a
nd
 d
isc
us
se
d 
in
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t m
ee
tin
gs
.
 
7
N
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
-
fe
ct
s o
f a
 C
M
I 
ar
e 
in
ev
ita
bl
e 
bu
t c
an
 b
e 
re
du
ce
d
• 
Se
ve
ra
l m
ea
su
re
s h
av
e 
to
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
to
 o
bt
ai
n 
go
od
 q
ua
lit
y 
C
M
I d
at
a.
 T
o 
ac
hi
ev
e 
th
is,
 
m
ed
ic
al
 sp
ec
ia
lti
es
 sh
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
a 
(fi
na
nc
ia
l) 
in
te
re
st 
in
 a
nd
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 fo
r t
he
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
da
ta
.
• 
 C
os
ts 
an
d 
sa
le
s d
at
a 
m
us
t b
e 
sta
bi
liz
ed
 a
s m
uc
h 
as
 p
os
sib
le
 b
y 
m
in
im
izi
ng
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 th
e 
co
st 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
m
od
el
, u
sin
g 
no
rm
at
iv
e 
un
it 
co
sts
, a
nd
 b
y 
m
in
im
izi
ng
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
th
e 
se
lli
ng
 p
ric
es
 b
y 
ta
ki
ng
 m
or
e 
as
pe
ct
s t
ha
n 
un
it 
co
sts
 in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
, s
uc
h 
as
 th
e 
se
lli
ng
 p
ric
es
 o
f t
he
 p
re
vi
ou
s y
ea
r, 
an
d 
str
at
eg
ic
 c
on
sid
er
at
io
ns
.
• 
 U
se
rs
 n
ee
d 
to
 h
av
e 
a 
ba
sic
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
of
 h
ow
 C
M
I d
at
a 
ar
e 
ge
ne
ra
te
d 
an
d 
by
 w
ho
m
, s
o 
th
ey
 k
no
w
 w
ith
 w
ho
m
 th
ey
 c
an
 d
isc
us
s t
he
 im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
.
• 
 U
se
rs
 m
us
t h
av
e 
ea
sy
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ts,
 w
ith
 m
in
im
al
 e
ffo
rt
. 
• 
 Po
w
er
 c
on
fli
ct
s c
an
 b
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
w
he
n 
th
e 
C
M
I i
s o
ffe
re
d 
as
 a
 le
ar
ni
ng
 to
ol
 a
nd
 n
ot
 a
s 
a 
w
ay
 to
 c
on
tro
l o
r c
ur
ta
il 
th
e 
be
ha
vi
or
 o
f p
eo
pl
e.
• 
 It 
is 
w
ise
, b
ot
h 
fro
m
 a
 su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e,
 to
 st
an
da
rd
ize
 c
as
e-
m
ix
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
as
 m
uc
h 
as
 p
os
sib
le
 fo
r t
he
 d
iff
er
en
t m
ed
ic
al
 sp
ec
ia
lti
es
 a
nd
 d
iv
isi
on
s. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
o 
pr
ev
en
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ov
er
lo
ad
, u
se
rs
 m
us
t h
av
e 
th
e 
op
po
rt
un
ity
 to
 in
di
ca
te
 
w
hi
ch
 st
an
da
rd
 fi
gu
re
s a
nd
 ta
bl
es
 a
re
 re
le
va
nt
 to
 th
em
 a
nd
 w
hi
ch
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 d
et
ai
ls 
th
ey
 n
ee
d.
 
 
 
General discussion
C
ha
pt
er
  1
0
323
Ta
bl
e 
10
.2
: P
ra
ct
ic
al
 g
ui
de
lin
es
 fo
r 
a 
su
cc
es
sf
ul
 im
pl
em
en
ta
ti
on
 o
f a
 C
M
I 
in
 u
ni
ve
rs
it
y 
m
ed
ic
al
 c
en
te
rs
 (U
M
C
s)
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
N
o
Im
pl
ic
at
io
n
G
ui
de
lin
es
 fo
r 
ho
sp
it
al
 m
an
ag
er
s
G
ui
de
lin
es
 fo
r 
re
gu
la
to
rs
6
C
ul
tu
ra
l, 
str
uc
tu
ra
l, 
an
d 
pr
ac
tic
al
 
ba
rr
ie
rs
 c
an
 
ob
str
uc
t 
pu
tti
ng
 th
e 
ph
ilo
so
ph
y 
of
 
th
e 
C
M
I i
nt
o 
pr
ac
tic
e
• 
Th
e 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 a
 C
M
I c
an
 b
e 
a 
m
ea
ns
 to
 st
ar
t m
an
ag
in
g 
th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
in
 a
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 m
an
ne
r. 
M
an
ag
er
s s
ho
ul
d 
id
en
tif
y 
to
 w
ha
t e
xt
en
t t
he
 p
hi
lo
so
ph
y 
of
 th
e 
C
M
I 
is 
co
ns
ist
en
t w
ith
 th
e 
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l c
ul
tu
re
, s
tr
uc
tu
re
, a
nd
 p
ra
ct
ic
e 
of
 th
e 
U
M
C
 a
nd
 
w
he
th
er
 th
ey
 a
re
 su
ffi
ci
en
tly
 p
re
pa
re
d 
to
 m
ak
e 
th
es
e 
ch
an
ge
s. 
• 
To
p 
m
an
ag
er
s s
ho
ul
d 
no
t o
nl
y 
pr
om
ot
e 
th
e 
ai
m
s o
f t
he
 C
M
I b
ut
 a
lso
 a
ct
 o
n 
be
ha
lf 
of
 
it.
 Th
ey
 sh
ou
ld
 u
se
 it
 th
em
se
lv
es
 a
nd
 d
isc
us
s i
t i
n 
th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t m
ee
tin
gs
. Th
ey
 h
av
e 
to
 a
ct
iv
el
y 
sti
m
ul
at
e 
th
e 
di
al
og
ue
 a
m
on
gs
t c
lin
ic
ia
ns
 a
nd
 a
dm
in
ist
ra
to
rs
 a
nd
 m
ak
e 
th
e 
C
M
I b
ro
ad
ly
 o
w
ne
d.
• 
Th
e 
C
M
I m
us
t b
e 
in
te
gr
at
ed
 in
to
 th
e 
Pl
an
ni
ng
 &
 C
on
tro
l c
yc
le
 a
nd
 d
isc
us
se
d 
in
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t m
ee
tin
gs
.
 
7
N
eg
at
iv
e 
ef
-
fe
ct
s o
f a
 C
M
I 
ar
e 
in
ev
ita
bl
e 
bu
t c
an
 b
e 
re
du
ce
d
• 
Se
ve
ra
l m
ea
su
re
s h
av
e 
to
 b
e 
ta
ke
n 
to
 o
bt
ai
n 
go
od
 q
ua
lit
y 
C
M
I d
at
a.
 T
o 
ac
hi
ev
e 
th
is,
 
m
ed
ic
al
 sp
ec
ia
lti
es
 sh
ou
ld
 h
av
e 
a 
(fi
na
nc
ia
l) 
in
te
re
st 
in
 a
nd
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
ty
 fo
r t
he
 q
ua
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
da
ta
.
• 
 C
os
ts 
an
d 
sa
le
s d
at
a 
m
us
t b
e 
sta
bi
liz
ed
 a
s m
uc
h 
as
 p
os
sib
le
 b
y 
m
in
im
izi
ng
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 th
e 
co
st 
ca
lc
ul
at
io
n 
m
od
el
, u
sin
g 
no
rm
at
iv
e 
un
it 
co
sts
, a
nd
 b
y 
m
in
im
izi
ng
 th
e 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
th
e 
se
lli
ng
 p
ric
es
 b
y 
ta
ki
ng
 m
or
e 
as
pe
ct
s t
ha
n 
un
it 
co
sts
 in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
, s
uc
h 
as
 th
e 
se
lli
ng
 p
ric
es
 o
f t
he
 p
re
vi
ou
s y
ea
r, 
an
d 
str
at
eg
ic
 c
on
sid
er
at
io
ns
.
• 
 U
se
rs
 n
ee
d 
to
 h
av
e 
a 
ba
sic
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
of
 h
ow
 C
M
I d
at
a 
ar
e 
ge
ne
ra
te
d 
an
d 
by
 w
ho
m
, s
o 
th
ey
 k
no
w
 w
ith
 w
ho
m
 th
ey
 c
an
 d
isc
us
s t
he
 im
pl
ic
at
io
ns
.
• 
 U
se
rs
 m
us
t h
av
e 
ea
sy
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ts,
 w
ith
 m
in
im
al
 e
ffo
rt
. 
• 
 Po
w
er
 c
on
fli
ct
s c
an
 b
e 
pr
ev
en
te
d 
w
he
n 
th
e 
C
M
I i
s o
ffe
re
d 
as
 a
 le
ar
ni
ng
 to
ol
 a
nd
 n
ot
 a
s 
a 
w
ay
 to
 c
on
tro
l o
r c
ur
ta
il 
th
e 
be
ha
vi
or
 o
f p
eo
pl
e.
• 
 It 
is 
w
ise
, b
ot
h 
fro
m
 a
 su
bs
ta
nt
iv
e 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e,
 to
 st
an
da
rd
ize
 c
as
e-
m
ix
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
as
 m
uc
h 
as
 p
os
sib
le
 fo
r t
he
 d
iff
er
en
t m
ed
ic
al
 sp
ec
ia
lti
es
 a
nd
 d
iv
isi
on
s. 
H
ow
ev
er
, t
o 
pr
ev
en
t i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
ov
er
lo
ad
, u
se
rs
 m
us
t h
av
e 
th
e 
op
po
rt
un
ity
 to
 in
di
ca
te
 
w
hi
ch
 st
an
da
rd
 fi
gu
re
s a
nd
 ta
bl
es
 a
re
 re
le
va
nt
 to
 th
em
 a
nd
 w
hi
ch
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 d
et
ai
ls 
th
ey
 n
ee
d.
 
 
N
o
Im
pl
ic
at
io
n
G
ui
de
lin
es
 fo
r 
ho
sp
it
al
 m
an
ag
er
s
G
ui
de
lin
es
 fo
r 
re
gu
la
to
rs
8
U
sin
g 
a 
C
M
I 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
lo
gi
c 
of
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
an
d 
th
is 
ca
n 
be
 p
ro
bl
em
at
ic
 
fo
r m
ed
ic
al
 
m
an
ag
er
s
• 
To
p 
m
an
ag
er
s m
us
t e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 th
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 m
an
ag
er
s h
av
e 
th
e 
rig
ht
 sk
ill
s a
nd
 k
no
w
l-
ed
ge
 to
 u
se
 a
 C
M
I i
n 
a 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 w
ay
. U
sin
g 
a 
C
M
I r
eq
ui
re
s t
ha
t m
an
ag
er
s a
re
 a
bl
e 
to
 h
an
dl
e 
ab
str
ac
t d
at
a 
an
d 
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
ie
s, 
co
nn
ec
t d
at
a,
 a
nd
 tr
an
sla
te
 it
 in
to
 a
ct
io
n 
an
d 
co
nfl
ic
ts 
of
 in
te
re
st.
 B
ef
or
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 m
an
ag
er
s g
et
 a
cc
es
s t
o 
th
e 
C
M
I t
he
re
 h
as
 to
 
be
 a
n 
as
se
ss
m
en
t o
f t
he
ir 
ab
ili
tie
s t
o 
co
m
bi
ne
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
 lo
gi
cs
 o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 
m
ed
ic
in
e.
 
• 
 Th
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 m
an
ag
er
s a
lso
 h
av
e 
to
 b
e 
tr
ai
ne
d 
in
 th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t o
f t
he
ir 
ca
se
-m
ix
 
po
rt
fo
lio
 a
nd
 u
nd
er
ly
in
g 
pr
oc
es
se
s, 
bo
th
 p
ra
ct
ic
al
ly
 a
nd
 le
ga
lly
. F
or
 th
is 
pu
rp
os
e,
 th
e 
Po
rt
fo
lio
 C
he
ck
lis
t o
f t
he
 A
M
C
 c
an
 b
e 
us
ef
ul
. F
in
al
ly,
 th
e 
(m
ed
ic
al
) m
an
ag
er
 m
us
t 
ha
ve
 so
m
e 
ba
sic
 k
no
w
le
dg
e 
of
 fi
na
nc
e 
in
 o
rd
er
 to
 u
se
 th
e 
C
M
I i
n 
a 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 w
ay
. 
Th
ey
 sh
ou
ld
 a
t l
ea
st 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 h
ow
 th
e 
ex
te
rn
al
 a
nd
 in
te
rn
al
 fu
nd
in
g 
w
or
ks
, h
ow
 
co
sts
 a
nd
 re
ve
nu
es
 a
re
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
, a
nd
 h
ow
 th
ey
 c
an
 in
flu
en
ce
 th
em
 a
s m
an
ag
er
s.
• 
In
 c
ur
re
nt
 m
ed
ic
al
 st
ud
ie
s i
n 
th
e 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s t
he
re
 is
 n
ot
 m
uc
h 
ro
om
 fo
r m
an
-
ag
em
en
t a
nd
 fi
na
nc
ia
l k
no
w
le
dg
e.
 Th
is 
is 
re
m
ar
ka
bl
e,
 si
nc
e 
th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
a 
la
rg
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f d
oc
to
rs
 w
ho
 a
re
 a
ss
ig
ne
d 
m
an
ag
em
en
t f
un
ct
io
ns
 in
 th
ei
r c
ar
ee
rs
, a
nd
 
th
ey
 w
ill
 n
ee
d 
th
at
 ty
pe
 o
f k
no
w
le
dg
e 
an
d 
sk
ill
s. 
Re
gu
la
to
rs
 c
an
 d
o 
m
or
e 
to
 b
et
te
r 
pr
ep
ar
e 
do
ct
or
s f
or
 w
or
ki
ng
 a
s h
os
pi
ta
l m
an
ag
er
s a
nd
 in
cr
ea
se
 th
e 
m
an
ag
em
en
t 
sk
ill
s o
f (
ch
ie
f)
 p
hy
sic
ia
ns
. 
• 
 Th
e 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t o
f m
an
ag
em
en
t s
ki
lls
 c
an
 b
e 
pr
om
ot
ed
 b
y 
off
er
in
g 
(o
pt
io
na
l) 
m
an
ag
em
en
t c
ou
rs
es
 to
 d
oc
to
rs
 a
nd
 n
ur
se
s. 
Th
es
e 
co
ur
se
s s
ho
ul
d 
in
cl
ud
e 
tr
ai
ni
ng
 
in
 c
on
tro
l t
ec
hn
iq
ue
s a
nd
 p
ro
ce
ss
es
 b
ut
 a
lso
 in
 c
on
fli
ct
 re
so
lu
tio
n 
an
d 
co
nfl
ic
t 
m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
Th
e 
M
an
ag
em
en
t G
am
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
by
 th
e 
AM
C
 m
ig
ht
 b
e 
us
ef
ul
 fo
r 
th
is 
pu
rp
os
e.
 
9
M
an
ag
er
s 
ar
e 
m
ai
nl
y 
in
te
re
ste
d 
in
 c
as
e-
m
ix
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
on
 
to
pi
cs
 th
ey
 c
an
 
co
nt
ro
l a
nd
 a
re
 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r
• 
 H
os
pi
ta
l m
an
ag
er
s m
us
t e
ns
ur
e 
th
at
 to
p 
(m
ed
ic
al
) m
an
ag
er
s h
av
e 
th
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 fo
r-
m
al
 ri
gh
ts 
an
d 
po
w
er
 to
 in
flu
en
ce
 k
ey
 to
pi
cs
 su
ch
 a
s t
he
 c
as
e-
m
ix
, c
os
ts 
an
d 
re
ve
nu
es
. 
• 
 Th
er
e 
m
us
t b
e 
cl
ea
r j
ob
 d
es
cr
ip
tio
ns
 w
ith
 c
om
m
itt
ed
 ta
sk
s a
nd
 re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s. 
Re
ga
rd
-
in
g 
th
ei
r r
es
po
ns
ib
ili
tie
s, 
th
er
e 
ne
ed
s t
o 
be
 c
le
ar
 d
efi
ni
tio
ns
 o
f w
ha
t t
he
 m
an
ag
er
s a
re
 
re
sp
on
sib
le
 fo
r: 
w
hi
ch
 (c
or
e)
 ta
sk
s, 
w
hi
ch
 e
le
m
en
ts 
(c
on
te
nt
 a
nd
/o
r b
us
in
es
s/
fin
an
ce
), 
an
d 
w
hi
ch
 e
nt
iti
es
 (m
ed
ic
al
 sp
ec
ia
lty
, m
ed
ic
al
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts)
. I
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 c
le
ar
ly
 st
at
ed
 
ho
w
 th
es
e 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s r
el
at
e 
to
 th
os
e 
of
 o
th
er
 m
an
ag
er
s a
nd
 h
ow
 th
e 
re
sp
on
sib
ili
tie
s 
ar
e 
di
vi
de
d 
w
he
n 
m
or
e 
m
ed
ic
al
 sp
ec
ia
lti
es
 a
nd
 m
ed
ic
al
 d
ep
ar
tm
en
ts 
ar
e 
in
vo
lv
ed
 in
 th
e 
tre
at
m
en
t o
f p
at
ie
nt
 g
ro
up
s. 
10
Th
e 
de
sig
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
-
ta
-ti
on
 o
f a
 
C
M
I s
ho
ul
d 
be
 a
pp
ro
ac
he
d 
in
 a
 sc
ie
nt
ifi
c 
w
ay
• 
 C
as
e-
m
ix
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 a
 st
ra
te
gi
c 
as
se
t f
or
 o
rg
an
iza
tio
ns
. I
t i
s 
re
co
m
m
en
de
d 
th
at
 th
e 
kn
ow
le
dg
e 
an
d 
sk
ill
s a
bo
ut
 a
 C
M
I a
re
 c
on
ce
nt
ra
te
d 
in
 o
ne
 
(m
an
ag
em
en
t) 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
de
pa
rt
m
en
t. 
It 
m
ay
 b
e 
w
ise
 to
 m
ak
e 
a 
C
hi
ef
 In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
O
ffi
ce
r (
C
IO
) r
es
po
ns
ib
le
 fo
r t
he
 d
es
ig
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
C
M
I. 
• 
 Th
e 
de
sig
n 
an
d 
im
pl
em
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 a
 C
M
I m
us
t b
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 a
s a
 sc
ie
nc
e 
th
at
 sh
ou
ld
 
be
 le
ft 
to
 p
ro
fe
ss
io
na
ls.
 H
os
pi
ta
l m
an
ag
er
s s
ho
ul
d 
ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 th
is 
ca
n 
be
 d
on
e 
by
 th
e 
ho
sp
ita
l’s
 o
w
n 
pe
op
le
 o
r b
et
te
r o
ut
so
ur
ce
d.
 In
 th
is 
co
nt
ex
t, 
th
e 
ad
va
nt
ag
es
 a
nd
 
di
sa
dv
an
ta
ge
s o
f t
he
 se
lf-
de
sig
n 
of
 th
e 
C
M
I h
av
e 
to
 b
e 
w
ei
gh
ed
 u
p.

Summary/Samenvatting

Summary/Samenvatting
327
Summary
Part I: Background and design of the research
The Dutch health care sector is under great financial pressure. As a result, since 2005, 
several major reforms have been introduced, including significant legislative changes. 
In the hospital sector, the liberalization of care was gradually expanded. Also, a new 
performance-based pricing system, called the Diagnosis Treatment Combinations 
(DBCs), was introduced and replaced the budget system. The increasing competition 
and financial pressure required adjustments to the way hospitals were generally managed. 
Case-mix information became increasingly important in order to make the right 
decisions regarding the type and volumes of patients (case-mix), planning, monitoring, 
process optimizing, and legitimizing. For several hospitals, the DBC system was an 
incentive to start introducing case-mix information systems. In a case-mix information 
system (CMI), financial, patient, and medical data are collected at patient level. This 
data can be integrated, correlated, and aggregated at different levels.
In the Dutch (academic) hospitals, there was actually no knowledge available about 
what type of CMI could be designed and how it could be implemented successfully. 
Up until then, no studies had been done in this context. In the literature, there were 
stories of failure and success of CMIs in other countries. Some implementations were 
successful and led to positive outcomes, such as better informed choices, increasing 
cost consciousness, rationalizing of operating processes, and cost reductions. But several 
implementations failed and led to negative effects, such as power conflicts and disputes 
about the data. In general, too little research has been done on the effects of CMIs 
in different contexts. Because of this, many important research topics had been left 
unexplored. To solve this, a design-oriented research project was executed as an in-depth 
longitudinal case study from 2006 to 2014 at the Academic Medical Center (AMC) in 
Amsterdam. The objectives of this research were:
1. To design and implement a CMI for the top medical and non-medical management, 
namely the chief physicians, division managers, and central managers; 
2. To gain in-depth design-oriented knowledge about a CMI. 
The methodology of design-oriented research was applied, which is essentially a process 
of gaining knowledge on the basis of reflection on the regulative cycle and involves a 
structured organizational problem-solving process within an organization. In the case 
study, the regulative cycles consisted of following phases: process design, object design, 
implementation, and evaluation, and was passed through several times. In addition to 
the regular evaluations, two extensive reflections took place about the outcomes and 
potential success factors of the CMI project. The evaluations and reflections were based 
328
on qualitative and quantitative research methods, using pilot groups, (semi-structured) 
interviews, and questionnaires. This research context was unique as regards to the 
reimbursement system (the Diagnosis Treatment Combinations [DBC] system), type 
of organization (university medical center [UMC]), and the momentum (just after the 
health care reforms).
Part II: Case study AMC 2006 - 2014
During the case study and while passing through the phases of the regulative cycle, the 
CMI was iteratively designed and implemented by pilot groups. In the first phase of the 
case study – the period between 2006 and 2008 – the Standard Report Patient Care and 
the Portfolio Matrix were designed by a pilot group. In the design of these information 
products, the patient groups of the medical specialties were put centrally, based on the 
assumption that the type and volumes of patients (case-mix) had a large impact on 
the performance in all core tasks and funding of the AMC. For this purpose, each 
medical specialty classified their patients into manageable groups that matched with 
their experience and language. There was quite a consensus between the managers about 
what types of information should be minimally covered (minimal data set) in the CMI 
and consisted of system data (such as patient characteristics, capacity, health care market 
and finance) and non-system data (such as relevance of care). In the Standard Report 
Patient Care, these types of information per patient group were presented side by side 
to allow comparison with each other and to evaluate strategic alternatives. The Portfolio 
Matrix was designed to provide quick insight into the medical and financial relevance 
per patient group. For each quadrant of the Portfolio Matrix, actions could be defined 
to optimize the portfolio. At the end of 2006, the pilot was positively evaluated and a 
decision was made to roll out the Standard Report and Portfolio Matrix to all medical 
specialties in order to support them when defining their annual plans. Between 2006 
and 2008, the Standard Report Patient Care and Portfolio Matrix were updated three 
times and sent to the managers. In 2008, 26 medical specialties participated and a total 
of 350 patient groups were defined. Training sessions were organized to demonstrate to 
the managers what types of case-mix information were available and how these could 
be used for their practice. At the end of 2008 the CMI was also made available through 
Cognos, the prevailing Business Intelligence tool, to increase the accessibility of the 
information for users.
At the end of 2008, an interim reflection on the project took place by surveying and 
interviewing 35 top managers (chief physicians, division managers and central managers). 
It showed that the Standard Report Patient Care and Portfolio Matrix were actually 
used by almost all managers of the target groups. The CMI was mostly used for getting 
more insight, decision support and, although to a lesser extent legitimization. However, 
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doubts about the quality of the data, particularly the DBC and cost data, appeared to 
be a major obstacle to the acceptance and use of the information. The poor quality was 
also due to errors in the computer systems, such as failing algorithms, incorrect linkages 
between care activities and DBCs and the leakage of data. It also took a long time to 
reach agreement with health insurers about volumes and prices (B-list DBCs) of the care 
products and as a result the prices only became available in the CMI late in the current 
year. Also, until then, the tariffs of the A-list DBCs were only used for administrative 
purposes, and did not determine the actual returns because these returns were still based 
on the budget system. This reduced the usefulness of the CMI considerably, since it was 
not possible to determine the financial coverage per care product or patient group. Also 
several managers indicated that they had insufficient knowledge and skills about how 
the CMI could be used for decision making. Moreover, they found it difficult to really 
implement choices into practice. About two-thirds of the respondents had perceived the 
CMI project as (very) successful for themselves, but it was also concluded that several 
necessary measures for improvement had to be taken to further increase the success of 
the CMI. The interim reflection also demonstrated that the expectations of the CMI 
were different per manager: some expected it to be an ‘answering machine’, others a 
‘dialogue machine’, and others a ‘budget generating machine’.
In the second phase of the case study – the period between 2009 and 2004 – the 
Standard Report Patient Care and the Portfolio Matrix were redesigned and improved. 
With regards to the Standard Report, new types of information were added (such as the 
type of referrer, waiting times, market shares, revenue forecasts, and percentages of top 
referral care) and several standards were added (for example, budgets and waiting times). 
Since data with regard to revenue forecasts and top referral care were not registered 
in the computer systems, calculation models were developed on extensive statistical 
analyses, such as a Forecasting Model and a Top Referral Care Model. Next, the Standard 
Report was not only made available per medical specialty, but also per division and at 
the corporate level. The Standard Reports could also be downloaded by the users at 
any time and at any organizational level (AMC, division or medical specialty). This 
increased the timeliness and accessibility of the Standard Report significantly. 
In addition, new information products were designed, such as the Interdependency 
Analysis, the Benchmark Analysis Resource Use Profiles and the Portfolio Checklist. The 
Interdependency Analysis was developed for the managers in order to provide insight 
on what the clinical interdependency was between patient groups and could be used by 
the managers to determine where coordination of medical policy between specialties 
was necessary when making case-mix decisions. The Benchmark Analysis Resource Use 
Profiles was designed to optimize the care processes and to reduce costs by comparing 
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costs and activities per care product from the AMC with other University Medical Centers 
(UMCs). The constructed Portfolio Checklist was a tool to assess the performance of 
the current case-mix in a systematic way by means of the CMI and to translate their 
outcomes to policy decisions in order to optimize the case-mix or underlying care 
processes. During this period the CMI was more and more embedded in the strategic 
management cycle and was used for gaining insight, conducting a dialogue on portfolio 
choices, external legitimization, process optimization, cost reduction, and also cost-
effectiveness studies.
In 2012, all existing information products had to be redesigned because of the 
replacement of the DBC system by the DOT (DBCs On their way to Transparency) 
system. This had a major negative impact on the CMI project. It meant not only a major 
technical change of the CMI, but also a substantive change as users had to understand 
this new system and related case-mix information. Although the DOT system certainly 
had advantages, the data were still perceived as unreliable, even more so than the DBC 
data. Furthermore, it still took much time to negotiate about volumes and prices with 
the health insurers and this meant that during the year essential data were missing. This 
reduced the number of possible applications and the use of the CMI in several ways. The 
continuous and dramatic changes in the DOT product structure and associated selling 
prices generated too many uncertainties to implement output budgeting in a responsible 
way. As a result, in 2012 the Board of Directors decided to abandon the plans to link 
the internal budgets to the DOT production. Because of this, an important aim of the 
CMI project, namely to use the CMI for planning purposes, could not be achieved and 
the need to use it was reduced. Further, the negative effects of the incomplete dataset 
were that there were risks of using this information and disclaimers had to be added to 
the information products. For example, a warning not to make case-mix decisions on 
basis of the CMI. Other obstructing factors were that managers still experienced several 
legal and practical barriers in managing the case-mix and that new priorities arose at the 
AMC such as the implementation of the electronic patient system and the proposed 
administrative merger with VUmc. The CMI was also used less for planning capacity. 
Reasons mentioned for this were that the production of the medical specialty was rather 
stable over the years and did not require an advanced planning tool and that some 
specialties used their own planning system and used their own data because the CMI 
data were not considered reliable enough to use.
Between 2009 and 2014, information products were designed for the business analysts 
to be able to support their top managers in their use of the CMI. The Intranet Page 
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Management Information and several Data Cubes in Cognos341were designed for them. 
The Data Cubes contained the detailed data of the Standard Report Patient Care and 
had options for drilling down into the data to patient level and for correlating medical 
data, patient data, and financial data. In 2014 about 40 business analysts used these 
products regularly. 
In 2014, the CMI was technically completed and it was concluded that the highest 
possible aims had been achieved and the project could end. At that time, 49 medical 
(sub)specialties, belonging to 10 divisions, were participating in the CMI project. 
Afterward, several actions were taken to secure the CMI for the future, such as the 
designation of those responsible for the CMI in the organization and to ensure that the 
case-mix information would be kept available in 2015 when the new electronic patient 
system (EPIC) was planned to be implemented. 
Part III: The final case-mix information system of the AMC
The final CMI of the AMC consisted of a set of information products regarding 
patient care. The CMI served multiple functions for multiple users at the same time. 
A distinction was made between products primarily designed for the top managers 
and those for the business analysts. The products for the top managers were designed 
to support them in the different stages of the strategic management cycle. For chief 
physicians and division managers, the CMI mainly served the decision-facilitating 
function, which meant that it would give insight into the case-mix and underlying care 
processes and these insights would support management in making (policy) decisions 
with regard to the case-mix and process optimization. For central management, the 
CMI mainly served a decision-control function, which meant that it could be used for 
planning (capacity, money) and monitoring of the policy plans. It was also helpful for 
external legitimation purposes (negotiating with the health insurance companies). To 
fulfill these functions, several information products were designed that were ready-made 
and contained information at a highly aggregated level. The Standard Report Patient 
Care and Portfolio Matrix were the key products of the CMI for the managers and 
were sent to them on a monthly basis. The Interdependency Analysis was generated for 
all medical specialties and updated every two or three years. The Benchmark Analysis 
Resource Profiles and Portfolio Checklist were implemented for a selected number of 
medical specialties. The products for the business analysts were designed to support 
the managers in their use of the CMI by giving background information and making 
in-depth analyses. All information products were part of the CMI and what they had 
34 The AMC used Cognos as their management information system. Cognos is a brand name used by IBM 
for activities in the field of business intelligence and business performance management. The software is 
designed to enable business users without technical knowledge to extract corporate data, analyse it, and 
assemble reports.
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in common was that the information was always based on the same resources and 
definitions; the information was expressed in the same clinical language, namely the 
patient group. This made it possible to connect and compare information with each 
other. With the total set of products, a substantial amount of information with regard 
to patient care was available from a variety of perspectives: from strategic to operational, 
from historical to prospective, from standard to ad hoc, and from one’s own hospital’s 
information to information from other hospitals. 
Part IV: Reflection and discussion 
In April 2014, an end reflection on the CMI project took place by surveying 53 (medical) 
managers (chief physicians, division managers and central managers). The reflection 
related to the design and implementation variables, organizational and environmental 
variables and the outcomes of the CMI. Most of the respondents used the CMI mainly 
for gaining insight into their case-mix, and to some extent for monitoring, internal 
legitimation, and decision support. The central managers, in particular, used the CMI 
for (annual) planning purposes, monitoring (A3 score card), process optimization 
(SLIM project), the preparation of the administrative merger (with VUmc), internal 
legitimation (Internal Review Committee) and for external legitimation (negotiations 
with health insurers). In accordance with the interim reflection, doubts over the quality 
of the CMI were the most frequently cited disadvantage. The CMI database was used 
in various ways for external legitimation purposes, for example to define the percentage 
of top referral care in the annual account and to influence the rate of the A-list DBCs. 
The CMI also supported cost effectiveness studies. The CMI was eventually not used 
for budgeting and the allocation of capacity. As a result the CMI lost significance, as the 
idea of internal performance budgeting disappeared. In general, the respondents agreed 
with the statement that the CMI had added value to the AMC and to themselves. The 
CMI was found especially useful in the context of the present market and financial 
pressure. 
It is difficult to determine exactly what the impact of the CMI has been on the user and 
the organization. However, based on the extensive interim and end reflections, we can 
conclude that the CMI has increased and improved the available information regarding 
patient groups enormously and that this information has contributed to the improvement 
of the various phases of the strategic management cycle. Although the perceived effects 
of the CMI differed per manager, it can be concluded that the CMI contributed to 
the following: identification of possible case-mix changes, providing the appropriate 
arguments, agreements were made about patient care, an increase of cost consciousness 
and cost savings, an improved registration of diagnoses and care activities, a greater 
appreciation for their work management and better rates (A-list DBCs). However, no 
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substantial case-mix decisions resulted immediately from the functioning of the CMI. 
This was probably due to the several barriers which were experienced by the user – apart 
from the (perceived) poor quality of the data – such as the lack of skills and knowledge, 
lack of decision-making power, the persistent complexity and volatility of the DBC 
system, existing organizational structure/culture, and legal barriers. Respondents also 
reported negative effects of the CMI, such as confusion and discussion about the data, 
information overload, and selective and incorrect use of the information. Overall, the 
CMI project was perceived as moderately successful for the users themselves, whereas 
the majority of the respondents perceived the CMI project as (very) successful for the 
organization. Reasons why the respondents perceived the CMI to be more successful for 
the organization than for themselves are probably related to the fact that they observed 
a corporate-wide system, used by various users and for different purposes, both within 
their own division and beyond. Moreover, there was the general belief that a CMI is 
necessary in the context of the present competition and financial pressure. On balance, 
the positive effects of the instrument outweighed the negative effects, but the perceived 
success of the CMI project differed very much per manager.
The research period was a relevant contextual factor for this case study because it had a 
major impact on the results. The research took place just after the implementation of 
health care reforms, which included the introduction of a new reimbursement system, 
product structure (DBC and DOT), and the liberalization of care. There was a mixture 
of a complex internal environment and a chaotic outside world. Several organizational 
and environmental variables were therefore very unstable and unpredictable over the 
course of time. Eventually, the free market of hospital care did not really come through. 
As a result, the aims of the CMI changed during the research project, as did the basic 
material for designing it, such as the DBC data, data sources, and definitions. These 
factors complicated the design of the CMI and implied that eventually some aims of 
the CMI – such as making real case-mix decisions and budgeting – could not be fully 
achieved and examined. 
To assess the applicability of the case study results for other hospital organizations we 
redesigned the AMC’s Portfolio Matrix and implemented this information tool at a 
selected number of medical specialties at the University Medical Center of Groningen 
(UMCG) and Free University Medical Center (VUmc). The comparisons between the 
three UMCs showed some interesting similarities and differences. The similarities were 
that the Portfolio Matrix was considered a powerful tool because it presented their case-
mix in a simple way and contributed to the dialogue about case-mix decisions. However, 
in the design and implementation of the Portfolio Matrices, different choices were made. 
The differences were determined by factors such as differences in the characteristics of 
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the Board of Directors, organization culture, quality of the data, and position on the 
health care market, and it made an impact on the contents of the CMI and the adoption 
and use of it. Although in the design and implementation of this type of portfolio 
matrices different choices had to be made, this part of the CMI can be implemented in 
a wide range of academic health care settings.
This study contributes in several ways to the management accounting discipline and has 
several practical implications. First, through this research, we gained in-depth knowledge 
about the possible benefits of a CMI in the context of Dutch UMCs. It demonstrated 
that the (DBC-based) market mechanisms can be a driving force for UMCs to change 
their organization, but there are also characteristics of market mechanisms that can 
reduce or even obstruct the process of management accounting change and the success 
of a CMI. Second, this research relates to both the design and the implementation of 
a CMI, whereas prior accounting research mostly focused on the implementation of 
an already-designed CMI. This resulted in new knowledge about the design of CMIs. 
Through continuous iterations in the reflective cycle, we gained in-depth knowledge 
about what types and combinations of information are useful to whom and about 
how the information system could be implemented in a responsible way. The study 
demonstrates that a CMI can fulfill multiple functions for multiple stakeholders at the 
same time. Through the research, the advantages and disadvantages of self-design of a 
CMI by a UMC became apparent. Third, the outcomes and the factors that contribute 
to the success of a CMI were examined in-depth, with both qualitative and quantitative 
methods. As a result, detailed insights were gained about the factors that hindered or 
facilitated the success of a CMI, and about the ways through which obstructions can 
be reduced. Finally, we conclude that the design and implementation of a CMI should 
be based on scientific and practice-based evidence. To achieve this, the design-oriented 
knowledge that was gained was translated into practical guidelines for a successful 
implementation of a CMI in Dutch university medical centers. The guidelines are 
meant for hospital managers (a Board of Directors, medical managers, chief physicians, 
project managers, and IT managers) as well as (international) regulators (the Ministry 
of Health, the Ministry of Education, and other health authorities such as the NZa and 
NMa), that can directly or indirectly influence the success of CMIs in hospitals.
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Samenvatting (Dutch summary)
Deel I: Achtergrond en onderzoeksontwerp 
De Nederlandse gezondheidszorg staat onder grote financiële druk. Als gevolg hiervan 
zijn sinds 2005 diverse hervormingen en omvangrijke wetswijzigingen doorgevoerd. 
In de ziekenhuissector werd de liberalisering van de zorg geleidelijk ingevoerd. Ook 
werd een nieuw vergoedingensysteem, de Diagnose Behandel Combinaties (DBC’s), 
geïntroduceerd ter vervanging van het budgetsysteem. De toenemende concurrentie en 
financiële druk vereisten ook aanpassingen aan de wijze waarop ziekenhuizen in het 
algemeen werden bestuurd. Case-mix informatie werd steeds belangrijker om de juiste 
beslissingen te nemen ten aanzien van het type en de volumes van de patiënten (case-
mix), planning, monitoring, proces optimalisatie en legitimering. Voor verschillende 
ziekenhuizen was het DBC-systeem een stimulans om case-mix informatiesystemen te 
introduceren. In een case-mix informatiesysteem (CMI) worden financiële, medische 
en patiëntgegevens verzameld op patiëntniveau. Deze gegevens kunnen op verschillende 
niveaus worden geïntegreerd, gecorreleerd en geaggregeerd.
In de Nederlandse (academische) ziekenhuizen was geen kennis beschikbaar over het 
type case-mixinformatie dat ontworpen kon worden en hoe een dergelijk ontwerp 
succesvol kon worden geïmplementeerd. Wel waren in de literatuur verhalen te lezen 
over mislukkingen en succes van CMI’s in andere landen. Sommige succesvolle 
implementaties hadden geleid tot positieve uitkomsten, zoals betere geïnformeerde 
keuzes, het verhogen van kostenbewustzijn, het rationaliseren van de operationele 
processen en kostenbesparingen. Maar er waren ook mislukte implementaties met 
negatieve effecten als gevolg, zoals machtsconflicten en discussies over de gegenereerde 
gegevens. In het algemeen kan worden gesteld dat er weinig onderzoek was gedaan naar de 
effecten van CMI’s. Hierdoor bleven veel belangrijke onderzoeksthema’s onontgonnen. 
Om die reden werd in het Academisch Medisch Centrum (AMC) in Amsterdam in de 
periode 2006-2014 een ontwerpgericht onderzoek uitgevoerd. 
De doelstellingen van deze diepgaande langdurige casestudie waren:
1. Het ontwerpen en implementeren van een CMI voor het hoger (medisch) 
management, namelijk de afdelingshoofden, divisie managers en centrale managers;
2. Het verkrijgen van gedetailleerde ontwerpgerichte kennis over een CMI.
In de casestudie werd de methodologie van het ontwerpgericht onderzoek toegepast. Het 
gaat dan om het verwerven van kennis op basis van een reflectie op de regulatieve cyclus 
die betrekking heeft op een gestructureerd organisatorisch probleemoplossend proces 
binnen een organisatie. In dit onderzoek bestond de regulatieve cyclus uit volgende fasen: 
procesontwerp, objectontwerp, implementatie en evaluatie. Deze cyclus werd meerdere 
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malen herhaald. In aanvulling op de reguliere evaluaties vonden twee uitgebreide 
reflecties plaats op de uitkomsten en mogelijke succesfactoren van het CMI-project. 
Bij de evaluaties en reflecties werd gebruik gemaakt van kwalitatieve en kwantitatieve 
onderzoeksmethoden, pilot-groepen, (semigestructureerde) interviews en vragenlijsten. 
Onze onderzoekscontext was uniek voor wat betreft het vergoedingensysteem (de 
Diagnose Behandel Combinaties), type organisatie (universitair medisch centrum) en 
momentum (direct na de hervormingen in de gezondheidszorg).
Deel II: Casestudie AMC 2006 - 2014
Tijdens het doorlopen van de fasen van de regulatieve cyclus werd het CMI iteratief 
ontworpen en geïmplementeerd door pilotgroepen. In de eerste fase van de casestudie 
- de periode tussen 2006 en 2008 - werd de Standaardrapportage Patiëntenzorg en 
Portfoliomatrix ontworpen. Bij het ontwerp van deze informatieproducten werden 
de patiëntengroepen van de medische specialismen centraal gesteld. Dit vanuit de 
gedachte dat het type en volume van patiënten (case-mix) een grote invloed heeft op 
de kerntaken en financiën van het AMC. De afdelingshoofden definieerden vervolgens 
een aantal hanteerbare patiëntengroepen in termen die aansloten bij hun klinische 
denk- en belevingswereld. Er was een behoorlijke consensus tussen de managers over 
het soort informatie dat minimaal in het CMI beschikbaar moest zijn (minimale 
dataset). Die informatie betrof systeemgegevens (zoals patiëntkenmerken, capaciteit, 
zorgmarkt en financiën) en niet-systeemgegevens (zoals relevantie van de zorg). In 
de Standaardrapportage Patiëntenzorg werd dit type informatie per patiëntengroep 
naast elkaar gepresenteerd om onderlinge vergelijking mogelijk te maken en om 
strategische alternatieven te evalueren. De Portfoliomatrix werd  ontworpen om snel 
inzicht te geven in de medische en financiële relevantie per patiëntengroep. Voor elk 
kwadrant van de Portfoliomatrix konden acties worden gedefinieerd om de portfolio te 
optimaliseren. Eind 2006 werd de pilot positief geëvalueerd. Er werd besloten om de 
Standaardrapportage Patiëntenzorg en Portfoliomatrix uit te rollen naar alle medische 
specialismen als ondersteuning bij het opstellen van hun jaarplannen. Tussen 2006 
en 2008 werd de Standaardrapportage Patiëntenzorg en Portfoliomatrix drie keer 
geactualiseerd en naar de managers verstuurd. In 2008 namen 26 medische specialismen 
deel aan het project en waren er inmiddels 350 patiëntengroepen gedefinieerd. Er 
werden trainingen georganiseerd om de managers te laten zien welke soorten case-mix 
informatie beschikbaar waren en hoe die in de praktijk gebruikt konden worden. Om 
de toegankelijkheid van de informatie te verhogen werd eind 2008 het CMI ook door 
middel van Cognos352aan de gebruikers beschikbaar gesteld.
35 Het AMC gebruikt Cognos als management informatie systeem. Cognos is een merknaam die wordt 
gebruikt door IBM voor activiteiten op het gebied van business intelligence en business performance 
management. De software is ontworpen om het gebruikers mogelijk te maken zonder technische kennis 
bedrijfsgegevens te extraheren, analyseren en rapporteren.
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Eind 2008 vond een interim-reflectie plaats waarbij 35 topmanagers (afdelingshoofden, 
divisie managers en centrale managers) werden geënquêteerd en geïnterviewd. Uit de 
reflectie kwam naar voren dat de Standaardrapportage Patiëntenzorg en Portfoliomatrix 
door vrijwel alle managers werden gebruikt. Het CMI werd vooral gebruikt voor het 
verkrijgen van meer inzicht en ondersteuning bij besluitvorming, maar in mindere mate 
voor legitimering. Twijfels over de kwaliteit van de aangeboden informatie, vooral de 
DBC- en kostengegevens, bleken een groot obstakel te zijn voor de acceptatie en gebruik 
van de informatie. De slechte kwaliteit van de gegevens werd onder andere veroorzaakt 
door fouten in computersystemen zoals verkeerde algoritmen, onjuiste koppelingen 
tussen zorgactiviteiten en DBC’s en het ‘weglekken’ van gegevens. Het duurde ook lange 
tijd tot een akkoord met de zorgverzekeraars bereikt was over volumes en prijzen van de 
DBC’s (B-lijst) met als gevolg dat de tarieven pas laat in het lopende jaar beschikbaar 
kwamen in het CMI. Ook werden tot dan toe de tarieven van de DBC’s uit het A-segment 
alleen gebruikt voor administratieve doeleinden en niet om te werkelijke opbrengsten te 
bepalen. Deze opbrengsten waren immers nog steeds gebaseerd op het budgetsysteem. 
Dit verminderde de bruikbaarheid van het CMI aanzienlijk, omdat het hierdoor niet 
mogelijk was de financiële dekking per zorgproduct of patiëntengroep te bepalen. Ook 
gaven verschillende managers aan dat ze onvoldoende kennis en vaardigheden hadden 
om het CMI te gebruiken bij hun besluitvorming. Bovendien vonden zij het moeilijk 
om keuzes daadwerkelijk in de praktijk te implementeren. Ongeveer twee derde van de 
respondenten beschouwden het CMI project als (zeer) succesvol voor zichzelf, maar er 
werd ook geconcludeerd dat verschillende verbeteringen nodig waren om het succes van 
het CMI te verhogen. De interim-reflectie toonde eveneens aan dat de verwachtingen 
van de managers ten aanzien van het CMI verschilden. Sommigen verwachtten dat het 
CMI een ‘antwoordmachine’ zou zijn, anderen een ‘dialoogmachine’ en weer anderen 
een ‘budgetverhogende machine’.
In de tweede fase van de casestudie - de periode tussen 2009 en 2004 - werd de ontwerpen 
van de Standaardrapportage Patiëntenzorg en de Portfoliomatrix vernieuwd en verbeterd. 
In de Standaardrapportage Patiëntenzorg werden nieuwe soorten informatie (zoals type 
verwijzer, wachttijden, marktaandelen, omzetprognoses en percentages topreferente 
zorg) en een aantal normen (zoals budgetten en wachttijden) toegevoegd. Aangezien 
gegevens over omzetprognoses en topreferente zorg niet in de computersystemen 
werden geregistreerd, moesten hiervoor rekenmodellen ontwikkeld worden met hulp 
van geavanceerde statistische technieken. Dit resulteerde in het Prognosemodel en 
het Topreferentiemodel. Vervolgens werd de Standaardrapportage Patiëntenzorg niet 
alleen per medisch specialisme opgesteld, maar ook per divisie en AMC-breed. De 
Standaardrapportages Patiëntenzorg konden voortaan op elk moment en op elk niveau 
(AMC, afdeling of medisch specialisme) door de gebruikers zelf worden gedownload. 
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Dit verhoogde de actualiteit en de toegankelijkheid van de Standaardrapportage 
Patiëntenzorg aanzienlijk.
Er werden ook nieuwe informatieproducten ontwikkeld, zoals de Verwevenheidsanalyse, 
de Benchmarkanalyse Zorgprofielen en de Portfoliochecklist. De Verwevenheidsanalyse 
werd ontwikkeld om de managers inzicht te geven in de klinische verwevenheid tussen 
de patiëntengroepen. Deze analyse kon worden gebruikt om te bepalen waar afstemming 
van het medisch beleid tussen specialismen nodig was en om ondersteuning te bieden 
bij het maken van case-mix beslissingen. De Benchmarkanalyse Zorgprofielen werd 
ontworpen om de zorgprocessen te optimaliseren en de kosten te verlagen. In deze analyse 
konden de kosten en activiteiten per zorgproduct van het AMC worden vergeleken met 
die van de andere universitaire medische centra (UMCs). De Portfoliochecklist was een 
instrument om de prestaties van de huidige case-mix op een systematische manier te 
beoordelen op basis van het CMI. De uitkomsten hiervan konden vervolgens vertaald 
worden naar beleidsbeslissingen om de case-mix of onderliggende zorgprocessen 
te optimaliseren. Gedurende deze periode werd het CMI steeds meer ingebed in de 
strategische managementcyclus en gebruikt voor het vergroten van organisatorische 
inzichten, dialogen over portfoliokeuzes, externe legitimering, procesoptimalisaties, 
kostenreducties en wetenschappelijke kosteneffectiviteitstudies.
In 2012 moesten alle bestaande informatieproducten worden herontworpen vanwege de 
vervanging van het DBC-systeem door het DOT-(DBC’s Op weg naar Transparantie) 
systeem. Dit had een uiterst ongunstige impact op het CMI-project. Het betekende niet 
alleen een grote technische aanpassing van het CMI, maar ook een inhoudelijke wijziging 
omdat de gebruikers dit nieuwe DOT-systeem en de verwante case-mix informatie 
opnieuw moesten leren begrijpen. Hoewel het DOT-systeem zeker voordelen had, 
werden de gegevens door de gebruikers nog steeds als onbetrouwbaar gezien, meer nog 
dan de DBC-gegevens. Bovendien kostte het nog steeds veel tijd om te onderhandelen 
over volumes en prijzen met de zorgverzekeraars, met als gevolg dat in de loop van 
het jaar essentiële gegevens nog steeds ontbraken. Dit beperkte het aantal mogelijke 
toepassingen en het gebruik van het CMI op verschillende manieren. De continue en 
drastische veranderingen in het DOT-systeem en de bijbehorende tarieven genereerden 
te veel onzekerheden om interne prestatiebudgettering op een verantwoorde manier in 
te voeren. Als gevolg hiervan besloot de Raad van Bestuur in 2012 om haar plannen 
voor de koppeling van interne budgetten aan de DOT-productie op te geven. Hierdoor 
kon een belangrijk doel van het CMI project, namelijk het CMI te gebruiken voor 
planningsdoeleinden, niet worden gehaald en werd de urgentie tot het gebruik ervan 
minder. Daarnaast kleefden aan het gebruik van onvolledige gegevens managerial 
risico’s en moesten disclaimers aan de informatieproducten worden toegevoegd. Een 
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voorbeeld van een dergelijke disclaimer was dat op basis van de case-mix informatie geen 
directe portfoliobeslissingen genomen konden worden. Andere belemmerende factoren 
waren dat managers nog steeds verschillende juridische en praktische belemmeringen 
tegenkwamen bij het managen van de case-mix en dat in het AMC nieuwe prioriteiten 
werden gesteld, zoals de invoering van het elektronisch patiëntendossier en de 
voorgenomen bestuurlijke fusie met het VUmc. Het CMI werd slechts in beperkte 
mate gebruikt voor capaciteitsplanningen. Als redenen hiervoor werden genoemd dat 
de productie van de medisch specialismen door de jaren heen vrij stabiel was en men 
hiervoor geen geavanceerde planningstool nodig had, dat een aantal specialismen hun 
eigen planningssysteem gebruikten en dat de CMI-gegevens niet betrouwbaar genoeg 
werden bevonden. 
 
Tussen 2009 en 2014 werden ook voor de business analisten informatieproducten 
ontworpen om hen beter in staat te stellen het hoger management te ondersteunen 
bij het CMI-gebruik. Voor hen werden de Intranetpagina Management Informatie 
Patiëntenzorg en verschillende Datakubussen in Cognos ontworpen. De Datakubussen 
bevatten de gedetailleerde gegevens van de Standaardrapportage Patiëntenzorg en boden 
de mogelijkheid om ‘door te steken’ naar de onderliggende gegevens op patiëntniveau, 
als ook om medische gegevens, patiëntengegevens en financiële gegevens onderling te 
correleren. In 2014 maakten ongeveer 40 business analisten regelmatig gebruik van deze 
producten. 
In 2014 werd het CMI als technisch voltooid beschouwd en werd geconcludeerd dat 
de hoogst haalbare doelen waren bereikt en het project kon worden beëindigd. Op dat 
moment namen 49 medische (sub)specialismen, behorende tot 10 divisies, deel aan 
het CMI project. Daarna werden verschillende maatregelen getroffen om het CMI te 
borgen voor de toekomst, zoals het aanwijzen van verantwoordelijken voor het CMI in 
de organisatie en het waarborgen dat de case-mix informatie in 2015 beschikbaar bleef 
als het nieuwe elektronische patiëntsysteem (EPIC) zou worden ingevoerd.
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Deel III: Het uiteindelijke case-mix informatiesysteem van het AMC
Het uiteindelijk ontwikkelde case-mixinformatiesysteem van het AMC bestond uit 
een reeks van informatieproducten met betrekking tot de patiëntenzorg. Het CMI 
vervulde meerdere functies ter ondersteuning van verschillende soorten en type 
gebruikers. Daarbij werd een onderscheid gemaakt tussen de producten die primair 
bedoeld waren voor de (medische) topmanagers en business analisten. De producten 
voor de topmanagers waren bedoeld om hen te helpen in de verschillende stadia van de 
strategische managementcyclus. Voor de afdelingshoofden en divisiemanagers had het 
CMI vooral een beslissingsondersteunende functie. Dat wil zeggen dat het CMI hen inzicht 
kon geven in de case-mix en de onderliggende zorgprocessen en hen kon ondersteunen 
bij (beleids) beslissingen met betrekking tot de case-mix en procesoptimalisatie. Voor 
de centrale managers had het CMI vooral een beheersingsfunctie. Dat wil zegen dat het 
CMI kon worden gebruikt voor het plannen (capaciteit, geld) en monitoren van de 
beleidsplannen. Het systeem was ook bruikbaar voor externe legitimeringsdoeleinden, 
bijvoorbeeld bij de onderhandelingen met de zorgverzekeraars. Om al deze functies 
te vervullen werden verschillende producten ontwikkeld die op zeer geaggregeerd 
niveau kant en klare informatie opleverden. De Standaardrapportage Patiëntenzorg en 
Portfolio Matrix waren voor de managers de belangrijkste CMI producten en werden 
maandelijks naar hen gestuurd. De Verwevenheidsanalyse werd gegenereerd voor alle 
medische specialismen en om de twee tot drie jaar geactualiseerd. De Benchmarkanalyse 
Zorgprofielen en Portfoliochecklist werden geïmplementeerd voor een beperkt aantal 
medische specialismen. De producten voor de business analisten werden ontworpen 
om de managers in hun gebruik van het CMI te ondersteunen door het geven van 
achtergrondinformatie en het maken van diepgaande analyses. Alle informatieproducten 
maakten deel uit van hetzelfde CMI waardoor de informatie altijd gebaseerd was op 
dezelfde bronnen en definities en waarbij de gegevens werden uitgedrukt in dezelfde 
klinische taal, namelijk in termen van patiëntengroepen. Dit alles maakte het mogelijk 
om verschillende soorten gegevens aan elkaar te koppelen en met elkaar te vergelijken. 
Met deze totale set aan producten was een omvangrijke hoeveelheid informatie met 
betrekking tot de patiëntenzorg vanuit verschillende perspectieven beschikbaar: zowel 
strategisch als operationeel, zowel historisch als prospectief, zowel standaard als ad hoc, 
zowel van de eigen organisatie als van andere ziekenhuizen.
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Deel IV: Reflectie en discussie 
In april 2014 vond een eindreflectie op het CMI project plaats waarbij 53 (medische) 
topmanagers (afdelingshoofden, divisie managers en centrale managers) werden 
geënquêteerd. De eindreflectie richtte zich op de ontwerp- en implementatievariabelen, 
de organisatorische en omgevingsvariabelen en de uitkomsten van het CMI. Het 
merendeel van de respondenten gebruikte het CMI vooral om inzicht te krijgen in 
hun case-mix en gebruikte het systeem in zekere mate ook voor monitoring, interne 
legitimering en ondersteuning bij besluitvorming. Vooral de centrale managers 
gebruikten het CMI voor (jaarlijkse) planningsdoeleinden, monitoring (A3 score 
card), procesoptimalisatie (SLIM-project), de voorbereiding van de bestuurlijke fusie 
met VUmc, interne legitimatie (Interne Visitatiecommissie) en externe legitimatie 
(onderhandelingen met zorgverzekeraars). Net als bij de interim-reflectie waren er twijfels 
over de kwaliteit van de CMI-gegevens. Het CMI werd op verschillende manieren 
gebruikt voor externe legitimeringsdoeleinden, bijvoorbeeld om het aandeel topreferente 
zorg te verantwoorden in de jaarrekening en om de tarieven DBC’s uit het A-segment 
te beïnvloeden. Het CMI vond ook haar weg in wetenschappelijke kosteneffectiviteit 
studies. Het CMI werd uiteindelijk niet gebruikt voor begrotingsdoeleinden en de 
toewijzing van capaciteit. Het plan voor interne prestatiebudgetten werd afgeblazen 
en hierdoor verloor het CMI haar betekenis. In het algemeen waren de respondenten 
het eens met de stelling dat het CMI toegevoegde waarde had, zowel voor henzelf als 
voor de organisatie. Het CMI werd vooral relevant geacht in de context van de huidige 
marktconcurrentie en financiële druk.
 
Het is moeilijk exact vast te stellen wat de precieze effecten van het CMI zijn geweest 
voor de gebruiker en de organisatie. Uit de uitgebreide interim- en eindreflecties 
kunnen wij echter wel afleiden dat door het CMI de beschikbare informatie met 
betrekking tot patiëntengroepen aanzienlijk is toegenomen en verbeterd en dat deze 
informatie heeft bijgedragen aan de verbetering van de verschillende fasen van de 
strategische managementcyclus. Hoewel de waargenomen effecten van het CMI per 
manager verschilden, kan worden geconcludeerd dat het CMI heeft bijgedragen aan het 
identificeren van mogelijke case-mix veranderingen, het verbeteren van de dialoog over 
patiëntenzorg, meer kostenbewustzijn en kostenbesparing, een verbeterde registratie van 
diagnoses en zorgactiviteiten, een grotere waardering voor het werk van de managers en 
betere tariefstellingen (DBC’s uit het A-segment). Er werden echter geen belangrijke 
case-mix beslissingen genomen op basis van het CMI. Naast de (gepercipieerde) slechte 
kwaliteit van de gegevens was dit waarschijnlijk te wijten aan barrières zoals: het gebrek 
aan vaardigheden en kennis, het ontbreken van beslissingsbevoegdheid, de aanhoudende 
complexiteit en de volatiliteit van de DBC-systeem, de bestaande organisatiestructuur 
/cultuur en juridische belemmeringen. De respondenten rapporteerden ook negatieve 
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effecten van het CMI, zoals verwarring en discussie over data, informatie overload en 
selectief en onjuist gebruik van de informatie. 
Over het algemeen beschouwden de respondenten het CMI-project als gematigd 
succesvol voor hen persoonlijk en als (zeer) succesvol voor de organisatie. De reden 
dat de respondenten het CMI succesvoller beschouwden voor de organisatie dan voor 
henzelf moet waarschijnlijk gezocht worden in het feit dat zij het CMI voor meerdere 
doeleinden en voor de hele organisatie bruikbaar vonden, dus niet alleen binnen hun 
eigen divisie maar ook daarbuiten. Bovendien was de algemene opvatting dat een 
CMI nodig is in tijden van marktconcurrentie en financiële druk. Al met al werden 
de positieve effecten van het instrument zwaarder gewogen dan de negatieve effecten. 
Echter, het gepercipieerde succes van het CMI project verschilde sterk per manager.
De onderzoeksperiode zelf was een relevante contextuele factor voor deze casestudie, 
omdat het een belangrijke invloed had op het resultaat. Het onderzoek vond net na 
de hervormingen in de gezondheidszorg plaats, waaronder de invoering van een 
nieuwe bekostigingssystematiek, productstructuur (DBC en DOT) en de liberalisering 
van de zorg. Het was een mix van een complexe interne omgeving en een chaotische 
buitenwereld. Verschillende organisatorische en omgevingsvariabelen waren gedurende 
de onderzoeksperiode dan ook uiterst instabiel en onvoorspelbaar. Uiteindelijk is de 
marktwerking van de ziekenhuiszorg niet echt van de grond gekomen. Dientengevolge 
veranderden de doelstellingen van het CMI tijdens het onderzoek, net als het 
basismateriaal voor het ontwerpen van het CMI, zoals de DBC-data, databronnen 
en definities. Deze factoren compliceerden het ontwerp van het CMI en hadden als 
gevolg dat sommige doelen van het CMI - zoals het daadwerkelijk nemen van case-mix 
beslissingen en budgettering - niet volledig konden worden bereikt en onderzocht.
Om de toepasbaarheid van onze onderzoeksresultaten voor andere ziekenhuizen te 
beoordelen, hebben wij de Portfoliomatrix van het AMC bij een geselecteerd aantal 
medische specialismen van het Universitair Medisch Centrum Groningen (UMCG) en 
het Vrije Universitair Medisch Centrum (VUmc) herontworpen en geïmplementeerd. 
De vergelijkingen tussen de drie UMC’s toonden enkele interessante overeenkomsten 
en verschillen. De overeenkomsten waren dat de Portfoliomatrix als een krachtig 
hulpmiddel werd beschouwd omdat het de case-mix op een eenvoudige manier 
presenteerde en bijdroeg aan de dialoog over case-mix beslissingen. Echter, in het 
ontwerp en implementatie van de Portfoliomatrices werden andere keuzes gemaakt. De 
verschillen werden bepaald door verschillen in bestuur, organisatiecultuur, de kwaliteit 
van de gegevens en de positie op de zorgmarkt. Al die elementen hadden impact op de 
inhoud van het CMI en de ontwikkeling en toepassing ervan. Hoewel in het ontwerp en 
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de implementatie van de Portfoliomatrix verschillende keuzes werden gemaakt, kan dit 
onderdeel van het CMI in een breed scala van academische gezondheidszorginstellingen 
worden geïmplementeerd.
Deze casestudie draagt  op verschillende manieren bij aan de management accounting 
discipline en heeft een aantal praktische implicaties. In de eerste plaats hebben wij 
door dit onderzoek gedetailleerde kennis gekregen over de mogelijke voordelen van 
een CMI in de context van Nederlandse UMC’s. Wij hebben laten zien dat de (DBC-
gebaseerde) marktmechanismen een drijvende kracht voor de UMC’s kunnen zijn om 
hun organisatie te veranderen. Maar er zijn ook kenmerken van marktmechanismen die 
het veranderingsproces van management accounting en het succes van een CMI kunnen 
verminderen of zelfs belemmeren. Ten tweede was dit onderzoek gericht op zowel het 
ontwerp als de implementatie van een CMI, terwijl eerder accounting onderzoek vooral 
gericht was op de implementatie van een reeds ontworpen CMI. Dit heeft geleid tot 
nieuwe kennis over het ontwerp van CMI’s. Door middel van continue iteraties in de 
reflecterende cyclus, kregen wij gedetailleerde kennis over welke soorten en combinaties 
van informatie nuttig zijn voor wie en hoe het informatiesysteem op een verantwoorde 
wijze kan worden geïmplementeerd. De studie toont aan hoe een CMI meerdere 
functies voor meerdere gebruikers tegelijkertijd kan vervullen. Uit het onderzoek zijn 
ook de voor- en nadelen naar voren gekomen van het zelf ontwerpen van een CMI 
door een UMC. Ten derde werden de resultaten en de factoren die bijdragen aan het 
succes van een CMI tot in detail bestudeerd, zowel met kwalitatieve als kwantitatieve 
methoden. Dientengevolge werden inzichten verkregen in de factoren die het succes 
van een CMI bevorderen of belemmeren en de manieren waarop weerstanden kunnen 
worden verminderd. Tot slot concluderen wij dat het ontwerp en de implementatie van 
een CMI moet worden gebaseerd op wetenschappelijk en praktijkgericht bewijs. Om 
dit te bewerkstelligen, is de opgedane ontwerpgerichte kennis vertaald in praktische 
richtlijnen voor een succesvolle implementatie van een CMI in Nederlandse universitaire 
medische centra. De richtlijnen zijn bedoeld voor ziekenhuismanagers (Raad van 
Bestuur, afdelingshoofden, projectmanagers en IT-managers) en (internationale) 
regelgevers die directe of indirecte invloed kunnen hebben op het succes van CMI’s in 
ziekenhuizen (het Ministerie van Volksgezondheid, het Ministerie van Onderwijs en 
andere zorginstanties, zoals de NZa en ACM).
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Appendix 1: Examples of the Standard Report Patient Care
The Standard Report Patient Care was designed for top (medical) managers in order to 
provide insight into the developments of the most relevant topics of patient care (see 
Section 7.3.1). The Report consisted of six chapters: Volumes, Patient characteristics, 
Producion, Process, Finance and Health Care Market and was available at three levels: 
corporate (one), division (eight) and medical (sub) specialties (forty-seven). In total, the 
Report contained 39 different figures. Most figures consisted of an explanation (about 
data sources, definitions, how to use it), a graph, and a data table. In this Appendix, 
several examples of the graphs are presented and explained.
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Examples from chapter 1:  Volumes
This chapter provided information about volumes of care products and patients. The 
volumes were presented in different ways like trends (past twenty-four months), forecast, 
the distinction between new and existing patients, and non-focus points, etc. In total, 
this chapter contained six different figures. 
Figure 1.1 shows the actual and forecasted number of DBCs in the 
current year. The actual number of initial DBCs can be compared with 
the previous year. At the corporate level, the forecasted number of DBCs 
can be compared with agreements with health insurers and can give rise 
to increase or decrease volumes. 
Figure 1.2 shows the number of DBCs started in the previous 
twelve months, broken down by initial and follow-up DBCs. The 
number of initial DBCs relates to patients with a new demand for 
care, the number of follow-up DBCs are existing demands for 
care. 
Figure 1.3 shows per month (x-axis) the number of opened DBCs (y-
axis), broken down by type of focus point and non-focus point (in dark 
blue). It gives insight as to whether the intended strategic aims are 
realized. 
Figure 1.4 shows, for the type of diagnosis / treatments where 
minimum volumes have been defined by the professional and / 
or health insurance, the forecast of volumes in 2013 versus the 
minimum volumes. If the forecasts of volumes are higher than 
the minimum volumes, the color is green, or otherwise red. 
(*) All figures contain fictitious data 
Figure 1.1: Actual and forcasted number of DBCs (*)
Figure 1.3: Volumes per focus point and non-focus point (*) Figure 1.4: Realization minimum volumes  surgery (*)
Figure 1.2: Number of initial and follow-up DBCs (*)
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Examples from chapter 2: Patient characteristics
This chapter provided information about the characteristics of the patients treated, 
such as travel distance to the hospital, age, referrer, and number of medical specialties 
involved. These characteristics were selected because they could be indicators for 
complexity of care. In total, this chapter contained six different figures. Below, some 
examples of the graphs are presented and explained. 
Figure 2.1 shows what kind of physicians had referred patients to the 
AMC: general practitioners, other hospitals, internal referrers, etc. These 
data were also used to determine the percentage of top referral care. 
Figure 2.2 shows the average travel distance of the patients. It 
provides insight into the origin of the patients for whom, over the 
past twelve months, a DBC has been started. The travel distance 
is broken down into the following categories: Amsterdam South 
East, region Amsterdam, region Northwest Netherlands, other 
parts of the Netherlands. 
Figure 2.3 shows a map of the Netherlands with the residences of all 
patients for which one or more DTC had been started in the last twelve 
months. The color shows per municipality the number of patients. There 
was also a map included in this chapter which reflected the changes in 
patients per year per municipality. 
In Figure 2.4, the average number of different treating DBC 
specialties per patient group are displayed. It gives an indication 
of the degree of comorbidity and the interrelationship with other 
specialties within or outside the division. 
(*) All figures contain fictitious data 
Figure 2.1: Type of referring physician  (*)
 Figure 2.3: Map with residences of patient (*) Figure 2.4 : # of medical specialties involved (*)
 Figure 2.2: Travel distance patients (*)
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Examples of chapter 3: Production
This chapter provided information about the key production of the policlinic – 
clinic, operating room, and intensive care – such as number of outpatient visits, (day) 
admissions, nursing days, and operating time. It gave insight into what production 
was done and how it was divided between organizational levels and/or patient groups. 
In total, this chapter contained three different figures. Most figures consisted of an 
explanation (about data sources, definitions, how to use it), a graph, and a data table. 
Below, some examples of the graphs are presented and explained.
Figure 3.1 shows the cumulative key production of the current year, such 
as number of outpatient visits, (day) admissions, nursing days, duration 
of surgery. It provided insight into what capacity had been deployed so 
far and how this was divided among patient groups. It could be examined 
to what extent the use of capacity was in line with the priorities. This 
information could also be used for planning purposes. 
Figure 3.2 shows the key production per month, such as number 
of outpatient visits, (day) admissions, nursing days, and duration 
of surgery. It provided insight into the volume trends in the key 
production. 
(*) All figures contain fictitious data 
Figure 3.1: Key production per patient group (*)  Figure 3.2: Key production per month (*)
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Examples from chapter 4: Process
This chapter provided information about the process of care such as average length of 
stay, average number of outpatient visits, and waiting times for the outpatient clinic and 
surgery. In total, this chapter contained nine different figures. Most figures consisted of 
an explanation (about data sources, definitions, how to use it), a graph, and a data table. 
Below, some examples of the graphs are presented and explained.
Figure 4.1 shows the average number of visits per outpatient, measured 
over a period of twelve months. The measurement period is increasingly 
shifted one month so that the volume trend in the course of time is 
visible. 
Figure 4.2 shows the average length of stay of patients in clinical 
days over the course of time. The average length of stay was 
measured over a period of twelve months. The measurement 
period is increasingly shifted one month so that the volume trend 
in the course of time is visible. 
In Figure 4.3, the average waiting time for first outpatient clinic 
consultation is shown. The objective of the AMC is that the average 
waiting time is no longer than fourteen days for treatments that should 
be carried out at the AMC. 
In Figure 4.4, the average waiting time for surgery is displayed in 
weeks. The waiting time refers to the time measured between the 
application date and the date of surgery. For oncological surgery, 
the objective is that within three weeks after completion of the 
preliminary investigation, surgery should have taken place. 
(*) All figures contain fictitious data 
Figure 4.1: Average number of outpatient visits (*)
Figure 4.3: Average outpatient waiting time per patient 
group (*)
Figure 4.4: average waiting times for surgery per patient 
group (*)
Figure 4.2: Length of stay per patient group (*)
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Examples from chapter5: Finance
Chapter five provides financial information about the patient groups and underlying 
care products, such as costs, returns, top five profitable/ unprofitable care products, 
and types of costs. In total, this chapter contained fifteen different figures. Most figures 
consisted of an explanation (about data sources, definitions, how to use it), a graph, 
and a data table. Below, some examples of the graphs are presented and explained. 
In Figure 5.1, the total costs and revenues of the validated DBC care 
products and billable procedures are shown by month. It provides insight 
into the financial coverage over the course of time. The trend of the 
average cost can provide insight into what the possible effects on the cost 
are of efficiency measures, such as reduction in number of hospital days, 
outpatient consultations, and diagnosis per patient. 
Figure 5.2 represents the cumulative cost of the DBCs, broken 
down by types of costs like outpatient clinic, clinic, medicines, 
laboratory, imaging, etc. It shows what kind of costs has been 
made for a specific department or patient group so far. It can be 
used as a starting point for defining efficiency measures. 
Figure 5.3 shows the timeliness and completeness of the DBC 
registration in the current year. It concerns the proportion of DBCs 
whose diagnosis and referrer are registered by the physicians. These 
insights can be used to improve the registration and speeding up of 
billing. 
In Figure 5.4, the cumulative internal transfer costs for the use of 
laboratory and imaging of the current year are shown broken 
down by patient group. It can be used as a starting point for 
defining measures to reduce the application of laboratory and 
imaging by physicians. 
 (*) All figures contain fictitious data 
Figure 4.2: Length of stay per patient group (*) Figure 5.1: Financial coverage per month (*)
Figure 5.3: Quality of the registration (*)
Figure 5.2: Cost types per patient group (*)
Figure 5.4: Transfer costs per patient group (*)
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Example from chapter 6: Health care market
This chapter provided information about market shares per medical specialty or patient 
groups in the region or the whole country. In total, this chapter contained two different 
figures. Below, one example of the graphs is presented and explained.
In this figure, the market share per patient group is displayed based on the number of DBCs started. The figures are 
based on the national Dutch hospital data (DIS). The figure shows both the market share of the AMC compared to 
other university medical centers and compared to all hospitals in the Netherlands. These insights an can, for example, 
be used for determination of the portfolio strategy and negotiations with insurers.
(*) Figure contains fictitious data 
Figure 6.1: Market share per patient group (*)
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